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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of justice, in all its dimensions1, is one of the most ancient and complex 
notions that surround humanity. Yet, crimes and mass atrocities have accompanied 
mankind from the beginning of times. Criminal conduct has been met with different 
responses, taking various forms, most of which are claimed to fit within the concept of 
“justice”. Theories of justice have emerged as rationales behind responses to mass crimes, 
each bearing consequences on the architecture of different legal systems2.  
 
The search for justice in the context of international crimes and mass human rights 
violations has gained much attention in international legal scholarship in recent decades3. 
In large part, this scholarship has been underpinned by a conceptual dichotomy between 
punishment of offenders on the one hand, and reparation4 for victims on the other: the 
dominant assumption has been that human rights law encompasses redress for victims of 
human rights violations5 while international criminal law has traditionally focused on the 
                                                      
1 See e.g. Amartya Sen, “Global Justice: Beyond International Equity”, in I. Kaul (ed.), 
Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, New York, UNDP, 1999 (for 
the concept of justice as a global public good). Other guiding works on the notion of justice 
include: D.D. Raphael, Concepts of Justice, Oxford University Press, 2003; Judith N. Shklar, The 
Faces of Injustice, Yale University Press, 1992; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard 
University Press, 1971. 
2 See inter alia, Luke Moffett, Justice for Victims before the International Criminal Court, 
Routledge, 2014, pp. 12-17. 
3 See generally, Steven Ratner, Jason Abrams, and James Bischoff, Accountability for 
Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, Oxford University 
Press, 2009, 3rd ed.; William Driscoll et al., The International Criminal Court: Global Politics and 
the Quest for Justice, International Debate Education Association, 2004. See also, Steven R. Ratner 
et al., Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law, Oxford University Press, 
1997; Antonio Cassese, “On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of 
Breaches of International Humanitarian Law”, European Journal of International Law 9 (1998), p. 
2. 
4 Reparations include “restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees 
of non-repetition”, see Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147 U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 2006). See 
also, ICJ, Case concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of 
the Congo), Judgment, 30 November 2010, Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, paras 
209-212.  The terms “redress” and “reparation” will be used interchangeably throughout this 
dissertation. 
5 See Thomas M. Antkowiak, “Remedial Approaches to Human Rights Violations: The 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Beyond”, 46 Columbia Journal Of Transnational Law 
351 (2008) (examining the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and 
European Court of Human Rights and noting that human rights mechanisms concern obtaining 
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criminal liability and the punishment of perpetrators6. The dichotomy between criminal 
dimensions– including the criminal process, prosecution and punishment of the accused – 
and civil dimensions – including civil remedies and reparations for victims – has 
traditionally been present in international justice. 
 
Dealing with the aftermath of conflicts and mass victimisation imposes difficult 
questions regarding the kind of response one ought to give to these crimes. In international 
criminal law, the guiding notion of justice (as in ‘international criminal justice’) has 
undergone a noteworthy refinement process. At its inception, the concept of justice 
involved the notion of accountability and punishment of the offender. More recently, 
international criminal law discourse embraces the notion of ‘justice for victims’ as a goal 
of international criminal justice7. Scholars have claimed that ‘justice for victims’ is one of 
the tenets of the international criminal justice enterprise8. Similarly, victims were said to be 
“both the reason for and objective of international criminal justice”9. But what is the 
meaning and scope of “justice for victims” of international crimes, and are criminal 
prosecution and punishment of perpetrators sufficient to deliver justice for victims?   
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
reparation from States and not from criminal offenders). See also, Dinah Shelton, Remedies in 
International Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 2005. 
6 See generally Robert Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and 
Procedure, Cambridge University Press (2007). 
7 See e.g. ICTY Annual Report to the General Assembly, A/50/365-S/1995/728, 1995, paras. 
198-199; Statement of the ICC Deputy Prosecutor in the opening of the Prosecutor’s case in 
Katanga and Chui, “ICC Cases and Opportunity for Communities in Ituri to Come Together and 
Move Forward”, ICC-OTP-20080627-PR332), 27 June 2008.  
8 Luke Moffett has recently written extensively on the notion of “justice for victims” and 
reparations for international crimes. His work has been inspirational for the analysis of this thesis, 
see inter alia Luke Moffett, Justice for Victims before the International Criminal Court, Routledge, 
2014; Luke Moffett, “Meaningful and Effective? Considering Victims Interests Through 
Participation at the International Criminal Court”, Criminal Law Forum; vol. 26 (2), 2015, 255-
289; Luke Moffett, “Elaborating Justice for Victims at the International Criminal Court : Beyond 
Rhetoric and The Hague”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 13 (2), 2015, 281-311; 
Luke Moffett, “Realising justice for victims before the International Criminal Court”, International 
Crimes Database, 2014; Luke Moffett, “Reparative Complementarity : ensuring an Effective 
Remedy for Victims in the Reparation Regime of the International Criminal Court”, International 
Journal of Human Rights, vol. 17 (3), 2013, 368-390. 
9 Cited in Emily Haslam, “Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: A 
Triumph of Hope Over Experience”, in D. McGoldrick (ed.), The Permanent International 
Criminal Court, Hart, 2004, 315-334, p. 316 (statement of former French Minister of Justice 
Elizabeth Guigou). 
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New developments in international law, both at the international level and in the 
domestic sphere, have begun to blur the apparent normative, doctrinal and practical civil/ 
criminal divide between the prosecution and punishment of individual perpetrators of 
international crimes on the one hand, and civil remedies including reparation for victims of 
those crimes, on the other. In relation to international crimes and mass atrocities, this 
divide has been characterized by the total separation of criminal processes and remedies 
(pursued in the international plane by international or hybrid criminal tribunals), and civil 
claims and remedies (pursued inter alia through inter-State agreements, mass claims 
processes, human rights mechanisms or civil claims before domestic courts10). Thus the 
criminal/ civil separation meant that international justice equated with international (or 
hybrid) criminal tribunals pursuing the criminal process (through the prosecution and 
eventual punishment of perpetrators), completely divorced of notions of non-criminal 
claims, such as civil remedies and reparations, and excluding victims redress from the 
equation. 
 
In the international plane, the advent of the Rome Statute for the International 
Criminal Court11 brought about a change in the traditional conception of international 
justice, and in the role of victims therein. More specifically, the Statute provides for the 
possibility, within the same proceedings in a given case, both for a criminal dimension – 
investigation, prosecution and the eventual punishment of perpetrators of international 
crimes12 (encompassing retribution, accountability and the fight against impunity) - and 
also a civil dimension – encompassing civil remedies through reparation for victims13  
(embracing the concept of restorative and reparative justice)14.  
                                                      
10 See generally on the topic of reparations, Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International 
Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press, 3rd ed. 2015. 
11 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 was adopted 
on July 17, 1998. It came into force on July 1st, 2002 (hereinafter: “Rome Statute” or “ICC 
Statute”) and it established the International Criminal Court (hereinafter: “ICC”).  
12 The jurisdiction of the ICC over international crimes is limited to genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression, see Rome Statute, art. 8. The definition of 
international crimes for the purpose of this thesis is further defined in the ‘Introduction’.  
13 See Rome Statute, art. 75. See also, Claude Jorda & Jerome de Hamptinne, “The Status 
and Role of the Victims”, in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, 
Antonio Cassese et al. (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 1387-1388. 
14 For a discussion on the inclusion of this principle within the ICC, see Linda M. Keller, 
“Seeking Justice at the International Criminal Court: Victims’ Reparations”, Thomas Jefferson Law 
Review 29 (2006-2007), p. 189. See also, Claude Jorda & Jerome de Hemptinne, ibid.   
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At the domestic level, in additional to civil claims for reparations brought before 
domestic courts, claims for civil remedies on the basis of the doctrine of universal 
jurisdiction have also been pursued as an avenue for bridging the gap between the criminal 
and civil dimensions of justice for international crimes. The scope of the doctrine of 
universal criminal jurisdiction is still in the process of formation15, and this development 
“advances in the face of crimes which affect the ‘essence of humanity’ and call for 
repression and justice”16. Similarly, while victims’ right to reparation for crimes he/she 
suffered is well-established under international law17, as will be further discussed in this 
study, and whereas in most domestic systems, a perpetrator of a crime will often not only 
be subject to criminal proceedings, but may also face civil action brought by the injured 
party (through a tort system or another form of civil liability system), the civil dimension 
of universal jurisdiction is still in early stages of development under international law18.  
 
Against this backdrop, this dissertation focuses on the development of reparations for 
victims in international criminal law and thus looks into the emerging civil dimension of 
international criminal justice. The conception of “civil dimension” in this study includes 
reparation or redress to victims of international crimes and it is juxtaposed to a criminal 
dimension in the sense of criminal investigations and prosecutions. This study considers 
whether international criminal justice should be concerned with a civil dimension 
concerning reparations for victims. It also asks what features make it a “civil” dimension 
as opposed to a “criminal” or “public/administrative”? Importantly, it raises questions as to 
the usefulness and implications of adding a civil dimension to international justice (e.g. 
burden proof, procedural status, duties of Judges). Ultimately, are we moving towards a 
blend of the two dimensions in international criminal procedure, or a sui generis model 
                                                      
15 See e.g. with regard to the realm of crimes for which universal jurisdiction can be 
exercised: Africa Legal Aid, The Cairo-Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of 
Gross Human Rights Offences (2002), where it is affirmed that, in addition to crimes currently 
recognised under international law for the application of universal jurisdiction, other crimes having 
major economic, social, or cultural consequences should also be subject to universal jurisdiction. 
16 Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind: Towards a New 
Jus Gentium, Nijhoff, 2010, p. 385. 
17 See Chapters I and II. 
18 See Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, “The Emerging Recognition of Universal 
Civil Jurisdiction”, American Journal of International Law 100 (2006), p. 142. . See also a deeper 
discussion under chapter 5 of the present study. 
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altogether? The research also explores how this civil dimension is best shaped and how it 
should further develop. These questions underlie the whole analysis of this study, and are 
addressed directly in the chapters of this thesis or implicitly.   
 
To discuss the theme of reparations for victims of international crimes, and related 
questions described above, this dissertation analyses various systems operating at the 
national and international levels, as well as their approach to victims’ reparation for 
international crimes. Based on international and domestic experiences, case studies and 
general criminal law theories, this study provides an original approach to the study of 
reparation in international criminal law and a fresh analysis of the reparations system at the 
ICC.  
 
This study frames the analysis on a specific paradigm: individuals versus individuals; 
that is, it focuses on the development of a duty of individual perpetrators (who are the 
object of international criminal justice) to give reparations to victims of international 
crimes. Any other concepts falling outside this paradigm are not the main focus of this 
study and may only be addressed in passing to support an argument. 
 
The theme underlying this study is particularly broad – reparations for international 
crimes - and cuts across diverse research questions, methodologies, disciplines, and fields 
of law. The goal of this study is not to address every single legal question related to the 
overall theme of reparations for international crimes, and through every singles 
methodology or angle. Choices had to be made to craft the research and analysis contained 
in this dissertation, and to give it a unique voice. As such, this project has specific 
purposes, addresses precise research questions and follows a focused paradigm, as 
described in the next sections. Many related concepts and issues might have thus been 
excluded from the scope of this study. Each chapter of this dissertation attempts to 
contribute to the overall research objectives, and focuses on one (or more) research 
question(s) that connect through the thematic fabric to address the research aims. In sum, 
this thesis attempts to engage with the problem statement of the thesis and the research 
questions, which are further elaborated in the next section; it does not propose answers to 
all questions referring to reparations to victims, but rather provides a lens through which 
some of these questions can be examined. The author also acknowledges that this is an area 
of law in constant development and that the analysis contained in this thesis address the 
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state of knowledge in the field from one particular angle. Finally, the subject of justice, 
victimization, and reparation for mass atrocities and heinous crimes is a very sensitive one 
and present complex dimensions that go beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
I.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND CLAIMS 
 
In general terms, the purpose of this research is to inquire into the emerging civil 
dimension of international criminal law both at national and international levels.  
 
By civil dimension, it is meant the dimension that concerns civil remedies relating to 
international crimes and more specifically reparation for victims of those crimes. The main 
distinctions between the “civil” and the “criminal” dimensions for purposes of this study is 
that a criminal dimension focuses on criminal processes and remedies whereas a civil 
dimension focuses on reparations for victims.  
 
On further elaboration, underlying this thesis is also the question of whether an 
individualized approach to reparations for international crimes is always preferable to the 
state-based approach that has historically existed to deal with reparations for international 
crimes. In this sense, this dissertation questions whether such an individualized approach to 
reparations could be a mismatch with the collective nature of international crimes. 
International criminal law rests on the premise that individuals should be held criminally 
accountable for international crimes they commit, but should this approach be transposed 
when it comes to reparations for victims? In other words, should the individualized 
approach that international criminal law proposes for reparations for victims be adopted, 
and what is the legal basis for imposing duties of reparations directly on individuals? If 
international criminal justice is to place a duty of reparation directly on individuals, what is 
the content of this duty (which may be different from state duties to repair), and how can it 
be operationalized? 
 




v Should international criminal justice be concerned with reparation for victims 
of international crimes? Specifically, is the blend of civil and criminal 
dimensions a desirable model in international criminal law, and if so, why?  
 
This overarching research inquiry also presents a number of additional related 
research questions, which are generally addressed in specific chapters of this study that 
build upon each other and connect together to provide the analytical fabric of this thesis. 
The related sub-questions are as follows: 
 
1. What is the legal basis of a legal duty of reparation on individual 
perpetrators? Is the individualized approach to reparation always better and 
more progressive than a State-based approach to reparation? Which justice 
theory(s) can provide the theoretical framework for the development of a civil 
dimension of international criminal justice? Chapter one of this study 
overviews different theories of justice and how they can inform the civil 
dimension of international criminal law. This chapter also traces the evolution 
of different dichotomies the legal duty to provide reparations and the right to 
reparation: from perspectives of State versus State, to State versus individual, 
to individual versus individual. This chapter also traces the development of a 
duty to repair for individual perpetrators alongside States’ duty to repair. 
 
2. What is the content and scope of a duty to repair for individuals? To what 
extent can principles and the case law on the duty of States to provide 
reparations inform the duty to repair for individuals? Chapter two attempts to 
address these questions through the lens of a case study of the jurisprudence 
on reparations of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and how it can 
inform the development of the content of a duty to repair for individuals. 
 
3. Are international criminal trials compatible with the adjudication and awards 
of reparation for international crimes? Should international criminal trials 
encompass a civil dimension for victims? How do different 
international/hybrid courts and tribunals compare and contrast in regards to 
reparations for victims? How can the civil dimension of international criminal 
justice operationalize within the setting of international criminal tribunals? 
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Chapter three dwells upon the operationalization of the civil dimension of 
international criminal justice within different international criminal tribunals.  
 
4. Should reparations for international crimes be dealt with by another 
mechanism, such as an international administrative mechanism (linked with a 
judicial mechanism)? What role can international administrative mechanisms 
play in relation to reparations for victims of international crimes? Chapter 
four examines these questions through the lens of the ICC Trust Fund for 
Victims (“TFV”) as a case study. 
 
5. Are domestic courts better placed to deal with reparations for international 
crimes? What role should domestic courts play in relation to reparations for 
victims of international crimes? Can the doctrine of universal jurisdiction that 
may justify domestic prosecution of international crimes include a civil 
dimension of reparation for victims? Chapter five addresses the role of 
domestic courts in the adjudication and award of reparations through 
examples and case studies, including a discussion of the principle of universal 
civil jurisdiction. 
   
This study fits within a wider range of related themes and inquiries concerning 
victimhood and critical analysis of criminal justice reparations for victims. In pursuing my 
analysis, I will look at some tangential questions such as: what other effects may adding a 
civil dimension to international criminal justice have on current trends? For instance, can it 
counterbalance the prioritization of victims? We currently see that there are certain 
archetypes of victims, such as children and sexual violence victims, particularly women. Is 
it proper to differentiate and prioritize and how does the civil dimension of criminal justice 
influence these dynamics? Further in this vein, some overarching themes present in my 
analysis concern the collective versus the individual and perceptions/constructions of 
victimhood.  
 
In discussing the operationalization of this duty of reparation in the international 
criminal law context, this dissertation also engages with critical scholarship pertaining to 
the detrimental effects that criminal justice may produce for victims. For instance, although 
guarantees of non-repetition, the right to reparation and the right to truth may apply to the 
 20 
ICC as an institution, they may need to be applied in a differentiated manner in concrete 
trials given that there are competing rights of the defence and the potential of further 
victimization. This dissertation accordingly dwells upon whether the differentiated 
application of victims’ rights in criminal contexts might ultimately be an argument against 
mixing criminal with civil processes. This dissertation concludes with a summary of the 
analysis of the research questions and related inquiries, bringing together the key themes 
discussed in the different chapters, and offers some recommendations. 
 
Throughout the analysis contained in the dissertation, it is posited that the 
architecture of international criminal justice cannot be grounded solely on a criminal 
dimension concerning the trial and punishment of the offender, without attaching a role for 
victims. Such vision of international criminal justice rests upon a synergy of efforts at 
international and national levels. The chapters of this thesis attempt to reflect on and justify 
these claims. 
 
II. RESEARCH GOALS 
 
The main purpose of this research project is to launch an inquiry into the emerging 
civil dimension of international criminal law (which as stated above, in contrast to the 
criminal dimension, focuses on reparation for victims) both at national and international 
levels. There may be other aspects of the “civil” dimension, in addition to reparation for 
victims; however, such aspects are not focus of this study, and will not be dealt with in this 
dissertation. The ultimate goal of this project is to address how international criminal 
justice should develop in relation to civil redress for victims of international crimes.  
There are two conceptual parameters within this project which guide its direction and 
inform its analysis: first, this project concerns international criminal law, thus, 
conceptually, proceedings against individuals, and not States; secondly, it concerns the 
civil dimension (i.e. reparation/ redress for victims, or “damages” in domestic courts 
terminology, see further below) of international criminal justice. As such, criminal 
accountability and criminal prosecutions will not be the main focus of this project. In 




For this purpose, this study will examine, compare and contrast three analytical 
frameworks for the adjudication of the civil dimensions of international crimes. The 
analysis starts the first framework from a theoretical and conceptual discussion of theories 
of justice grounding the right of victims to reparation juxtaposed with the development of a 
duty of reparation imposed directly on individuals.  In order to build the theoretical 
foundations for the examination that will then follow, it will be necessary to address a 
theoretical question concerning the dichotomy between criminal punishment and 
reparation within the notion of justice. I address the relationship between punishment and 
reparation and their impact on victims, offenders and societies in general, in a theoretical 
perspective. The theoretical foundation of this thesis is pursued mainly in the first two 
chapters: chapter one discusses theories of justice and inquires upon the legal basis of the 
duty of reparation for individuals; and chapter two discusses the contents of a duty to 
repair for individuals, as well as the extent to which case law pertaining to the contents of 
duties to repair for States can be transposed19.  
 
After this theoretical discussion, the first framework concerns the adjudication of 
civil claims within the international criminal process and deals with the evolving 
approaches to reparations before international criminal courts and tribunals. For this 
purpose, this dissertation studies international criminal justice institutions, not with a view 
to purely describe each institution but rather to compare their models (i.e. international 
criminal trials with only a criminal function and the international criminal process 
encompassing a civil dimension). Thus, chapter three addresses the operationalization of 
duties to repair within the setting of international criminal courts and tribunals. 
 
In the second analytical framework, beginning at chapter four, I propose to examine 
the contribution of administrative mechanisms at the international level, which are linked 
to legal processes. This will be done through the lens of the Trust Fund for Victims (linked 
to the ICC), which is a relevant model, to examine whether similar models could be 
applied in the international criminal law context. In this part, I examine the advantages and 
disadvantages of concentrating civil redress claims in administrative mechanisms. I will 
also posit whether a novel administrative mechanism should be created at the international 
level to deal with civil claims resulting from international crimes.  
                                                      
19 This inquiry will be carried out through a case study of the experience of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. 
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The third analytical framework of this research concerns the civil dimension of 
international criminal law at the national level and is developed in chapter five. It looks at 
an alternative model for claims for reparations for victims of international crimes: before 
domestic courts on the basis of an extension of the doctrine of universal civil jurisdiction to 
encompass civil suits. In this framework, the dissertation examines selected transnational 
tort litigation that focuses on individual versus individual and questions whether a 
transnational torts litigation model provides an alternative avenue, and discusses a critical 
perspective on including a civil dimension to universal jurisdiction. In this part, I examine 
the role that national courts play in the adjudication of civil claims relating to international 
crimes. I also consider the possibilities that exist for civil litigation pertaining to 
international crimes  within domestic courts.  
 
At the conclusion of this project, I hope to be able to critique a purely criminal 
function of international justice with respect to international crimes. In this manner, I hope 
to be able to sustain the claim that international criminal justice should encompass a civil 
dimension in addition to its criminal function. Nevertheless, it may be pondered that the 
focus for the progressive development of this civil dimension should be on the building of 
a stronger domestic civil litigation framework pertaining to reparation for international 
crimes, and further development (or empowerment) of international administrative 
mechanisms linked to legal processes. This study differentiates between post-conflict 
context, armed conflict context, and peace time context in the conclusion.  
 
In sum, the research goals are to analyse and critique a purely criminal function of 
international criminal justice and examine possibilities of a greater emphasis on victim 
reparation for international crimes through alternative avenues such as national courts and 
administrative mechanisms entertaining civil claims pertaining to international crimes. 
III.  METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS 
This study applies a number of methodologies in analysing the research questions. 
Overall, this dissertation uses descriptive, theoretical, comparative and normative 
approaches to examine the research questions and propose different paths in which 
international criminal justice should develop as regards reparations for victims of 
international crimes.  
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More specifically, the present study first relies on descriptive and theoretical 
methodologies to examine theories of justice and the role of reparation in criminal justice 
systems. It also relies on a doctrinal analysis of the right to reparation and the legal basis of 
a duty of reparation imposed on individuals in international criminal law. Then, descriptive 
and comparative methodologies are employed to compare and contrast the models of 
justice devised by different international criminal tribunals and the approach to reparations 
for international crimes taken by domestic systems  at the national level.  
 
To analyse the research questions proposed above, and in line with the research goals 
herein described, this project is organized and divided into three analytical frameworks as 
already outlined above. The frameworks contribute to the overall aim of the project which, 
as stated above, consists of examining the civil dimension of international criminal justice. 
While a more complete description of each chapter is provided below, the three main 
frameworks are:  
 
1) Civil dimension of international criminal justice within the international criminal 
process: After discussing the legal basis and the contents of a legal duty to repair imposed 
on individuals, this analytical framework examines the approach of different international 
criminal jurisdictions on a spectrum view in relation to their approach to victims’ 
reparation. In this view, this study focuses on the permanent International Criminal Court, 
the ad hoc international criminal tribunals (for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda), the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”), and other hybrid 
mechanisms. This analytical framework compares and contrasts the ways in which each of 
the criminal jurisdictions analysed treats the question of victim reparation, from a 
minimalist approach, at one end of the spectrum, to an approach where victims have a right 
to reparation within the process, at the other end of the spectrum. 
 
2) Civil dimension of international criminal justice as part of administrative procedures 
linked to legal processes: The second analytical framework on which this study focuses 
refers to claiming reparation for international crimes as part of administrative procedures 
linked with judicial processes.  In this regard, it uses the primary example of the Trust 
Funds for Victims at the ICC as a case-study. The purpose of this analytical framework is 
to examine the pioneering mechanism of the Trust Fund linked to the ICC judicial 
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procedures and to assess whether this is a normatively compelling way forward in the 
pursuit of reparations for victims of international crimes. This analytical framework will be 
specific in that it is focused on the Trust Fund for Victims as a case-study, but it will also  
serve as a window into broader questions. 
 
3) Civil dimension of international criminal law in domestic civil litigation of international 
crimes: In this analytical framework, the study will examine the role of domestic courts in 
the award of reparations for victims of domestic crimes. In this respect, the present 
research first looks into the architecture of the two main legal systems by which one may 
seek reparations for international crimes (i.e. only in civil proceedings or also as part of 
criminal proceedings) and the role of victims in each model. It then focuses on a case study 
of national courts and mechanisms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the aftermath of the 
Balkans war, to analyse the potential role of national courts in reparations proceedings. It 
also looks into the concept of universal civil jurisdiction as a means to counter the 
jurisdictional challenges of bringing claims of reparations in domestic courts. 
 
IV.  DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS AND SCOPE OF DISSERTATION 
 
It is important to explain and define some key concepts and terms on which the thesis 
is premised that surface throughout the project. As already explained, this research is 
concerned solely with reparations in international criminal law, which in this study is 
articulated through the lens of the “civil dimension of international criminal justice”. 
 1. Key concepts 
1. “Civil dimension” in this project is juxtaposed to criminal dimension and 
includes: civil liability of the accused, as opposed to criminal liability, reparation for 
victims of international crimes, as opposed to criminal mechanisms aimed at the 
investigation, prosecution and punishment of accused persons. It encompasses the concepts 
of redress or reparation 20 , including the procedures regarding reparation (i.e. civil 
litigation, civil proceedings, etc.). Importantly, “civil dimension” is broader than only 
reparations; however this dissertation is focused on the reparations aspect of a civil 
dimension” of international justice; thus other aspects that may fall under a civil dimension 
                                                      
20 See below discussion of reparations for the purpose of this study.  
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of international justice are outside the scope of this study. “Civil dimension” is a lens 
through which this dissertation looks at the question of reparations in international criminal 
justice. 
The terms “civil redress”, “reparation” and “redress” are used interchangeably in this 
project. Throughout this dissertation, this central concept will underpin discussions be 
further elaborated upon and developed. The features that make the “civil” dimension are 
the focus on reparation and civil claims rather than criminal processes and remedies, and 
the process by which victims can claim reparations for international crimes perpetrated by 
individuals.  
Why does this distinction matter in the context of this study? The analysis in this 
study concerns reparations for victims within international criminal justice, and through the 
inclusion of reparation in international criminal justice, there comes a development of a 
civil dimension alongside a criminal dimension of international criminal justice. In other 
words, the question of reparation adds a new layer in international justice, one that this 
study treats as a “civil dimension”. The distinction between a civil and a criminal 
dimension is useful when juxtaposing the types of process, the burden of proof, the duties 
of the judges, the remedies, the enforcement of remedies, and the role of victims and the 
accused. The civil dimension will be treated in this study through three different 
frameworks: before international courts (with the ICC as the primary example), through 
administrative mechanisms (the ICC Trust fund for Victims will be the focus of the 
analysis) and before national courts.  
  
2. “International crimes” in this project refers to the core crimes defined in the ICC 
Statute, that is: genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. This study does not 
focus on torture21 as it does not have the collective dimension of the international crimes 
and is not an independent crime as such recognized by the ICC. Transnational crimes22 as 
                                                      
21 See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85. 
22 Transnational crime is understood as “offences whose inception, prevention and/or direct 
or indirect effects involved more than one country”, UN Doc. A.CONF. 169/15/Add.1 (1995). The 
crimes listed in the UN document include inter alia: money laundering, terrorist activities, theft of 
art and cultural objects, theft of intellectual property, illicit arms trafficking, aircraft hijacking, sea 
piracy, insurance fraud, computer crime, environmental crime, trafficking in persons, trade in 
human body parts, illicit drug trafficking, fraudulent bankruptcy, infiltration of legal business, 
corruption and bribery of public or party officials. See also, Neil Boister & Robert J. Currie, 
Routledge Handbook of Transnational Criminal Law, Routledge, 2014; Philip Reichel & Jay S. 
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well as aggression are also excluded as different rules and regimes apply to them. This 
study proceeds on the basis of the conscious decision to focus on international crimes, 
acknowledging that such analysis is limited and inherently selective, leaving out many 
other mass atrocities and human rights violations that do not fall within the definition of 
international crimes. 
 
3. “International criminal law” and “international criminal justice” are treated as, 
respectively, a doctrine and system; and therefore are not limited to the examination of one 
particular institution (e.g. the ICC). Rather, they encompass the fabric of numerous 
procedures, institutions and mechanisms which address international criminal conduct and 
reparation thereof. This study encompasses the civil dimension of both international 
criminal law and international criminal justice. 
 
4. “Victims” in the context of this project means: victims of international crimes (see 
definition of international crimes above). This concept is further elaborated in the 
dissertation (e.g. definition of victims, direct and indirect victims). The project takes a 
broad approach to the meaning of victims and goes beyond the definition of victim within 
one specific institution or framework (e.g. the concept of victim in the ICC). 
 
 5. “Reparations” include: “restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction 
and guarantees of non-repetition”23. The focus of this study is on the right to reparation, 
and a corresponding legal duty to reparation. While this study will not discuss the right to 
remedy, such right includes: “(a) Equal and effective access to justice; (b) Adequate, 
effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered; (c) Access to relevant information 
concerning violations and reparation mechanisms”24. 
 
 6. “Justice for victims” is widely referred to in this study. The aim of this 
dissertation is not to provide a conclusive definition of justice for victims of international 
crimes, or how to attain it. The notion of justice for victims in the aftermath of 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Albanese,  Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice,   Sage Publications, 2nd ed., 2014. 
23 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147 U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (March 21, 2006) (“Basic 
Principles”), Article 18. 
24 Ibid., Article 11. 
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international crimes is complex and open to debate as to its scope. It is acknowledged that 
justice for victims encompasses much more than reparations25. This notion is used in the 
present dissertation in a limited way, linked solely to reparations.  
 
2. Exclusions from the scope of this study 
In addition to defining key concepts and terms, it is also important to delineate the 
scope of the research and analysis in the thesis, and to establish what is excluded from the 
scope of the dissertation and the reasons for such exclusions. It is important to note at the 
outset that the law in this field is very fluid; this dissertation takes into account key 
developments in law and jurisprudence, that are important to develop this study, up to 
beginning of October 2016. Conceptual exclusions from this study include: 
a) State responsibility:  
This project concerns civil dimensions of international criminal law, thus, State 
responsibility is conceptually excluded as international criminal law does not concern the 
responsibility of States, but rather of individuals. This study examines individual civil 
liability towards victims of international crimes. Although the study does refer to State 
responsibility in the first part concerning theoretical dimensions, this will be done purely in 
a complementary, informative and comparative manner without it being the main focus of 
the study. State responsibility will be looked at in order to assess whether an individualized 
approach to a civil dimension (i.e. seeking reparations from individuals rather than the 
State) is well-suited for international criminal justice and dealing with redress for 
international crimes. It also examines to what extent principles and case law on State 
responsibility for reparation can inform the content of an individual legal duty to repair. 
b) International/regional human rights mechanisms:  
Similarly, because they deal with State responsibility for human rights violations 
(as opposed to a focus on international crimes), and have a different set of rules, the 
detailed study of human rights mechanisms is outside the scope of this research project. 
This project overviews the jurisprudence of a regional human rights court purely to inform 
the analysis of principles of reparation in international criminal law. 
                                                      
25 For an excellent study of the conceptualization of justice for victims of international 
crimes, see Luke Moffett, Justice for Victims before the International Criminal Court, Routledge, 
2014. 
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c) Domestic (transnational) human rights litigation:  
In a similar vein, the focus of this project will not be on all (transnational) human 
rights civil litigation in domestic courts.  Although some civil litigation of this nature may 
be referenced to inform the analysis of the civil dimensions of international criminal law at 
the domestic level, the focus will primarily centre on the possibilities of civil redress for 
international crimes (and not for all kinds of human rights violations) in domestic 
proceedings. 
d) Truth and reconciliation commissions:  
The focus of this study is on legal processes. Truth and reconciliation mechanisms 
are not usually based on legal processes. Moreover, they are distinct mechanisms to 
international criminal law in dealing with the aftermath of armed conflicts. Studying truth 
and reconciliation commissions would shift the focus away from the study of international 
criminal justice, which is the main theme of the research project. 
e) Mass claims and processes:  
This project does not focus on mass claims and processes as they relate to State 
responsibility for international crimes and they are based on a different paradigm: State 
versus individual or State versus State.  
 
V. APPROACH AND CONTRIBUTION TO LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
 
With this research project, I hope to engage in the ongoing academic dialogue 
about developing trends in this field and to be able to contribute an informative analysis to 
the development of scholarship in this area. This study wishes to contribute to existing 
legal scholarship by engaging in a broader analysis of whether international criminal 
justice should encompass a civil dimension and how reparations for victims should develop 
in international criminal justice. This dissertation surveyed and was informed by a number 
of significant studies concerning reparations for victims of international crimes which have 
been both influential and inspiring26. The present study builds upon seminal pieces in the 
                                                      
26 Influential studies that have guided and informed the analysis contained in this dissertation 
include, inter alia, Luke Moffett, Justice for Victims before the International Criminal Court, 
Routledge, 2014 (analysing the ICC system of reparation through the creation of a theory of justice 
for victims and drawing on field research); Brianne McGonigle Eyh, Procedural Justice? Victims 
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field and proposes an analysis of the question of reparations for international crimes from a 
broader perspective, one that takes into account three frameworks, rather than focusing 
solely on the system at the ICC. As such, the present study both contributes to scholarly 
discussions in the field as well as adds a new parameter to such discussions.  
 
It is submitted that a study focused on reparation within international criminal law 
as a doctrine (rather than focusing only on the ICC, for example) is an important addition 
to existing scholarship in this field, and is of great theoretical and practical relevance in 
light of recent developments in international criminal law. This project aims to provide an 
informative fresh analysis on the role of reparations at the ICC. I believe the contribution 
of this project lies in the fact that it takes a step back and questions the inclusion of civil 
redress within international criminal justice from doctrinal and normative frameworks 
within the broader inquiry as to what the goals of international criminal justice are and how 
it should develop. In this sense, the contribution of this project relies both on its specificity, 
and the fact that it is a gateway to broader questions.  
 
The originality of this project may well lie first in the fact that most previous studies 
dealing with similar questions of reparations for international crimes were mostly 
theoretical concerning the award of reparation in international criminal law. This study 
looks at the development of reparation decisions in practice and critically assesses the 
outcome against a theoretical discussion. Furthermore, the project is original in its proposal 
to study reparations within international criminal law at the broader international 
(including the ICC, but also other courts and tribunals within international criminal law) 
and national levels (by the study of how the application of international criminal law 
should develop at the national level).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Participation in International Criminal Proceedings, Intersentia, 2011 (focusing on procedural 
justice analysed through the lens of victim participation at the ICC); Eva Dwertmann, The 
Reparation System of the International Criminal Court, (Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) and Connor 
McCarthy, Reparations and Victim Support in the International Criminal Court, Cambridge 
University Press, 2012 (both analysing the ICC system of reparation); Ernesto Kiza, Corene 
Rathgeber, and Holger Rohne, Victims of War: War-Victimization and Victims’ Attitudes towards 
Addressing Atrocities, Hamburger Edition, 2006 (analysing empirical data from a survey of 991 
victims of international crimes on their views of justice); Thorsten Bonacker and Christoph 
Johannes Maria Safferling, Victims of International Crimes: An Interdisciplinary Discourse, 
Intersentia, 2013. 
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One of the challenges of this project is the fact that the conceptual and empirical 
bases of this study are currently under development. This is however also one of its 
highlights: this is a timely project which sets itself apart from previous studies undertaken 
when reparation was still an ideological endeavour in international criminal law, or where 
the ICC had not yet delivered any concrete decisions against which to assess the system.  
 
The bigger challenge however is the richness of the topic of reparations and its 
interconnectedness with other topics and areas of law which make a focused analysis 
difficult. This study attempts to provide a discussion that has pulled out some aspects of 
the theme of reparations as defined by the research questions. It is not meant to be an 
exhaustive discussion of reparations for international crimes and some selections and 
exclusions were inherently necessary. 
  
 
With this study, I hope to engage in the rich academic debate that already exists 
concerning questions of the development of international criminal justice. this dissertation 
acknowledges that the topics of mass victimization and reparations are very complex and 
sensitive. The analysis and recommendations contained in this study are made with the 
utmost respect for victims and their suffering. This study has trailed with the caution that is 
warranted by the topic. This study does not purport to be a revolutionary analysis of the 
theme; rather more humbly, it aims to add to existing voices, by presenting a perspective 
which the author hopes to be useful for reflection on such a complex and important topic, 
which is also close to the author’s heart. With this dissertation the author pays tribute to the 
victims who have suffered due to international crimes and mass human rights violations. 
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CHAPTER 1: PUNISHMENT AND REPARATION: CONSTRUING THE LEGAL BASIS OF A DUTY 
TO REPAIR FOR INDIVIDUAL PERPETRATORS 
 
This study starts with a theoretical inquiry into theories of justice, victim reparation 
and punishment. This chapter will lay the foundation for the study of reparations in 
international criminal justice. In this light, this chapter examines how justice theories – 
mainly retributive and restorative/reparative justice theories – have provided some bases 
for the architecture of international criminal law and justice27.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of justice theories relevant to the 
study of international criminal law, from its inception to its contemporary application.  
Additionally, the theoretical dichotomy of punishment and reparation will be considered in 
relation to the criminal and civil dimensions of international criminal justice.  
 
This chapter also sets out some theoretical foundations that will guide the 
examination of central questions of this study. As such, this chapter attempts to answer the 
following research sub-questions: 
§ Which justice theories provide the theoretical framework for the civil 
dimension of international criminal justice?  
§ What is the legal basis of a legal duty of reparation on individual 
perpetrators?  
§ Is the individualized approach to reparation always better and more 
progressive than a State-based approach to reparation?  
This chapter will start addressing the above questions by overviewing different 
theories of justice and how they can inform the civil dimension of international criminal 
justice. This chapter also traces the evolution of the development of the right to reparation 
under international law and different dichotomies in relation to the duty and the right to 
reparation: starting from a relationship between States, to State versus individual, to 
individual versus individual. This chapter also examines the development of the duty to 
repair for individual perpetrators alongside States’ duty to repair. Furthermore, this chapter 
                                                      
27 The purpose of this chapter is not to provide  a thorough analysis of different theories of 
justice, but rather to trace the genesis and evolution of international criminal justice through the 
prism of how principles of different theories of justice shape international criminal justice. 
 32 
also discusses the different dimensions of reparations and whether the adoption of an 
individualized approach to reparations (as opposed to a State-based approach) is desirable, 
and if so, whether there is a legal basis for such a duty.  
 
This chapter starts by looking at punishment and reparation through an analysis of 
the interplay between retributive and restorative or reparative justice theories 28 .  
Importantly, these main justice theories bear relevance to the shaping of international 
criminal law, from its inception to its contemporary form. I then examine the different 
duties and rights in relation to reparation for international crimes: the State’s duty to repair, 
the development of an individual right to reparation and the construction of an individual 
duty to repair. 
I. A THEORETICAL INQUIRY INTO PUNISHMENT AND REPARATION: AN OVERVIEW OF 
RETRIBUTIVE AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE THEORIES 
 
In order to understand how punishment of the offender and reparations for victims of 
international crimes fit into the fabric of modern international criminal justice, and how the 
latter is shaped by different justice theories, one needs to first discuss justice theories that 
inform international criminal law.  
 
As is widely known, the aftermath of international crimes can be dealt with in 
different forms of post-conflict justice, for example, with criminal trials, truth and 
reconciliation processes, amnesties, and peace accords (which often have a provision for 
State-based reparations)29.  
 
In contrast to other responses to mass atrocities, punishment and retributive justice 
theory have provided an important model for international criminal justice. Responding to 
                                                      
28  For an excellent account of these two theories in criminal law, see Lucia Zedner, 
“Reparation and Retribution: Are they Reconcilable?”, The Modern Law Review 57 (1994), pp. 
228-250. 
29 This important question goes beyond the scope of this chapter. See generally on this topic, 
Darryl Robinson, “Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions, and the 
International Criminal Court”, European Journal of International Law 14  (2003), p. 3; Charles 
Villa-Vicencio, “Why Perpetrators Should Not Always Be Prosecuted: Where the International 
Criminal Court and Truth Commissions Meet”,  Emory Law Journal 49 (2000), p. 205; Martha 
Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence, 
Beacon Press, 1998. 
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criminal conduct with criminal prosecution represents  a commitment to the rule of law and 
the recognition that alleged perpetrators should be held accountable for their crimes30. 
International criminal trials represent an opportunity to seek the truth, they generate a 
historical account of events, they produce retribution for criminal conduct, and they may 
provide deterrence31. Furthermore, punishment and international criminal trials may also 
be seen in the light of their expressive roles32.   
1. Crime and punishment 
There are a few different rationales that underpin the idea of punishment as a 
response to criminal conduct. It is often claimed that punishment may deter future criminal 
conduct. Members of a given society, knowing that a certain conduct entails a given 
punishment, might abstain from pursuing that conduct. This idea finds support in the 
writings of authors throughout the centuries, among whom Plato, who stated that “…he 
who desires to inflict rational punishment does not retaliate for a past wrong which cannot 
be undone; he has regard to the future, and is desirous that the man who is punished, may 
be deterred from doing wrong again. He punishes for the sake of prevention”33. As such, 
inflicting punishment in relation to a given criminal conduct can be regarded as a way to 
prevent future crimes. In modern international criminal justice, this deterrent role is often 
debatable as some scholars question whether international criminal law as applied by 
international courts actually has a deterrent role34. 
 
                                                      
30 Martha Minow, ibid., p. 25.  
31 But see Brianne N. McGonigle, “Two for the Price of One: Attempts by the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia to Combine Retributive and Retorative Justice Principles”,  
Leiden Journal of International Law 22 (2009), p. 129, who claims that there is no empirical 
evidence that criminal trials have a deterrent effect. See also generally, Payam Akhavan, “Beyond 
Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?” American Journal of 
International Law 95 (2001), p 12.  
32 See generally in this regard, Anthony Duff, “Authority and Responsibility in International 
Criminal Law” in The Philosophy of International Law, Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas, 
Oxford University Press, 2010; Bill Wringe, “Why Punish War Crimes? Victor’s Justice and 
Expressive Justifications of Punishment”, Law and Philosophy 25 (2006), p. 159. 
33 Plato, “Protagoras”, in Works of Plato,Irwin Edman, The Modern Library,1956, pp. 193, 
211, 12. 
34  David Wippman, “Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice”,  
Fordham International Law Journal 23 (1999), p.12; Payam Akhavan, “Beyond Impunity: Can 
International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?”,  American Journal of International Law 
95 (2001). 
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In the same vein, another theoretical justification for punishment as a response to 
criminal conduct is the rehabilitation of the criminal; the proponents of this justification 
focus on punishment for the criminal, as opposed to a focus on the crime35. The goal of 
punishment, so the theory goes, is to effect a change in the behaviour of the criminal so as 
to decrease the likelihood of the commission of a crime in the future36. In this sense, it is 
based on the premise that punishment can change behaviour. For Hart, “announcing certain 
standards of behavior and attaching penalties for deviating … [leaves] individuals to 
choose. This is a method of social control which maximizes individual freedom within the 
framework of the law”37. 
 
A further theoretical rationalization of punishment is retribution38. Responding to 
international crimes with criminal trials and punishment follows the model of retributive 
justice theory. In classical retributive justice theory, a crime is responded to by punishing 
the perpetrator in a way that is proportional  to the crime committed. The focus in this kind 
of response is not on the individual victim(s); the crime is seen to have been committed 
against the State as a whole. A crime is first and foremost a violation of a law, a legal norm 
enacted by the State. The affected community and the victim are represented by the State. 
 
Retributive theorists’ view of punishment is that it produces a proper response to 
crime because it “cancels out” the crime, restoring the proper balance in society39. To 
Kant, punishment  
“can never be inflicted merely as a means to promote some other good for 
the criminal himself or for civil society. It must always be inflicted upon 
him only because he has committed a crime. For a human being can never 
be treated merely as a means to the purposes of another or be put among 
the objects of rights to things: his innate personality protects him from 
this, even though he can be condemned to lose his civil personality”40.  
                                                      
35 Farooq Hassan, “The Theoretical Basis of Punishment in International Criminal Law”,  
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 15 (1983),  p. 49.  
36 George Whitecross Patton, A Textbook of Jurisprudence, George Whitecross Patton & 
David P. Derham (4th ed.), Clarendon Press, 1972, p. 360. 
37 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, Clarendon Press, 1968, p. 23. 
38 Anthony Platt, “The Meaning of Punishment”, Issues in Criminology  2 (1966), p.79. 
39 David Dolinko, “Punishment” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Criminal Law, 
John Deigh & David Dolinko, Oxford University Press, 2011,  p. 406. 
40 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, translation by Mary Gregor, Cambridge 
University Press, 1996, p. 105.  
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In this light, the focus of retributive justice theory is on finding guilt and imposing 
blame. The offender is seen as a danger to society as a whole. As such, the offender is 
believed to deserve punishment once  guilt is found, and is often times  taken out of 
society. This kind of justice is based on the premise that punishment is an effective 
response to a crime. 
 
Retribution theory has a long history. Retributive justice is illustrated in the lex 
talioni, where reciprocity should equate the crime committed. In ancient history, the Code 
of Hamurabi recognized retributive justice. Retribution has been a form of justice for 
centuries ever since. As a consequence of the centralization of the State, sustained attention 
was given to the punishment of the offender and retribution, which brought about a 
proliferation of criminal codes and penalties 41 . The focus on retribution, and the 
marginalised role of victims in the administration of justice lasted until the end of the 
eighteenth century. It was at this time that  victims began  playing a more active role in the 
administration of justice42. 
 
Retribution, from the inception of international criminal law in the XXth century, has 
been a leading justification for punishment of offenders in international law43. As one 
author has put it “[r]etribution, …, though not historically a significant part of the 
evolutionary trends of international criminal law, was a definite component of at least the 
punishments awarded by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg”44. The idea of 
fighting impunity, which is symbolic of international criminal justice and the establishment 
of international and ad hoc criminal tribunals, speaks to the justification of punishment as a 
form of retribution.  
 
                                                      
41 Ilaria Bottigliero, Redress for Victims of Crimes under International Law, Nijhoff,  2004, 
p. 24. 
42 Lucia Zedner, “England”, in Reparation in Criminal Law: International Perspectives, 
Albin Eser & Susanne Walther (vol. 1), Iuscrim, Max-Planck Institute Für Ausländisches und 
International Strafrecht, 1996,  pp.109-227. 
43 For thorough review of the goals and functions of punishment in international criminal 
law, see Mark A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, Cambridge University 
Press, 2007. 
44 Farooq Hassan, “The Theoretical Basis of Punishment in International Criminal Law”,  
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 15 (1983), p. 55. 
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It can be argued that at a moment of global recovery following  the horrors of the 
war, an international criminal trial pours the rule of law back again in the international 
legal order. Setting up an international tribunal to try and punish the alleged offenders re-
establishes law and order in a world devastated by war. At the end of the Second World 
War, when the world became aware of the atrocities that were committed by Nazi forces, 
something needed to be done against those who perpetrated acts that shocked the 
conscience of humankind. One of the most famous statements emanating from the 
Nuremberg trials refers specifically to the idea that those crimes could not go unpunished 
due to the their nature and level of gravity: “… by punishing individuals who commit such 
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced”45.  
 
Be that as it may, retribution is not the only justification for trying and punishing 
criminals. One of the claimed underlying rationales for punishment of offenders in 
international criminal law is deterrence46. If a criminal is punished, as the theory goes, 
others will know that act is wrongful under international law which entails consequences, 
thus deterring others from taking the same course of action. Deterrence and prevention of 
future crimes seem to have been justifications for inflicting punishment on those found 
responsible for the crimes committed by Nazi Germany47. This is illustrated by the famous 
statement of Justice Jackson: “It is high time that we act on the juridical principles that 
aggressive war-making is illegal and criminal … so as to make war less attractive to those 
who have governments and the destinies of people in their power”48. 
 
Punishment is said to aide in the maintenance of the international legal order49. One 
author has posited in regard to this justification for punishment that “[j]ust as the general 
welfare of citizens and the supreme need for maintaining the social order in the domestic 
                                                      
45 Trial of Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 
November 1945-1 October 1946 (Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal, 1947), p. 223. 
46 See generally, Farooq Hassan, “The Theoretical Basis of Punishment in International 
Criminal Law”,  Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 15 (1983), pp. 48 et seq. 
47 Ibid. at p. 50. 
48 Report to the President by Mr. Justice Jackson, 6 June 1945, “International Conference on 
Military Trials”, pp. 42, 52-53.  See also, Robert Jackson, The Case against the Nazi War 
Criminals, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1946. 
49 See generally, Cesare Beccaria cited in Elio Monachesi, “Pioneers in Criminology IX: 
Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794)”,  Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology & Political Science 46 
(1955),  p. 445.  
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scene are considered paramount, the need for ensuring the sanctity of the most fundamental 
values of the international community also demands that potential violators be forewarned 
from committing breaches of the international legal order”50.  
 
In the international legal order, where there are no central enforcing institutions or 
agencies, punishment could be seen as a manner in which international rules are enforced. 
This said, it is difficult to grasp precisely whether international criminal law and the 
punishment with which individual perpetrators are being sentenced actually fulfil the role 
of retribution or deterrence. There is a growing debate as to whether punishment of 
individuals actually contributes to the prevention of future crimes51. It is also premature at 
this point of international criminal justice to understand whether, and if so how, 
punishment can influence and modify individuals’ conduct.  
 
As international criminal law developed, however, retribution began to lose its 
importance as a justification for inflicting punishment on offenders52. Whether or not 
punishment can truly promote deterrence in relation to international crimes cannot yet be 
fully assessed. Many claim that international criminal law (and punishment) is not 
producing the magnificent effect that its proponents were hoping for53.  
 
 Given the less important role of retribution as a justification for punishment in this 
context, it is understandable how victim redress could make its way into international 
criminal law. In a framework where reparation does not take the form of punitive damages, 
but rather comes from the concern with victims’ justice, it is difficult to reconcile how 
reparation for victims would contribute to retributive justice theory54. Retribution provides 
                                                      
50 Farooq Hassan, “The Theoretical Basis of Punishment in International Criminal Law”,  
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 15 (1983), p. 56. 
51 See generally, David Wippman, “Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International 
Justice”,  Fordham International Law Journal 23  (1999), pp. 473, 488; Payam Akhavan, “Beyond 
Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?”,  American Journal of 
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52 See generally, Farooq Hassan, “The Theoretical Basis of Punishment in International 
Criminal Law”,  Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 15 (1983), p. 56. 
53  David Wippman, “Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice”,  
Fordham International Law Journal 23 (1999), pp. 473, 488. 
54 On the question of the dichotomy between reparation and retribution, see Charles F. Abel 
& Frank H. Marsh, Punishment and Restitution: A Restitutionary Approach to Crime and the 
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no justification for including reparation within the realm of international criminal law 
remedies. Reparations in international criminal law are not equated to punishment; they are 
not punitive in nature. This is confirmed, at least within the ICC framework, by the 
negotiating history of the Rome Statute and the reparation provisions within the Statute55.  
 
Beyond the issue of the driving rationale for including reparation within international 
criminal justice, an interesting question is whether reparation could contribute to the main 
goals with which trial and punishment are concerned, that is, prevention and deterrence, 
thus reinforcing its role in international criminal law56.  
 
The relationship between reparation and deterrence is closely linked with the forms 
of reparation that can be awarded within the realm of international criminal justice and the 
involvement of the offender in the reparation process. If reparation is pursued as 
compensation through a sum of money from the accused, this may provide a degree of 
deterrence similar to that of criminal liability  - the possibility of having to face a criminal 
trial as well as having to pay compensation for the victims may deter individuals from 
committing a crime. 
 
Perhaps, however, the most significant way in which reparation or victim redress 
may impact the prevention of future atrocities can be evaluated in a more holistic way. The 
integration of victims’ concerns in the international criminal justice process may affect the 
way in which criminal conduct is dealt with. Including victims in the process, and 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Criminal,  Greenwood Press, 1984; Ezzat A. Fattah, “From a Guilt Orientation to a Consequence 
Orientation: A Proposed New Paradigm for the Criminal Law in the 21st Century”, in  Beitraege 
zur Rechtswissenschaft, Wilfried Küper & Jürgen Welp,  C.F. Mueller Juristischer Verlag, 1993, 
pp. 771- 792. See also, David Watson et al.,  “Reparation for Retributivists”, in Mediation and 
Criminal Justice: Victims, Offenders and Community, Martin Wright & Burt Galaway,  Sage 
Publications, 1989, cited in Lucia Zedner, “Reparation and Retribution: Are they Reconcilable?”,   
Modern Law Review 57  (1994), p. 228. 
55 See on this point, Conor McCarthy, “Victim Redress and International Criminal Justice: 
Competing Paradigms, or Compatible Forms of Justice?”, Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 10 (2012), pp. 361-362.  
56 In this chapter, I do not intend to dwell on the following questions: whether reparation for 
victims within international criminal proceedings, and at the ICC as its main example, is 
compatible with the traditional goals of international criminal justice, whether it is appropriate and 
how it should develop. These are questions that will be addressed in the following chapters of this 
study. The inquiry at this juncture fits within the broader discussion of theories of justification for 
punishment in international criminal justice.  
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implementing  reparation-based  awards (i.e. where the offender will have to face the 
victim and respond to  his/her actions), as opposed to treating crime as a public matter, 
might contribute to the preventive effect that punishment is intended to have.  
 
Thus, looking solely through the retributive justice lens, international criminal justice 
would have a purely criminal dimension, focusing mainly on the perpetrator, the crime, 
and the degree of punishment. A civil dimension, that is, a dimension which  includes 
reparation for victims, does not fit within this paradigm. Thus, including a civil dimension 
in international criminal justice requires another theoretical underpinning. 
 
2. Victims, reparation and restorative justice theory  
Similar to retributive justice, restorative justice has been known to many 
civilizations. Since the Roman law period, there were possibilities for remedies for a 
wrongful conduct57. The shift to retribution as a way to respond to criminal conduct seems 
to have occurred between the 12th and 13th centuries. When a wrongful act  was committed 
against the State, retribution demanded that the interests of society as a whole be 
emphasized above and beyond those of  individual victims.  
 
Restorative justice58, to the contrary of retributive justice, focuses on the needs of 
victims  and seeks to provide forms of redress.   It is concerned with bringing victims and 
offenders together. The perpetrator is encouraged to make amends and repair the harm 
caused to the victim. Thus, restorative justice has a distinct  forward-looking approach.  
 
John Braithwaite, a leading author in restorative justice theory, has defined 
restorative justice as:  
“a process where all stakeholders affected by an injustice have an 
opportunity to discuss how they have been affected by the injustice and to 
decide what should be done to repair the harm. With crime, restorative 
justice is about the idea that because crime hurts, justice should heal. It 
                                                      
57 Arlette Lebigre, Quelques Aspects de la Responsabilité Pénale en Droit Romain Classique,  
Presses Universitaires de France, 1967. 
58 See e.g. Conor McCarthy, “Reparations under the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court and Reparative Justice Theory”, International Journal of Transitional Justice 3 
(2009). 
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follows that conversations with those who have been hurt and with those 
who have afflicted the harm must be central to the process”59. 
 
As far as reparations are concerned, it has been noted that “[restorative justice] 
places particular emphasis on the principles and aims of human dignity, strong 
relationships and morality [which] allows a more holistic approach to reparations”, to the 
extent that “restorative justice provides a persuasive theoretical rationale for reparations”60. 
 
An important concern of restorative justice is whether the criminal justice process 
addresses the full complexity of the criminal conduct. Under this theory,  criminal conduct 
is not a wrong committed against some abstract community but instead,  should be dealt 
with as a dispute between the offender and the victim61. 
 
In this light, reparations to victims of international crimes are more in line with the 
premises of restorative justice. The question that remains is whether a blend of retributive 
and restorative justice theories makes sense in international criminal law. Similarly, the 
leading question of this study is whether a mixture of criminal and civil dimensions, and 
thus influences from diverse justice theories, is desirable in international criminal justice. 
These are the inquiries I turn to in the following sections. 
 
II. THE GENESIS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND THE SHIFT FROM STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
To understand the theoretical framework that guided the development of the doctrinal 
foundations of international criminal law, one needs to place international criminal law 
within the broader context of international law at the time of its inception. 
 
                                                      
59 John Braithwaite, “Restorative Justice and De-Professionalization”,  The Good Society 13  
(2004), pp. 28–31. 
60 Antonio Buti, “The Notion of Reparations as a Restorative Justice Measure”, in One 
Country, Two Systems, Three Legal Orders – Perspectives of Evolution: Essays on Macau’s 
Autonomy after the Resumption of Sovereignty by China, Jorge Costa Oliveira & Paulo Cardinal,  
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61 Conor McCarthy, “Reparations under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
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Modern international criminal law developed as a response to the atrocities 
committed during the Second World War. In the aftermath of the war, it became clear that 
the international crimes committed during the war needed to be accounted for and that the 
punishment of individual perpetrators was crucial for the reestablishment of the 
international legal order. Making the State, an abstract entity, solely responsible, without 
reaching those who individually perpetrated mass atrocities was no longer desirable, 
acceptable, and was a disconnect with domestic criminal law systems. At the wake of the 
end of the Second World War, the framework for allocating responsibility in the 
international legal order was focused on the State. Importantly, the development of 
international criminal law represented a shift from a State-centred approach62. For many 
centuries, international law was concerned solely with inter-State matters, and the idea of 
individuals being a (passive) subject of international law, standing trial and being inflicted 
with punishment, would have been inconceivable within the traditional framework of 
international law63.  
 
In this sense, it can be said that the mere advent of international criminal law 
represents a turning point in the conceptual framework of international law. This paradigm 
is well illustrated by the famous statement of the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg whereby “crimes against international law are committed by men, not by 
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the 
provisions of international law be enforced”64. This statement also demonstrates that, since  
its inception, international criminal law has focused on the trial and punishment of 
perpetrators as a means to enforce international law. It is perceived that individual 
accountability and punishment informed the formative stages of international criminal law. 
This can be explained by the need to hold individual perpetrators accountable for their 
crimes, thus making the shift from State-based responsibility for international wrongs to 
individual accountability for international crimes, which marks the modern development of 
                                                      
62 See generally, Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War 
Crimes”,  British Yearbook of International Law 21  (1944), p. 58. 
63 See e.g. the 1912 edition  of the Lassa Oppenheim treatise  on international law, stating 
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64 Trial of Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 
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international criminal law in parallel with the regime of State responsibility. This shift 
from a State-based framework was not however complete in dealing with the aftermath of 
conflicts.  Although individual perpetrators were held criminally accountable, civil redress 
for victims of the crimes perpetrated during the War was left to be resolved by inter-State 
agreements65. 
 
Holding individual perpetrators accountable for international crimes, rather than the 
States for which they acted, has put the focus on prosecution and punishment of the 
offender, while moving away from victims and civil redress. International criminal law at 
its inception was concerned with addressing the limitations that the system based on State 
responsibility afforded. The idea of redress for victims of international crimes was thus not 
present at the developmental stage of international criminal law66 and, as we shall see in 
later chapters, only gained relevance in the international criminal justice discourse more 
recently and more prominently with the advent of the ICC.  
 
As such, international criminal law, in its first phase, solidified the foundation of a 
system based on individual accountability and punishment, as opposed to collective 
responsibility. This dichotomy was explained by Hans Kelsen in the following terms:  
 
“the difference between the punishment provided by national law and the 
specific sanctions of international law… consists of the fact that 
punishment in criminal law constitutes individual responsibility, whereas 
the specific sanctions of international law constitute collective 
responsibility”67. 
 
                                                      
65 Indeed, according to Ariel Colonomos and Andrea Armstrong: “[t]raditionally, reparations 
were part of the framework of relations between nations following a conflict and obligated the 
losing State to compensate damages incurred by its opponents during the course of the war”, Ariel 
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The focus on the criminal accountability of individual perpetrators, as opposed to a 
framework that included criminal accountability and victim redress (or a mix of criminal 
and civil dimensions), in the shaping of the architecture of international criminal law at its 
formative stages can be understood in the context of the position of the individual as a 
subject of international law. The battle of that time was to pierce the veil of the State, in 
order to be able to put on trial the individuals responsible for the atrocities of the Second 
World War68. Thus, at its inception, international criminal justice was focused on a 
criminal dimension. 
 
In that sense, Hersch Lauterpacht warned of the risks of continuing to hold a purely 
State-centred approach: “[t]here is little hope for international law if an individual, acting 
as an organ of the state, can in violation of international law, effectively shelter behind the 
abstract and artificial notion of the state”69. The idea that individuals should not be 
shielded by the State’s responsibility for certain acts, which were ultimately performed by 
individuals, was the necessary rationale to shift from mere  State responsibility to a system 
that includes individuals’ accountability for international crimes, thus sometimes creating a 
system of concurrent State responsibility and individual criminal liability for certain 
international acts70. Thus, the focus on retribution and punishment of the perpetrator, in 
contrast with reparations, at this early stage of international criminal law can be explained 
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by the idea that “[individual] punishment, in contrast to [interstate] reparation, satisfies … 
the need for guarantees against future infractions of the law”71.  
 
As it can be seen, the dogma of State sovereignty remained as far as reparations for 
victims were concerned: if there was any claim for reparation from an individual victim, it 
was for the sovereign State to “represent” their interests, and reparations for international 
crimes were to be sought from States; in other words, victim redress for international 
crimes was centred on a State-based approach72. 
 
In sum, with the advent of international criminal law, individuals could be criminally 
prosecuted on their personal capacity. This was a passive role for individuals in 
international law as they were the object of prosecutions; at this point in history (at the 
wake of the Second World War and the development of international criminal law in the 
XXth century) individuals could not yet play an active role, separate from their State of 
origin, to claim reparations for himself/herself in international law. As Connor McCarthy 
sums it up, “international criminal law was concerned primarily with perpetrators and the 
enforcement of the rules of international law itself”73.  
 
Thus, international criminal law, as it was originally developed, was concerned with 
a criminal dimension; the civil dimension, that is the dimension concerning reparation for 
victims, was not included. As it shall be further developed next, reparation for victims 
followed a State-based approach.  
 
This paradigm that had been in effect since the conception of international law raises 
the questions: does a mixture of criminal and civil dimensions make sense at the 
international level? Is it working, is it a desirable model and if so, why? The following 
sections of this chapter, and following chapters, unpack these considerations. 
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III. PAVING THE WAY TO REPARATIONS FOR MASS CRIMES: OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL 
DUTY OF REPARATIONS IN OTHER FIELDS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Reparations for victims of international crimes rely on two premises: the right of 
victims to obtain reparation and the legal duty to provide reparation. Two questions 
underpin this analysis: who bears the legal duty of reparation (i.e. the State, the individual, 
both?) and to whom is the reparation owed (i.e. to individuals and/or to the State)?  
 
In relation to the latter, a question to be addressed is whether the individual (i.e. the 
victim) has a legal right to reparation under international law. And importantly, does this 
by implication create an international obligation on individuals rather than States 
concerning reparation? As it shall be further discussed, the individual’s right to reparation 
developed under international law creating a legal duty on States to repair. Modern 
international criminal law, in some cases as shall be discussed, proposes an individualized 
approach to reparations, which creates a legal duty for individuals to provide reparation. Is 
this not a mismatch with the collective nature of international crimes? This study claims 
that it is not necessarily so. Just like in a criminal dimension, State responsibility and 
individual criminal accountability are not mutually exclusive, in a civil dimension, State 
responsibility and individual liability concerning reparations need not necessarily be either.  
 
 Alongside the development and solidification of international criminal law 
procedures, victim redress mechanisms have developed in other fields of international law, 
slowly giving rise to an individual right to reparation for international wrongs, including 
human rights violations and international crimes. In order to better understand the shift 
from a purely retribution-oriented international criminal justice to a system which has a 
more active role for victims 74 , including the right to seek reparations within the 
international criminal proceedings, it is crucial to review the wider legal framework75 and 
the development of a right to reparation under international law.  There are two areas in 
                                                      
74 The question of the inclusion of reparation within international criminal proceedings will 
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75 Theoretical questions pertain to the genesis of the right to reparation under the different 
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particular that are closely linked to international criminal law which relate to the duty of 
reparation imposed on the State rather than the individual): international human rights law 
and international humanitarian law. While this study is primarily concerned with the 
paradigm of the individual vis-à-vis the individual (i.e. individual victims seeking 
reparation from individual perpetrators), evaluating the State-based approach to reparations 
will inform the construction of a legal basis of a duty to repair imposed on the individual, 
and the contents of this duty.  
 
In this prism, this section first dwells upon the broad and somewhat abstract question 
of the purpose of reparations, as well as the right to reparation in relation to a State’s duty 
to provide reparations under international law. Then I briefly overview the right of 
reparation in fields of international law closely linked with international criminal law, to 
then finally engage in a theoretical discussion of the relationship between theories of 
punishment and reparation. This analysis will focus on a review of systems only in the 
international legal system since later in this study attention is given to  the role of national 
courts in the award of redress for victims of international crimes (see chapter 5).  
 
1. The purpose of reparations 
It goes without saying that reparations may serve varied purposes and thus be based 
on different theoretical underpinnings76. A common purpose of reparations is that of 
remedial justice, in order to correct the wrong done and rectify injustice by restoring the 
status quo ante. As Professor Dinah Shelton puts it, this rationale “appears to be the basis 
for most international decisions on reparations, including the Chorzów Factory case”77. 
 
Reparations may also serve as a form of retribution, to punish the offender and deter 
the wrong conduct78. Under this theoretical explanation, the form and extent of reparations 
could bring about a deterrent factor in future wrongdoing. In this sense, reparations can 
include a form of punitive damages and in a way,  could bridge criminal (sanctions) and 
                                                      
76  This chapter is not aimed at examining or discussing the purpose of reparations 
specifically in international criminal law. This topic will be addressed in following chapters. 
77 See generally, Dinah Shelton, “Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State 
Responsibility”,  American Journal of International Law 96 (2002). 
78 See Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind: Towards a 
New Jus Gentium, Nijhoff, 2010, p. 371.  
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civil (restoration) dimensions. Another purpose of reparation speaks to restoration of 
victims and affected communities. The goal in this perspective would be to reconcile and 
restore, as well as induce positive future behaviour79. 
 
Some aspects of this overview of theories and purposes of reparations are worth 
emphasizing. First, it may be noted that the system of reparations could be different 
depending on its context (i.e. the society where it is applied or the purpose it is devised to 
achieve). These questions shed light on the interconnectedness between victims and 
offenders, and the community in which they may belong. When a wrongful act is 
committed (e.g. a crime), various relationships are broken, values shattered and the 
situation that existed before the wrongful conduct is no longer in place.  
 
Thus, the theoretical framework of the purpose of reparations evidences, in my view, 
the tight relationship between crimes (a wrongful conduct) and civil redress (reparation), 
offenders and victims, the past and the future. It also exposes the weaknesses of a nuclear 
treatment of international law, the compartmentalised study of different doctrines, in 
parallel, and with different aims, even though in essence they often pertain to the same 
conduct.  
 
In the same line of reasoning, a broader question pertains to the consideration of 
international law and international justice: if different disciplines of international law do 
not interact and feed off of each other, in a synergetic communication, the ultimate goal of 
justice may not be fully achieved. As Judge Cançado Trindade puts it,  
 
“While an international tribunal of human rights (such as the European and 
Inter-American Courts, and more recently, the African Court) cannot 
determine the international criminal responsibility of the individual, and an 
international criminal tribunal (such as the ad hoc International Criminal 
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTFY] and for Rwanda [ICTR], 
and the ICC) cannot determine the responsibility of the State, impunity is 
                                                      
79 See generally on theories of restorative justice: Daniel W. Van Ness & Karen Heetderks 
Strong, Restoring Justice, Routledge, 2nd ed., 2002; Nigel Bigger, Burying The Past: Making 
Peace And Doing Justice After Civil Conflict, Georgetown University Press, 2003;  Heather Strang 
& John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice And Civil Society, Cambridge University Press,  2001; 
Gerry Johnstone, Restorative Justice: Ideas, Values, Debates, Willan, 2002.  
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most likely bound to persist, being only partially sanctioned by one and 
the not other”80. 
 
In this section, the multifaceted purposes of reparation were only briefly overviewed 
in general terms in order to set the stage for the next chapters.  
 
2. The multifaceted dimensions of reparation 
 Recently, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, 
reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, Dr. Pablo de Greiff, prepared a report 
focusing on reparations for mass violations of human rights and international humanitarian 
law. His report focused on the challenges of reparation including implementation, 
exclusion of certain “categories of victims on the basis of political considerations … and 
the gender insensitivity of a majority of reparation programmes, which results in too few 
victims of gender-related violations receiving any reparation”81.  
 
 Significantly for the purpose of this study, the Special Rapporteur discusses in his 
report discusses different dimensions of reparation awards. In particular, he warns against 
looking at reparations from a singular dimension and posits that:  
 
“to count as reparation and to be understood as a justice measure, it has to 
be accompanied by an acknowledgment of responsibility and needs to be 
linked with other justice initiatives such as efforts aimed at achieving 
truth, criminal prosecutions and guarantees of non-recurrence”82.  
 
In a similar vein, he adds that “[o]ffering reparations to victims should not be part 
of an effort, for example, to make impunity more acceptable”83.  
 
This discussion is crucial to the present study as it is argued, precisely as the 
Special Rapporteur does, that reparation is a complement to the criminal liability of 
perpetrators of international crimes. In other words, they are not mutually exclusive and 
                                                      
80 See Antônio Augusto  Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind: Towards a 
New Jus Gentium, Nijhoff, 2010, p. 371. 
81 United Nations, General Assembly, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of 
truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence”, A/69/518, 14 October 2014.  
82 Ibid., para. 83. 
83 Ibid. 
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should work together as two facets of international criminal justice: the criminal and civil 
dimensions of international justice complement one another. The conclusion of the Special 
Rapporteur’s report is thus a guiding chart throughout this study. 
 
Finally, the report makes another important point concerning the different 
dimensions of reparation. It calls on those responsible, rightly so it is argued, to design   
 
“reparation programmes to consider the great advantages of distributing 
benefits of different kinds and to not reduce reparation to a single 
dimension, be it material or symbolic. The great harms that reparation is 
supposed to redress require a broad array of coherently organized 
measures”84.  
 
 This report, and the guidelines provided therein, are useful for the development of a 
conception of a civil dimension for victims of international crimes and provide some 
insight for the analysis in the present study. 
 
3. State responsibility and the duty of reparation in international law 
The duty of reparation in relation to an internationally wrongful act is a well-
established principle of international law85. While much has been written on the right of 
States to obtain reparation86, the focus of this study rests on victims of international crimes 
and thus on reparation to the benefit of individuals.  
 
                                                      
84 Ibid., para. 84. 
85 See e.g. on the duty to reparation for wrongful conduct under international law, Paul 
Fauchille, Traité de Droit international public, vol. I Part I, Paris, Libr. A. Rousseau Éd., 1922, p. 
515; Ladislas Reitzer, La réparation comme conséquence de l’acte illicite en Droit international, 
Paris, Libr. Rec. Sirey, 1938, p. 30 ; Jean Personnaz, La réparation du préjudice en Droit 
international public, Paris, Libr. Rec. Sirey (1939), pp. 53-60; Hildebrando Accioly, “Principes 
généraux de la responsabilité internationale d’après la doctrine et la jurisprudence”,  Recueil des 
Cours de l’Académie de Droit International de La Haye 96 (1953), p. 415.   
86 See e.g., Christian Dominicé, Observations sur les droits de l'Etat victime d'un fait 
internationalement illicite, dans : Droit international 2, par C. Dominicé, Paris : Pedone, 1982, p. 1-
70 ; Francisco V. García-Amador, The changing law of international claims, New York [etc.]: 
Oceana, 1984. Francisco V. García Amador, Principios de derecho internacional que rigen la 
responsabilidad: análisis crítico de la concepción tradicional, Madrid: Escuela de funcionarios 
internacionales, 1963.  
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The principle underlying the legal duty to make reparation is that every breach of an 
international obligation carries with it a duty to repair the harm caused by the breach87. 
This has been confirmed in a number of international instruments and jurisprudence of 
international and regional courts88. It has been crystallized in an often-cited passage by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, in the Charzów Factory Judgment, wherein it is 
stated that:  
 
“The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act . . . 
is that reparation must, so far as possible, wipe-out all the consequences of 
the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, 
have existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if 
this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a 
restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss 
sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in 
place of it—such are the principles which should serve to determine the 
amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international law”89. 
 
It is further stated in the same case that: “It is a principle of international law, and 
even a general conception of the law, that any breach of an engagement involves an 
obligation to make reparation … Reparation is the indispensable complement of a failure 
to apply a convention, and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention 
itself”90. 
 
This traditional conception of reparation has been applied in the jurisprudence of 
many international courts and tribunals such as the International Court of Justice91, other 
                                                      
87  See Dinah Shelton, “Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State 
Responsibility”,  American Journal of International Law 96 (2002), p. 835. 
88 This study examines the question of reparation from the perspective of the victims’ right to 
obtain reparation and not the State or the offender’s duty to provide reparation.  
89 Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction, Judgment No. 8, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, no. 17, p. 29. 
90  Ibid.; see also PCIJ Statute, Article 36, which states that “the States Parties to the present 
Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special 
agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court 
in all legal disputes concerning: … (d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the 
breach of an international obligation”. Article 36 of the ICJ Statute is written similarly. 
91 ICJ, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory 
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 184; ICJ, Case concerning Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 81, para. 152; ICJ, Case concerning 
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 2004,  p. 59, para. 119; ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 198, para. 152; ICJ, Case 
concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
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international courts92, including regional human rights courts and other human rights 
bodies93, arbitral tribunals94 and claims tribunals and commissions95.  
 
The principle of a State’s duty of reparation for international wrongful acts 
(including international crimes) has also been explicitly recognized in Article 31 of the 
2001 International Law Commission Articles, which reads as follows: “[t]he responsible 
State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the 
internationally wrongful act”96. 
 
The State’s duty of reparation for a wrongful act has also been explained in 
numerous works of learned jurists. As Anzilotti posed it : “La violation de l’ordre juridique 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 257, para. 259; ICJ, Case concerning Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina 
v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, pp. 232-233, para. 460; Case 
concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
2010, p. 77, paras. 273-274; ICJ, Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 48, para. 161.   
92 See, for example, M/V “Saiga” (No. 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), 
Judgment, I.T.L.O.S. Reports 1999, para. 170.   
93 See, for example, IACtHR, Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits Judgment,  29 July 
1988,  para. 174; see also Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece, Application No. 14556/89, 
Judgment,  31 October 1995, E.Ct.H.R., Series A, No. 330-B, para. 36.   
94 See, for example, LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., LG&E International Inc. v. 
Argentine Republic, Case No. ARB/02/1, Award of 25 July 2007, I.C.S.I.D., available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docI
d=DC786_En&caseId=C208  (accessed 15 February 2012), para. 31; ADC Affiliate Limited and 
ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. Republic of Hungary, Case No. ARB/03/16, Award of 2 
October 2006, I.C.S.I.D., para. 484.   
95 See, for example, Final Award, Eritrea’s Damages Claims Between the State of Eritrea 
and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 17 August 2009, Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims 
Commission, available athttp://www.pca-
cpa.org/upload/files/ER%20Final%20Damages%20Award%20complete.pdf  (accessed 12 January 
2012), pp. 7-8, para. 24; Final Award, Ethiopia’s Damages Claims Between the State of Eritrea 
and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 17 August 2009, Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims 
Commission,availableathttp://www.pca-
cpa.org/upload/files/ET%20Final%20Damages%20Award%20complete.pdf (accessed 12 January 
2012), p. 8, para. 24; Amoco International Finance Corporation v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et 
al., Partial Award No. 310-56-3 of 14 July 1987, 15 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports 
189, paras. 189-206.   
96 Paragraph 2 of Article 31 defines “injury” as: “any damage, whether material or moral, 
caused by the internationally wrongful act of a State”. 
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international commise par un État soumis à cet ordre donne ainsi naissance à un devoir de 
réparation, qui consiste en général dans le rétablissement de l’ordre juridique troublé”97. 
 
In a similar vein, Fauchille explained that: 
 
“A quelles règles est soumise la responsabilité juridique internationale des 
Etats? Les règles auxquelles cette responsabilité est assujettie se résument 
dans l’idée de droit naturel que tout fait qui cause à autrui un dommage 
oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé à le réparer. Cette idée est 
appliquée en droit privé dans les rapports des individus ; il n’y a pas de 
motifs pour ne pas l’appliquer aussi dans les relations que des collectivités 
ont entre elles-mêmes au avec des individus. Pour qu’il y ait lieu à la 
responsabilité juridique à la charge d’un Etat, il faut dès lors : 1o. qu’un 
dommage ait été causé par lui ; 2o. que ce dommage soit le résultat d’une 
action illicite de sa part ; 3o. qu’il lui soit imputable”98. 
 
The International Court of Justice clarified in the Avena and Other Mexican 
Nationals case that “[w]hat constitutes ‘reparation in an adequate form’ clearly varies 
depending upon the concrete circumstances surrounding each case and the precise nature 
and scope of the injury, since the question has to be examined from the viewpoint of what 
is the ‘reparation in an adequate form’ that corresponds to the injury”99. 
4. International human rights law and the development of individual victims’ redress 
 
As we have seen above, the early stages of international criminal law in the XXth 
century was focused on prosecution and punishment. Other areas of international law 
developed alongside international criminal law which had some impact on the 
development of reparations for victims of conflicts. The most significant development in 
this area was the advent of international human rights law, which, through its mechanisms, 
empowered victims to seek and obtain reparations from their State for violations of their 
rights. In this perspective, international human rights law does not concern a criminal 
dimension (i.e. it is not directly focused on criminal prosecutions or punishment of 
                                                      
97 Dionisio Anzilotti,  “La responsabilité internationale des États a raison des dommages 
soufferts par des étrangers”,  Revue générale de droit international public, p. 13. 
98 Paul Fauchille, Traité de Droit International Public, Tome I, Rousseau & Cie. (eds.), p. 
515. 
99 ICJ, Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of 
America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004 (I), p. 59, para. 119; see also ICJ, Case Concerning Pulp 
Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment,  20 April 2010, p. 77, para. 273.   
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individual perpetrators), but rather a civil dimension, in the sense of reparations for victims 
of human rights violations. 
 
The advent of international human rights law has provided avenues for individuals to 
seek reparations for acts committed by their State of origin100. It has significantly expanded 
the possibility for individuals to seek and obtain redress. The trailblazing instrument was 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights101, which then prompted the adoption of many 
other similar instruments102. The right of victims to seek and obtain a remedy has been 
codified in human rights treaties and instruments. It has also been firmly reiterated and 
expanded upon by international jurisprudence103. The European Convention on Human 
Rights104, the American Convention on Human Rights105, and the Optional Protocol to the 
African Charter establishing an African Court of Human Rights106, provide their Courts the 
possibility of awarding reparation for violations of a conventional right.  
 
                                                      
100   Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi, “International Obligations to Provide for Reparation 
Claims”, in State Responsibility and the Individual – Reparations in Instances of Grave Violations 
of Human Rights, Albrecht Randelzhofer & Christian Tomuschat, Kluwer Law International, 1999, 
p. 149. 
101 Proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 217A (III), 10 December 1948.  
102 See generally, e.g. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 8); the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (art. 2(3), 9(5) and 14(6)); the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (art. 6); the Convention of the Rights of the 
Child (art. 39); the Convention against Torture and other forms of Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment (art. 14); the European Convention on Human Rights (art. 5(5), 13 and 41); the Inter-
American Convention on Human Rights (art. 25, 68 and 63(1)); the African Charter of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (art. 21(2)).  
103 See e.g., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Serial C, No 
4 (1989), par. 174 . See also Papamichalopoulos v. Greece, E.C.H.R. Serial A, No 330-B (1995), 
p. 36. See e.g. Rodriquez v. Uruguay (322/88), CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988 (1994); 2 IHRR 12 (1995); 
Blancov v. Nicaragua (328/88), CCPR/C/51/D/328/1988 (1994); 2 IHRR 123 (1995); and Bautista 
de Arellana v. Columbia (563/93), CCPR/C/55/D/563/1993 (1995); 3 IHRR 315 (1996). The most 
impressive and significant jurisprudence on reparations in international human rights law has been 
developed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. This jurisprudence will be studied in the 
next chapter in the context of a discussion of principles of reparation. 
104 European convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 
November 1950, entry into force 3 September 1953, CETS No. 5, as amended by Protocol 11 
CETS No. 155, 11 May 1994, entry into force 1 November 1998. 
105 American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, entry into force 18 July 
1978, 114 UNTS 123. 
106 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ rights on the Establishment of an 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 9 June 1998, entry into force 25 January 2004, 
OAU/LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT.1 rev.2 (1997). 
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The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has interpreted the individual’s right to a 
remedy as stated in Article 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights as requiring 
States to provide reparation to individuals who have suffered a violation of the Convention. 
Importantly, the Court has held that a State which violates the Convention is under a “duty 
to make reparation and to have the consequences of the violation remedied”107. The 
European Court of Human Rights, for its part, has taken a more timid approach to 
reparations. In its jurisprudence, the Court repeatedly refers to the provision of 
compensation “where appropriate”108. The jurisprudence of both Courts, and especially 
that of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, may provide insightful guidance as to 
the examination of reparations in other fields of international law, particularly in 
international criminal law. For this reason, the next chapter (chapter 2) focuses on the 
experience of the Inter-American Court to draw some lessons that can inform, while not 
directly applicable, the development of a civil dimension to international criminal justice 
context. 
 
Beyond the jurisprudence of regional human rights Courts, there have been other 
important developments in this field in the form of soft law. Already in 1985, the United 
Nations adopted the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and 
Abuse of Power109, whereby the right of victims to obtain reparation was emphasised. The 
focus of this Declaration was on reparation for victims of domestic crimes 110 . 
Subsequently, another instrument was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly: 
the Basic Principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of 
gross violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law111. 
The right of victims of gross violations of international human rights law or serious 
violations of international humanitarian law to obtain reparation was enunciated in  Article 
15, pursuant to which:  
 
                                                      
107 IACtHR, Baldeón-García v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 6 April 2006, Series C 
No. 147, para. 147. 
108 See ECtHR, Aydin v. Turkey, Merits, Grand Chamber, 25 September 1997, 25 EHRR 
251, para. 103. 
109 GA Res. 40/34, 29 Nov 1985. 
110 Cherif Bassiouni, “International Recognition of Victims’ Rights”, Human Rights Law 
Review 6 (2006),  pp. 203-279. 
111 GA Res. A/RES/60/147, 16 Dec 2005. 
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“In accordance with its domestic laws and international legal obligations, a 
State shall provide reparation to victims for acts or omissions which can be 
attributed to the State and constitute gross violations of international 
human rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian law.” 
 
Other recent documents have also affirmed victims’ right to receive reparation. For 
example, the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United 
Nations Secretary-General concluded that, on the basis of human rights law,  
 
“the proposition is warranted that at present, whenever a gross breach of 
human rights is committed which also amounts to an international crime, 
customary international law not only provides for the criminal liability of 
the individuals who have committed that breach, but also imposes an 
obligation on States of which the perpetrators are nationals, or for which 
they acted as de jure or de facto organs, to make reparation (including 
compensation) for the damage made”112. 
  
This brief analysis demonstrates that reparation for victims of conflicts is a basic 
tenet of international human rights law113. The concept of individual redress for victims of 
armed conflict is not as alien as it used to be before the development of international 
human rights law. 
 
Be that as it may, it remains that, in spite of the impressive number of instruments 
providing for the possibility of seeking a remedy, as discussed above, there remains a large 
gap whereby individuals might not obtain redress through international human rights 
mechanisms. International human rights law is built upon the premise of State 
responsibility for violations of rights. This explains two limitations of international human 
rights law for the award of reparations to individual victims of international wrongful acts. 
The first limitation concerns the fact that victims cannot, under international human rights 
mechanisms, obtain reparation from individual perpetrators, as a State  must have been 
involved in the violation. As it is widely known, many international crimes are committed 
by armed opposition or rebel groups, and thus, because the State in question might not held 
                                                      
112 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations 
Secretary-General, para. 598. 
113 Jurisprudence of regional human rights Courts provide examples of awards of reparation 
in relation to armed conflicts. In the European Court of Human Rights, e.g.: Khatsiyeva et al. v. 
Russia, Merits, 17 January 2008, unreported, Application No. 5108/02, para. 139; Varnava et al. v. 
Turkey, Merits, Grand Chamber, 18 September 2009, unreported, Application No. 16064/90. 
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accountable, the individual victim cannot use the mechanism of the international human 
rights system.  
 
The second limitation which stems from this premise is that for a human rights Court 
(such as e.g. the European Court of Human Rights) to award reparation to victims, there 
needs to be a violation of the rights recognized in the basic human right instrument of that 
Court (i.e. the European Convention on Human Rights or the American Convention on 
Human Rights) and the State against whom reparation is sought must have acceded to the 
convention. Finally, the question of extraterritorial application of human rights might also 
restrict the possibility of victims of international armed conflicts to seek redress under 
international human rights law114. 
 
Thus, as it can be seen, international human rights law has provided an important 
avenue for victims who have experienced human rights violations  (and victims of armed 
conflicts) to seek redress, albeit, it does not encompass all victims of violations. This is an 
interesting point to bear in mind for a later discussion of the appropriateness of a 
mechanism for individual redress within the realm of international criminal law. 
 
5. International humanitarian law: reparation and its enforcement 
In this section, the present chapter examines reparations for violations of 
international humanitarian law, within the same perspective of the broader framework of 
victim redress in different fields of international law.  It also considers  the possibilities and 
limitations of provisions of reparation under international humanitarian law.  
 
Victims’ individual right to reparation under international humanitarian law is a topic 
of much debate in legal doctrine115. It is submitted that there exists an obligation to make 
                                                      
114 On this question, see generally, Marko Milanovic, “From Compromise to Principles: 
Clarifying the Concept of State Jurisdiction in Human Rights Treaties”, Human Rights Law Review 
8  (2008), p. 411. 
115 See e.g., Frits Kalshoven, “State Responsibility for Warlike Acts of the Armed forces”, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 40 (1991), p. 827; Christopher Greenwood, 
“International Humanitarian Law (Laws of War)”, in The Centennial of the First International 
Peace Conference, Frits Kalshoven, Kluwer Law International, 2000,  p. 250. 
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reparation stemming from texts of international humanitarian law116, as will be further 
expanded upon below. The controversy however hinges upon whether victims of 
international humanitarian law violations can claim reparation directly from the 
offender117. 
 
In relation to armed conflicts, both international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law may be applicable, the latter being the lex specialis118. In the present 
chapter, this study provides an overview of the question concerning the beneficiaries of 
reparation for international humanitarian law violations119. The present chapter does not 
aim at an extensive analysis of reparations under international humanitarian law120.  
                                                      
116  Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Article 31; Second Protocol to the Hague 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, Article 38; First Geneva Convention, Article 
51; Second Geneva Convention, Article 52; Third Geneva Convention, Article 131; Fourth Geneva 
Convention, Article 148; cf., Rule 150 of the ICRC Rules on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law: “A State responsible for violations of international humanitarian law is 
required to make full reparation for the loss or injury caused.” As to examples of treaty provisions 
in international humanitarian law that establish an obligation to provide reparation for breaches, 
Article 3 of the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907 states that: “A belligerent party which violates 
the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It 
shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.” Similarly, 
Article 91 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 states that: “A party to the conflict which violates the 
provisions of the Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay 
compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed 
forces.” 
117 See e.g., Conor McCarthy, “Victim Redress and International criminal Justice: Competing 
Paradigms, or Compatible Forms of Justice?”,  Journal of International Criminal Justice 10 (2012),  
p. 356.  
118 Cf. ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 136 (2004), p. 178.  
119 See Georges Abi-Saab, “The Specificities of Humanitarian Law”, in Studies and Essays 
of International Humanitarian Law and the Red Cross Principles in Honour of Jean Pictet,  
Christophe Swinarski, Nijhoff ,  1984, p. 269, where it is argued that international humanitarian 
law’s objective goes “beyond the inter-state levels and [reaches] for the level of the real (or 
ultimate) beneficiaries of humanitarian protection, i.e. individuals and groups of individuals”. See 
also, Theodor Meron, “The Humanization of Humanitarian Law”, American Journal of 
International Law 94 (2000), pp. 239-278. 
120 See generally as to this question: Veronika Bílková, “Victims of War and Their Right to 
Reparation for Violations of International Humanitarian Law”,  Mickolc Journal of International 
Law 4 (2007),  pp. 1-11.;  Christian Tomuschat, “Reparation in Favour of Individual Victims of 
Gross Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law”, in Promoting Justice, 
Human Rights and Conflict Resolution through International Law,  Marcelo G. Kohen,  Nijhoff, 
2007; Rainer Hofmann, “Victims of Violations of International Humanitarian Law: do they have an 
Individual Right to Reparation against States under International Law?”, in Common Values in 
International Law: Essays in Honour of Christian Tomuschat, Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al., Kehl 
Engel, 2006; Emanuela-Chiarra Gillard, “Reparation for Violations of International Humanitarian 
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A study by the International Law Association addressing the question of reparations 
for victims of armed conflict devotes some attention to the conceptualisation of 
“victims”121 for purposes of the application of the principles proclaimed therein: 
 
“1. For the purposes of this Declaration, the term ‘victim’ means natural or 
legal persons who have suffered harm as a result of a violation of the rules 
of international law applicable in armed conflict. 
 
2. This provision is without prejudice to the right of other persons - in 
particular those in a family or civil law relationship to the victim - to 
submit a claim on behalf of victims provided that there is a legal interest 
therein. This may be the case where the victim is a minor child, 
incapacitated or otherwise unable to claim reparation.”122 
 
According to this conception of “victims”, there must be (1) a violation of 
international law applicable in armed conflicts; (2) a harm must have been suffered; (3) 
there must be a link between the harm suffered and the violation of the international law 
applicable in armed conflict123. It has been argued that international humanitarian law 
ensures the protection and assistance to individuals that are victims of an armed conflict 
but when that same individual becomes a victim of a violation of international 
humanitarian law, the protection given by this field of  international law does not seem 
sufficient124. 
 
Delving into the provisions that pertain to reparations for violations of international 
humanitarian law, as far as international armed conflicts are concerned, Article 3 of The 
Hague Convention IV provides that: 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Law”,  International Review of the Red Cross 85 (2003), pp. 529-553. 
121 The word “victim” does not appear in all instruments of IHL. For example, the Geneva 
Conventions and other treaties do not mention the word “victim” in contrast with the Additional 
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts, of 8 June 1977 and the Additional Protocol to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts. 
122 International Law Association, Remedies for Victims of Armed Conflict, 74 International 
Law Association Report Conference 291, 2010, Article 4, p. 302. 
123 See commentary to: International Law Association, Remedies for Victims of Armed 
Conflict, 74 International Law Association Report Conference 291, 2010, Article 4, p. 302. 
124 Liesbeth Zegveld, “Remedies for Victims of Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law”, International Review of the Red Cross 85 (2003), pp. 497-526. 
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“A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the [annexed] 
Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It 
shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its 
armed forces.”125 
   
This same obligation appears in Article 91 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions (concerning violations of the Additional Protocol or of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949)126. The duty to make reparation for violations of international 
humanitarian law is also stated in Article 38 of the Second Protocol to the Hague 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, and it is implied in the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, whereby States cannot absolve themselves for liability incurred in 
respect of grave breaches: First Geneva Convention, Article 51; Second Geneva 
Convention, Article 52; Third Geneva Convention, Article 131; Fourth Geneva 
Convention, Article 148127. 
 
As to non-international armed conflicts, Common Article 3 to the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, Provisions of Additional Protocol II relating to Non-International 
Armed Conflicts128, Article 38 of the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property129, (which expressly refers to the duty of States to provide 
                                                      
125 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 
1907, entry into force 26 January 1910, 9 UKTS (1910). 
126 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, entry into force 7 December 
1978, 1125 UNTS (1979). 
127 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 150: Reparation. 1949 Geneva 
Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field, 12 August 1949, entry into force 21 October 1950; 1949 Geneva Convention (II) for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at 
Sea, 12 August 1949, entry into force, 21 October 1950; 1949 Geneva Convention (III) relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, entry into force 21 October 1950; 
1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 
August 1949, entry into force 21 October 1950. 
128 Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, entry into force 7 
December 1978, 1125 UNTS 609.  
129 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict, 26 March 1999, entry into force 9 March 2004, 38 ILM (1999). 
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reparation, and which applies in any armed conflict), as well as other rules of customary 
international law form the legal framework for reparation in such types of conflict130.  
 
6. Conclusion on the legal duty of reparations 
 From the discussion above, it seems clear that a legal duty exists for States to 
provide reparations for internationally wrongful conduct, including violation of human 
rights norms and international crimes. This stems from decisions of international courts, 
numerous conventions imposing the specific duty to repair, and the ILC Work of State 
Responsibility, some of which were reviewed above.  
 
  Having established this principle, two related questions are pertinent, both of 
which lay the foundation of one of the premises of this study: whether there is a legal duty 
for individuals who have committed international crimes to pay reparations to individual 
victims. The first concerns the beneficiaries of reparations – that is, only States, or also 
individual victims? The second question pertains to whether individuals, just as States, can 
have a legal duty of reparation. These two questions will be addressed next. 
IV. THE BENEFICIARIES OF REPARATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Having set out the positive legal duty of States to provide reparation for violations of 
international human rights law and international law, both in international and non-
international armed conflicts, an important question to be examined is the beneficiary of 
such reparation (i.e. who has the right to reparations), and whether individual victims may 
claim reparations directly. In other words, who can claim reparations from States - the 
individual who suffered harm or solely other States?  
 
The Basic Principles distinguish between the right to a remedy and reparation. The 
latter is the focus of this study, thus the right to a remedy generally will not be discussed in 
the present dissertation131.  
                                                      
130 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 150: Reparation. The ICRC 
concludes in its study on customary international law that a State that has violated the laws of war 
in relation to a non-international armed conflict has a duty to make reparation.  
131 Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005, 
in particular Sections VII and IX. See in particular Chapter 1, Section IV (1) of this study 
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Traditionally, the legal duty of States to repair was not owed directly to individuals, 
but rather to other States, due to the original architecture of international law as rights and 
duties among sovereign States. While legally a State’s legal duty to repair can be owed to 
other States, there is also one fundamental question that should be considered.  
 
When the harm is done solely and directly to individuals, is it morally acceptable that 
the State takes over all rights of reparation from the individual victim (presumably its 
national) without the consent of the victim, and without his/her participation in the 
reparation award, and to the exclusion of the any right of reparation the victim may 
eventually claim? The recent example of the agreement between Turkey and Israel 
concerning the killing of nine Turkish civilians by Israeli commandos on the Mavi 
Marmara flotilla set to Gaza Strip in May 2010 is telling. In this case, the State of the 
victims – Turkey – made an agreement with Israel which excludes any and all rights of 
individual victims (who actually suffered the harm) to claim reparation132.  
 
Importantly however if within the realm of international human rights law, 
individuals are able to claim reparations directly from the State. The entire system of 
international human rights litigation is based on the premise of individuals claiming 
reparations from the State. Thus, the traditional dichotomy of an international legal order 
that is solely on the basis of State vs. State (as having the legal duty and being the 
beneficiary of reparation) is no longer the only possibility when it comes to reparation.  
 
As discussed above, the Basic Principles, provide that victims of gross violations of 
human rights and serious international humanitarian law violations should be provided 
with full and effective reparation. Article 18 provides that:  
“In accordance with domestic law and international law, and taking 
account of individual circumstances, victims of gross violations of 
international human rights law and serious violations of international 
humanitarian law should, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of 
the violation and the circumstances of each case, be provided with full and 
effective reparation, as laid out in principles 19 to 23, which include the 
                                                                                                                                                                   
concerning the right to a remedy and the right to reparations.  
132 See http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.727369.  
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following forms: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and 
guarantees of non-repetition”133.  
 
Furthermore, Article 33(2) of the International Law Commission Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility posits that Part II (which deals with “Content of the international 
responsibility of a State”) “is without prejudice to any right, arising from the international 
responsibility of a State, which may accrue directly to any person or entity other than a 
State”134. Similarly, the commentary on Article 33 furthermore states that: 
 
“When an obligation of reparation exists towards a State, reparation does 
not necessarily accrue to that State’s benefit. For instance, a State’s 
responsibility for the breach of an obligation under a treaty concerning the 
protection of human rights may exist towards all the other parties to the 
treaty, but the individuals concerned should be regarded as the ultimate 
beneficiaries and in that sense as the holders of the relevant rights.”135 
 
 The International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) in reviewing the state of 
customary law regarding reparation in international humanitarian law also asserts a trend 
enabling victims to seek reparations directly from the State. The ICRC Commentary on 
Customary International Humanitarian Law concerning Rule 150 (Reparations) cites 
various examples of individuals seeking reparations directly from States, including: (i) 
Reparation provided on the basis of inter-State and other agreements; (ii) Reparation 
provided on the basis of a unilateral State act; (iii) Reparation sought in national courts136. 
 
A few domestic courts have had to decide cases where individual victims sought 
reparation from a foreign State, outside the realm of international human rights law, for 
violations of international humanitarian law137. While there have been instances – in 
                                                      
133 Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005. 
134  Emphasis added. 
135 International Law Commission, Commentary on Article 33 of the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility. 
136   ICRC, Customary IHL, available at: https://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule150#refFn_2_28, accessed in April 2016. 
137 The question of whether or not States have an obligation to pay reparation to individual 
victims of international humanitarian law violations is intrinsically intertwined with questions of 
State immunity. See e.g.: Maria Gavouneli, “War Reparation Claims and State Immunity”,   Revue 
Hellénique de droit international 50 (1997); Brigitte Stern, “Vers une limitation de 
‘l’irresponsabilité souveraine’ des Etats et chefs d’Etat en cas de crime de droit international?”, in 
Promoting Justice, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution through International Law: Liber 
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Greece138 and Italy139 – where individuals were successful in seeking reparations against a 
State (for crimes against humanity and violations of international humanitarian law), there 
is also case law that stands against the possibility for individuals to claim reparation 
directly from a State140.  
 
Recently, this question was put to the International Court of Justice in the Case 
concerning jurisdictional immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy; Greece 
intervening)141, in relation to the decisions of Greek and Italian Courts mentioned above, 
which awarded reparation to individual victims against a State (Germany) for violations 
that  occurred during the Second World War. The question of whether or not individuals 
have a right to reparation (enforceable against a State) under international humanitarian 
law was debated during the proceedings142. Nevertheless, based on its decision that 
Germany enjoyed immunity under international law, the Court did not deem it necessary to 
dwell upon this question in the Judgment143. It follows  that the question of State immunity 
is a limitation on the possibility of individual victims to obtain reparations from the 
responsible State. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Amicorum Lucius Caflisch, Marcelo Kohen,  Nijhoff, 2007, pp. 511-548. 
138 Prefecture Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Hellenic Supreme Court, 4 May 
2000, Case no. 11/2000. Note however, that the decision was not enforced  due to a lack of 
authorization by the Minister of Justice of Greece. See also, at the European Court of Human 
Rights concerning a similar factual background, Kalougeropoulou and Others v. Greece and 
Germany, Admissibility, 12 December 2002, Application No. 59021/00. 
139 Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, Corte di Cassazione (Sezioni Unite), 11 March 
2004, 87 Rivista di diritto internazionale 539. 
140 See e.g. Bridge of Varvarin case, Landgericht (LG) Bonn, 1 O 361/02, NJW 2004, 525, 
HuV-I 2/2004, 111-113, confirmed by Oberlandesgericht (OLG) Köln, 7 U 8/04.  
141 Judgment of 3 February 2012 (“ICJ State Immunity Judgment”). 
142 See e.g. ibid., Counter-memorial of Italy, 22 December 2009, chapter V, Section II; Reply 
of Germany, 5 October 2010, chapter 4, sections 37-41.  
143 See para. 108 of the ICJ State Immunity Judgment. This Judgment has prompted many 
scholarly commentaries. Recent scholarship concerning this Judgment include: Benedetto Conforti, 
“The Judgment of the International Court of Justice on the Immunity of Foreign States:  a Missed 
Opportunity”, Italian Yearbook of International Law 21 (2011); Riccardo Pavoni, “An American 
Anomaly? On the ICJ’s Selective Reading of United States Practice in Jurisdictional Immunities of 
the State”, Italian Yearbook of International Law 21 (2011); Carlos Espósito, “Jus Cogens and 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States at the International Court of Justice: A Conflict Does Exist”,  
Italian Yearbook of International Law 21 (2011); Mirko Sossai, “Are Italian Courts Directly Bound 
to Give Effect to the Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment?”,  Italian Yearbook of International Law 
21 (2011). 
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Be that as it may, it is important to keep in mind that international law is  constantly 
and tirelessly developing in this field. As was  posited at the beginning of this century,   
 
“A decade ago, it would have been generally understood that only the 
classical approach, which considers war-related individual claims as being 
subsumed by the intergovernmental arrangements for peace, was 
consistent with international law as reflected in practice and doctrine. 
However, the 1990s have witnessed a remarkable, and in some respects 
revolutionary, attempt to restructure the classical approach to peacemaking 
and the resolution of matters relating to the international consequences of 
war. In what may be described as an attempt to replace the traditional 
exclusive government-to-government process of negotiating a 
comprehensive peace treaty, efforts were undertaken to adjudicate claims 
by individuals before regular courts of law.”144   
  
On the question of reparation to victims of violations of international humanitarian 
law, it has been stated that  
 
“[t]here is increasing acceptance that individuals do have a right to 
reparation for violations of international law of which they are victims. 
This is particularly well established with regard to human rights law. Not 
only do many of the specialized human rights tribunals have the right to 
award ‘just satisfaction’ or ‘fair compensation’, but a number of human 
rights treaties also expressly require States to establish a remedy for 
violations before national courts. … The courts of various States have 
considered claims by individual victims of violations of international 
humanitarian law on a number of occasions and the results of such cases 
have been far from uniform.”145  
 
In a similar vein, former President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Judge Jorda, also stressed this development of international 
law for the benefit of individuals in saying  that  
 
“the universal recognition and acceptance of the right to an effective 
remedy cannot but have a bearing on the interpretation of the international 
provisions on State responsibility for war crimes and other international 
crimes. These provisions may now be construed to the effect that the 
obligations they enshrine are assumed by States not only towards other 
                                                      
144  Rudolf Dolzer, “The Settlement of War-related Claims: Does International Law 
Recognize a Victim’s Private Right of Action? Lessons After 1945”, Berkeley Journal of 
International Law 20  (2002), p. 296. 
145 Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, “Reparation for Violations of International Humanitarian Law”, 
International Review of the Red Cross  85  (2003),, pp. 536-537. 
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contracting States but also vis-à-vis the victims, i.e. the individuals who 
suffered from those crimes. In other words, there has now emerged in 
international law a right of victims of serious human rights abuses (in 
particular, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide) to 
reparation including compensation) for damage resulting from those 
abuses.”146 
 
History demonstrates, however, that reparation involving States has been generally 
settled by other means than an individual action against a responsible State: as for 
example, through claims processes and lump-sum agreements between States, especially 
relating to the Second World War, but also more recently147 . Furthermore, claims 
commissions and arbitral tribunals have been set up to deal with reparation claims148; 
without purporting to be exhaustive, some examples of such institutions established to 
settle claims of redress arising out of international armed conflicts, include, in recent years, 
the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission149, the Housing and Property Claims Commission 
(concerning the 1998-1999 conflict in Kosovo)150, the Commission for Real Property 
Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees in Bosnia and Herzegovina151. 
 
Thus, it can be said that under certain circumstances, States as well as individuals 
may be the beneficiaries of reparations claimed directly from a State. It stems from the 
foregoing however that in many instances individual victims are left without reparation 
outside the international human rights system. This is because, inter alia, of the absence of 
arrangements for reparations or because the reparation received does not reach the 
individual victims. The analysis above demonstrates that it is not ideology that is driving 
                                                      
146 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations 
Secretary-General, para. 597, citing a letter dated 12 October 2000 of Judge C. Jorda (the then 
President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) to the United Nations 
Secretary General.  
147 See generally, Pierre d’Argent, Les Réparations de Guerre en Droit International Public, 
LGDJ, 2002; Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law: Volume 1: Rules, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 539 et seq. 
148 See generally, Howard Holtzmann and Edda Kristjánsdóttir, International Mass Claims 
Processes: Legal and Practical Perspectives, Oxford University Press, 2007. 
149 Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and 
the Government of the State of Eritrea, 12 December 2000, 40 ILM 260 (2001). It does not grant 
individuals standing to submit claims. 
150 UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/23, 15 November 1999, UNMIK/REG/1999/23. 
151 Article 1, Annex 7, General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
35 ILM 75 (1996), “Dayton Agreement”.  
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the development of reparation for violations of international law but rather the remnants of 
the historical conception of international law as inter-State relationships. 
 
Be that as it may, the fact that individuals can now claim reparation under 
international law does not by implication create an international obligation on individuals 
rather than States to repair. Does such a legal duty exist under international law and if so, 
what is its content? These are the questions that the present study turns to next. 
V. CONCEPTUALIZING A CIVIL DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: A NEW 
PARADIGM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INDIVIDUAL LEGAL DUTY TO REPAIR 
 
Having explored, on the one hand, some key concepts of two justice theories that 
may provide some theoretical foundations for international criminal law, and on the other, 
the development of the duty of States to pay reparation in other areas of international law, 
this section now discusses the development of the legal basis of the duty of reparation for 
individuals.  
 
The paradigm of this study is individual versus individual (i.e. individuals claiming a 
right to reparation from other individuals). Thus, the fundamental questions relate to the 
legal foundation for this paradigm. The legal duty discussed above is the legal duty of a 
State to provide reparations. The crucial question is thus: what is the basis of the duty upon 
individuals? 
 
Under domestic law, individuals that commit crimes may also face civil or tort 
liability towards their victims, through the system of tort responsibility or responsabilité 
civile. Can this civil dimension be transposed into the international law context? Should 
criminal and civil liability be blended at the international level when it comes to 
international crimes? In this study, this is presented as the civil dimension of international 
criminal justice, which attaches civil liability to the accused and the possibility of civil 
claims of reparation by victims.  
 
At the international level, alongside a right to reparation that victims may claim 
under certain circumstances from States as discussed above, it is worth recalling that the 
United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation 
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for Victims of Gross Violations of International Humanitarian Law confirms that both 
States and individuals have a legal duty to provide reparations for violations of human 
rights and international humanitarian law. According to the Principles: “a State shall 
provide reparation to victims for acts or omissions which can be attributed to the State and 
constitute gross violations of international human rights law or serious violations of 
international humanitarian law.”  Furthermore, where a natural or a legal person is found 
liable, “such party should provide reparation to the victim”152. Thus, under international 
law, according to the Basic Principles, a legal duty of reparation to victims exists for States 
as well as for individual perpetrators. 
 
Under international criminal law, with the advent of the Rome Statute creating the 
ICC, individual perpetrators found guilty of crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court may 
have a legal duty of reparation. The individual right to reparation, and its accompanying 
duty imposed on individuals, have developed at a slower pace than international human 
rights law153. Indeed, a study on reparations in international criminal law explained that: 
 
“The idea that individuals are entitled to have international judicial fora 
deciding upon and awarding reparations is not new. First the European 
Court of Human Rights and then the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, have for decades been awarding victims reparations. As the first 
part of this study shows, the individual’s right to reparation is a 
fundamental human right that is not only expressly guaranteed by global 
and regional human rights instruments but also routinely applied by 
international and national courts. Yet, it is only with article 75 of the 
Rome Statute that the idea of restorative justice against the individual 
perpetrators of violations has become a dimension of international 
criminal justice”154.  
 
Thus, it is not the fact that individuals can now claim a legal right to reparation under 
international law that created an international obligation (under international criminal law) 
                                                      
152 United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation 
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Humanitarian Law, adopted by the UN General 
Assembly Resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005, principle 15. 
153  Christine Evans, “Reparations for Victims in International Criminal Law”, Raoul 
Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, (2012). 
154 Shepard Forman, “The International Criminal Court Reparations to Victims of Crimes 
(Article 75 of the Rome Statute) and the Trust Fund (Aritcle 79): Recommendations for the Court 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence”, Prologue, prepared by the Center for International Cooperation, 
New York University, for the 26 July – 13 August 1999 Meeting of the Preparatory Commission 
for the International Criminal Court. 
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on individuals to repair. The basis of this duty to repair imposed on individuals rather than  
States comes from international criminal law itself, with the advent of the Rome Statute, 
which created a legal duty upon individuals. Article 75 of the Rome Statute, which will be 
examined in more detail in the following chapters, creates thus such duty: 
 
“1. The Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in 
respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation 
[...] 
 
2. The Court may make an order directly against a convicted person 
specifying reparations [...] Where appropriate, the Court may order that the 
award for reparations be made through the Trust Fund provided for in 
article 79”.  
 
 This duty was confirmed by the Appeals Chamber of the ICC in the Court’s first 
case that dealt with reparations (this case will be discussed in detail below). The Appeals 
Chamber unequivocally confirmed that there exists a legal duty of reparation upon 
individuals in international criminal law. The Chamber recognized a “principle of liability 
to remedy harm” and stated that such liability flows “from the individual criminal 
accountability of the perpetrator”155 This is an important point: according to the Appeals 
Chamber, the duty to repair flows from the criminal responsibility of the accused, contrary 
to a pure civil model where the guilt or innocence of the accused generally does not matter. 
In the ICC context, the Appeals Chamber decided, the civil liability is a corollary of 
criminal liability of the individual perpetrator.  
 
Importantly, the Appeals Chamber also affirmed that the individual perpetrator 
(who is found guilty of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC) bears the legal duty to 
repair, even if the payment is to be made through the TFV. In other words, the civil 
liability rests upon the individual perpetrator, regardless of his/her eventual indigence 
condition156.  
 
Thus, in international criminal law, the legal duty to provide reparations is imposed 
on individuals from a different source than the ones discussed earlier in this chapter – it is 
                                                      
155 ICC, Appeals Chamber, “Judgment on the appeals against the ‘Decision establishing the 
principles and procedures to be applied to reparations of 7 August 2012’, 3 March 2015, ICC-
01/04-01/06-3129, paras. 99 and 101. 
156 Ibid., para. 105. 
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a creation of international law itself, and it is included in the formative texts of 
international criminal law. This legal basis is not limitless however. Reparation is not to be 
awarded to any and all victims of every international crime. There are some inherent 
limitations. First, reparation is to be awarded against a convicted person; thus, if an 
accused is not found guilty, then reparation cannot be awarded. Reparation is also for 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and not for all international crimes and/or 
human rights violations. These elements will be further evaluated in chapter 3 concerning 
the operationalization of the duty to repair in international criminal law at the international 
level. At this juncture, it is sufficient to simply introduce some of these limitations in order 
to draw the contours of the definition of the legal duty to repair imposed on individuals. 
 
 Furthermore, this duty on individuals for reparations in relation to international 
crimes is not in any way mutually exclusive of the responsibility of States. As 
Muttukumaru explains, the Rome Statute “does not diminish any responsibilities assumed 
by States under other treaties and will not – self-evidently – prevent the Court from making 
its attitude known through its judgements in respect of State complicity in a crime”157. 
State responsibility in regard to reparations to victims remains, as already discussed158. The 
legal duty imposed on individuals for reparations is additional to that of the State, just as 
the criminal responsibility of individuals did not do away with the responsibility of States, 
as discussed above. 
 This study does not claim that an individualized approach to reparation for 
international crimes (i.e. individual duty to repair) is more progressive or better than a 
State-based approach, which existed prior to this development in international criminal 
law. They are complementary; one is not to substitute the other, and they can  co-exist. As 
it has been stated: 
“[R]esponsibility for reparations should maintain an element of state 
responsibility as those considered to have carried the greatest 
responsibility for serious violations may have exercised functions of state 
                                                      
157  Christopher Muttukumaru, “Reparations to Victims”, in The International Criminal 
Court: the Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, Results, Roy S. K. Lee, Kluwer Law 
International, 1999, pp. 262– 270. 
158  In fact, Article 25(4) of the Rome Statute asserts that: “no provision in this Statute 
relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the responsibility of States under 
international law”.  
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authority. There are inherent dangers in shifting responsibility from states 
towards individuals as this may ultimately leave victims without redress. 
While the shift towards recognising victims and their right to reparations 
in international criminal law is welcome and positive, ideally this should 
operate alongside measures to establish potential state responsibility vis-à-
vis victims”159. 
In this regard, there may be cases where maintaining a State-based approach to 
reparations for international crimes will be more suitable. For example, when States are 
involved and individual perpetrators are declared indigent and may not be able to provide 
reparation for victims. Furthermore, it is crucial to bear in mind one important aspect of 
international crimes: their collective nature. This can be seen as a mismatch with the idea 
of a duty on individuals to provide reparations due to the collective nature of international 
crimes. This is an important question that advocates in favour of a complementary 
approach to reparations for international crimes: individual reparations shall exist and 
further develop alongside States’ duty to repair, which although not the main focus of this 
study, was briefly considered  above160. 
 Conversely, there may be instances where the State is not involved in international 
crimes, and thus, victims cannot claim State responsibility to ground reparations, as for 
example in cases of international crimes by rebel groups. Or, it may be  that if reparations 
are not sought within international criminal justice processes, victims may  find hurdles to 
obtaining reparations from the State 161 . Accordingly, this study argues that a 
complementary approach to reparations, both State-based and individualized, is the most 
appropriate manner to deal with the complexities of international mass crimes. In this 
prism, this study thus proposes to examine the paradigm of the individual vis-à-vis the 
individual, or in other words, the civil dimension of international criminal justice. 
                                                      
159  Christine Evans, “Reparations for Victims in International Criminal Law”, Raoul 
Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, (2012). 
160  For further insightful analyses on States’ duty to repair, see: Albrecht Randelzhofer, and 
Christian Tomuschat, State Responsibility and the Individual: Reparation in Instances of Grave 
Violations of Human Rights, Nijhoff , 1999; James Crawford, The International Law Commission's 
Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries, Cambridge University 
Press, 2002. 
161  See discussion above concerning State immunity and the decision of the ICJ in the case 
of Germany v. Italy. 
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 Interestingly, this link complementarity between individual and State responsibility 
with regards to reparation is expressed in Articles 1 and 2 of the European Convention on 
Compensation of Victims of Crime: 
“1. When compensation is not fully available from other sources the State 
shall contribute to compensate:  
a  those who have sustained serious bodily injury or impairment of health 
directly attributable to an intentional crime of violence;  
b  the dependants of persons who have died as a result of such crime.  
2.  Compensation shall be awarded in the above cases even if the offender 
cannot be prosecuted or punished”162.  
 
VI.  CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
Some conclusions can be drawn from the discussion above. On a legal theory level, 
international criminal justice has been traditionally aligned with theories of punishment, 
retribution and deterrence. International criminal justice as conceived today applies a mix 
of theories, with elements of retributive and restorative or reparative justice theories.  
 
Upon having considered  the possibilities of reparation for victims in other domains 
of international law, it stems that, one way or another, there is some avenue of victim 
redress for violations of international law. This chapter has reviewed how international law 
has evolved to allow individuals (victims) to claim reparations for international crimes. It 
has also overviewed the legal duty of States, and the construction of a legal duty upon 
individuals to provide reparations for victims. This chapter has thus demonstrated the 
evolution of international law concerning reparations: from an earlier singular state-State 
based approach, international law has evolved to include a State vis-à-vis individuals 
model and, more recently, also individuals versus individuals. 
 
It has also been argued that an individualized approach to reparations for mass 
international crimes is not always better or more appropriate than the traditional State-
based approach; it simply offers an additional avenue for victims to obtain redress and 
complement the criminal dimension of international justice with a civil dimension.  
 
                                                      
162 European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes, European 
Treaty Series, European Treaty Series No, 116, Strasbourg, 24.XI.1983. 
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 The enforcement of reparations is a different matter however. The brief overview 
above of the wider legal framework of victim redress under international law demonstrates 
that while reparations claimed directly by individuals under international law (generally 
speaking) is possible under certain circumstances, it remains that in each field of 
international law, there are gaps pertaining to the possibility of obtaining redress. 
 
Having laid this theoretical foundation on justice theories and justifications for 
punishment within international criminal law, and having construed the legal basis of the 
duty of reparation for individuals, the next chapter focuses on the contents of this legal 
duty and to what extent the content of the duty of reparation upon States can inform the 
latter. It does so by looking at one specific system of victim redress, reparations directly 
from the State for human rights violations via international human rights law and 
mechanisms. The next chapter thus examines this question through the lens of one specific 




CHAPTER 2: THE CONTENT OF REPARATION FOR VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: 




In the previous chapter, this thesis examined the divide between punishment and 
reparations in theories of justice, and how areas of law other than international criminal 
law treat the question of reparation for victims. The aim of the previous chapter was to lay 
the foundation of the paradigm of individual versus individual: the construction of a legal 
duty upon individuals to give reparations to victims. It was noted that throughout the 
development of international law, a divide between State responsibility and individual 
criminal accountability has existed. While a State cannot be criminally convicted, and it is 
individual perpetrators that actually commit international crimes, with or without the 
apparatus of the State, international criminal justice law was originally conceived as a tool 
to bring the actual perpetrators to justice, thus enforcing international law. 
 
Alongside this development, international human rights law was conceived so that 
victims can have a forum to claim reparation for human rights violations from the injuring 
State. Before regional human rights courts and mechanisms, victims can enforce their right 
to reparation against States. Thus, human rights law was created in parallel to the law on 
State responsibility, which applied purely on an inter-State level, leaving individual 
victims without an avenue when it came to reparations for harm they had suffered as a 
consequence of acts of other States.  
 
International human rights law has thus filled the gap that existed before: it has 
provided victims with the right to seek  reparation directly from their own States163. 
Victims’ right to reparation has been solidified in the jurisprudence of human rights courts 
and mechanisms. These institutions have contributed a great deal to the elucidation of 
                                                      
163 For reparation to victims of international wrongs committed by third States, see the law 
on the treatment of aliens: see generally, Edwin Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens 
Abroad of the Law of International Claims,  Banks Law Publishing, 1919. This body of law 
however deals with claims on an inter-State level. 
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principles and forms of reparation under international law. Much can be learned from their 
experience. 
 
Another development in international law, which is the main focus of the present 
study, happened through the integration of reparation for victims of international crimes 
within international criminal justice, which from its nature is divorced from State 
responsibility and focuses on individual criminal responsibility. Thus, reparation in 
international criminal law may fill another gap: where  State responsibility (in the 
international human rights system or otherwise) is not engaged, victims may be able to 
claim a right of reparation against the individual perpetrator as discussed in the previous 
chapter.  
 
In this context, in this early stage of the development of applicable principles on 
reparations in international criminal justice and of the architecture of the jurisprudence 
from the ICC,  it is important to reflect upon the content of the legal duty to repair. In this 
development of reparations under international criminal law, principles of reparations will 
need to be solidified and many difficult questions will arise.  
 
Having discussed the legal basis of the duty to repair under international criminal law 
at the international level, the aim of the present chapter is to dwell upon the contents of a 
duty to repair for individuals and to what extent the case law on the contents of duties to 
repair for States can be transposed to the international criminal law setting. This chapter 
has a specific focus and attempts to address some subsidiary research questions as outlined 
above164: what is the scope and content of a duty to repair for individuals? To what extent 
can principles and the case law on the duty of States to repair inform the duty to repair for 
individuals?  
 
This chapter addresses these questions through the study of international human 
rights jurisprudence on reparation and how the latter may inform the development of the 
content of a duty to repair for individuals in international criminal law. This chapter uses 
the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”) given that 
this Court has the most far-reaching jurisprudence in the development of the doctrine and 
                                                      
164 Cf. Introduction to the present thesis. 
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practice of reparation. The selection of the jurisprudence of the IACtHR is thus aimed to be 
focused and provide a case-study which can inform the content of the legal duty to repair 
in international criminal law. In particular, through the analysis of some key cases from the 
IACtHR, this chapter proposes how concretely it can inform individuals’ duty to repair. It 
is acknowledged that the study of international human rights jurisprudence and the 
comparison between human rights law and international criminal law pose very broad 
questions; the purpose of this chapter is however limited and focused, and will thus not 
address an exhaustive discussion of these questions. 
 
This chapter focuses on international human rights law due to the similarities of the 
two fields: like in international criminal law, under international human rights law, victims 
are the direct beneficiaries of reparations. Additionally, the violations that are the object of 
international human rights law are similar to those in international criminal law. 
Furthermore, the link between international human rights law and international criminal 
law has been recognized as: “The reference to human rights in the [Rome] Statute is an 
important recognition of victims’ rights as jurisprudence on redress in international and 
regional human rights systems … has significantly contributed to developing the concept 
of reparations”165.  
 
It should be explained, at the outset, that due to some significant and systemic 
differences of a system based on State responsibility, and one based on individual 
responsibility, the principles and case-law of the IACtHR cannot be directly transposed to 
international criminal law; rather, it is submitted that it may provide some guidance as to 
the contents and scope of the legal duty to repair under international criminal law.  
 
 Within the context of the ICC  concerning principles of reparation, it is interesting to 
note that Parties and participants, as well as the Chamber itself, have referred to the 
jurisprudence of regional human rights courts, particularly the IACtHR and the European 
Court of Human Rights, as well as other texts and documents dealing with the question of 
                                                      
165 Gilbert Bitti &  Gabriela Gonzalez Rivas, “The Reparations Provisions for Victims under 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”, in  Redressing Injustices through Mass 
Claims Processes, Innovative Responses to Unique Challenges, The International Bureau of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, Oxford University Press, 2006,   p. 312.  
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reparations under international law166. It is submitted that this is a positive development 
demonstrating the interconnectedness of different fields of international law.  
 
In its first Decision on Reparations, ICC Trial Chamber I recognised the relevance of 
the experience of human rights institutions, in stating that 
 
“given the substantial contribution by regional human rights bodies in 
furthering the right of individuals to an effective remedy and to 
reparations, the Chamber has taken into account the jurisprudence of the 
regional human rights courts and the national and international 
mechanisms and practices that have been developed in this field”167. 
  
Against this background, in the present chapter, this thesis examines how the content 
of the duty of States to provide reparations to individuals for human rights violations 
developed particularly at the IACtHR could inform the content of the legal duty of 
reparations for individuals. 
 
While not intended to be exhaustive, the present chapter aims at shedding light on 
some interesting aspects of the case-law of the IACtHR that could inform the doctrinal 
foundations of the reparations jurisprudence of the ICC. It also discusses how systemic and 
structural differences between the ICC and the IACtHR may affect  the extent to which the 
ICC can directly draw on IACtHR case law or whether it should be informed by it in a 
more general and indirect manner. The underlying theme of this chapter is that the 
principles and contents found in international human rights law may inform  the content of 
the legal duty of individuals to repair  in international criminal law. Overall, it is submitted 
that much can be learned from a continuous dialogue among regional and international 
institutions committed to  the promotion of international justice and the rule of law168. 
 
                                                      
166 See e.g., ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, “Decision establishing the principles 
and procedures to be applied to reparations”, 7 August 2012, ICC-01/04-01/06 (“Decision on 
Reparations”), para. 186 and footnote 377.  
167 Ibid. 
168 See in this regard, Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, State responsibility in Cases of 
Massacres: Contemporary Advances in International Justice, Inaugural Address as Honorary 
Professor to the Chair in ‘International and Regional Human Rights Courts’, 10 November 2011 at 
Utrecht University, pp. 57-65. 
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II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURTS: DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES 
 
International human rights courts, especially the IACtHR, have dealt with numerous 
cases of mass human rights violations, including cases of massacres. Much can be learned 
in terms of reparation for mass atrocities by looking to the jurisprudence of the IACtHR on 
this topic, considering its vast expertise and experience in the field. While this section 
examines general principles of reparation that could inform the architecture of the 
reparation scheme under international criminal law,  attention will be given to cases of 
mass violations due to their similarity  with international crimes and also the fact that often 
mass violations of human rights amount to international crimes169.  
 
The systems under which the IACtHR and the international criminal courts and 
tribunals operate share some similarities, but they  are also divided by some structural and 
conceptual differences. For example, it has been noted that, although set up for the precise 
purpose of examining claims for reparation, human rights treaty bodies and human rights 
courts often suffer from limited budget and institutional constraints170. Furthermore, by 
their very nature, these institutions have to grapple with the individualized nature of human 
rights complaints when dealing with broader mass atrocities and mass victimisation. These 
constraints also form part of the reality under which the ICC operates. The main similarity 
between these two systems, it can be argued, rests on the nature of the violations that 
underlie both systems: international crimes involve mass violations of human rights. As it 
has been argued:  
 
“The practice of international human rights law bodies, like the IACtHR, 
is relevant for the ICC, not only because the Rome Statute clearly states 
that ‘the application and interpretation of law pursuant to [article 21] must 
be consistent with internationally recognised human rights’ but also 
                                                      
169 See e.g. the crime of torture, which is considered a violation of human rights, which has 
been dealt with in many instances by human rights courts, and may also amount to an international 
crime, see e.g. Article 7 of the Rome Statute. 
170 See e.g. Annual Report of the European Court of Human Rights, 2006, Foreword by Jean 
Paul Costa, President of the European Court of Human Rights,  p. 5 et seq.  
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because most of the time the crimes that the ICC deals with also constitute 
a breach of international human rights law”171.  
 
In a similar vein, former ICC Judge Odio-Benito, stated that: 
 
“The extensive case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
which has defined crucial concepts such as moral damage, damage to a life 
plan, and has interpreted the right to receive reparations taking into 
account the particu- larities of groups or communities (such as indigenous 
groups), could certainly serve as an exemplary model for our future 
judicial work”172. 
 
Importantly, however, some inherent and systemic differences between the IACtHR 
(and human rights systems more generally) and the ICC (and other international criminal 
courts) have a direct impact on how the jurisprudence of the IACtHR may influence the 
development of principles of reparation within the ICC. These differences make it 
impossible to directly transpose and apply the jurisprudence of the IACtHR to the ICC 
context, or more generically, to international criminal law.  
 
For example, human rights reparations are awarded by a State to victims (individual 
or collective reparation awards), rather than against individual perpetrators of international 
crimes. With regards to the form of reparations and the  principles followed for the award 
thereof, it is true that not all forms of reparation awarded on the basis of State liability can 
be directly transposed to international criminal proceedings, which is not aimed at State 
liability. This is a pivotal difference as some of the forms of reparation that have been 
awarded at the IACtHR which may require the participation of the State in question – for 
example, a change in legislation, or the building of a memorial, or the continuation of 
investigations – cannot be directly transposed to the ICC context and applied  to individual 
perpetrators.  
 
                                                      
171 See Octavio Amezcua-Noriega, “Reparation Principles under International Law and their 
Possible Application by the International Criminal Court: Some Reflections”, Reparations Unit, 
Briefing Paper No.1, Dr. Clara Sandoval, University of Essex, 2011, no. 13.	
 
172  Elizabeth Odio-Benito, “Foreword”, in Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes 
and Crimes Against Humanity: Systems in Place and Systems in the Making, Carla Ferstman et al. 
(ed.),  Nijhoff, 2009, p. 3. 
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Furthermore, the aim of human rights systems is to examine claims of reparation 
against a State for its failure to prevent, punish or protect claimant victims.  Conversely, 
reparation within an international criminal tribunal is a direct consequence of an 
international crime perpetrated by an individual. If one looks at Article 75 of the Rome 
Statute, the award of reparations depends on the conviction of the alleged perpetrator, 
whereas convictions of individual perpetrators are not necessary for the award of 
reparations at the IACtHR.  
 
This also highlights a systemic difference between the ICC and the IACtHR 
pertaining to the objective of each system, and the role of victims therein: whereas in the 
IACtHR victims are parties, and the proceedings are aimed at deciding whether there has 
been a violation for which appropriate reparation is required, at the ICC, victims are 
participants in the proceedings, and their claims for reparation are not the principal object 
of the proceedings against the accused, but rather one possible consequence of a guilt 
verdict. Finally, as discussed in more detail below, the applicable law at the ICC may also 
limit the extent to which the ICC can  use the jurisprudence of the IACtHR.  
 
These important systemic, conceptual and structural differences that separate both 
systems  need to be taken into account when assessing whether the jurisprudence of the 
IACtHR can be directly transposed to the ICC. Nevertheless, the principles developed by  
the IACtHR, along with its learned expertise, may prove helpful to the conception of the 
principles of reparation at the ICC. Specifically,  the practice of the IACtHR may  prove 
insightful to the building of a new system of international justice which aims at retribution 
as well as restoration173.  
 
                                                      
173 There are not many studies, at the time of the writing of the present study, which examine 
how the jurisprudence and principles developed by regional human rights courts, and notably the 
IACtHR, could inform the interpretation of the ICC provisions on reparations. I am very thankful 
for  the following contributions, which have provided insightful guidance in writing the present 
article: Elizabeth Odio Benito, “Development and Interpretation of Principles of Reparation: the 
Case Law of the IACHR and its Possible Contributions to the Jurisprudence of the ICC”, in 
Protecting Humanity: Essays in International Law and Policy in Honour of Navanethem Pillay, 
Chile Eboe-Osuji, Nijhoff, 2010, pp. 571-594. See also, Thomas Antkowiak, “An Emerging 
Mandate for International Courts: Victim-Centered Remedies and Restorative Justice”, Stanford 
Journal of International Law 47 (2011), and more generally, Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, 
State Responsibility in Cases of Massacres: Contemporary Advances in International Justice, 
Inaugural Address as Honorary Professor to the Chair in ‘International and Regional Human Rights 
Courts’, 10 November 2011 at Utrecht University, pp. 57-65. 
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Thus, based on the foregoing observations, it seems that while the jurisprudence of 
the IACtHR cannot be readily and directly transposed the ICC context, it can provide 
insightful guidelines as to how the reparation system should develop at the ICC, especially 
in the construction of the contents of the legal duty to repair. In my view, reparations in 
international criminal law can be informed by the jurisprudence of the IACtHR in an 
indirect manner, while bearing dividing differences in mind.  
 
III. THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS TRAILBLAZING 
JURISPRUDENCE ON REPARATIONS174 
 
With the advent of international human rights law, victims of human rights violations 
have been afforded  the right to claim reparation before various fora of human rights 
mechanisms. These include, for example: the European Court of Human Rights, the recent 
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, treaty bodies, and the Inter-American 
Commission for Human Rights. The jurisprudence of these bodies has been rich and 
together, they have contributed to the formation of a meaningful human rights system, 
where victims’ voices can be heard. While the experience of each of  these institutions is 
undoubtedly valuable, this part of the study will focus on the jurisprudence of the IACtHR 
due to its consolidated experience, as well as its extensive, diverse and creative 
jurisprudence that may provide guidance in the architecture of the contents of the legal 
duty to repair in international criminal justice, both at the ICC and beyond. 
 
                                                      
174 On the importance of the jurisprudence of the IACtHR to the development of a rich 
jurisprudence on reparations for human rights violations, see  Philippe Weckel, “La justice 
internacionale en le soixantième anniversaire de la Déclaration Universelle des Droits de 
l’Homme”,  Revue générale de Droit international public 113 (2009), pp. 14-17. 
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1. Contextual background  
The IACtHR and the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights are the main 
organs of the Inter-American system of Human Rights, which monitor the compliance of 
States Parties with their obligations to the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights of 
1979 (Pact of San José)175. This system of human rights protection appears as a response to 
the countless atrocities that have occurred in the Americas in the past centuries, and to the 
struggle of peoples against their governments176. 
 
Article 63 (1) of the Inter-American Convention concerning reparations provides as 
follows: 
 
“1. If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom 
protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be 
ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall 
also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation 
that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that 
fair compensation be paid to the injured party.” 
 
The IACtHR, since its first proceedings, has  cultivated a far-reaching jurisprudence 
on reparations which elaborates on many concepts that are omnipresent in every system of 
reparation and which can be taken into account for the development of reparation 
principles within the ICC. Thus, the present study examines the jurisprudence of the Inter-
American system of human rights through the lens of principles and concepts developed 
therein  in hopes that this may shed light on similar notions at the ICC. 
 
2. The concept of victims: who is entitled to receive reparation? 
This is a key question concerning the award of reparation. The IACtHR has defined 
“victims” as persons whose rights have been violated 177 . A main feature of the 
jurisprudence of the IACtHR in this context is its broad conception of persons entitled to 
                                                      
175  Adopted at the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights,  
San José, Costa Rica, 22 November 1969 (“the Inter-American Convention”). 
176 For an account of civil wars and dictatorships in Latin America in the past, see e.g.  Paul 
H. Lewis, Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America: Dictators, Despots, and Tyrants, Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers,  2005. 
177 Cf. e.g. ICtHR, Amparo v. Venezuela, Reparations Judgment, 14 September 1996, para. 
40.   
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receive reparation; the Court developed the notion of “next of kin” which includes the 
immediate family of the victims, e.g. direct descendants, ascendants, siblings, spouses or 
permanent partners178. The development of the notion of “next of kin” as persons who may 
be eligible to reparation represents an enlargement of those who can receive reparation in 
addition to the direct victim of the violation for which reparation is awarded179. In this 
context, reparations have  often been awarded to spouses and children of the direct victim 
since the Court considered that as a result of the violations, these persons also suffered 
material and moral harm180.  
 
Thus, it stems clearly from the jurisprudence of the IACtHR that the award of 
reparation goes beyond the strict definition of who is a “direct victim” of the violation in 
question and also includes “indirect victims” who may have suffered harm as a 
consequence of the violation181. It goes without saying that the award of reparations is not 
automatic to all persons related to the victim, and the Court has established some criteria 
on the basis of which reparation may be awarded182.  
 
At this juncture, it is also worth mentioning that the Court has taken  a flexible 
approach in cases where the victim could not be found. For example, in cases of forced 
disappearances and massacres, surviving persons have been permitted to  obtain reparation. 
                                                      
178 See IACtHR, Garrido Baigorria v. Argentina, Reparations Judgment, 27 August 1998, 
para. 50.  
179 IACtHR,  Juan Humberto Sanchez v. Honduras, Judgment, 7 June 2003, para. 155; 
IACtHR, Lopez Alvarez v. Honduras, Judgment, 1 February 2006, para. 120. 
180 Ibid.. See also, Elizabeth Odio Benito, “Development and Interpretation of Principles of 
Reparation: the Case Law of the IACHR and its Possible Contributions to the Jurisprudence of the 
ICC”, in Protecting Humanity: Essays in International Law and Policy in Honour of Navanethem 
Pillay, Chile Eboe-Osuji, Nijhoff, 2010, p. 577. 
  181 IACtHR,  Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina, Reparations Judgment, 27 August 1998, 
Series C No 39, paras. 62, 63; IACtHR,  Blake v. Guatemala, Judgment,  22 January 1999, para. 
37; IACtHR,  Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, Reparations Judgment,  22 February 2002, paras. 
33-36; IACtHR,  Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, Reparations Judgment,  10 September 1993, para. 71; 
IACtHR,  Panel Banca v. Guatemala, Reparations Judgment,  25 May 2001, para. 85, 86; IACtHR, 
Case of Street Children v. Guatemala, Reparations Judgment,  26 May 2001,para. 68; IACtHR,  
Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras,  Judgment,  7 June 2003, para. 152; IACtHR,  Loayza 
Tamayo v. Peru, Reparations Judgment, 27 November 1998, para. 92. 
182 See IACtHR,  Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, Reparations Judgment,  10 September 1993, 
paras. 67, 68. 
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Thus, the Court considers as victims not only those who have been killed or forcefully 
abducted, but also those displaced as a result183. 
 
Another interesting aspect of the jurisprudence of the IACtHR, which could shed 
some light on the development of the jurisprudence of the ICC, relates to the identity of a 
victim. In cases related to indigenous groups, for example, the Court has established that 
when no identity document is available, a declaration which is made to the competent 
authority can be used to determine the identity of the victim184.   
 
Thus, it can be seen from the jurisprudence of the IACtHR referred to herein that the 
Court has adopted an approach concerning persons entitled to receive reparation which 
goes beyond a  strict understanding  of who qualifies  as a victim within the system. The 
Court has recognized the inconvenient truth: that human rights violations generally harm 
persons beyond the direct victim and that such individuals shall be considered victims for 
the purposes of claiming and potentially receiving reparations185.  
 
These are important lessons which ought to be kept in mind, in spite of the inherent 
differences that exist between both systems of reparations, for the devising of reparation 
principles within international criminal law. In the context of international crimes, where 
the consequences thereof go beyond the direct victims186 of the crime, affecting families 
                                                      
183 IACtHR, Case of Acosta Calderon v. Ecuador, Judgment,  24 June 2005, para. 154 and 
IACtHR, Case of Mapiripan Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment,  15 September 2005, para. 256. Cf., 
Elizabeth Odio Benito, “Development and Interpretation of Principles of Reparation: the Case Law 
of the IACHR and its Possible Contributions to the Jurisprudence of the ICC”, in Protecting 
Humanity: Essays in International Law and Policy in Honour of Navanethem Pillay, Chile Eboe-
Osuji, Nijhoff, 2010, p. 577.  
184 IACtHR, Case of Moiwana v. Suriname, Judgment,  15 June 2005, paras. 117 and 178; 
IACtHR, Case of Massacre of Plan de Sanchez, Reparations Judgment, 19 November 2004, para. 
62. 
185 IACtHR, Case of Caracazo v. Venezuela, Reparations Judgment,  29 August 2002, paras. 
63-73. 
186 Rule 85 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC provides the following 
definition of victims:  
“For the purposes of the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence: 
(a) ‘Victims’ means natural persons who have suffered harm as a result of the 
commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; 
(b) Victims may include organizations or institutions that have sustained direct harm 
to any of their property which is dedicated to religion, education, art or science or 
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and communities, it is fundamental, in my view, that the award of reparations does not 
follow a  formalistic or inflexible approach as to the persons who can receive reparation. 
3. Assessment of harm 
The IACtHR has produced a very rich jurisprudence concerning the definition and 
classification of damage187. According to the Court, moral damage is the psychological 
impact on a victim or his/her family members as a consequence of the violations of the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention188. This type of damage has been 
considered to include changes and deterioration of the standard of living of the victims and 
eventual financial difficulties or family disintegration189.  
 
An important remark about the jurisprudence of the IACtHR in this respect is that the 
Court has relied on some assumptions as regards the proof of immaterial damages and has 
taken decisions on this basis which stem from the gravity of the violations190. For example, 
the Court has found that aggression and abuses are important causes of moral suffering and 
                                                                                                                                                                   
charitable purposes, and to their historic monuments, hospitals and other places and 
objects for humanitarian purposes.” 
187 Elizabeth Odio Benito, “Development and Interpretation of Principles of Reparation: the 
Case Law of the IACHR and its Possible Contributions to the Jurisprudence of the ICC”, in 
Protecting Humanity: Essays in International Law and Policy in Honour of Navanethem Pillay, 
Chile Eboe-Osuji, Nijhoff, 2010, p. 579.  
188 IACtHR, Case of Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment,  21 July 1989, para. 51.  
189 IACtHR, Case of La Rochela Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment,  11 May 2007, paras. 
262, 263, 264. 
190 See e.g., IACtHR, Case of Mapiripan Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment,  15 September 
2005, para. 267; IACtHR, Case of Villagrán Morales et al v. Guatemala, Street Children Case, 
Reparations Judgment,  26 May 2001, , para. 79 [“in view of the lack of precise information on the 
real earnings of the victims, [the Court] should use the minimum wage for non-agricultural 
activities in Guatemala as a basis”]; IACtHR, Case of Caracazo v. Venezuela, 
ReparationJudgment,  29 August 2002,  para. 88 [in the absence of detailed or reliable information, 
the reference for the Court was the minimum wage in national law]; IACtHR, Case of Panel 
Blanca v. Guatemala, Reparations Judgment,  25 May 2001,  paras. 116-117 [in the absence of 
detailed or reliable information, the reference for the Court was  the minimum wage in national 
law]; IACtHR., Castillo Páez v. Peru, Reparations Judgment,  27 November 1998,  para. 75 [in the 
absence of detailed information, the reference for the Court was the minimum wage in national 
law]; IACtHR, Case of Neira Alegría et al. v. Peru, Reparations Judgment, 19 September 1996,  
paras. 49-52 [the Court determined the loss of income “for reasons of equity and in view of the 
actual economic and social situation of Latin America”]; IACtHR, Case of Maritza Urrutia v. 
Guatemala, Judgment,  27 November, 2003,  paras. 158-159 [the Court determined the loss “in 
fairness”]; IACtHR, Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador, Reparations Judgment,  20 January 1999,  
paras. 66 and 99; IACtHR, Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, Judgment,  3 December 2001,  
para. 51. 
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that no evidence is necessary to arrive at such conclusion191. This is a particularly relevant 
consideration to be borne in mind when developing the contents of the legal duty of 
reparations under international criminal law. This is because it concerns the aftermath of 
international crimes where the gravity of the breach of international law is inherently 
present, but  the moral harm pertaining to the consequences of conflicts and wars is often 
difficult to adduce.  
 
Similarly, in relation to evidence of damage, reliance on presumptions and 
circumstantial evidence has been accepted “when they lead to consistent conclusions as 
regards the facts of the case”192.  
 
The use by the IACtHR of concepts of judicial fairness and equity, both in the 
decision to award moral damages as well as in the quantification of the damages, is worth 
taking into account also in the context of ICC reparations, as the latter may have to make a 
decision as to the award of reparation in contexts, where, for example, there is a lack of 
substantial evidence. In my view, it should not be overly formalistic to the detriment of the 
victim193.  
 
As to material damages, these concern the negative impact of the violations on the 
victim’s earnings or the expenses resulting from the violations194. In this context, the Court 
                                                      
191 IACtHR,  Garrido Baigorria v. Argentina, Reparations Judgment,  27 August 1998, para. 
49; IACtHR, Case of Loaiza Tamayo v. Peru, Reparations Judgment,  27 November 1998, para. 
138; IACtHR, Case of La Rochela Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment,  11 May 2007, para. 256; 
IACtHR, Case of La Cantuta v. Peru, Judgment,  29 November 2006, para. 217.  
192 IACtHR, Gangaram Panday v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations and Costs Judgment,  21 
January  1994,  para. 49.  
193 In some cases, the IACtHR decided on the basis of equity and guided by principles of 
fairness, for example: IACtHR, Case of Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, Reparations Judgment, 
22 February 2002,  para. 54 (a); IACtHR, Case of Goiburú et al. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs Judgment,  22 September 2006,  para. 156; IACtHR, Case of Caracazo v. Venezuela, 
Reparations and Costs Judgment,  29 August 2002,  para. 94 [N.B. the Court established non-
pecuniary damage inter alia “through reasonable application of judicial discretion and in terms of 
fairness”]; IACtHR, Case of Ituango Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs 
Judgment,  1 July 2006,  para. 380; IACtHR, Case of Neira Alegría et al. v. Peru, Reparations 
Judgment,  19 September 1996,  paras. 49-52 [the Court determined the loss of income “for reasons 
of equity”]; IACtHR, Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, Judgment,  3 December 2001,  para. 62; 
IACtHR, Case of Yvon Neptune v. Haiti, Judgment,  6 May 2008,  para. 168 [the amount of 
compensation for moral damage was based on equity]. 
194 IACtHR, Case of Acevedo Jaramillo and others v. Peru, Judgment,  7 February 2006, 
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has also applied numerous assumptions as regards loss of future income and has made 
awards based on the principle of fairness195. The Court has also found that the Judgment 
itself can constitute a form of reparation for material damages, as it will be discussed 
below196. At this juncture, it is also worth mentioning the notion of damage to the “proyeto 
de vida”, a concept developed by the IACtHR, which concerns a long-term reduced ability 
to benefit from life in light of the altered circumstances as a consequence of the 
violation197. 
 
These approaches by the IACtHR as to the assessment of damages may provide 
interesting insights as to  the route that  international criminal law should take with  regards 
to the assessment of evidence of damage and causation, as well as the method of 
quantification of damages. 
4. Collective reparations 
The IACtHR’s experience with collective reparations may prove pertinent for the 
award of reparations in international criminal law in instances where calculating 
individualized reparations for  victims may be a rather difficult task.  The following section 
dwells upon the question of collective reparations in the context of the ICC; in the present 
chapter, the goal is simply to provide  some concrete examples of collective reparations 
from a State-based perspective (in the IACtHR context specifically) to inform collective 
reparations in the international criminal law context.  
 
Again, the jurisprudence of the IACtHR has been a pioneer in this area198. While 
establishing that the award of collective reparation entails direct damage to individual 
                                                                                                                                                                   
para. 301.  
195 IACtHR, Case of Molina Theissen v. Guatemala, Reparations Judgment,  3 July 2004, 
para. 57.  
196 See IACtHR, Case of La Cantuta v. Perú, Judgment,  29 November 2006, para. 162. 
197  See e.g. IACtHR, Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, Reparations Judgment,  3 
December 2001,  para. 80; IACtHR, Case of Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, Reparations and Costs 
Judgment,  27 November 1998,  para. 147. See also C. Droege, “El derecho a interponer recursos y 
a obtenir reparación por violaciones graves de los derechos humanos: guía para profesionales”, 2 
Serie de guías para profesionales, 2007, pp. 141-142; S.G. Ramírez, “Las reparaciones en el 
sistema interamericano de protección de los derechos humanos”, in El sistema interamericano de 
protección de los derechos humanos en el umbral del siglo XXI: tomo I (San José: Corte 
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 2001), pp. 150-152.   
198 Elizabeth Odio Benito, “Development and Interpretation of Principles of Reparation: the 
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victims199, in several cases, collective reparations to entire communities have been  
awarded. These cases deal with massacres of entire communities, as illustrated, for 
example, in the Plan de Sanchez Massacre case, which concerned a massacre to a Mayan 
village by the Guatemalan army. The massacre almost completely destroyed the village. 
During the massacre, women were raped, tortured and assassinated; children were beaten 
to death200. The Court heard the testimony of survivors of the massacre and experts about 
the impact of the crimes on the community as a whole. The Court recognized in its 
Judgment the consequences of violence and extermination towards women for a 
community. The Court, while recognizing that it could not award reparation to victims who 
were not individually indicated, decided to give reparation to the communities where the 
victims used to live201. Furthermore, this case is also interesting in that the Court 
considered the loss of traditions and cultural values (due to the death of those members of 
the community who transmitted such values) and it qualified such loss as grounds for the 
award of moral damages202.   
 
These findings of the IACtHR can be enlightening to the ICC, which will likely have 
a similar task of awarding reparations in the context of massacres, where many victims 
cannot be individually singled out. Similarly, the ICC may also have to grapple with 
having to award reparations for crimes such as mass rape, extermination and torture. In my 
view, like the IACtHR experience demonstrates,  the ICC should take into account the 
impact of certain types of violations on the entire community where the victims come 
from. 
 
The experience of the IACtHR may also prove useful as to the kinds of collective 
reparation that can be awarded. The Court has awarded various kinds of collective 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Case Law of the IACHR and its Possible Contributions to the Jurisprudence of the ICC”, in 
Protecting Humanity: Essays in International Law and Policy in Honour of Navanethem Pillay, 
Chile Eboe-Osuji, Nijhoff, 2010, p. 584.  
199 IACtHR, Case of Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, Reparations Judgment,  10 September 1993, 
para. 83. 
200 IACtHR, Case of Massacre of Plan de Sanchez v. Guatemala, Reparations Judgment,  19 
November 2004.  
201 Ibid., para. 62. 
202  Ibid., paras. 12-49. See also, J. J. Rojas Báez, “La Jurisprudencia de la Corte 
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en Materia de Reparaciones y los Criterios del Proyeto de 
Artículos sobre Responsabilidad del Estado por Hechos Internacionalmente Ilícitos”,  American 
University International Law Review 92 (2007-2008), p. 110.   
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reparations in its jurisprudence, for example203: the creation of a project for the entire 
community to provide potable water and sanitary infrastructure204; establishment of a 
community fund for specific projects for education, health, housing, and agriculture for 
members of the indigenous tribe affected205; educational grants for the population affected 
by the violation206; setting in place safety measures for displaced persons in case they 
decide to return to their villages207; public apology and acknowledgment by the State to the 
community where the human rights violations took place208; the building of memorials as a 
means to prevent the reoccurrence of such serious violations209; and setting up courses in 
human rights210, among others.  
 
This list of collective reparations is of course not exhaustive; the jurisprudence of the 
IACtHR is not exhaustive either, as there are other types of collective reparations that can 
be awarded in cases of massacres211. The point to be taken from these examples of 
collective reparations, awarded in cases of massacres, is the open and creative attitude of 
the Court to award reparations that uniquely  fit the violation with which it is seized. The 
lesson to be learned, it is submitted, is that the overwhelming task of assessing claims of 
reparation for massive human rights violations has not stopped the Court from awarding 
significant redress to victims.  
                                                      
203 See in this regard, Elizabeth Odio Benito, “Development and Interpretation of Principles 
of Reparation: the Case Law of the IACHR and its Possible Contributions to the Jurisprudence of 
the ICC”, in Protecting Humanity: Essays in International Law and Policy in Honour of 
Navanethem Pillay, Chile Eboe-Osuji, Nijhoff, 2010, p. 586. 
204 IACtHR, Case of YakyeAxa v. Paraguay, Judgment,  17 June 2005, paras. 205-206. 
205 Ibid. 
206 IACtHR, Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru, Reparations Judgment,  30 November 2001, para. 
43. 
207 IACtHR, Case of Mapiripan Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment,  15 September 2005, para. 
313. 
208 Ibid. at para. 314.  
209 Ibid., at para. 315. 
210 Ibid. at para. 316. 
211  See e.g. Elizabeth Odio Benito, “Development and Interpretation of Principles of 
Reparation: the Case Law of the IACHR and its Possible Contributions to the Jurisprudence of the 
ICC”, in Protecting Humanity: Essays in International Law and Policy in Honour of Navanethem 
Pillay, Chile Eboe-Osuji, Nijhoff, 2010, p. 586, who claims that: “… until now, these collective 
reparations do not include specific reparations for women survivors of sexual violence such as 
gynaecological clinics, HIV treatment programs, stigma-sharing programs, preventive campaigns 
on violence against women, etc.” 
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5. Types of reparation 
This thesis claims that one lesson that can be learned from the experience of the 
IACtHR is that reparations for mass atrocities ought to take into account the perspective of 
the victim and it should include a holistic approach to reparations, bearing in mind the goal 
and types of reparations that can be awarded.  
 
One of the main challenges of  reparations in the international criminal law context is 
that the accused may not have any financial resources at the end of the trial to pay 
reparations to victims212. This criticism can be easily rebutted if one takes a broader 
approach of what it means to “repair” the harm caused. In this section, this thesis  
examines the jurisprudence of the IACtHR with respect to  the forms of reparations that 
have been awarded to victims of human rights violations. The aim of this section is not to 
be exhaustive, but rather to demonstrate that the mandate of reparations in international 
criminal law can be much more encompassing than the translation of reparations into a 
sum of money. This notion has guided the IACtHR in the development of its jurisprudence 
on reparation for human rights violations. 
 
The IACtHR has taken a broad approach to reparations and has referred to the 
concept of “full reparation”. In this perspective, it went beyond pecuniary reparations213 
and has awarded reparations in the form of restitution214, rehabilitation215, satisfaction and 
guarantee of non-repetition216, reparations of symbolic or emblematic nature, going beyond 
individual victims and having an impact on the community in which the victim belongs.  
 
                                                      
212 See e.g. Saul Levmore, “Reparations in the Wake of Atrocities: A Plan for Encouraging 
Participation by Governments”, Human Rights and International Criminal Law Online Forum, 
Invited experts on reparations question, available at: http://uclalawforum.com/reparations#Levmore  
213 See IACtHR, Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Reparations Judgment,  27 November 
1998, para. 124.  
214 See e.g. IACtHR, Case of Velazquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Reparations Judgment,  21 
July 1989. 
215 See e.g. IACtHR, Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru, Reparations Judgment,  30 November 
2001, para. 42. 
216 See e.g. IACtHR, Case of Villagrán Morales et al v. Guatemala, Street Children Case, 
Reparations Judgment,  26 May 2001. 
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An example of the diversity of forms of reparations ordered by the Court is 
illustrated in the Villagrán Morales and Others case (“Ninõs de la Calle”)217. In addition to 
indemnification for moral and material damage, the Court ordered a change in legislation 
to conform with Article 19 of the American Convention, the transfer of the mortal remains 
of one of the assassinated children and its exhumation in the place chosen by his family 
members, the designation of an educational centre with an allusive name of the victimized 
children and bearing a plate of the five victims as well as the investigation of the facts and 
punishment of those responsible218. This case demonstrates, it is submitted, the willingness  
of the Court to take the perspective of the victim in the award of reparations, their needs 
and their wishes.  
 
Moreover, the IACtHR has awarded reparations to victims consisting of sums of 
money and has also  relied on positive obligations by the State. For example, in the Bulacio 
v. Argentina case219, which concerned the detention and killing of a teenager by the police, 
the Court ordered, in addition to  financial compensation,  the continuation of investigation 
in the case and the adoption of legislative and other measures in order to ensure the non-
repetition of the violation220.  
 
Significantly, the Court has acknowledged that the right to truth221 is also a form of 
reparation222. It has ordered, in this respect, inter alia, “the translation of the American 
                                                      
217 Ibid. 
218 Ibid. 
219 Merits, Reparations and Costs Judgment,  September 18, 2003. 
220 C.f. also, Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, “The Inter-American System of Protection 
of Human Rights (1948-2009): Evolution, Present State and Perspectives”, in Dossier 
Documentaires/Documentary File- XL Session d’Enseignement , Tome II, Strasbourg, IIDH, 2009, 
p. 102. 
221 See Revised final report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of impunity of 
perpetrators of human rights violations (civil and political), 2 October 1997, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Re v.1, para. 19, where the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
stated that: “Every society has the inalienable right to know the truth about past events, as well as 
the motives and circumstances in which aberrant crimes came to be commit ted, in order to prevent 
repetition of such acts in the future. Moreover, the family members of the victims are entitled to 
information as to what happened to their relatives. Such access to the truth presupposes freedom of 
speech, which of course should be exercised responsibly; the establishment of investigating 
committees whose membership and authority must be determined in accordance with the internal 
legislation of each country, or the provision of the necessary resources, so that the judiciary itself 
may undertake whatever investigations may be necessary. The Commission considers that the 
observance of the principles cited above will bring about justice rather than vengeance, and thus 
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Convention and Judgments into the language of the victims … [and also] that these be 
widely disseminated among the victims of violations and … published in official journals 
and newspapers with national circulation.”223 In addition to the right to truth, apology, 
public acknowledgement and acceptance of responsibility are also recognized by the Court 
as fundamental forms of reparation224. The IACtHR and the Inter-American Commission 
have also acknowledged that a Judgment of the Court in this respect provides a form of 
reparation225. Certainly, as the IACtHR itself has recognized, in cases of human rights 
                                                                                                                                                                   
neither the urgent need for national reconciliation nor the consolidation of democratic government 
will be jeopardized.” See also, Report 21/00, Case 12.059, Carmen Aguiar de Lapacó (Argentina), 
29 February 2000, where Argentina guaranteed “the right to truth, which involves the exhaustion of 
all means to obtain information on the whereabouts of the disappeared persons.” 
222 IACtHR, Case of Prison Miguel Castro Castro v. Peru, Judgment,  25 November 2006, 
para. 440. In this sense, the Court has ordered the translation of Judgments into the language of the 
victims and that the Judgments be disseminated among victims of violations, see IACtHR, Case of 
Massacre of Plan de Sanchez v. Guatemala, Reparations Judgment, 19 November 2004, para. 102; 
IACtHR, Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, Reparations Judgment,  3 December 2001, para. 79. 
223 Elizabeth Odio Benito, “Development and Interpretation of Principles of Reparation: the 
Case Law of the IACHR and its Possible Contributions to the Jurisprudence of the ICC”, in 
Protecting Humanity: Essays in International Law and Policy in Honour of Navanethem Pillay, 
Chile Eboe-Osuji, Nijhoff, 2010, pp. 590-591, citing IACtHR, Case of Massacre of Plan de 
Sanchez v. Guatemala, Reparations Judgment,  19 November 2004, para. 102 and IACtHR, Case of 
Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, Reparations Judgment,  3 December 2011, para. 79. 
224 For cases where the Court ordered recognition of responsibility and public apology: 
IACtHR, Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru, Reparations Judgment,  30 November 2001,  para. 44 e) 
and operative paragraph 5 e); IACtHR, Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, Reparations 
Judgment,  3 December 2001,  para. 81; IACtHR, Case of Durand and Ugarte v. Peru, Reparations 
Judgment,  3 December 2001,  para. 39 b) and operative par agraph 4 b); IACtHR, Case of Bámaca 
Velásquez v. Guatemala, Reparations Judgment, 22 February 2002,  para. 84; IACtHR, Case of 
Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras, Judgment, 7 June 2003, para. 188; IACtHR, Case of Plan de 
Sánchez Massacre, Reparations Judgment, 19 November 2004, para. 100. Guatemala apologized 
publicly for the massacre: AP Guatemala Apologizes for 1982 Massacre [available at 
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/ 20050719/aponrelaamca/guatemala_human_rights]. For cases where 
the IACtHR has ordered States to make their Judgments public: IACtHR, Case of Trujillo Oroza v. 
Bolivia, Reparations Judgment,  27 February 2002,  para. 119; IACtHR, Case of Barrios Altos v. 
Peru, Reparations Judgment, 30 November 2001,  para. 44 (d) and operative paragraph 5 d); 
IACtHR, Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, Reparations Judgment,  3 December 2001,  para. 79; 
IACtHR, Case of Durand and Ugarte v. Peru, Reparations Judgment,  3 December 2001, para. 39 
a) and operative paragraph 3 a); IACtHR, Case of Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, Reparations 
Judgment,  22 February 2002,  para. 84; IACtHR, Case of Caracazo v. Venezuela, Reparations 
Judgment,  29 August 2002,  para. 128; IACtHR, Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras, 
Judgment,  7 June 2003,  para. 188. See also UN Human Rights Commission resolutions, 
Resolutions on Impunity E/CN.4/RES/2001/70, 25 April 2001, para 8; E/CN.4/RES/2002/79, para 
9; E/CN.4/RES/2003/72 I, para. 8, where it is recognized that “for the victims of human rights 
violations, public knowledge of their suffering and the truth about the perpetrators, including their 
accomplices, of these violations are essential steps towards rehabilitation and reconciliation.” 
225 IACtHR, Case of Cesti Hurtado Case, Reparations Judgment,  31 May 2001,  para. 59, 
where the Court found that the judgment constitutes satisfaction with regard to the reputation and 
honour of the victim. 
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violations, the Judgment alone may fail to fully do justice to victims226. The point, 
however, is that the focus should not always and in all cases be on pecuniary reparation.  
 
In this sense, in line with the findings of the IACtHR and the Inter-American 
Commission that the right to truth is a form of reparation 227, the ICC is already 
contributing to restoration and reparation within its activities, by investigating situations 
and cases, by outreaching to communities and victims and by revealing certain acts as 
criminal. The same is true for cases before national courts in relation to international 
crimes. 
 
IV.  HOW THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE IACTHR CAN INFORM THE CONTENT OF THE 
DUTY TO REPAIR IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
Many kinds of reparations in international human rights courts can only be ordered 
against a State, as opposed to individual perpetrators. Nevertheless, the above review of 
collective reparation awards and other forms of reparations serve at least two purposes. 
First, it shows that reparation may take various forms in addition to financial compensation 
and that creativity has its place when awarding reparations for acts which are difficult to 
repair. Secondly, principles of reparation may be distilled from these examples in order to  
guide the content of the legal duty to repair for individuals, as well as the principles of 
reparation for the ICC and  the Trust Fund for Victims in their mandate. 
 
As ICC Trial Chamber Judge Odio Benito stated, the jurisprudence of the IACtHR 
“offers evidence of the complementarity between international human rights law and 
international criminal law.”228 It is argued that international criminal law, like other 
                                                      
226 IACtHR, Case of El Amparo v. Venezuela, Reparations Judgment,  14 September 1996,  
para. 35; IACtHR, Case of Neira Alegría et al v. Peru, Reparations Judgment, 19 September 1996, 
para. 56; IACtHR, Case of Castillo Páez v. Peru, Reparations Judgment,  27 November 1998, para. 
84; IACtHR, Case of Blake v. Guatemala, Reparations Judgment,  22 January 1999, para. 55; Case 
of Panel Blanca v. Guatemala, Reparations Judgment,  25 May 2001,  para. 105. 
227 The right to truth, as the Court defined it in the Barrios Alto Massacre case, “se encuentra 
subsumido en el derecho de la véctima o sus familiars a obtener de los órganos competentes de 
Estado el esclarecimiento de los hechos violatorios Ibid. las responsabilidades correspondientes, a 
través de la investigación Ibid. el juzgamiento que previenen los artículos 8 Ibid. 25 de la 
Convención”, IACtHR, Case of Barrios Alto v. Peru, Judgment,  14 March 2001, para. 48. See 
also, IACtHR, Case of Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, Judgment,  25 November 2000, para. 201. 
228 Elizabeth Odio Benito, “Development and Interpretation of Principles of Reparation: the 
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branches of international law, should not develop in a vacuum, without taking into account 
principles and the practice devised and applied in other areas of international law229.  
 
As stated above, the assessment and award of reparations to victims within  
international criminal proceedings is a new phenomenon in international criminal law. This 
is all the more reason to  learn from institutions that have proven experience in the domain, 
albeit from a State-based perspective. It goes without saying that certain  adaptations need 
to be put into place, as there are inherent differences between the two fields of international 
law. It remains, nevertheless, that much can be  borrowed from the jurisprudence of the 
IACtHR in relation  to reparations, especially  pertaining  to cases of massacres.  
 
Turning specifically to the case of the ICC, and how the contents of the legal duty to 
repair for States can inform the legal duty to repair for individuals, some contextual 
analysis is required. As to formal criteria for utilizing international human rights principles 
and jurisprudence to inform the ICC framework for reparations for victims, one first needs 
to inquire into the legal applicability of the former within the Rome Statute “applicable 
law”.  
 
Article 21 of the Rome Statute establishes the applicable law at the International 
Criminal Court: 
“1.         The Court shall apply:    
            (a)     In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence;    
            (b)     In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties 
and the principles and rules of international law, including the established 
principles of the international law of armed conflict;    
            (c)     Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court 
from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, 
the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over 
the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this 
Statute and with international law and internationally recognized norms 
and standards.    
                                                                                                                                                                   
Case Law of the IACHR and its Possible Contributions to the Jurisprudence of the ICC”, in 
Protecting Humanity: Essays in International Law and Policy in Honour of Navanethem Pillay, 
Chile Eboe-Osuji, Nijhoff, 2010, p. 591. 
229 See as an example of the possibility of cross-fertilisation, the IACtHR in the Case of 
Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru  used the definition of sexual violence, and the typification as 
rape of certain acts, of the ICTR Trial Chamber in the Akayesu case: IACtHR, Case of Miguel 
Castro Castro Prison v. Peru, Judgment,  25 November 2006, para. 306, citing: ICTR, Prosecutor 
v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment,  2 September 1998, para. 688. 
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2.         The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in 
its previous decisions.    
3.         The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article 
must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and be 
without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender as 
defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or 
belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, 
birth or other status.”230  
 
As it can be perceived, where appropriate, the Court may apply principles and rules 
of international law (Article 21 (1) (b)). Thus, it could be argued, on a first read, that this 
provision grants the legal basis for the application of principles of international human 
rights law, as developed by the jurisprudence of international human rights courts, within 
the proceedings in the International Criminal Court.  
 
This provision should however be read in light of the 2006 Judgment of the Appeals 
Chamber, whereas it stated that such sources of law can only be applied when there is a 
gap in the Rome Statute231. Furthermore, in its previous Judgment of 13 July 2006, the 
Chamber explained that the sources cited in Article 21 (1) (b) and (c) are subsidiary 
sources and thus cannot be applied so as to create procedures other than those included in 
the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence232.  
                                                      
230 Compare and contrast the applicable law as stated in Article 21 of the ICC Statute with 
the sources of law at the International Court of Justice, pursuant to its Article 38:  
“1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:  
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states;  
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.  
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo 
et bono, if the parties agree thereto.” 
231 ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, “Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court 
pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006”, 14 December 2006, ICC-01/04-
01/06-772, para. 34. 
232 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, “Judgment on the Prosecutor's 
Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying 
Leave to Appeal”, 13 July 2006, ICC-01/04-168, paras. 33-42. 
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It remains however that Article 21 (3) may potentially have a broad effect on the 
application of principles of international human rights jurisprudence to the work of the 
Court, in particular in relation to reparations. This provision states that the application and 
interpretation of the law as stated in Article 21 of the Rome Statute, “must be consistent 
with internationally recognized human rights…” As expected, this provision has been 
much commented upon233. One author has pondered that Article 21 (3) “provides a 
standard against which all the law applied by the court should be tested. This is a sweeping 
language, which, as drafted, could apply to all three categories in Article 21.”234 
 
As to the interpretation of Article 21(3), in its Judgment of 13 July 2006, the Appeals 
Chamber stated that the Rome Statute, being a treaty itself, is to be interpreted in 
accordance with Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties235.  
 
As the Preamble of the Statute recalls, “during this century millions of children, 
women and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the 
conscience of humanity”. The Appeals Chamber, in its Judgment of 14 December 2006, 
dwelled further upon this provision. According to the Chamber: 
 
“Article 21 (3) of the Statute stipulates that the law applicable under the 
Statute must be interpreted as well as applied in accordance with 
internationally recognized human rights. Human rights underpin the 
Statute; every aspect of it, including the exercise of the jurisdiction of the 
Court. Its provisions must be interpreted and applied in accordance with 
internationally recognized human rights; …”236 
 
                                                      
233 See Mahnoush Arsanjani, “The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”, 
American Journal of International Law 93 (1999), p. 22;  Gilbert Bitti, “Article 21 of the 
International Criminal Law Statute and the Treatment of Sources of Law in the Jurisprudence of 
the ICC”, in The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court,  Carsten Stahn and  Göran 
Sluiter, Nijhoff, 2008, pp. 285-304. 
234  Mahnoush Arsanjani, ibid.   
235  United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155 (“VCLT”), p. 331. 
236 ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, “Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court 
pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006”, 14 December 2006, ICC-01/04-
01/06-772, para. 37. 
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Be that as it may, even if the Court is not required per se to refer to principles 
developed by the human rights courts and bodies, such reference may prove very useful 
and insightful in many respects. For instance, as illustrated above, the jurisprudence of 
human rights courts provide many examples of types of reparation awarded to victims.  A 
well-developed practice of awarding collective reparations  could also provide useful 
guidelines for determining  those who can receive reparation and for defining the notion of 
harm.  
 
A number of Judgments and decisions of the ICC Chambers referred to the 
jurisprudence of regional human rights courts to assist in the definition of some terms, such 
as “victim” and “harm”. Such reference to the case law of the IACtHR, if applicable, will 
of course have to be adapted to the circumstances of each case and will need to take into 
consideration the differences that exist between the two systems (see above). Nevertheless, 
it remains that such jurisprudence may serve as trailblazers to some of the difficult 
questions the Court will be concerned with in the years to come. 
 
As to the significance of the jurisprudence of the IACtHR to the development of 
principles and practice of the ICC, in my view, there are numerous ways in which the 
former can inform and, to a certain extent, indirectly influence the latter. First and 
foremost, I am of the opinion that a great contribution of such jurisprudence is the  creative 
and holistic approach to reparations. As Judge Cançado Trindade, former President of the 
IACtHR has posited, in one of his Separate Opinions, 
 
“… one ought to focus the whole theme of the reparations of violations of 
human rights as from the integrality of the personality of the victims, 
discarding any attempt of mercantilization - and the resulting trivialization 
- of such reparations. It is not a question of denying importance to the 
indemnizations, but rather of warning for the risks of reducing the wide 
range of reparations to simple indemnizations. It is not by mere chance 
that contemporary legal doctrine has been attempting to devise distinct 
forms of reparation - inter alia, restitutio in integrum, satisfaction, 
indemnizations, guarantees of non- repetition of the wrongful acts - from 
the perspective of the victims, so as to fulfill their needs and claims, and to 
seek their full rehabilitation. (...) I am not at all convinced by the ‘logic’ - 
or rather, the lack of logic - of the homo oeconomicus of our days, to 
whom, amidst the new idolatry of the god-market, everything is reduced to 
the fixing of compensation in the form of amounts of indemnizations, 
since in his outlook human relations themselves have - regrettably - 
become commercialized. Definitively, to the integrality of the personality 
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of the victim corresponds an integral reparation for the damages suffered, 
which is not at all reduced to the reparations for material and moral 
damages (indemnizations). (...) Article 63(1) of the American Convention, 
on the contrary, renders it possible, and requires, that reparations be 
enlarged, and not reduced, in their multiplicity of forms. The fixing of 
reparations ought to be based on the consideration of the victim as an 
integral human being, and not on the degraded perspective of the homo 
oeconomicus of our days. (...)”237 
 
In my view, this is an important point that goes to the heart of critiques to 
reparations within the ICC, and international criminal law more broadly. As discussed 
above, one of the main challenges of awarding reparations within the context of an 
international criminal trial, in the aftermath of mass atrocities, and against individual 
perpetrators pertain to practical considerations. The first often mentioned is the concern 
that the individual perpetrator may not have the financial ability to pay compensation. 
Nevertheless, at this juncture, it is important to state clearly that such concern, in my view, 
misses the point. It misses the point because it is grounded on a potentially flawed 
premise: the idea that reparations must necessarily be monetary238.  As it has been stated: 
 
“Monetary damages can provide funds for basic necessities. But 
commentators note that many civil plaintiffs want an apology above all 
else, and frequently only file a lawsuit when unsuccessful in obtaining 
one. Several observe that cash damages are often “much less important 
than emotional or symbolic reparation” for litigants. Monetary 
compensation does not aptly address a person’s need for “dignity, 
emotional relief, participation in the social polity, or institutional 
reordering.”239 
 
                                                      
237  IACtHR, Case of Villagrán Morales et al v. Guatemala, Street Children Case, 
Reparations Judgment,  26 May 2001,  Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, paras. 28, 35 
and 37. 
238 There are many short-comings in a monetary award of reparation. It can be argued that 
money does not carry moral or symbolic significance and that money does not heal wounds. Also, 
it appears that monetary awards, especially when victims’ wishes point away from such a type of 
award, places the offender in the centre of the proceedings on reparation which are intended to 
focus on victims; it is not supposed to be translated into a form of punishment of the offender. 
From a moral perspective, money can be spent and its  moral and spiritual value, if any, lost. 
239 Thomas Antkowiak, “Remedial Approaches to Human Rights Violations: The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights and Beyond”,  Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 46  
(2008), p. 284, citing many relevant sources:  Brent T. White, “Say You’re Sorry: Court-Ordered 
Apologies as a Civil Rights Remedy”,  Cornell Law Review 91  (2006), pp.1271-1272; John 
Braithwaite, “A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?”,  UCLA Law 
Review 46 (1999), pp. 1727, 1744 ; Eric K. Yamamoto, Interracial Justice: Conflict and 
Reconciliation in Post-civil Rights America, New York University Press,  1999. 
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Bearing this consideration in mind, the practice of the IACtHR can prove useful in 
its efforts to hear victims and not to focus solely on monetary compensation awards. 
Borrowing this idea, and applying it to ICC reparation proceedings, it can address the 
criticism that reparation awards may not be enforceable against a convicted person if he or 
she does not have financial resources to honour the award.  
 
The reparation phase of proceedings is, more than any other phase, about the victim, 
his/her suffering and how an award may redress such suffering. In this context, it is 
important to take victims’ views into account. For instance, it has been argued that the 
IACtHR’s approach to reparation as not limited to monetary awards has been viewed 
positively and is constructive with victims240. In this regard, it has been noted that, for 
example, Mr. Cantoral Benavides, a victim in a case heard by the IACtHR, claimed that 
the state apology ordered by the Court was a “triumph” to him241. 
 
In conclusion, it is argued that one of the most important contributions of principle 
that the jurisprudence of the IACtHR can provide to the building of a solid jurisprudence 
at the ICC is the idea that harm caused must be accompanied by due reparation to the 
victim; the inclusion of the victim in the centre of the justice process; and the creativity 
exercised by the Court to award reparation even in cases where such an award is neither 
intuitive nor an easy task. This lesson should be borne in mind when the ICC Judges are to 
give life to the grandiose task of trying and punishing the accused while also including 
victims in the process and delivering justice. 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
It seems that, at the current print of international law, the civil and criminal 
dimensions of justice are not completely dissociated, they go in fact hand-in-hand: an 
international crime or a gross human rights violation may entail both the prosecution and 
eventual punishment of the offender as well as the right of the victims to seek and obtain 
                                                      
240 Thomas Antkowiak,  “Remedial Approaches to Human Rights Violations: The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights and Beyond”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 46  
(2008), p. 287. 
241  Carlos M. Beristain, Diálogos sobre la Reparación: Experiencias en el Sistema 
Interamericano de Derechos Humanos (2008), p. 93. 
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reparation. Significantly, the right of victims to obtain reparation has transcended the 
realm of international human rights law and is contemporarily also recognized in 
international criminal law242, demonstrating the doctrinal interconnectedness of the fields 
of international human rights law and international criminal law.  
 
Although the ICC is an international criminal court, its mandate is a noble, yet 
ambitious, one: it includes perspectives for offenders, victims and the broader 
international community. The rights of victims are recognized in the founding documents 
of that institution and the ICC should live up to its grand task. My claim is that 
international courts and tribunals, and international law in general, should work in 
synergy, one feeding off of the other, and ensuring a fertilization and integration of 
systems243. In this perspective, while there are some systemic and structural differences 
between the ICC and the IACtHR which make it impossible to directly apply the 
jurisprudence of the IACtHR in ICC proceedings, the latter can be informed by the 
practice and jurisprudence of the former. This chapter has addressed the question of how 
the principles and case law from the IACtHR (dwelling upon State-based reparations) can 
inform the content of a legal duty of individuals of reparation within international criminal 
law. Within that framework, as this chapter has argued, the experience of the IACtHR in 
cases of reparation proves insightful in many ways in international criminal law244.  
  
                                                      




243  Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind, Nijhoff, 2010, 
pp. 57-65. 
244 Decision on Reparations.  
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CHAPTER 3: OPERATIONALIZING THE DUTY TO REPAIR WITHIN THE SETTING OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS: THE ICC AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL/ HYBRID 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS APPROACHES TO VICTIMS’ REDRESS 
 
International prosecutions pertaining to international crimes are not a contemporary 
phenomenon. Since the end of the Second World War, international prosecutions were held 
in Nuremberg245 and Tokyo246. The suffering of victims during the War was often referred 
to as a justification for the creation of the Tribunals and prosecution of those responsible 
before international fora247. While the American Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson stated 
that a finding of guilt against the defendants meant that “justice may be done to these 
individuals as to their countless victims”248, the conception of justice was through the 
punishment of Nazi and Japanese perpetrators249. Victim reparations for crimes which they 
had suffered were not part of the justice system. The building blocks of modern 
international criminal law, by these historical trials, conceived “justice for victims” 
through a criminal dimension – the trial and punishment of perpetrators – which provided 
victims a symbolic sense of justice. At its inception, international criminal justice had no 
space for a civil dimension that included reparations for victims. 
 
Other more recent international and hybrid criminal tribunals followed this model: 
they delivered justice for victims through the prosecution and punishment of individual 
perpetrators, thus limiting international justice to a criminal dimension, as will be further 
discussed below. It stems from the jurisprudence of the ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals that trial and accountability of perpetrators were their primary goals.  
 
                                                      
245  Created by the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, London, 8 
August 1945 (London Charter).  
246 Created by the Charter for the International Military tribunal for the Far East, Tokyo, 19 
January 1946 (Tokyo Charter). 
247 Luke Moffett, Justice for Victims before the International Criminal Court, Routledge, 
2014, p. 60. 
248 IMT Transcripts Vol. XIX, p. 434, cited in ibid. 
249 Sam Garkawe, “The Role and Rights of Victims at the Nuremberg International Military 
Tribunal”, in The Nuremberg Trials: International Criminal Law since 1945, IBID.. Reginbogin, 
C. Safferling, and IBID.. Hippel (eds.), Kluwer, 2006, pp. 86-94, p. 86, cited in ibid., p. 61. 
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Developments in modern international criminal law not only mean that victims play 
a more active role in the proceedings250, but also include the possibility of the award of 
reparations, by imposing a legal duty on individual perpetrators. One of the main 
innovations of the ICC as compared to other precursor international criminal tribunals was 
to incorporate victims’ rights within the framework of an international criminal tribunal251. 
This change in the dynamics of international criminal law however brings about many 
questions, challenges and critiques.  
 
Having discussed in other chapters some theoretical questions relating to the 
development of a right to reparations under international law, the construction of a legal 
duty of reparation for individuals, and different forms of reparation in the context of 
international human rights law, this chapter now discusses the different approaches of 
international criminal and hybrid tribunals to victims’ redress. Using a descriptive and 
comparative methodology, this chapter juxtaposes the different models established by 
these tribunals pertaining to redress for victims of international crimes in order to assess 
the feasibility and desirability, based on a “lessons learned approach”, of including a civil 
dimension in international criminal trials.  
 
In this regard, this chapter addresses the following research sub-questions: 
§ How do different international/hybrid courts and tribunals compare and 
contrast in regards to reparations for victims?  
§ How can the civil dimension of international criminal justice operationalize 
within the setting of international criminal tribunals?  
                                                      
250 Concerning victim participation in criminal proceedings, see e.g. Serge Vasiliev, “Victim 
Participation Revisited: What the ICC is learning about itself”, in The Law and Practice of the 
International Criminal Court, Carsten Stahn (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2015; Charles P. 
Trumbull, “The Victims of Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceedings”, Michigan 
Journal of International Law  29 (2007), p. 777; Gerard J. Mekjian & Mathew C. Varughese, 
“Hearing the Victim’s Voice: Analysis of Victims’ Advocate Participation in the Trial Proceeding 
of the International Criminal Court”, Pace  International Law Review  17 (2005), pp. 1-413; 
Brianne N. McGonigle, “Bridging the Divides in International Criminal Proceedings: An 
Examination into the Victim Participation Endeavor of the International Criminal Court”, Florida 
Journal of Internatinal Law  21 (2009), p. 93; Christine IBID.. Chung, “Victim's Participation at 
the International Criminal Court: Are Concessions if the Court Clouding Promise”, Northwestern 
Journal of International Human Rights  6 (2007), p. 459. 
251 The focus of the present study concerns victims’ reparations within the ICC and other 
frameworks. This monograph will not review victims’ right to participate in ICC proceedings.  
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§ Are international criminal trials compatible with the adjudication of 
reparation claims in respect to international crimes?  
 
In this light, this chapter dwells upon the manner in which the legal duty to repair 
imposed on individuals can be operationalized at the international level and the extent to 
which international criminal courts and tribunals are compatible with victims’ redress. This 
chapter directly addresses the underlying theme of this study concerning a civil dimension 
of international justice: are the two dimensions (civil and criminal) blurred in international 
criminal justice at the international level? This chapter looks at reparations solely within 
international criminal trials and posits that at the international level, international criminal 
justice developed historically from a criminal dimension outlook to a blend of the civil and 
criminal dimensions with the advent of the ICC. This chapter trails along this spectrum of 
the development of international criminal justice, between the criminal and civil 
dimensions, at the international level. 
 
In this context, in this chapter, I first briefly recall the legacy of the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo trials, the ad hoc criminal tribunals and their approaches to victims and reparation, 
and the more recent courts and tribunals such as the ICC, and the hybrid tribunals of 
Lebanon, Sierra Leone and Cambodia, for example.  I contrast and compare the different 
approaches to reparation in a spectrum, from the early experiences where reparation was 
not part of the proceedings, to the other side of the spectrum, where victims’ redress is an 
integral part of the system. The goal of this chapter is to set out the different models of 
international criminal proceedings and their approaches to victims’ redress for international 
crimes.  
 
 I. HISTORICAL ACCOUNT - ‘WHERE IT ALL BEGAN’: MODERN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW AND THE NUREMBERG AND TOKYO TRIALS 
As already discussed, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials did not provide for a 
possibility of victim reparation252. As a consequence, since victims of Nazi crimes were 
                                                      
252  Concerning the legacy of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, see e.g. Yael Danieli, 
“Reappraising the Nuremberg Trials and their Legacy: The Role of Victims in International Law”, 
Cardozo Law Review  27 (2005), p. 1633; Christian Pross, Paying for the Past: The Struggle over 
Reparations for Surviving Victims of the Nazi Terror, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998; 
Benjamin B. Ferencz, “International Criminal Courts: The Legacy of Nuremberg”, Pace 
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not able to claim civil redress against the perpetrators during the international criminal trial 
proceedings, they obtained reparation through other means, mainly through lump-sum 
agreements253. 
 
The main point of interest, in my view, of the precedent of the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
trials and reparations after World War II is that civil redress in relation to those crimes was 
mainly based on state responsibility254. These trials did not set up a regime for civil redress 
or individual civil responsibility at the international criminal level for the victims of World 
War II crimes (international crimes). Thus, under this regime, to obtain reparation, State 
responsibility was a prerequisite. Fast forwarding to recent conflicts, the problem is when 
State responsibility is engaged, that is, when the State (machinery) is not necessarily 
involved in the international crime. In this scenario, civil redress is not an option255.  
 
It seems paradoxical that while the main point of international criminal justice at its 
inception was to hold individuals criminally accountable for the crimes they committed, 
thus departing from a system based purely on State responsibility as “crimes are committed 
by men, not by abstract entities”256, there is a visible reliance on States for civil redress at 
the international level257. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
International Law Review  10 (1998), p. 203; Won Soon Park, “Japanese Reparations Policies and 
the “Comfort Women” Question”, positions 5, no. 1 (1997), 107-136. 
253 See Ariel Colonomos & Andrea Armstrong, “German Reparations to the Jews after 
World War II: A Turning Point in the History of Reparations”, in The Handbook of Reparations, 
Pablo de Greiff, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 390-419. See also, John Authers, “Making 
Good Again: German Compensation for Forced and Slave Laborers”, in The Handbook of 
Reparations, Pablo de Greiff, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 420-450. 
254 Ibid. 
255 For example, the attempt in Rome to include State responsibility for reparation for 
victims, see report on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Draft Statute and Draft 
Final Act, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/2/Add.1, 1998, article 73: “[b) The Court may also [make an 
order] [recommend] that an appropriate form of reparations to, or in respect of victims, including 
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation, be made by a state]: [if the convicted person is unable 
to do so himself/herself; [ and if the convicted person was, in committing the offence, acting on 
behalf of that state in an official capacity, and within the course and scope of his/her authority]]; c) 
[in any case other than those referred in subparagraph b), the Court may also recommend that states 
grant an appropriate form of reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, 
compensation and rehabilitation].” cited by Thordis Ingadottir, “The Trust Fund of the ICC”, in 
International Crimes, Peace, and Human Rights: The Role of the International Criminal Court, 
Dinah Shelton,  Transnational Publishers,  2000, p. 159. 
256 “Judgment of the Tribunal”, American Journal of International Law 41 (1947), p. 172. 
257 In the criminal dimension, see concerning the relationship between individual and State 
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This gap between the criminal and civil aspects in the aftermath of an international 
crime is slowly closing, as it will be examined below, with new Courts taking into account 
victims’ right to reparation under international law. This new milestone in international 
law – where individuals are not only held criminally liable for their international crimes, 
but also face “civil” liability vis-à-vis their victims – brings about many new challenges 
and questions, which will be examined in this chapter.  
 
II. THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA 
Unfortunately, the years since the Second World War and the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
trials have seen many wars, conflicts, and mass victimisation258. Similar to the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo trials, the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals of former Yugoslavia and Rwanda did 
not provide for a self-standing right of victims to claim reparation from convicted persons, 
within international criminal proceedings259. They address victims’ redress for crimes 
under the jurisdiction of the tribunals in a limited way, through the restitution of 
unlawfully taken property. The ICTY’s and ICTR’s provisions on restitution are very 
similar - respectively, 24(3) and 23(3), which concern penalties - and read as follows: 
“In addition to imprisonment, the Trial Chambers may order the return of 
any property and proceeds acquired by criminal conduct, including by 
means of duress, to their rightful owners.”260 
                                                                                                                                                                   
responsibility:  Beatrice I. Bonafè, The Relationship Between State and Individual Responsibility 
for International Crimes, BRILL, 2009; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, “International Criminal 
Responsibility of the Individual and International Responsibility of the State”, in International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary, Antonio Cassese et al., Oxford University Press, 2002; André 
Nollkaemper, “Concurrence Between Individual Responsibility and State Responsibility in 
International Law”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 52 (2003), p. 615-640. 
258 See M.Cherif  Bassiouni, “Assessing Conflict Outcomes: Accountability and Impunity”, 
in The Pursuit of International Criminal Justice: A World Study on Conflicts, Victimization, and 
Post-Conflict Justice, M. Cherif Bassiouni,  Intersentia, 2010, p.  6: “[…] it is estimated that 92 to 
101 million persons have been killed between 1945 and 2008. That does not include those who 
have died as a consequence of these conflicts, which a World Health Organization projection puts 
at twice the estimated number of persons killed during these conflicts. […] The 313 conflicts 
studied in this project reveal that they involve systematic human rights violations, including 
genocide, crimes against humanity, torture, slavery and slave-related practices, disappearances, 
rape and population displacement”. 
259 See Carla Ferstman & Mariana Goetz, “Reparations before the International Criminal 
Court: the Early Jurisprudence on Victim Participation and its Impact on Future Reparations 
Proceedings”, in Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: 
Systems in Place and Systems in the Making, Carla Ferstman et al., Nijhoff, 2009,  p. 315. 
260 Restitution of unlawfully taken property has been further developed in the Rules of 
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There are conditions that must be fulfilled before the restitution of property can be 
ordered: it must be associated with a crime pursuant to the Statute and it must be the object 
of a specific finding in the Judgment261. Once these conditions are met, the Trial Chamber 
shall, at the request of the Prosecutor, or, acting proprio motu, may, hold a special hearing 
for the determination of restitution262. 
 
Importantly, Rule 106 (“Compensation for Victims”) of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence of the ICTY provides that: 
 
“(A) The Registrar shall transmit to the competent authorities of the States 
concerned the judgement finding the accused guilty of a crime which has 
caused injury to a victim.  
(B) Pursuant to the relevant national legislation, a victim or persons 
claiming through the victim may bring an action in a national court or 
other competent body to obtain compensation.  
(C) For the purposes of a claim made under Sub-rule (B) the judgement of 
the Tribunal shall be final and binding as to the criminal responsibility of 
the convicted person for such injury”263. 
 
It is clear from this provision that reparation for victims (and restorative justice, as a 
consequence thereof) is not part of the Tribunal’s role, nor is it one of its goals. In this 
regard, it is worth recalling that the United Nations Security Council, in resolution 827 of 
25 May 1993, which established the ICTY, stated that: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunals: see Rule 98 ter (B), of the ICTY “rules of evidence”, 
adopted on 10 July 1998: “If the Trial Chamber finds the accused guilty of a crime and concludes 
from the evidence that unlawful taking of property by the accused was associated with it, it shall 
make a specific finding to that effect in its judgement. The Trial Chamber may order restitution as 
provided in Rule 105.” Rule 88 (B) of the ICTR makes a provision to the same extent.    
261 See Susanne Malmström, “Restitution of Property and Compensation to Victims”, in  
Essays on ICTY Procedure and Evidence in Honour of Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Richard May et 
al., Kluwer Law International, 2001, p. 375, cited in  Ilaria Bottigliero, Redress for Victims of 
Crimes Under International Law, Nijhoff, 2004, p. 198.   
262 See Rule 105 of the ICTY and the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, amended on 
30 November 1999, IT/32/Rev. 
263 See Rules 106 (B) of the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, with a very minor 
difference in wording: “Pursuant to the relevant national legislation, a victim or persons claiming 
through him may bring an action in a national court or other competent body to obtain 
compensation” (emphasis added).  
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“The work of the International Tribunal shall be carried out without 
prejudice to the right of the victims to seek, through appropriate means, 
compensation for damages incurred as a result of violations of 
international humanitarian law.”264 
 
This resolution, however, on its face does not seem to exclude, once and for all, the 
possibility for victims to seek reparation through the Tribunals. However, Rule 106 makes 
it clear that the Tribunals are not completely denying that victims of crimes in their 
jurisdiction receive reparation – but this cannot be claimed through the Tribunal.  
 
The Rules Committee of the ICTY, in the drafting process, made it clear that the 
exclusion of victims’ right to reparation from the scope of the Tribunal’s activities was not 
an oversight. It seems that the Tribunal made a clear decision to exclude any role in 
relation to reparation for victims of the crimes which fall under their jurisdiction. It was a 
deliberate decision that the Tribunal’s sole purpose was to prosecute persons who allegedly 
committed crimes under their jurisdiction. 
 
In this respect, it seems worth referring to a Report prepared in November 2000 in 
which the Committee dwells upon the question of victims’ reparation. The Report 
 
“states that it is the view of the judges of the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia that the victims of the crimes over which the 
International Tribunal has jurisdiction have a right in law to compensation 
for the injuries that they have suffered. 
(…) the judges have considered the possibility that the Security Council 
might be requested to amend the Statute of the International Tribunal in 
order to confer upon it the power to order the payment of compensation to 
the victims of the crimes that were committed by the persons whom it may 
convict. 
(…) the judges have, however, come to the conclusion that it is neither 
advisable nor appropriate that the Tribunal be possessed of such a power, 
in particular, for the reason that it would result in a significant increase in 
the workload of the Chambers and would further increase the length and 
complexity of trials. The judges doubt, moreover, whether it would be 
possible for the Tribunal to secure adequate resources to fund such awards 
as it might make. Furthermore, they consider that it would be inequitable 
that the victims of crimes which were committed by persons who are not 
                                                      
264 See Ilaria Bottigliero, Redress for Victims of Crimes Under International Law, Nijhoff, 
2004, p. 201. 
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prosecuted and convicted by the Tribunal would not benefit from any 
orders of compensation that the Tribunal might make.”265 
 
The foregoing does not however suggest that the Tribunal did not deem that 
reparation had no role to play in the aftermath of the mass atrocities that happened in the 
region. In this sense, it was noted that in order to bring about reconciliation in the former 
Yugoslavia and to ensure the restoration of peace, it was necessary that the victims of 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal receive compensation for their injuries266.  
 
 There is no question as to whether or not victims of the crimes under the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunals deserve compensation: this much does not seem to be denied. The 
question is whether the way in which the Tribunals dealt with the issue of reparation – i.e. 
directing it to the appreciation of domestic courts – is satisfactory and attainable.  
 
Be that as it may, the interesting aspects of this 2000 Report refer, in my opinion, to 
the challenges of including a civil dimension (i.e. reparation) within international criminal 
trials. The challenges put forth in the Report provide some justification for not entertaining 
the idea of including victims’ reparations within the mandate of the Tribunal. These remain 
pertinent to date in the context of the critiques of the ICC reparation system (see further 
below) and the challenges it will face in the implementation of this mandate. It also fleshes 
out important considerations for the proposition of other methods of implementing 
reparation for victims, which will be the object of further discussion and conclusions (see 
further below).  
 
                                                      
265 “Victims’ Compensation and Participation”, Appendix to a letter dated 12 October 2000 
from the President of the ICTY addressed to the Secretary-General, ANNEX to UN Doc. 
S/2000/1063 of 3 November 2000, p. 1. The Report further argued that the Security Council 
excluded the possibility of the Tribunal hearing victims’ claims for compensation: “Victims’ 
Compensation and Participation”, Appendix to a letter dated 12 October 2000 from the President of 
the ICTY addressed to the Secretary-General, ANNEX to UN Doc. S/2000/1063 of 3 November 
2000, p. X. See also, in this regard,  Virginia Morris &  Michael P.  Scharf, An Insiders Guide to 
the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia, Transnational Publishers, 1995, 
pp. 167, 286-287, cited in UN Doc. S/2000/1063, para. 24, in support of the idea that the Security 
Council was aware of the issue of reparation for victims but decided not to address it.  
266 “Victims’ Compensation and Participation”, Appendix to a letter dated 12 October 2000 
from the President of the ICTY addressed to the Secretary-General, ANNEX to UN Doc. 
S/2000/1063 of 3 November 2000, p. 2. 
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In a nutshell, it seems that practical considerations played an important role in the 
decision not to have the Tribunal deal with reparation claims. The following were some of 
the reasons: the impact of reparation claims on the Tribunal’s daily work; the possibility of 
causing delays in the accused’s trial; and the costs related to implementing reparation 
awards, among others267.  
 
The ICTY and ICTR mechanisms allow for268: restitution of property and proceeds, 
compensation, and rehabilitation. For restitution of property, Article 24(3) of the ICTY 
Statute and Article 23(3) of the ICTR Statute269 govern the institution. However, as it has 
been argued, victims have not received compensation through the Tribunals and according 
to Common Rule 106 of the ICTY/ICTR, issues concerning compensation are delegated to 
national courts or other competent bodies270. 
 
While these seem to be reasonable concerns, there is a broader issue which appears 
to have been overlooked: does the approach of the Tribunals to leave reparation matters to 
domestic jurisdictions wind up amounting to very little or no reparation at all for victims? 
As it has already been pointed out, given the nature of the crimes and the system of 
prosecution thereof (in an international tribunal set up in The Hague), it may be very 
difficult for victims to access domestic courts in order to claim for reparation, and if they 
are able to do so, they may encounter many practical difficulties to substantiate their 
claim271. Furthermore, one of the reasons for setting up an international tribunal to address 
the crimes committed in the Former Yugoslavia (and the same is true for Rwanda) was 
precisely because it was not possible to prosecute the alleged perpetrators in the State of 
                                                      
267 “Victims’ Compensation and Participation”, Appendix to a letter dated 12 October 2000 
from the President of the ICTY addressed to the Secretary-General, ANNEX to UN Doc. 
S/2000/1063 of 3 November 2000, p. X. 
268  See generally, Susanne Malmström, “Restitution of Property and Compensation to 
Victims”, in  Essays on ICTY Procedure and Evidence in Honour of Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, 
Richard May et al., Kluwer Law International, 2001,  p. 373–84. 
269 Further elaborated by Common Rule 105 of the ICTY and ICTR Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (RPE) and Rule 98 ter (B) of the ICTY RPE/Rule 88 of the ICTR RPE. 
270 Anne-Marie De Brouwer, “Reparation to Victims of Sexual Violence: Possibilities at the 
International Criminal Court and at the Trust Fund for Victims and Their Families”, Leiden Journal 
of International Law 20 (2007),  pp. 214-215. 
271 See Ilaria Bottigliero, Redress for Victims of Crimes Under International Law, Nijhoff, 
2004, p. 202.  
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the locus delictum; difficulties may similarly arise in relation to civil claims for reparation 
as it happens with criminal prosecutions272.  
 
Moreover, as a matter of legal principle, it does not seem entirely equitable that 
victims who have had their property taken are eligible to receive restitution through the 
procedure set up by the Tribunal, whereas victims of heinous crimes such as torture, rape 
and sexual slavery cannot claim other forms of reparation through the Tribunals. This can 
possibly create an undue hierarchy of victims, where some victims have rights to 
restitution within the proceedings of the Tribunals but other categories of victims struggle 
to secure redress outside the auspices of the Tribunals. 
 
This brings this study to address a broader question: the institution of a fragmented 
approach to justice. As the former Prosecutor of the ICTY, Ms. Carla del Ponte, stated: “A 
system of criminal law that does not take into account the victims of crimes is 
fundamentally lacking”273. As stated above, the Report concludes that “the victims of the 
crimes over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction are entitled to benefit from a right to 
compensation”274; nevertheless, implementing a system of reparation for victims “would 
counter all efforts of the last few years to minimize the length of preventive detention, 
which is a fundamental right of the accused, by shortening the trials”275. Importantly, the 
Report further explains that: 
 
“There is a clear trend in international law to recognize a right of 
compensation in the victim to recover from the individual who caused his 
or her injury. …There does appear to be a right to compensation for 
victims under international law. Although there is an emerging right of 
compensation, the law is much less developed on the mechanism by which 
that right can be exercised”276. 
                                                      
272  Ibid.  
273 Carla del Ponte, “Compensating Victims with Guilty Money”, interview with Carla del 
Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda, in Judicial Diplomacy: Chronicles and Reports on International Criminal Justice, 
The Hague, 9 June 2000.  
274 “Victims’ Compensation and Participation”, Appendix to a letter dated 12 October 2000 
from the President of the ICTY addressed to the Secretary-General, ANNEX to UN Doc. 
S/2000/1063 of 3 November 2000. 




The solution to what seems to be incongruous statements of law and principle – i.e. 
on the one hand, victims have a right to reparation under international law, but on the 
other, it is not the Tribunal’s responsibility to implement this right – was the suggestion 
that “a far better approach would be for an international claims commission to be 
established”, a point that was to be considered by the appropriate organs of the United 
Nations277. Nevertheless, such mechanism has not yet been instituted, and one can wonder 
whether it will ever be. 
 
The same result came about in the ICTR278. The former President of the Tribunal, 
Judge Navanethem Pillay, on the issue of compensation, stated that: 
 
“The Judges wholeheartedly empathize with the principle of compensation 
for victims, but … believe that the responsibility for processing and 
assessing claims for such compensation should not rest with the Tribunal. 
… if the Tribunals adds to its responsibilities a whole new area of law 
relating to compensation, then the Tribunal will not only have to develop a 
new jurisprudence; it will also have to expand its staffing considerably and 
establish new rules and procedures for assessing claims.”279 
 
As to the reasoning behind the rejection of implementing provisions on reparation for 
victims in the Statutes and the work of the Tribunals, the ICTR was driven by similar 
concerns. In the words of the then President of the Tribunal:  
 
“Research on compensation schemes presently in operation suggests that 
very few of the eligible victims receive the compensation to which they 
are entitled. Often, only victims represented by counsel achieve a 
satisfactory level of compensation. There are substantial overhead costs in 
collecting and processing documentation and the administration costs are 
usually very high. Victim satisfaction with compensation programmes 
appears to be quite low. Victims usually express considerable frustration 
with the complexity of compensation documentation procedures. … It 
seems likely that if the Tribunal embarks on the processing of claims for 
compensation, then, in addition to any dissatisfaction with its present 
                                                      
277 Ibid. See also, Ilaria Bottigliero, Redress for Victims of Crimes Under International Law, 
Nijhoff, 2004, pp. 206-207. 
278 Cf. Letter of the President of the ICTR to the United Nations Secretary-General, annex to 
a letter of 14 December 2000 by the United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, to the United 
Nations Security Council, UN Doc. S/2000/1198 of 15 December 2000.  
279 Ibid.  
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progress, it can expect to add to this the frustration and disappointment of 
those attempting to establish claims.”280 
 
The Judges at the ICTR, while putting forward the view that victims are entitled to 
compensation for international crimes, offer some suggestions as to ways for victims of the 
crimes committed in Rwanda to receive reparation:  
 
“(a) A specialized agency set up by the United Nations to administer a 
compensation scheme or trust fund that can be based upon individual 
application, or community need or some group-based qualification; 
(b) A scheme administered by some other agency or governmental entity 
on similar lines to (a); 
(c) An arrangement which could operate in tandem with options (a) and 
(b) and which would allow the Tribunal to exercise a limited power to 
order payments from a trust fund for victims actually appearing before it 
as witnesses in a case. It is noteworthy that such a power exists in the 
criminal courts of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, but is especially limited to compensation issues where the issue is 
factually clear and where there is no dispute as to quantum before the 
court. In that jurisdiction, extensive inquiry into compensation issues by 
criminal courts is expressly abjured.”281 
 
While these proposals point to some possible ways of redress for victims of crimes, 
they are only the tip of the iceberg. For such proposals to have any effect for victims, more 
thought would have to go into whether they are actually feasible and desirable in 
practice282.  
                                                      
280 Ibid., paras. 13-14. The latter refers in this regard to the work of Robert Elias, The Politics 
of Victimization: Victims, Victimology and Human Rights, Oxford University Press, 1986, 
especially pages 162, 212 and 238. 
281 Ibid., para. 15.  
282 See e.g. Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, An Insider’s Guide to the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Transnational Publishers, 1995, pp. 167, 286–287, 
concerning the possibility of establishing a claims commission for the victims. Concerning failed 
attempts by former Prosecutor Carla del Ponte to amend the Statute to be able to compensate 
victims, see Anne Marie de Brouwer, Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: The 
ICC and the Practice of the ICTY and the ICTR, 2005, at 406–409, cited in: Anne-Marie De 
Brouwer, “Reparation to Victims of Sexual Violence: Possibilities at the International Criminal 
Court and at the Trust Fund for Victims and Their Families”, Leiden Journal of International Law 
20 (2007), p. 215. For an account that it was not the Tribunals’ role to provide compensation for 
victims, see Ralph Zacklin, “The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals”, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 2 (2004),  p. 544. See on the feasibility of transcending the 
distinction between punishment and court-ordered restitution, Marc Groenhuijsen, “Victims’ 
Rights and Restorative Justice: Piecemeal Reform of the Criminal Justice System or a Change of 
Paradigm?”, in Crime, Victims and Justice: Essays on Principles and Practice,  Hendrik Kaptein &   
Marijke Malsch, Ashgate Publishing,  2004, p. 73. In this respect, according to Van Boven, 
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To conclude, the ad hoc criminal tribunals have been successful from the perspective 
of retribution, trial and punishment of the offenders; they have left a true legacy for 
international criminal justice283. However, part of this legacy is the exclusion or oblivion of 
victim reparation284, as discussed above, by focusing their efforts on the offenders, their 
trial and their punishment. Their legacy will always include the fact that many victims of 
the crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have been, for the most part, left without 
reparation285.  
                                                                                                                                                                   
compensation during criminal proceedings can be regarded as follows: “First, it makes the criminal 
offender more aware that not only was a wrong committed against public order and public welfare 
but, in addition, an injury was inflicted on one or more human beings. Second, it establishes a link 
between punitive measures and measures of reparation. Third, it tends to facilitate and expedite the 
process of obtaining civil damages.”:  Theo van Boven, “The Perspective of the Victim”, in The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Fifty Years and Beyond, Yael Danieli et al., Baywood 
Publishing Company, 1999,  p. 21. 
283 Much has been written recently about the legacy of the ICTY, from many different 
perspectives. See e.g., Máximo Langer & Joseph IBID.. Doherty,  “Managerial Judging Goes 
International, But Its Promise Remains Unfulfilled: An Empirical Assessment of the ICTY 
Reforms”, Yale Journal of International Law 36 (2011),  p. 241-305; Giovanna M. Frisso, “The 
Winding Down of the ICTY : the Impact of the Completion Strategy and the Residual Mechanism 
on Victims”,  Goettingen Journal of International Law 3(2011),  p. 1092-1121; Michael G. 
Karnavas, “The ICTY Legacy: A Defense Counsel's Perspective”,  Goettingen Journal of 
International Law 3 (2011),  p. 1052-1092; Frédéric Mégret, “The Legacy of the ICTY as Seen 
Through Some of Its Actors and Observers”,  Goettingen Journal of International Law 3 (2011) p. 
1011-1052; Maria Swart, “Tadic Revisited : Some Critical Comments on the Legacy and the 
Legitimacy of the ICTY”,  Goettingen Journal of International Law 3 (2011), p.  985-1009; Donald 
Riznik, “Completing the ICTY-Project Without Sacrificing Its Main Goals: Security Council 
Resolution 1966:  A Good Decision”,  Goettingen Journal of International Law 3 (2011),   p. 907-
922; Richard IBID.. Steinberg,  Assessing the Legacy of the ICTY,  Nijhoff, 2011. 
284 See generally on retributive justice Mark A. Drumbl, “Sclerosis Retributive Justice and 
the Rwandan Genocide”, Punishment & Society 2 (2000), p. 287-307. See Irene Scharf, “Kosovo's 
War Victims: Civil Compensation or Criminal Justice for Identity Elimination”, Emory 
International Law Review 14 (2000), p. 1423, who claims that: “Given the apparent present 
inability of the Yugoslav courts to provide civil remedies to the victims at issue here, the question 
follows whether the United-Nations-created Yugoslav Tribunal might offer any assistance in 
developing a system to provide civil compensation to the victims. Unfortunately, the answer to that 
question is apparently negative, for the statute establishing the Tribunal does not provide for 
financial “or other compensation for damages suffered by the victims” of the war”. 
285 See e.g. on the difficulties for victims’ to obtain compensation at the national level: Ilaria 
Bottigliero, Redress for Victims of Crimes Under International Law, Nijhoff, 2004, p. 211. See 
also, Jean Paul Mugiraneza, “Rwanda genocide: why compensation would help the healing”, The 
Guardian, 8 March 2014, available at: http://Ibid..theguardian.com/global-development-
professionals-network/2014/mar/04/rwanda-genocide-victims-compensation (last accessed 11 May 
2016), claiming that “the government has established a fund, Farg, to provide healthcare and tuition 
for survivors. But does this go far enough? Though Rwanda and the international community have 
valiantly pursued justice, financial compensation for genocide survivors has still not materialized”.  
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III. OTHER INTERNATIONAL OR HYBRID CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 
 
A few words on other ad hoc international/ hybrid tribunals are necessary to 
complete the picture of the approach to redress for victims, outside the scope of the ICC 
Statute, which will be discussed lastly. These other tribunals are discussed briefly in this 
chapter and comprise the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”)286 will also be 
reviewed. 
1. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
 
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (“STL”) was inaugurated in March 2009. The 
mandate of the STL is very specific: to bring to justice those responsible for the attack of 
14 February 2005 which killed 23 people, including the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, 
Mr. Rafiq Hariri, and injured many others287.  
 
Following the attacks that occurred in Lebanon in 2005, the Lebanese government 
requested that the United Nations create a tribunal of an “international character”. In 
Resolution 1644, the United Nations Security Council acknowledged the letter of the 
Prime-Minister of Lebanon in this respect288. In January 2007, the Lebanese government 
and the United Nations reached an agreement concerning the creation of the STL, which 
was established in 2007 by resolution 1757, adopted under chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter289. In this resolution, the Security Council did not adopt the Statute of the 
                                                      
286 The Kosovo and East Timor structures are outside the scope of this study due to their 
unique nature. 
287 For an overview of the STL, and special issues facing the Tribunal, see generally: Nidal 
Nabil Jurdi, “The Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon”, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 5 (2007), pp. 1125-1138; Marieke Wierda et al., “Early Reflections 
on Local Perceptions, Legitimacy and Legacy of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon”, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 5 (2007), pp.1065-1081; Choucri Sader, “A Lebanese Perspective 
on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon Hopes and Disillusions”, Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 5 (2007), pp. 1083-1089; Marko Milanović, “An Odd Couple Domestic Crimes and 
International Responsibility in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon”, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 5 (2007), pp. 1139-1152. 
288 See “The Situation in the Middle East”, Security Council Resolution 1644 (2005), 15 
December 2005, S/RES/1644. 
289 See Security Council Resolution 1757 (2007), Adopted by the Security Council at its 
5685th meeting, on 30 May 2007. 
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Tribunal per se as it had done with the ICTY in 1993 and with the ICTR in 1994. Rather, it 
endowed the unratified agreement between the United Nations and Lebanon and the 
attached statute with legal force290. 
 
The STL thus differs from the ad hoc international criminal tribunals in the sense 
that it has a connection with the national legal system of Lebanon, highlighting its hybrid 
nature291. In fact, the staff, including the Judges, are a mix of internationally recruited and 
Lebanese nationals; the applicable law is also mixed.  
 
This fact, in turn, has an impact on provisions for victims. Victims have a more 
active role during proceedings than in other ad hoc criminal tribunals. There is a special 
victims and witnesses unit. Victims also have the right to participate in proceedings292 and 
can play a significant role on trial and appeal293. Article 17 of the STL Statute states that:  
                                                      
290 See Gianluca Serra, “Special Tribunal for Lebanon: A Commentary on its Major Legal 
Aspects”, International Criminal Justice Review 18 (2008).  
291  See in general about hybrid tribunals, Kai Ambos & Mohamed Othmann, New 
Approaches in International Criminal Justice: Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone and Cambodia,  
Max Planck Institute for International Law, 2003;  Cesare P. R. Romano et al.,  Internationalized 
Criminal Courts – Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia, Oxford University Press, 
2004;  Taru Kuosmanen, Bringing Justice Closer: Hybrid Courts in Post-Conflict Societies, Erik 
Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights,  2007. Concerning the nature of hybrid 
tribunals, Jan Erik Wetzel, and Yvonne Mitri explain that:  
“It is not easy to categorize hybrid tribunals due to their varying forms and 
degrees of mixture of these national and international elements. One possibility 
would be to distinguish between hybrid tribunals set up within or outside of a 
national legal framework. An alternative approach would be to divide hybrid 
tribunals into three sub-categories according to their respective legal bases: first, 
tribunals within UN-administrations, such as the internationalized panels in 
Kosovo and Timor-Leste, whose authority ultimately stems from the Security 
Council resolutions establishing the peacekeeping operations; second, tribunals 
set up on the bases of bilateral agreements, such as the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL), the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) 
and possibly a future Special Chamber for Burundi; and third, tribunals set up 
essentially as domestic courts by national law, which however contain a 
considerable degree of international impetus, such as the War Crimes Chambers 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, respectively, as well as the Iraqi Special 
Tribunal.” Jan Erik Wetzel & Yvonne Mitri, “The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: 
A Court Off the Shelf for a Divided Country”, The Law and Practice of 
International Courts and Tribunals 7 (2008),  pp. 86-87. 
292 See Articles 17 and 25 of STL Statute. 
293 See generally concerning victims’ participation at the STL, Jérôme De Hemptinne, 
“Challenges Raised by Victims’ Participation in the Proceedings of the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon”, Journal of International Criminal Justice 8 (2010), pp. 165-179. See also, Cécile Aptel, 
“Some Innovations in the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon”, Journal of International 
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“[w]here the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Special 
Tribunal shall permit their views and concerns to be presented and 
considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by 
the Pre-Trial Judge or the Chamber and in a manner that is not prejudicial 
to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial 
trial.” 
 
While the STL is more progressive towards granting an active role for victims during 
proceedings, in terms of reparation, it stands closer to the ad hoc criminal tribunals. In fact, 
Article 25(3) of the Statute, entitled “compensation to victims” states that:  
 
“Based on the decision of the Special Tribunal and pursuant to the relevant 
national legislation, a victim or persons claiming through the victim, 
whether or not such victim had been identified as such by the Tribunal 
under paragraph 1 of this article, may bring an action in a national court or 
other competent body to obtain compensation”. 
 
Thus, the STL creates an interesting dichotomy in relation to victims’ rights, 
whereby victims have an active role during proceedings, but have no right of redress 
within the auspices of the STL, and are directed to national courts to seek redress. It seems 
still too early to tell whether such a system will guarantee that victims obtain redress for 
the crimes they have suffered. 
 
2. The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) is a product of the civil war that 
devastated the country until the cessation of hostilities in 2002, with the signature in 1999 
of the peace agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Rebel United 
Front. The war left about 1.5 million people internally displaced or refugees and thousands 
of children were raped, killed or conscribed as child soldiers294. The Court was created by 
an agreement signed between the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations in 
2002295. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Criminal Justice 5 (2007),  pp. 1120-1121. 
294  Celina Schocken, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Overview and 
Recommendations”, Berkeley Journal of International Law 20 (2002), p. 436. 
295 See “Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone”, available at: http://Ibid..sc-
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In many aspects, the SCSL is similar to the STL. It has many of the characteristics of 
a hybrid tribunal, with sitting Judges from both Sierra Leone and the broader international 
community.  The SCSL is supported by the Government of Sierra Leone, by international 
human rights groups, the United Nations Security Council, the United States, and the 
European Union296. It sits in the country where the crimes took place. 
 
Similarly to the Statute of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the Statute of 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone also does not recognize a right to reparation for victims 
of crimes under its jurisdiction. Be that as it may, the SCSL has the power to order the 
forfeiture of the property, proceeds and assets of a convicted person to their rightful owner, 
if acquired unlawfully or by criminal conduct, pursuant to Article 19(3)297. This penalty 
can only be invoked after a conviction. It must be noted however that the Lomé Peace 
Agreement foresaw reparations for victims. In this regard, one author explains that:  
 
“Under the Lomé Peace Agreement a reparations program was established 
to address the needs of victims of the war in Sierra Leone, with the 
National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA) designated in 2007 as 
the implementing agency. Despite some progress in community-based and 
capacity-building projects, the Commission has suffered from chronic 
under-funding”298. 
 
In this context, on the basis of new developments at the SCSL, especially the 
conviction of Charles Taylor for crimes committed in Sierra Leone, and the rejection of his 
appeal299, it is regretful that the Statute does not contain any kind of provision concerning 
reparation for victims. The issue of the lack of funding, for one, could be somewhat 
resolved if redress could be obtained from the convicted accused. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=CLk1rMQtCHg%3d&tabid=176  
296  Celina Schocken, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Overview and 
Recommendations”, Berkeley Journal of International Law  20 (2002), p. 436. 
297 See The Hague Justice Portal, “No signs of victim compensation in Sierra Leone: Chief 
Prosecutor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Brenda Hollis deplores the lack of assistance for 
victims”, 18 November 2010, available at: http://Ibid..haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=12284  
298 Ibid. 
299 See Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Judgment, Special Court for Sierra Leone, 18 
May 2012, SCSL, 03-01-T. See also, for the appeals Judgment: Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay 
Taylor, Appeals Judgment, Special Court for Sierra Leone, 26 September 2013, SCSL, 03-01-A. 
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3.  Parting with the trend: the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers (ECCC) 
approach to civil redress in the international criminal scene  
 
Following the conflict three decades ago from 1975 to 1979300, in May 2003, the 
United Nations and the Cambodian government concluded an agreement providing for 
United Nations assistance with the “Extraordinary Chambers” in the domestic courts of 
Cambodia301.  
 
The Extraordinary Chambers were created to prosecute those accused of serious 
violations of Cambodian Penal Law and of international humanitarian law during the 
Democratic Kampuchea period, which is considered to be one of the most violent periods 
in modern history, where the Khmer Rouge is estimated to have killed between 1.5 and 1.7 
million people 302. The Expert Report for Cambodia pursuant to General Assembly 
Resolution 52/135 indicates that this period was “marked by abuses of individual and 
group human rights on an immense and brutal scale”303. Along with other recent initiatives, 
such as the Regulation 64 panels in Kosovo and Special Panels in East Timor (which will 
not be discussed in this study)304, the ECCC is an example of a hybrid criminal tribunal305, 
which operates in conjunction with national and international efforts.  
                                                      
300 Concerning the background to the conflict that led to the creation of the ECCC, see e.g. 
David Chandler, A History of Cambodia, Westview Press, 4th ed., 2008, pp. 254-255; The Group 
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Challenges and Risks Facing the Joint Tribunal in Cambodia”, New Jersey International Human 
Rights 4 (2006), pp. 549,  553-554,  concerning the violations that occurred during this period.  
303 The Group of Experts for Cambodia, Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia 
Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 52/135, 1, U.N. Doc. S/1999/231, A/53/850 (16 March 
1999), para. 18. 
304 See e.g. Suzanne Kartenstein, “Hybrid Tribunals: Searching for Justice in East Timor”,  
Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 (2003), p. 245. 
305 See e.g.  Laura A. Dickinson, “The Promise of Hybrid Courts”,  American Journal of 
International Law 97 (2003), p. 295; Suzannah Linton, “Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: 
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The Court has caught the attention of many commentators, many critical of it306. Be 
that as it may, the focus of this study is not on the structure and operation of the Court307 as 
a whole, nor on its efficiency and its legitimacy; rather, the focus of this study is on the 
reparation provision of the ECCC and an assessment thereof.  
 
The ECCC stands in the middle of the spectrum of examples of mechanisms 
providing reparation for international crimes within international criminal proceedings, 
between the reparation system at the ICC – which is more encompassing in terms of the 
scope of reparation than the ECCC – and the system at other tribunals, which do not have 
provisions on reparation for victims. 
 
The ECCC provide, according to their Internal Rules (as revised on 1 February 2008) 
- rules 10, 11 -  that the Chambers may make an award for reparations to civil parties for 
moral damage, which may take the following forms:  
 
“a) An order to publish the judgment in any appropriate news or other 
media at the convicted person’s expense;  
b) An order to fund any non-profit activity or service that is intended for 
the benefit of Victims; or  
c) Other appropriate and comparable forms of reparation.” 
 
Furthermore, according to the ECCC, it is useful to note that:  
                                                                                                                                                                   
Experiments in International Justice”,  Criminal Law Forum 12 (2001), p. 185. 
306 Sarah Williams, “The Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers-A Dangerous Precedent for 
International Justice”, International & Comparative Law Quarterly 53 (2004); Sylvia De 
Bertodano, “Problems Arising from the Mixed Composition and Structure of the Cambodian 
Extraordinary Chambers” Journal of International Criminal Justice 4 (2006),p. 285-293; Padraic J 
Glaspy, “Justice Delayed-Recent Developments at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia”, Harvard Human Rights Journal  21 (2008), p.143; Tessa V. Capeloto, “Reconciliation 
in the Wake of Tragedy: Cambodia's Extraordinary Chambers Undermines the Cambodian 
Constitution”, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 17 (2008), p. 103; Phuong Pham, et al., “After 
the First Trial: A Population-Based Survey on Knowledge and Perceptions of Justice and the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia”, Available at SSRN 1860963 (2011); Göran 
Sluiter, “Due Process and Criminal Procedure in the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers”, Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 4 (2006), p. 314-326; James P. Bair, “From the Numbers Who 
Died to Those Who Survived: Victim Participation in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia”, University of Hawaii Law Review 31 (2008), p. 507. 
307 For an excellent recent study concerning the ECCC: Sergey Vasiliev, “Trial Process at the 
ECCC: The Rise and Fall of the Inquisitorial Paradigm in International Criminal Law?” in The 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: Assessing their Contribution to International 
Criminal Law, S Meisenberg & I Stegmiller (eds.), T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016 (concerning inter alia 
the inquisitorial model at the ECCC). 
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“Civil Parties can seek moral and collective reparation. Such reparation 
can only be awarded if an Accused is convicted.   
Moral and collective reparations are measures that: 
a) acknowledge the harm suffered by Civil Parties as a result of the 
commission of the crimes for which an Accused is convicted and 
b) provide benefits to the Civil Parties which address this harm. These 
benefits shall not take the form of monetary payments to Civil Parties. 
The cost of the reparations shall either be borne by the convicted person, 
or by external funding which has already been secured to implement a 
project designed by the legal representatives of the Civil Parties in 
cooperation with the Victims Support Section.”308 
 
Interestingly, to date, some attention has been focused on the reparation mandate of 
the ECCC309. It stems from the framework of the ECCC, and the provision cited above, 
that only civil parties310 are entitled to receive a specific kind of reparation (i.e. moral or 
symbolic)311.  Reparation is to be collective in form. Reparation (thus the civil dimension) 
is connected to a conviction (the criminal dimension) of the accused. The ECCC does not 
provide for the possibility of all kinds of reparation to victims. When victims apply to 
become civil parties the application form permits claimants to propose a type of moral or 
collective reparation that they wish the Judges to make. The ECCC, by recognizing some 
form of reparation for victims within the proceedings before the Court, encompasses a civil 
                                                      
308 ECCC official website available at: http://Ibid..eccc.gov.kh/en/topic/477 (last checked on 
18 June 2013). 
309 See e.g. Toni Holness &  Jaya Ramji-Nogales, “Participation as Reparations: The ECCC 
and Healing in Cambodia”, Cambodia's Hidden Scars: Trauma Psychology In The Wake Of The 
Khmer Rouge, Documentation Center of Cambodia (2012),pp. 2011-2029; Ruben Carranza,  
“Imagining the Possibilities for Reparations in Cambodia”, International Centre for Transitional 
Justice, Briefing Paper (2005); Hae Duy Phan, “Reparations to Victims of Gross Human Rights 
Violations: The Case of Cambodia”, East Asia Law Review  4 (2009), p. 277; Christoph Sperfeldt, 
“Collective Reparations at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia”, International 
Criminal Law Review 12 (2012), pp. 457-490. 
310 On civil parties at the ECCC, and their rights of participation, see generally Alain Werner 
& Daniella Rudy, “Civil Party Representation at the ECCC: Sounding the Retreat in International 
Criminal Law”, Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights  8 (2009), p. 301; 
Johanna Herman, “Reaching for Justice: The Participation of Victims at the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia”, CHRC Policy Paper No. 5, (2010); Silke Studzinsky, 
“Participation Rights of Victims as Civil Parties and the Challenges of Their Implementation 
Before the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia”, in Victims of International 
Crimes: An Interdisciplinary Discourse, Thorsten Bonacker & Christoph Safferling,  TMC Asser 
Press, 2013, pp. 175-188. 
311 See Hae Duy Phan, “Reparations to Victims of Gross Human Rights Violations: The Case 
of Cambodia”, East Asia Law Review  4 (2009). 
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dimension in the proceedings before the Court, through civil liability for perpetrators and 
civil redress for victims. 
 
It is interesting to note that the ECCC has taken the approach that compensation (i.e. 
monetary payments) is not a permissible form of reparation. Symbolic or moral reparation, 
bearing a lower cost and thus surpassing the hurdle of securing financial resources 
available for reparation (and considering the circumstances of the conflict that afflicted 
Cambodia happened decades ago312) is the avenue for victims of the conflict in Cambodia.  
 
The ECCC implemented a new scheme for victim redress which stands in contrast 
with other hybrid tribunals of its generation, and predecessors. It shall also be seen that it 
differs from the scheme established at the ICC, which will be reviewed shortly, both in its 
scope and the manner in which it dealt with victim reparation in its first decision. In this 
regard, this study turns attention first to a unique feature of the ECCC – the concept of civil 
party – and then it turns to examine the first decision on reparation of the ECCC. 
 
A) Civil parties at the ECCC 
 
   A civil party under ECCC proceedings is a victim of a crime being prosecuted at 
the Court who applies to participate as a party in the proceedings, alongside the defence 
and the prosecution. A civil party must be a natural person, or legal entity, who suffered 
physical, material or psychological harm as a direct consequence of one of the crimes 
alleged against the accused313. 
 
The concept of civil party (partie civile) is derived from French law and grants 
victims full-fledged legal party status in proceedings. This means that according to Rule 23 
of the ECCC Internal Rules victims have the right to ‘participate in criminal proceedings’ 
with the status of civil parties and may seek ‘seek collective and moral reparations’. 
                                                      
312  Ibid., at pp. 290-291. 
313 For a discussion of the civil party system at the ECCC, see Alain Werner and Daniella 
Rudy, “Civil Party Representation at the ECCC: Sounding the Retreat in International Criminal 




According to Rule 23(3), civil parties are allowed to be represented as a “single, 
consolidated group” and present submissions on reparations in a “single claim for 
collective and moral reparations”. It follows that, if the accused is convicted, civil parties 
will note be granted individual or material reparations. 
 
While victims have the status of civil parties at the ECCC, the scope of their 
participation has been limited by the judges. In the first case (Case 001) against the Kaing 
Guek Eav (‘Duch’), the Trial Chamber’s decision of 9 October 2009 clarified that victims 
do not have the same standing as the Prosecutor and as such could not question the accused 
or witnesses, nor could they present their views on sentencing314. In the second case  (Case 
002) against senior leaders of the Khamer Rouge, 4000 victims applied to be civil parties 
and the Trial Chamber limited their participation through collective representatives rather 
individually. 
 
Thus, the system at the ECCC is quite unique in the sense that it recognizes victims 
the status of civil parties, with nevertheless limited participation abilities as a result of 
jurisprudential construction and the possibility to claim reparations within the proceedings. 
B) Reparation jurisprudence at the ECCC 
 
 The first case to reach the final conviction verdict, Case 001, granted modest 
reparations. The Trial Chamber ordered as a form of reparation the publication of the name 
of victims in the Judgment and a recording of apologies by the convicted person315. It 
rejected or failed to include various other forms of reparations requested by the civil 
parties316, including the building of memorials and pagodas, and access to health care. On 
appeal, the ECCC Supreme Court accepted 10 additional requests for reparation.  Some of 
                                                      
314 Trial Chamber, “Decision on Civil Party Co-Lawyers’ Joint Request for a Ruling on the 
Standing of Civil Party lawyers to Make Submissions on Sentencing and Directions Concerning the 
Questioning of the Accused, Experts and Witnesses Testifying on Character”, Case 001: Kaing 
Guek Eav (001/ 18-07-2007/ECCC/TC), 9 October 2009. 
315 ECCC, “Judgment”, Case File/Dossier No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 26 July 2010. 
316 Such forms of reparation have been recognized, inter alia, by the jurisprudence of the 
IACtHR, as discussed above. 
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the reparation requests were rejected because of the “because of the lack of financial means 
to ensure their implementation”317. 
 
The first case of the ECCC thus included minimal reparations awards which fell 
short of some form of symbolic and collective reparations. It was also disappointing that 
both Chambers did not take the opportunity to clarify and discuss in-depth the meaning and 
scope of reparations within the ECCC and principles guiding reparations therein. 
 
The second case, Case 002/01, which dealt with Civil parties submitted 13 requests 
for projects for reparation, including building of memorials, creation of a national 
remembrance day, therapy groups, documentation and education projects, among others. 
The Trial Chamber found that these projects complied with the requirements of collective 
and moral reparations. Two projects (relating to a Public Memorials Initiative and the 
construction of a memorial to Cambodian victims living in France) were not endorsed by 
the Chamber given that it was not demonstrated that they had secured sufficient external 
funding318. The appeal on this case is pending at the time of writing319. Other cases have 
not reached the judgment stage at the time of writing320. 
 
From the review of these decisions, it can be pondered that from Case 001 to Case 
002/01 there has already been some recorded progress in terms of reparations awarded. 
The Court is still however shying from providing more clarity and guiding principles on 
the reparations scheme. It is still unclear thus how the jurisprudence on reparation will 





                                                      
317  ECCC, “Appeal Judgment”, Case File/Dossier No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC, 3 
February 2012.  
318 ECCC, “Case 002/01 Judgment”, Case File/ Dossier No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, 7 
August 2014. 
319 As of June 2016. 
320 As of June 2016. 
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IV. REPARATIONS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A CIVIL DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL 
JUSTICE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT  
 
The right of victims to obtain reparation for international crimes is now part of the 
proceedings at the ICC321, by the operation of Article 75 of the Rome Statute322. This 
provision reads as follows: 
 
“1.         The Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in 
respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. 
On this basis, in its decision the Court may, either upon request or on its 
own motion in exceptional circumstances, determine the scope and extent 
of any damage, loss and injury to, or in respect of, victims and will state 
the principles on which it is acting.  
2.         The Court may make an order directly against a convicted person 
specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including 
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.  
            Where appropriate, the Court may order that the award for 
reparations be made through the Trust Fund provided for in article 79.  
3.         Before making an order under this article, the Court may invite and 
shall take account of representations from or on behalf of the convicted 
person, victims, other interested persons or interested States.  
4.         In exercising its power under this article, the Court may, after a 
person is convicted of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, 
determine whether, in order to give effect to an order which it may make 
under this article, it is necessary to seek measures under article 93, 
paragraph 1.  
5.         A State Party shall give effect to a decision under this article as if 
the provisions of article 109 were applicable to this article.  
6.         Nothing in this article shall be interpreted as prejudicing the rights 
of victims under national or international law. ” 
 
As it can be perceived from the foregoing discussion, before the adoption of the 
Rome Statute and the establishment of the ICC, victims had very limited reparation 
possibilities within international criminal proceedings.  As such, this is a novel feature of 
                                                      
321 Gibert Bitti & Gabriela González Rivas, “Reparations Provisions for Victims Under the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”, in Redressing Injustices Through Mass Claims, 
International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration,  2006,  p. 301. 
322 See in this regard, e.g., Gioia  Greco, “Victims’ Rights Overview under the ICC Legal 
Framework: A Jurisprudential Analysis”,  International Criminal Law Review 7 (2007), pp. 531–
547;  Carla Ferstman & Mariana  Goetz, “Reparations before the International Criminal Court: The 
Early Jurisprudence on Victim Participation and its Impact on Future Reparations Proceedings”, in 
Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, Systems in Place 
and Systems in the Making, Carla Ferstman et al., Nijhoff, 2009, pp. 313–350.   
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the permanent international criminal court and one that may have a tremendous impact on 
the architecture and development of international criminal justice, both nationally and 
internationally. It will also likely influence the perception as well as the actual role of 
victims as part of the process of justice in the aftermath of international crimes.  
 
Through the recognition of reparation for victims within the Court proceedings, the 
ICC is developing a civil dimension to international criminal justice. The same judges that 
sit on pre-trial, trial and appeals proceedings, to decide on criminal matters, to decide on 
the guilt or innocence of the accused, and an eventual criminal remedy, also decide on 
important questions of a civil nature, such as principles of reparations, beneficiaries of 
reparations, the type of reparations, the proof required for purposes of reparations, among 
others. The two dimensions of international criminal justice – civil and criminal - are 
apparent in the first case before the Court, examined below.  
 
The interconnectedness of both dimensions is also a feature of the system: for 
example, reparations can only be claimed from the accused person if he or she is convicted 
(Article 75 (2) of the Rome Statute). At the ICC, the link between the criminal dimension 
and civil dimension is such that there is the creation of a sui generis system, where one 
dimension is not completely dissociated from the other. 
 
The distinction between a civil and a criminal dimension is thus useful in this chapter 
as it relates to the beneficiaries of reparation, the forms of reparation and the role of an 
administrative mechanism connected to a judicial process (i.e. the Trust Fund for Victims). 
Through the discussion of these selected topics in this chapter, it will be demonstrated that 
we are moving towards a system that blends the two dimensions before the ICC, where 
many aspects of reparations are dependent upon, and are connected to, the criminal 
dimension of international justice. 
 
This section of the present study focuses on the first case that reached the reparations 
stage before the ICC to set the scene of some of the issues analysed in this chapter. Then, 
this chapter dwells upon beneficiaries of reparation before the ICC and constructions of 
victimhood. The purpose of this chapter, or the present dissertation as a whole, is not to 
discuss in detail the reparation system of the ICC, a question that has been the object of 
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various interesting studies to date323. The goal is to describe and assess in a comparative 
perspective the ICC scheme of reparation for victims of international crimes alongside 
other mechanisms. For this purpose, some key features of the system of reparation at the 
ICC are discussed (without the aim of exhaustiveness) in order to allow for a more 
comprehensive analysis324.  
 
The purpose of this section of the present chapter is to provide a general overview of 
the system of reparation for victims at the ICC, by highlighting its main features325. It is 
important to draw, at first, a descriptive analysis of the unparalleled reparation scheme that 
was created by the ICC, which is, at the time of writing, still at an infancy state. Then the 
way will be paved for the development of normative arguments concerning an assessment 
of the different models of dealing with reparations in the context of international criminal 
trials.  
                                                      
323 See generally, Linda Keller, “Seeking Justice at the International Criminal Court: Victims' 
Reparations”, Thomas Jefferson Law Review 29, (2007), p. 189; Carla Ferstman, “The Reparation 
Regime of the International Criminal Court: Practical Considerations”, Leiden Journal of 
International Law 15 (2002), pp. 667-686; Conor McCarthy, “Reparations under the Rome statute 
of the International Criminal Court and Reparative Justice Theory”, International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 3 (2009), pp. 250-271; Jo-Anne M. Wemmers, Reparation and the 
International Criminal Court: Meeting the Needs of Victims, International Centre for Comparative 
Criminology, University of Montreal, 2006;  Jo-Anne M. Wemmers, “Victim Reparation and the 
International Criminal Court”, International Review of Victimology 16 (2009), p. 123; Frédéric 
Mégret, “The International Criminal Court Statute and the Failure to Mention Symbolic 
Reparation”, International Review of Victimology 16 (2009), pp. 127-147; Conor McCarthy, 
Reparations and Victim Support in the International Criminal Court, Cambridge University Press, 
2012; Eva Dwertmann, The Reparation System of the International Criminal Court: Its 
Implementation, Possibilities and Limitations, Nijhoff,  2010. 
324 In other parts of the present study, some aspects of the ICC system of reparation are 
studied in more detail, see e.g. chapter 4 on the Trust Fund for Victims. 
325 This chapter is not intended to draw an exhaustive description and analysis of the scheme 
for reparation and support for victims at the ICC. For such study, see  Eva Dwertmann, The 
Reparation System of the International Criminal Court: Its Implementation, Possibilities and 
Limitations, Nijhoff, 2010;   Claude Jorda and Jérôme de Hemptinne, “The Status and Role of the 
Victim”, in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Antonio 
Cassese et al., Oxford University Press, 2002,  pp. 1387-1419;  Conor McCarthy, Reparations and 
Victim Support in the International Criminal Court,  Cambridge University Press, 2012;  Carla 
Ferstman, “The Reparation Regime of the International Criminal Court: Practical Considerations”, 
Leiden Journal of International Law 15 (2002), p. 667;  Edda   Kristjánsdóttir, “International Mass 
Claims Processes and the ICC Trust Fund for Victims”, in  Reparations for Victims of Genocide, 
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, Carla Ferstman et al.,  Nijhoff, 2009, p. 167;   T. 
Markus Funk, Victims Rights and Advocacy at the International Criminal Court, Oxford University 
Press, 2010; and  Godfrey  Musila, Rethinking International Criminal Law: Restorative Justice and 
the Rights of Victims in the International Criminal Court, Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010.  
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1. The search for victims’ justice before the ICC: case law on reparations  
Much debate has surrounded the question of reparations at the ICC and how the 
Chambers therein would develop and apply principles of reparations326. It took some time 
after the beginning of the activities of the ICC before one of the Court’s Chambers had to 
examine requests for reparation. Many questions remain open to date as to how Article 75 
will be interpreted and what practical effects it will have for awards of reparation to 
victims. At this juncture, it is worth bearing in mind that, at the time of the writing of this 
paper, the “reparation system” within the ICC is still at an infancy stage since only one 
case has reached the reparation judgment stage, the case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo327.  
 
Turning to the Lubanga case, considering that it is the precursor of the establishment 
of reparation principles at the ICC, it merits some discussion to set the context for this 
study. In 2012, in the case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber I rendered the 
first decision of the ICC on the question of reparations328. The Appeals Chamber 
subsequently rendered its Judgment in 2015 further elaborating on principles of reparation 
and appending an amended reparation Order to its Judgment. 
 
At this juncture, it will be useful to briefly examine both this first Decision of Trial 
Chamber I329 and the Appeals Chamber Judgment concerning the principles to be applied 
                                                      
326 See e.g., Carla Ferstman, “The Reparation Regime of the International Criminal Court: 
Practical Considerations”, Leiden Journal of International Law 15 (2002); Liesbeth Zegveld, 
“Victims’ Reparations Claims and International Criminal Courts”, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 8  (2010).); Marc Henzelin et al., “Reparations to Victims Before the International 
Criminal Court: Lessons from International Mass Claims Processes”, Criminal Law Forum 17  
(2006); Gilbert Bitti &  Gabriela Gonzales Rivas, “The Reparations Provisions for Victims Under 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”, in Redressing Injustices Through Mass 
Claims Processes: Innovative Responses to Unique Challenges, The International Bureau of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, Oxford University Press, 2006. 
327 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06 (“the Lubanga case” or “the 
first case on reparations”). It is to be noted that at the time of the writing of this article, a second 
trial before the ICC, in the case of Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, is 
at a very advanced stage, and reparations proceedings may follow the final Judgment in the case. 
328 ICC, Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, “Decision Establishing the 
Principles and Procedures to be applied to Reparations”, 7 August 2012, ICC-01/04-01/06 
(“Decision on Reparations”).  
329 Upon the delivery of the first Judgment of the Court in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, on 14 March 2012, Trial Chamber I issued a scheduling order on, inter 
alia, the issue of reparations. 
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as to the question of reparation and the procedure to be followed. The purpose of this paper 
is not to dwell upon all the important points of the Decision of Trial Chamber I and the 
Appeals Chamber Judgment in detail but rather to set out the main conclusions of the 
Chambers which offer some clarity as to the path ahead for reparations at the ICC.  
 
In general terms, in its Decision, Trial Chamber I established principles relating to 
reparations and the approach to be taken to their implementation, and emphasized that the 
Decision on Reparations should not affect the right of victims in other cases. Then, the 
Chamber set out: the applicable law; the principles of dignity, non-discrimination and non-
stigmatisation; the beneficiaries of reparations; accessibility and consultation with victims; 
principles relating to victims of sexual violence and child victims; the scope of reparations 
and the modalities thereof; the principle of proportional and adequate reparations; 
causation; standard and burden of proof; principles relating to the rights of the defence; 
questions relating to States and other stakeholders, as well as the publicity of the Principles 
established therein330.  
 
Interestingly, the Chamber has indicated that the convicted person, Mr. Lubanga 
Dyilo, has been declared indigent and that any symbolic reparation from him would need 
his agreement331. Similarly, the Trial Chamber decided not to order reparations against the 
accused directly given his state of indigence. Essentially, the Chamber outsourced to the 
TFV and found it unnecessary to “remain seized throughout the reparations 
proceedings”332. In the operative paragraphs, the Trial Chamber decided not to examine the 
individual applications for reparations and instructed the Registry to transmit to the TFV 
all the individual application forms received333.  
 
The Appeals Chamber reversed many of the Trial Chamber’s findings. Among its 
many conclusions, established the minimum elements that are necessary in a reparations 
order. These are: 1) the order for reparations shall be directed at a convicted person; 2) it 
must establish and inform him/her of his/her liability regarding reparation; 3) it must 
                                                      
330 Decision on Reparations, pp. 64-85. 
331 Ibid., para. 269. 
332 Ibid., para. 261. 
333 Ibid.at para. 289 (b).  
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describe and reason the type of reparation in accordance with Rule 97(1) and 98 of the 
RPE; 4) It must describe the harm caused and the modalities of reparation that are 
appropriate in the circumstances; 5) it shall also identify the victims or set out eligibility 
criteria based on the link between the harm suffered and the crimes the accused was 
convicted334. The Appeals Chamber also confirmed that in this case, reparations should be 
ordered on a collective basis rather than an individual basis, given the number of victims 
involved. It also confirmed that reparations are to be awarded on the basis of the harm 
suffered as a consequence of the crime within the jurisdiction of the Court335. 
 
Another significant contribution of the Appeals Chamber Judgment is, as Carsten 
Stahn has put it well:  
 
“its articulation of the link between criminal conviction and reparation 
under Article 75. The ICC reparations regime differs from civil claim 
models due to its nexus to the criminal case, and specifically the focus on 
conviction. The judgment clarifies that ‘reparation orders are intrinsically 
linked to the individual whose criminal responsibility is established in a 
conviction and whose culpability for these criminal acts is determined in a 
sentence’”336. 
 
In light of the Appeals Chamber Judgment, the essential elements set out by the 
Chamber cannot be delegated to an administrative organ like the TFV and thus continuous 
monitoring by the Trial Chambers will be necessary. This is a positive development as 
some issues in relation to reparations (including those “essential elements”) are by nature 
legal issues and should be overseen by judicial organs.  
 
All in all, the Appeals Chamber Judgment represented a step forward in the 
clarification of principles of reparation at the ICC, the rights of victims and convicted 
                                                      
334 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeals against the “Decision establishing the 
Principles and Procedures to be applied to Reparations”,  7 August 2012 with AMENDED order 
for reparations (Annex A) and public annexes 1 and 2, 3 March 2015 (hereinafter: “Judgment on 
Reparations”). 
335  Ibid..., at para. 1. 
336 Casten Stahn, “Reparative Justice after the Lubanga Appeals Judgment on Principles and 




persons, and the roles of Chambers and the TFV. In critically assessing the Judgment, 
Carsten Stahn has pondered that: 
 
“The Order for Reparation prioritizes accountability over other societal 
concerns, such as well-being, security or peace. Rationales, such as relief 
of suffering, deterrence of future violations, societal reintegration or 
reconciliation, are treated as secondary objectives that should be pursued 
“to the extent possible” … Critics are thus likely to remain skeptical as to 
whether this new liability regime will make an actual difference to the 
lives of victims. But the door is open for further creativity. This is the 
legacy of the decision – and an important turning point for future 
practice”337. 
 
Commenting on the Lubanga reparations case, Anja Wiersing states that: 
“regarding the ICC, as the current reparations framework stands it is not intended and is 
unable to provide reparations to all of the victims implicated in any one situation under 
investigation. This should not, at least for the present, be seen as a failure of the reparations 
system”338.  
 
In a recent interdisciplinary study on reparations, Mariana Goetz also comments on 
the shortcomings of the Lubanga case, as she critiques the Court’s confusing reasoning 
regarding Mr. Lubanga responsibility and his ability to pay reparations to victims339.  
 
 The question of reparations has not ended with the Judgment of the Appeals 
Chamber discussed above. Victims are yet to fully benefit from reparations. This case not 
only demonstrates the pitfalls of having to decide on the principles of reparations on a 
case-by-case basis (rather than by the adoption of guiding principles by the plenary of the 
Court) but also how internal delays are ultimately equated with delays of justice. 
 
Once the long trial ended, victims are now caught in between a back and forth 
between the TFV and the Trial Chamber charged with monitoring the implementation of 
                                                      
337 Ibid. 
338 Anja Wiersing, “Lubanga and its Implications for Victims Seeking Reparations at the 
International Criminal Court”, Amsterdam Law Forum 4:3, 2012, p. 37. 
339 Mariana Goetz, “Reparative Justice at the International Criminal Court: Best Practice or 
Tokenism?”, in Reparation for Victims of Crimes against Humanity: The Healing Role of 
Reparation: the Healing Role of Reparations, Jo-Anne M. Webbers (ed.), Routledge, 2014, pp. 53-
71. 
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reparation340. In fact, since the first decision on reparation in the Lubanga case by the Trial 
Chamber, in 2012, more than four years later, only very recently (end of October 2016) has 
the reparation plan been accepted by the Trial Chamber, which will admittedly take time to 
be fully implemented. While it is acknowledged that this is the first case of reparations 
before the Court, this example sheds light on the delays and complexities for the 
substantive realization of reparations for victims.  
 
A final comment regarding the Lubanga case goes to the notion of an emerging 
civil dimension of reparations before the ICC. According to the pronouncements of the 
Court, reparation forms a special kind of civil liability since they are linked to the criminal 
liability of the accused (i.e. a criminal conviction). Carsten Stahn posits that reparations 
before the Court “differs from purely civil forms of liability due to its connection to 
criminal proceedings which requires reconciliation of different interests, namely ‘the rights 
of victims and the convicted person’”341. The Appeals Chamber reliance on the principle of 
“liability to remedy harm” creates a sui generis reparation liability342. He also criticizes the 
approach of the Court for failing to acknowledge that reparations may have the effect of 
creating societal frictions and its minimalistic approach to other objectives of reparations 
that are non-accountability related343. 
 
While this study focuses on the Lubanga case as the first case that reached the 
reparations stage and set out the principles on reparations, at writing, a second case against 
Germain Katanga is very close to a decision on reparations344.  
 
                                                      
340 For a detailed account of the numerous procedural stages of the implementation of 
reparations in the Lubanga case, see the procedural history summarized in ICC, Trial Chamber II, 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, “Order approving the proposed plan of the Trust Fund for 
Victims in relation to symbolic collective reparations”, ICC-01/04-01/06, 21 October 2016, paras. 
1-10.  
341 Carsten Stahn, “Reparative Justice after the Lubanga Appeal Judgment New Prospects for 
Expressivism and Participatory Justice or ‘Juridified Victimhood’ by Other Means?”, Jounal of 
International Criminal Justice 13(4) (2015), pp. 801-813. 
342 Ibid., p. 808. 
343 Ibid. 
344 See ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, “Order instructing the parties and participants 
to file observations in respect of the reparations proceedings”, 1 October 2015, ICC-01/04-01/07-
3532-tENG. 
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Another recent development with regard to reparation is worth mentioning.  In the 
case against Kenya’s Deputy President William Ruto and former journalist Joshua arap 
Sang345. In light of the termination of the case against the accused (charges were vacated 
against the accused), the Trial Chamber was asked whether the State of Kenya had an 
obligation to give reparation to post-election violence victims and whether the TFV had an 
obligation to provide assistance to victims346. The Court decided by majority (2-1) that it 
was not the right forum to rule on the reparation requested given that the case against the 
accused was terminated347. In a Dissenting Opinion appended to this Decision, Judge 
Eboe-Osuji discussed at length the reparation mandate of the Court and stated: 
 
“To conflate considerations of punitive justice with those of reparative 
justice - and say that this Court cannot entertain questions about reparation 
for victims when a case against the accused has been terminated - will 
create more confusion and anxiety about the administration of justice in 
this Court.”348 
 
Judge Eboe-Osuji also added an important point regarding the role of the ICC and 
the role of States with regard to reparations: 
 
“There is a critical need to recall here that the role of the ICC as an 
instrument of justice - including reparative justice - is only 
complementary. In that regard, the ICC can only be a court of last resort. 
The primary responsibility for the administration of justice remains with 
the States- also possibly augmented by other complementary regional 
arrangements that do not in any way jeopardise the role of the ICC as a 
court of last resort. 
That being the case, the existence of the ICC should not result in a 
situation in which national Governments may feel free to abdicate their 
responsibility to attend to the needs of justice for their own citizens. This 
is particularly the case as regards the responsibility for reparative justice, 
where the concerned Government had failed in the first place to prevent 
the harm that so engaged the need for reparative justice”349. 
                                                      
345 ICC, The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11 
(“Suto and Sang case”). 
346 ICC, The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, “Decision on the 
Requests regarding Reparations” ICC-01/09-01/11, 1 July 2016. 
347 Ibid. 
348 Ibid.,  Dissenting Opinion of Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji, p. 8. 
349 Ibid., p. 9.  
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Importantly, Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji raises an important point at the hear of the 
reparation system at the ICC: he questions whether reparations at the ICC are necessarily 
conditional on a conviction of the accused person(s): 
“[…] I see no convincing basis in law for the idea that an ICC Trial 
Chamber may not entertain questions of reparation merely because the 
accused they tried was not found guilty. The reasoning is […] inimical to 
the 'dictates of fundamental justice […] In my view, such formalistic 
approach could never supply a convincing system of reasoning that 
prevents an ICC Trial Chamber from entertaining questions of reparation 
in the absence of conviction. And this is especially so in a case, as the 
Ruto and Sang trial, in which there was never a question that the victims 
suffered harm - to the contrary, all the parties and the Government of 
Kenya had accepted that the victims had suffered harm.  
Indeed, there is a solid basis in international law to reject the no 
‘compensation without conviction thesis. International and transnational 
norms concerning criminal  injuries compensation have completely 
rejected the idea. […]”350 
 
In sum, while the first case of reparations before the ICC (the Lubanga case) 
clarified many questions and will pave the way for future developments, there remains 
many layers of complexities that are yet to be unraveled. The very recent example of the 
points raised by the majority and Dissenting Opinion in the Suto and Sang case 
demonstrate that there are many important questions that surround reparation proceedings 
at the ICC. One important issue is the question of the interconnectedness of the conviction 
of the accused person(s) and the ability of the Court to pronounce on reparations. Thus the 
shaping of the civil dimension of international criminal justice before the ICC is still in 
process of formation. 
 
2. Beneficiaries of reparation awards 
 
This section now turns to a discussion on the beneficiaries of reparation awards within 
the ICC by first examining the definition of victims with the framework of the Rome 
Statute, and then dwelling upon one critical point regarding categories of victims.  
 
                                                      
350 Ibid., p. 4. 
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A) Definition of victims 
It goes without saying that an individual has to qualify as a victim in order to be 
entitled to claim reparations under the ICC scheme. Legal proceedings for reparations are 
initiated by the filing of a request by the victims themselves or on their behalf. The Court 
may also initiate proprio motu the reparation procedure under exceptional 
circumstances351. 
 
According to Rule 85 of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, victims are 
“natural persons who have suffered harm as a result of the commission of any crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court.” Victims may also include legal persons, such as 
organizations or institutions. 
 
This Rule was interpreted by the Pre-Trial Chamber I in the Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo 352  whereby the Chamber established the criteria for 
determining whether individual applicants meet the definition of victim in relation to 
natural persons. The four part test thus developed by Pre-Trial Chamber I has been 
subsequently followed by other Chambers and confirmed on appeal353. The test to identify 
whether an applicant could be considered a victim under Rule 85 of the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence is based on the following: 
 
“(i) whether the identity of a natural person or legal person can be 
established; 
(ii) whether the applicants claim to have suffered harm; 
(iii) whether a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court can be established; and 
(iv) whether harm was caused “as a result” of the event constituting the crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court”354. 
 
                                                      
351 Article 75(1) of the Rome Statute and Rule 95(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
See also, Eva Dwertmann, The Reparation System of the International Criminal Court: Its 
Implementation, Possibilities and Limitations, Nijhoff, 2010, chapter 6.  
352 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, “Decision on the Application for 
Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS1, VPRS2, VPRS3, VPRS4, VPRS5 and VPRS6”,17 
January 2006, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr,  para. 9. 
353 ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga, “Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor 
and The Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation”,  18 January 2008, 
ICC-01/04-01/06-1432. 
354 ICC, Decision on the applications for participation in the proceedings of VPRS1, VPRS2, 
VPRS3, VPRS4, VPRS5, and VPRS6, ICC-01/04-1o1-t-ENG-Crr, 17 January 2006, para. 79. 
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As a preliminary question, the definition of victims for the purpose of being eligible 
to receive reparation needs to be addressed. In this regard, the jurisprudence of the Court is 
very extensive on the notion of victims355. The conceptualisation of “victims” in the 
context of participation in the Court’s proceedings will likely inform the Court’s 
assessment of this notion in the reparation phase356.  
 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the Trust Fund (see a more detailed discussion in 
the following chapter) may provide support to victims outside the scope of Court-ordered 
reparations357. As commentators have noted, this mechanism is aimed at safeguarding 
victims’ rights due to special circumstances of a given case (e.g. remote location of the 
victim, lack of information about the procedure for reparation, etc.)358. 
                                                      
355 See e.g. jurisprudence in relation to the definition of “victims” pursuant to rule 85 of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, in the context of application for victim participation, in the 
situation, pre-trial and trial phases: “Decision on the Applications for Participation in the 
Proceedings of VPRS1, VPRS2, VPRS3, VPRS4, VPRS5, and VPRS6”, 17 January 2006,  ICC-
01-04-101-t-ENG-Corr,  para. 65 (situation phase); “Decision on Applications for Participation in 
Proceedingsa/0004/06 to a/0009/06, a/001606, a/0063/06, a/0071/06 to a/0080/06 and a/01/05/06”,  
in the case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 20 October 2006, ICC-01/04-01/06-601; 
“Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of Applicants a/0327/07 to 
a/00337/07 and a/0001/08”, 2 April 2008, ICC-01/04-01/07-357; “Decision on Victims’ 
Application for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0/0070/06, a/0081/06, a/0082/06, a/0084/06 
to a/0089/06, a/0091/06 to a/0097/06, a/0099/06, a/0100/06, a/0102/06 to a/0104/06, a/0111/06, 
a/0113/06 to a/0117/06, a/0120/06, a/0121/06 and a/0123/06 to a/0127/06”, in the case of The 
Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, 14 March 2008, ICC-
02/04-01/05-282,  (pre-trial phase); and “Decision on Victims’ Participation”, in the case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119,  (trial phase), cited 
in . Carla Ferstman & Mariana  Goetz, “Reparations before the International Criminal Court: The 
Early Jurisprudence on Victim Participation and its Impact on Future Reparations Proceedings”, in 
Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, Systems in Place 
and Systems in the Making, Carla Ferstman et al., Nijhoff, 2009, pp. 313 et seq. 
356 Carla Ferstman & Mariana  Goetz, “Reparations before the International Criminal Court: 
The Early Jurisprudence on Victim Participation and its Impact on Future Reparations 
Proceedings”, in Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, 
Systems in Place and Systems in the Making, Carla Ferstman et al., Nijhoff, 2009, p. 320. 
357 See aConor McCarthy, “Victim Redress and International Criminal Justice: Competing 
Paradigms or Compatible Forms of Justice?”,  Journal of International Criminal Justice 10 (2012), 
p. 360.  
358  Claude Jorda and Jérôme de Hemptinne, “The Status and Role of the Victim”, in The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Antonio Cassese et al., Oxford 
University Press, 2002, pp. 1387 et seq., at 1408. See also,  Christopher Muttukumaru, “Reparation 
to Victims”, in The International Criminal Court – The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, 
Negotiations, Results, Roy S. K. Lee,  Nijhoff, 1999, pp. 262 et seq. 
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B) Constructions of victimhood: inclusion and exclusion, and the collective versus the 
individual 
 
 When discussing the beneficiaries of reparation, the first question pertains to the 
legal definition of victim for purpose of ICC proceedings, as discussed above. A more 
fundamental question, one that cuts across law and morality, pertains to constructions of 
victimhood and the creation of a potential hierarchy of victims: is it proper to differentiate 
and prioritize victims and how does the civil dimension influence these dynamics? Should 
certain types of victims be differentiated and prioritized when it comes to reparation?  This 
study offers more questions than answers in this regard. 
 
An issue to be addressed concerns the effect that adding a civil dimension (that is, a 
dimension focused on reparations) to international criminal justice may have on different 
kinds of victims. In many different cross-roads, actual victims of international crimes are 
compartmentalized by the selection of which conflict to focus on, the timeframe of 
international crimes that occurred, the actual charges that are brought against perpetrators, 
the confirmation of such charges, and the conviction of the accused. All of these decisions 
put some victims closer to receiving reparation than other victims who may fall outside the 
scheme359 . This may impose a hierarchy of victims when it comes to reparations 
proceedings: victims of international crimes who can obtain reparation and those who 
cannot.  
 
To take this analysis further, looking at a concrete example, in the reparations 
phase of the Court’s first trial in the Lubanga case, representative of victims, victim groups 
advocated that reparations should take into account the needs of individual victims and 
individual reparations were favoured360. Victims also claimed that individual awards 
should vary according to the experience and varying needs361.  
 
                                                      
359 See Sara Kendall &  Sarah Nouwen, “Representational Practices at the International 
Criminal Court: the Gap between Juridified and Abstract Victimhood”,  Law and Contemporary 
Problems 75 (2013).   
360  ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, “Observations on the Sentence and Reparations by 
Victims”, (‘V01 Group’), 18 April 2012, ICC- 01/04-01/06,  paras. 24–27. 
361 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, “Observations of the V02 Group of Victims on Sentencing 
and Reparations”, (‘V02 Group’), 18 April 2012, ICC-01/04-01/06,  para. 27. 
 136 
An interesting study conducted in 2015 by researchers from the Human Rights 
Center at the University of California, Berkely School of Law, reported similarly with 
regards to victims’ interests in individual awards. The Center interviewed 622 victim 
participants at the ICC concerning the participation regime at the ICC: while it concluded 
that the participation regime needs to be reformed, it also had some interesting conclusions 
with regards to reparations. In particular, it concluded that: 
 
“Victim participants joined ICC cases with the expectation that they would 
receive reparations. In Uganda and DRC, the prospect of receiving 
reparations was the primary motivation for the overwhelming majority of 
victim participants; in Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire, less than half reported that 
receiving reparations was their main objective. Nearly all respondents, 
however, reported an interest in individualized reparations for themselves 
and others. Their conceptions of reparations were frequently interwoven 
with local conceptions of justice”362.  
 
 Similarly, a 2013 study on victims’ rights before the ICC reported that: “As 
the damage to participating victims is individual, victims do not understand collective 
reparations and feel that individual reparations would better fulfil their expectations”363.  
 
                                                      
Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkely School of Law, “The Victims’ 
Court: A Study of 622 Victim Participants at the International Criminal Court”, p. 3, available at: 
https://Ibid..law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/VP_report_2015_final_full2.pdf. The 
Human Rights Center interviewed ICC victim participants, in four countries where the ICC had 
started investigations and prosecutions: Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, and Côte 
d’Ivoire. Individuals interviewed were either registered as victim participants or had submitted 
applications for consideration as victim participants. Some of the questions addressed were: “What 
motivated these men and women to become victim participants? Was it to tell their story and to 
have it acknowledged by the court? Did they wish to see the accused punished? Or was it more 
important to receive reparations for the harms they suffered? What did they think of the process of 
becoming a victim participant? What were their perceptions of the court and how it operated? How 
were their interactions with court staff? And did they have security or safety concerns?”.?” 
363 FIDH, “Enhancing Victims’ Rights Before the ICC: A View from Situation Countries on 
Victims ́ Rights at the International Criminal Court”, November 2013, pp. 27-28, available at: 
https://Ibid..fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fidh_victimsrights_621a_nov2013_ld.pdf  The Report addressed 
various issues relating to victims before the ICC, including reparations.  FIDH selected a “group of 
11 men and women, experts and representatives from local civil society from situation countries 
that have worked with victims of Rome Statute crimes in the field and/or have interacted with the 
ICC staff or have good knowledge of the Court. They came from Democratic Republic Congo 
(DRC), Kenya, Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan and Central African Republic”.  
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These considerations raise the question whether including a civil dimension into 
international criminal justice necessarily creates a hierarchy among victims of international 
crimes and prioritizes some victims while excluding others. It also sheds light on the 
disconnect between real victims’ interests and their perception of justice versus the rhetoric 
justice and what is actually delivered to victims. I further sheds light on the tension that 
exists between individualized and collective reparations, which will be considered below: 
Although  individual awards permit the voices, needs and desires of  victims  to be heard, 
collective reparations are more inclusive and can benefit a greater number of victims. 
Individualized reparations also lead to greater selectivity – as awards have to be made to 
individual victims based on specific selection criteria – and may lead to prioritization of 
victims.  
 
 It is submitted that there is no entirely satisfactory answer to this dilemma: the civil 
dimension of international criminal justice will undoubtedly suffer from selectivity, 
hierarchy and prioritization, at one level or another. These are also marked characteristics 
of international justice. There is no easy answer to this dilemma: perhaps the most 
appropriate approach is to move forward on a case-by-case basis as each individual case 
presents unique characteristics and issues. 
 
 Further on the issue of prioritization and hierarchy of victims it is pondered that 
within the assistance mandate of the TFV (which will be further elaborated upon in the 
next chapter) it may be necessary to prioritize certain categories of victims in light of their 
urgent needs. Thus, again, much will depend on specific circumstances of each case. 
 
The analysis that follows will discuss some of the characteristics of the ICC 




3. Forms of reparation and the tension between collective and individual reparation 
in the ICC context 
A further question to be addressed is the kind of redress that could possibly be 
awarded in the context of the ICC. Article 75 (2) states that:  
 
“2. The Court may make an order directly against a convicted person 
specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including 
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. Where appropriate, the Court 
may order that the award for reparations be made through the Trust Fund 
provided for in article 79”. 
 
A preliminary comment regarding this definition pertains to the types of reparation 
mentioned therein. It is expressly mentioned “restitution, compensation and rehabilitation” 
but not symbolic reparations such as satisfaction and non-repetition. The focus thus seems 
to be on material forms of reparation. The precise reason for failing to mention symbolic 
reparations is unknown, and the assertion that ordering symbolic reparations to an accused 
person may raise human rights concerns is inconclusive364. As Frédéric Mégret argues:  
 
“Symbolic reparations have several uses. They may be particularly 
important in cases where the harm is hard to evaluate, or continuing, or 
where the injury cannot be repaired. Mere compensation might encourage 
a state to think that it can “buy its way out” of violations by simply paying 
the compensation but not remedying the situation … Symbolic reparations 
also cater to a broader range of victim concerns, and take seriously their 
need for recognition, respect, dignity and hope for a safe future”365.  
 
Much like Frédéric Mégret, this study submits that material and symbolic reparations 
are not mutually exclusive, they in fact complement one another. In the ICC context this 
also rings true in particular in light of the mass victimization and nature of international 
crimes.  
 
A related point is that under the terms of Rule 97 of the ICC Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence the Court may award reparations on an individualized basis or, where it deems it 
                                                      
364 Fréderic Mégret, “The  International Criminal Court and the Failure to Mention Symbolic 
Reparations”, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1275087  
365 Ibid.  
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appropriate, on a collective basis, or both. Trial Chamber I in the Lubanga case also 
recognized that reparations can be made both on an individual and collective basis366.  
 
According to the Rules of the Court, collective awards of reparation are channelled 
through the Trust Fund for Victims (“TFV”)367 to “set out the precise nature of the 
collective award(s), where not already specified by the Court, as well as the methods for 
its/their implementation.”368 It is worth noting, however, that the assessment by the Fund is 
to be approved by the Court.  
 
In the context of mass international crimes, collective reparations gain an important 
role as a means to redress the collective nature of the crimes that come before the ICC. In 
fact, it may be difficult, if not impossible to provide redress to each individual victim of an 
international crime369.  
 
A key practical advantage of  collective reparation is  the maximization of the limited 
resources that the Court may have to provide reparation for victims. In fact, because of the 
nature of the crimes which come before the ICC, mass victimization may occur, which in 
turn could potentially lead to a situation where victims may have to be selected for 
reparation purposes. On a normative perspective, in the context of international crimes 
where mass atrocities are committed, individual reparation may not  be the most 
appropriate form of redress, which by its nature may exclude a large number  of victims of 
a certain crime370. Another advantage of collective reparation awards concerns the form of 
reparation, a point which will be discussed below: collective awards may be symbolic, 
                                                      
366 Decision on Reparations, paras. 217-221. 
367 See Article 79 of the ICC Statute. 
368 Regulation 69 of the Trust Fund Regulations.  
369 For studies on collective reparations in the context of mass violations of human rights or 
international humanitarian law, see Friedrich Rosenfeld, “Collective Reparation for Victims of 
Armed Conflict”, International Review of the Red Cross 92  (2010); see also Heidy Rombouts, 
Victim Organizations and the Politics of Reparation: A Case-Study on Rwanda, Intersentia, 2004, 
p. 34.  
370  See in this regard, Naomi Roht-Arriaza “Reparations, Decisions, and Dilemmas”,  
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 27 (2004), pp. 157 et seq. 
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which in turn, may provide a measure of “moral reparation” to victims371. Collective 
reparations can also be seen from an ontological lens. As Frédéric Mégret argues,  
 
“the opposition between individuals and groups is also partially artificial: 
international crimes target the “groupness” that is in the individual, and the 
individual that is in the group. More than trying to offer reparation to 
groups and/or individuals as such, one may wonder whether a truly 
groundbreaking theory of reparations would not try to direct itself less at 
mending the subjects – individual or collective – than the relations that 
exist between them and the rest of society. In the end, it seems, what is 
broken and torn apart by international crimes is not only the integrity of 
individuals or groups taken in isolation, as much as their place in the world 
and the ties that bind them. In that respect, however, looking at groups, the 
place of individuals within them, and the place of the group within society, 
is already in itself a way of focusing attention on the relational aspects of 
reparations”372.  
 
An interesting issue as to the discussion of collective reparations concerns their 
raison d’être. Often international crimes are not aimed at a specific individual but rather at 
a community, or a group of individuals, and often the crime is perpetrated against 
individuals due to the fact that they belong to a certain group373. Collective reparations can 
potentially offer a means of redress to a large number of victims, while acknowledging 
their suffering and losses as well as providing a means to reach victims, who for one 
reason or another, cannot claim reparation before the Court374. The jurisprudence of the 
IACtHR, as discussed in chapter 2, provides many important insights as to the award of 
                                                      
371  Birte Timm, “The Legal Position of Victims in the Rule of Procedure and Evidence”, in 
International and National Prosecution of Crimes under International Law,  Horst Fischer et al.,  
Bochumer Schriften zur Friedenssicherung und zum Humanitären Völkerrecht, Berlin, Arno Spitz, 
2001, pp. 289 et seq., p. 304, cited in  Eva Dwertmann, The Reparation System of the International 
Criminal Court: Its Implementation, Possibilities and Limitations, Nijhoff, 2010, p. 123.  
372 Fréderic Mégret, “ The Case for Collective Reparations before the ICC”, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2196911   
373 Raphael Lemkin, “Genocide as a Crime under International Law”, American Journal of 
International Law 41 (1947), pp. 145 et seq., cited in  Eva Dwertmann, The Reparation System of 
the International Criminal Court: Its Implementation, Possibilities and Limitations, Nijhoff, 2010, 
p. 122.   
374  Christian Tomuschat, “Darfur – Compensation for the Victims”,  Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 3 (2005), pp. 579 et seq.;  Paul R. Dubinsky, “Justice for the Collective – The  
Limits of the Human Rights Class Action”,  Michigan Law Review 102 (2004), pp. 1152 et seq.;  
Anne-Marie de Brouwer, “Reparation to Victims of Sexual Violence – Possibilities at the 
International Criminal Court and at the Trust Fund for Victims and Their Families”, Leiden Journal 
of International Law 20 (2007), pp. 207 et seq. 
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collective reparation for mass human rights violations. As it was argued, their legacy can 
prove very helpful to the ICC. 
 
An interrelated question is whether collectives have standing to claim reparation. 
This latter question calls for the analysis of whether “collectives” are included in the 
definition of “victims”, as described above, which does not expressly exclude it because 
collective forms of reparation are envisaged within the ICC, which are meant to serve the 
benefit of a community, perhaps collectives could be recognized as victims375. Be that as it 
may, the Court’s legal framework concerning the right to reparation does not provide many 
details as to this question. It will be for the Judges to decide on these issues376 as the 
jurisprudential construction of the reparation regime is currently underway. 
 
As argued in a previous chapter, much can be learned about the  forms of reparations 
from the experience of other specialized tribunals. I argued that such lessons could inform 
decisions relating to forms of reparation for international crimes, not only at the ICC but 
also at other reparation mechanisms. Thus, given the importance of the question of the 
forms of reparation at the ICC context, as well as the Court’s lack of experience in this 
field, this study has dedicated one chapter (see chapter 2 above) to a case-study of the rich 
jurisprudence of the IACtHR concerning reparation to victims of mass atrocities and how 
this jurisprudence can inform decisions at the ICC. 
 
 When it comes down to the adjudication and award of reparation, an obvious 
consideration pertains to the nature of international crimes versus the capabilities of 
international criminal justice, and the ICC in particular, to fulfill reparation needs. This 
stands at the heart of the tension between individual and collective reparation, which was 
evidenced in the first reparation case before the Court377. Individual reparations are 
provided to individual claimant victims, and necessarily take into account the individual 
                                                      
375  Birte Timm, “The Legal position of Victims in the Rule of Procedure and Evidence”, in 
International and National Prosecution of Crimes under International Law,  Horst Fischer et al.,  
Arno Spitz, 2001, pp. 303 et seq. cited in  Eva Dwertmann, The Reparation System of the 
International Criminal Court: Its Implementation, Possibilities and Limitations, Nijhoff, 2010, p. 
198 
376  See “Reparations before the International Criminal Court: Issues and Challenges, 
Conference Report”, Peace Palace, The Hague, 12 May 2011, p. 5. 
377 The Lubanga case. 
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needs and desires of victims. Collective reparations can be provided to communities and 
victims. Collective reparations may “address the harm the victims suffered on an 
individual and collective basis”378.  
 
  As discussed above, victims in the Lubanga case requested both individual 
and collective reparations. The Trial Chamber adopted a collective/ community-based 
approach, rejecting requests for reparation on an individual basis, due to the limited 
financial availability of funds. Since the convicted person was declared indigent,  
reparation would be provided on the basis of voluntary contribution to the TFV. By 
deciding to focus on collective reparations, the reparation net is wider and could benefit a 
greater number  of victims but it also discharged the Court of having to craft individual 
remedies and assess each individual claim379. It is claimed however that by focusing on 
collective reparation, an abstract, intangible construction of victims in international 
criminal law is given priority over individual victims that have needs, interests and 
concrete claims of reparations desires as a result of their suffered harm380. The choice of 
collective reparation, despite the requests of victims raises the question of the true meaning 
of “justice for victims” before the ICC and the extent to which their voices are being 
heard381.  
1. The Trust Fund for Victims 
Reparation within the ICC cannot be examined without mentioning the Trust Fund 
for Victims. The importance of this mechanism is illustrated in chapter 3, dedicated to an 
examination of the Trust Fund. In this chapter, the aim is to highlight the key issues 
relating to the Trust Fund in the context of reparation within the ICC. 
 
The Trust Fund has an important role in the implementation of the mandate of the 
Court concerning reparation. The Trust Fund, and a five-member Board of Directors which 
                                                      
378 Decision on Reparations, para. 221. 
379 Ibid.  
380 Laurel Fletcher, “Refracted Justice: the Imagined Victim and the International Criminal 
Court”, in Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court 
Interventions,  Carsten  Stahn et al.,  Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 317-319. 
381 Ibid., pp. 317-319. 
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oversees its activities, were established in September 2002382 and in 2004, a Trust Fund 
Secretariat was created as part of the Court’s Registry383. The Trust Fund was established 
by the Assembly of States parties in accordance with Article 79 of the Rome Statue, which 
reads as follows: 
 
“(1) A Trust Fund shall be established by decision of the Assembly of 
States Parties for the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court, and of the families of such victims.  
(2) The Court may order money and other property collected through fines 
or forfeiture to be transferred, by order of the Court, to the Trust Fund.  
(3) The Trust Fund shall be managed according to criteria to be 
determined by the Assembly of States Parties.”  
 
Many important aspects of the Trust Fund for Victims require in-depth analysis. I 
will review them in more detail in the next chapter of this study, which examines 
exclusively the Trust Fund as an administrative mechanism devised  for the purpose of 
reparation for victims of international crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
 
Suffice it to say for present purposes that a key aspect in relation to the role of the 
Trust Fund in the award of reparation to victims refers to whether it will act, in practice, as 
a sort of administrative body that takes care of the payment and logistics of reparation384, 
or as a true mechanism of restorative justice, concerned with different forms of reparation 
and the rehabilitation of victims. Financial constraints, unsurprisingly, will be a challenge 
to the performance of the activities of the Trust Fund. The source of income of the Trust 
fund is not unlimited. The financial resources that the Trust Fund may have at its disposal 
will dictate, to a certain degree, not only the scope of its activities but also the extent and 
type of reparation victims may receive. 
 
                                                      
382 Resolution ICC-ASP/1/Res.6 (9 September 2002), and Annex to same, para. 7.  
383 Resolution ICC-ASP/3/Res.7, Establishment of the Secretariat of the Trust Fund for 
Victims, paras. 2 and 4 (10 September 2004). The Trust Fund for Victims is funded by the Court’s 
budget and not from the funds that the Trust Fund holds for the benefit of victims.  
384 See Amnesty International, International Criminal Court: Ensuring an Effective Trust 
Fund for Victims, IOR 40/005/2001, 1 September 2001. 
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2. Victim participation and reparation 
Victim participation385 is distinct from victim reparation with the ICC context. 
While this study does not deal with the details of victim participation at the ICC, it is 
relevant to dedicate a brief discussion of this topic. While victim participation can happen 
throughout different stages of the proceedings, reparation necessarily needs to take place 
only at the end of a trial, if there is a conviction.   
 
The report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation 
and guarantees of non-recurrence, Pablo de Greiff reminds of important dimensions of 
reparation: 
 
“For a benefit to count as reparation and to be understood as a justice 
measure, it has to be accompanied by an acknowledgment of responsibility 
and needs to be linked with other justice initiatives such as efforts aimed at 
achieving truth, criminal prosecutions and guarantees of non-recurrence. 
The Special Rapporteur insists that each of these kinds of measures is a 
matter of legal obligation and warns against the tendency to trade one 
measure off against the others”386.  
 
Specifically relating to the participation of victims in the reparation process, the 
Special Rapporteur:  
“… calls on Governments to establish mechanisms for the meaningful 
participation of victims and their representatives. This requires 
guaranteeing their safety. … Victim participation can help improve the 
reach and completeness of programmes, enhance comprehensiveness, 
better determine the types of violations that need to be redressed, improve 
the fit between benefits and expectations and, in general, secure the 
meaningfulness of symbolic and material benefits alike. Moreover, active 
                                                      
385  For thorough studies of victim participation before the ICC, see Luke Moffett, 
“Meaningful and effective? Considering victims’ interests through participation at the International 
Criminal Court”, Queen’s University Belfast School of Law, Research Paper 2016–03; Sergey 
Vasiliev, “Article 68 (3) and personal interests of victims in the emerging practice of the ICC”, in 
The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court, Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds.) 
Brill, 2008, pp. 635-690; Sergey Vasiliev, “Victim Participation Revisited: What the ICC is 
Learning About Itself”, in The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court Carsten Stahn 
(ed.), Oxford University Press, 2015. See also other works cited in this study concerning victim 
participation. 
386 United Nations, General Assembly, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion 
of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence”, A/69/518, 14 October 2014, para. 
83. 
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and engaged participation may offer some relief in the light of the dismal 
record in the implementation of reparations”387.  
 
An interesting study conducted in 2015 by researchers from the Human Rights 
Center at the University of California, Berkely School of Law, interviewed 622 victim 
participants at the ICC concerning the participation regime at the ICC. While it concluded 
that the participation regime needs to be reformed, it also had some interesting conclusions 
with regards to reparations. In particular, it concluded that: 
 
“Victim participants joined ICC cases with the expectation that they would 
receive reparations. In Uganda and DRC, the prospect of receiving 
reparations was the primary motivation for the overwhelming majority of 
victim participants; in Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire, less than half reported that 
receiving reparations was their main objective. Nearly all respondents, 
however, reported an interest in individualized reparations for themselves 
and others. Their conceptions of reparations were frequently interwoven 
with local conceptions of justice”388.  
 
As a recommendation they propose that victims be better informed of the goals of 
participation and how they are distinct from reparation. By keeping the process of 
participation transparent to victims, and making clear that participation does not 
necessarily entail compensation will make the participation system more “meaningful”389. 
 
                                                      
387 Ibid., paras. 91 and 92. 
388  Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkely School of Law, “The Victims’ 
Court: A Study of 622 Victim Participants at the International Criminal Court”, p. 3, available at: 
https://Ibid..law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/VP_report_2015_final_full2.pdf. The 
Human Rights Center interviewed ICC victim participants, in four countries where the ICC had 
started investigations and prosecutions: Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, and Côte 
d’Ivoire. Individuals interviewed were either registered as victim participants or had submitted 
applications for consideration as victim participants. Some of the questions addressed were: “What 
motivated these men and women to become victim participants? Was it to tell their story and to 
have it acknowledged by the court? Did they wish to see the accused punished? Or was it more 
important to receive reparations for the harms they suffered? What did they think of the process of 
becoming a victim participant? What were their perceptions of the court and how it operated? How 
were their interactions with court staff? And did they have security or safety concerns?” 
389 Ibid., pp. 4-5.  
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3. Tackling the difficult dilemmas: reconciling reparations before the 
ICC with conflicting perspectives and new paradigms 
It is submitted that the ICC cannot single-handedly be the promoter of reparation for 
international crimes. The Court faces many practical and systemic challenges from the 
inclusion of reparations within its mandate. The Court is part and parcel of broader systems 
and efforts: national justice systems and other international tribunals and mechanisms must 
work in synergy to attain the goal of reparations within international justice. It is hoped 
that the ICC can be the catalyst for other similar efforts to provide redress for victims of 
international crimes. For example, a narrow approach to the role of reparations within 
international criminal proceedings may lead to a timid development of the reparation 
system of the ICC390. On the other hand, a broader conception of the role of international 
criminal justice and the possibilities of the ICC relating to victims may lead to a more 
developed system of reparation for victims under the ambit of the ICC. 
 
A) Critical scholarly outlook on ICC reparations  
 
In this context, it is important to dwell upon critical scholarship concerning possible 
detrimental effects of including a civil dimension (i.e. reparations) to international criminal 
trials. The operationalization of a civil dimension of international criminal law within the 
ICC for example has been criticised from different perspectives including: the tension 
between the rights of victims and rights of the accused; detrimental effects on victims; and 
false creations of victimhood (discussed above)391. Taking into account these arguments, 
the overarching question is whether mixing criminal trial with civil processes ultimately is 
more detrimental than beneficial, especially for victims. 
 
A prominent criticism of the right to reparation is that it may  conflict with the rights 
of the defence in ICC trials. In this context, victims’ rights (including the right to 
reparation) might have a different effect in relation to the overarching goals of the ICC as 
an institution  than they do in relation to concrete criminal trials in light of competing 
rights of the defence. Thus, the differentiated application of victims’ rights in criminal trial 
                                                      
390 Some argue in this sense, see e.g. Eric A. Posner, “A Minimalist Reparations Regime for 
the International Criminal Court”, Human Rights and International Criminal Law Online Forum, 
February 1, 2012.  
391 See section on “constructions of victimhood”. 
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might actually militate against mixing criminal and civil dimensions of international 
criminal law392. Professor Zappalà argues that:  
 
“Any conflict between the rights of victims and the rights of defendants 
has to be the object of a delicate balancing that must be carried out in the 
knowledge that the overarching purpose of criminal procedure is to reach a 
finding of guilt or innocence whilst protecting at the highest level the 
rights of those subjected to the proceedings (i.e. the suspect and the 
accused)… The balancing of victim participation against the rights of the 
accused should be inspired by some procedural principles of an 
imperative nature, which represent the backbone of international criminal 
procedure: the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair hearing in full 
equality, the right to an expeditious trial, the right to confront and present 
evidence, and so on”393.  
 
In this regard, while reparation for victims work in different ways in theory (in 
relation to the broader institutional goals of the ICC) than in practice (in relation to 
concrete trials), where one primary consideration is the rights of the accused, the 
differentiated application of victims’ rights in criminal contexts is not necessarily an 
argument against the operationalization of a civil dimension of international criminal law. 
What it does is remind us that the right to reparation shall not be to the detriment of the 
rights of the accused; for example, reparations shall not cause a delay in proceedings 
against the accused, and shall not set aside the presumption of innocence. 
 
Another important contention in relation to reparations in the context of criminal 
trials refers to constructions and perceptions of victimhood. When including reparations 
within traditionally criminal processes (i.e. international criminal trials), could this create 
an abstract conception of victimhood which does not always correspond to reality and is  to 
the detriment of “real” victims? In this regard, Laurel Fletcher submits that: 
 
“Although victims are entitled to limited participation in the trial and to 
seek reparations after a sentence is reached, the legal structure of the ICC 
prioritises retributive over restorative justice, punishment over reparations, 
and the conviction of perpetrators over the character of the charges they 
face. Looking at trial procedures, victims are framed as a consideration 
against which other rights and values are weighed. Thus the real victims 
                                                      
392 Cf. Salvatore Zappalà, “The Rights of Victims v. the Rights of the Accused”,  Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 8 (2010), pp. 137-164. 
393 Ibid. p. 140. 
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are subordinated to the retributive justice aims of the ICC, and their 
desires are continually compromised despite their moral centrality to the 
integrated justice (retributive and restorative) mission of the Court”394.  
 
Laurel Fletcher claims that this dichotomy between the abstract construction of 
victims and the real victims of international crimes was evident in the first reparations 
proceedings at the ICC. She reviews the submissions of victims in regards to reparations 
and submits that while victims of the crimes perpetrators actually claimed for individual 
redress (in addition to collective awards), the Chamber only considered community-based 
reparations, so the “imagined victim worked again here to justify abstracted, collective 
forms of repair and obscured the particular and disparate preferences of individual victims 
for reparative justice”395. 
 
Another important consideration is the extent to which reparations is an inherently 
political act and whether it could further victimize vulnerable victims by submitting them 
to criminal processes, where they shall be “recognized” as victims in order to be 
considered for reparations with that system. In this regard, Peter Dixon argues that 
“provision of international criminal reparations is an inherently political act through which 
the ICC will necessarily become a player in local power relations” through the “politics of 
recognition”, which is inherent in reparations396. 
 
What stems from some of these critical accounts of the reparation system and the 
broader question of the mixture of criminal and civil dimensions in international criminal 
justice is that when reparations for international crimes start to be unpacked at the ICC, 
many practical, moral, ethical, and political challenges arise. It is important to dwell upon 
and engage with these critical accounts, always bearing in mind the broader picture: the 
ICC, and the reparation system developed therein, is part of a plethora of alternatives for 
victim redress for international crimes. As reparations proceedings at the Court advance 
and principles are further developed, new lessons will also be learned from past practice. 
                                                      
394 Laurel Fletcher, “Refracted Justice: the Imagined Victim and the International Criminal 
Court”, in Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court 
Interventions,  Carsten Stahn et al.,  Cambridge University Press, 2015,  pp. 304-305.  
395 Ibid. p. 319. 
396 Peter J. Dixon, “Reparations and the Politics of Recognition”, in Contested Justice: The 
Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions, Carsten Stahn et al.,  
Cambridge University Press, 2015,  p. 326. 
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Additionally, there should be an emphasis on understanding the real experiences of 
victims. In this journey of discovery and improvement, it is also important to think of the 
symbolic gain of including a civil dimension of international criminal law at the 
international level and the potential for the system at the ICC to be a catalyst for further 
development of reparations for international crimes domestically, and with regards to 
administrative mechanisms. 
 
B) Reparations and contemporary issues 
 
 In addition to some selected critical perspectives of including reparations within the 
ICC proceedings as discussed above, there are also some difficult and fundamental 
questions that the ICC will have to grapple with as it develops its reparation system. I 
focus here on two main themes: reparations for victims of sexual or gender-based crimes 
and reparations for victims who are both victims and perpetrators. These are by no means 
the only new paradigms or dilemmas concerning reparations for international crimes, but 
given their prominence in the early stages of the development of reparations before the 
ICC, they merit some words at this stage397. 
 
The first important dimension of reparations for international crimes, especially in 
the context of the ICC, refers to reparations for sexual and gender-based violence. Sexual 
crimes can be war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, for example, depending of 
the criminal conduct and other factors. When it comes to reparations, should victims of 
gender-based violence be treated differently from other victims? Should victims of sexual-
based violence be prioritized due to urgent needs (e.g. medical needs, psychological needs, 
etc.)? For example, the United Nations Guidance Note of the Secretary General: 
Reparations for Conflict‐Related Sexual Violence of June 2014 recommends some 
principles in relation to reparation:  
“1. Adequate reparation for victims of conflict-related sexual violence 
entails a combination of different forms of reparations  
2. Judicial and/or administrative reparations should be available to victims 
of conflict-related sexual violence as part of their right to obtain prompt, 
adequate and effective remedies  
                                                      
397 It is acknowledged that these issues merit a more extensive discussion, however due to 
some space constraints of a doctoral thesis, they are treated here briefly. See references in this 
Section for recent and deeper discussions of these topics. 
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3. Individual and collective reparations should complement and reinforce 
each other  
4. Reparations should strive to be transformative, including in design, 
implementation and impact  
5. Development cooperation should support States’ obligation to ensure 
access to reparations  
6. Meaningful participation and consultation of victims in the mapping, 
design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of reparations should 
be ensured  
7. Urgent interim reparations to address immediate needs and avoid 
irreparable harm should be made available  
8. Adequate procedural rules for proceedings involving sexual violence 
and reparations should be in place.”398 
 
Regarding whether victims of sexual and gender based crimes should be prioritized 
or treated differently, the report recommends that victims of sexual violence receive 
“priority access to services”399. This is so due to the nature of their harm and the possible 
need for treatment, and thus reparation orders should bear this dimension of sexual and 
gender based crimes into account.  
 
Recent conflicts have left tens of thousands of victims of sexual and gender violence. 
This is compounded by criticisms that the ICC has met with concerning its reluctance to 
prosecute gender-based crimes400. In the Lubanga case the Office of the Prosecutor 
decided to limit prosecution to charges of conscripting child soldiers and did not bring any 
charges of sexual violence allegedly perpetrated by a rebel group, a decision which 
instigated fierce criticism401. The prosecutorial decision concerning what charges to bring 
against the accused, Mr. Lubanga, dictated which victims could potentially ask for 
reparations at the appropriate stage. This sheds light on the discussion above mentioned 
                                                      
398 United Nations Guidance Note of the Secretary General: Reparations for Conflict‐Related 
Sexual Violence of June, 2014, p. 2. 
399 Ibid., p. 5. 
400 Laurel Fletcher, “Refracted Justice: The Imagined Victim and the International Criminal 
Court”, in Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court 
Interventions, Carsten Stahn et al.,  Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 311-312. See similarly   
Kelisiana Thynne, “The International Criminal Court: A Failure of International Justice for 
Victims”, Alberta Law Review, Vol. 46, Issue 4 (August 2009), pp. 957-982, p. 968 who claims 
that “[t]he fact that these charges [concerning sexual violence] were not brought in the Lubanga 
case means that the Court is excluding consideration of the major aspects of the conflict with which 




concerning included and excluded victims for purposes of reparation. This hesitation to 
prosecute gender and sexual violence charges effectively created, in terms of reparation, 
two categories of victims: those who were victims of someone convicted by the Court and 
who could benefit from the reparations regime, and those that suffered from harm by those 
not convicted by the Court, who will not be part of a Court ordered reparations regime402. 
 
The first case before the Court also raises the question of the politics of gender 
justice at the ICC. In fact, Louise Chappell argues that “the failure [of the ICC] to 
adequately prosecute crimes of sexual and gender-based violence in its first two cases has 
made the Court’s reparations regime appear selective and unfair to victims of these crimes, 
and could possibly do more harm than good in the fragile postconflict contexts in which it 
will be implemented”403.  
 
Theories concerning how reparations for sexual violence should develop have 
emerged. Some scholars claim that reparations for victims of sexual violence should be 
“transformative”, which entails the rebuilding of political, social and economic relations 
that contributed to the exposure to the harm victims suffered404. A critical account of this 
transformative reparation theory claims that  
“this agenda threatens to bypass or displace reparative justice as a distinct 
and distinctly victim-centered ideal in favor of a different kind of justice 
agenda. In doing so, it threatens to efface or to demote in importance 
concrete forms of relief and support for individual victims as ‘merely’ 
remedial or restorative, and so to de- mote the importance of recognizing 
individual victims themselves whose status as bearers of rights and 
                                                      
402  Frédéric Mégret, “The Reparations Debate”, 2012, Invited Experts on Reparations 
Questions. ICC Forum, Available at: http://iccforum.com/reparations   
403 Louise Chappell, The Politics of Gender at the International Criminal Court: Legacies and 
Legitimacy, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 156-157. 
404  See discussion and references cited in Margaret Urban Walker, “Transformative 
Reparations? A Critical Look at a Current Trend in Thinking about Gender-Just Reparations”, 
International Journal of Transitional Justice, (10), 2016, 108–125, including: Colleen Duggan and 
Adila Abusharaf, “Reparation of Sexual Violence in Democratic Transitions: The Search for 
Gender Justice”, in The Handbook of Reparations, ed. Pablo de Greiff, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2006; Ruth Rubio-Marín and Pablo de Greiff, “Women and Reparations”, 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 1(3), 2007, pp. 318– 337; Valérie Couillard, “The 
Nairobi Declaration: Redefining Reparations for Women Victims of Sexual Violence”, 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 1(3), 2007, pp. 444–453; Anne Saris and Katherine 
Lofts, “Reparation Programmes: A Gendered Perspective”, in Reparations for Victims of Genocide, 
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: Systems in Place and Systems in the Making, ed. Carla 
Ferstman, Mariana Goetz and Alan Stephens, Leiden: Brill, 2009. 
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subjects of justice depends crucially on their standing to claim 
accountability and repair for violations to their individual persons”405.  
 
Reparations for sexual and gender based violence is thus far from a straight-forward 
issue. The ICC cannot lose sight of the fact that many of the conflicts that come before it 
have left far too many victims of sexual and gender violence406. It has been suggested, as a 
way forward, that “modifying initiatives of the ICC's Trust Fund for Victims and a greater 
emphasis by the ICC on the notion of member state ‘reparative complementarity’ may 
provide mechanisms for transforming conditions that trigger and perpetuate gender 
violence during conflict”407. 
 
Another dilemma in terms of reparations and definitions of victimhood concerns 
victim-perpetrators, and how they should be treated. Luke Moffett recently examined this 
dilemma by drawing from victimology studies and examined ways in which victim-
perpetrators have been either included or excluded from reparation programmes408. The 
dilemma of how to treat victims who are also (or have been) perpetrators has been 
explained in the author’s words as: “individual identities in protracted armed conflicts and 
political violence can be more complex than the binary identities of victim and perpetrator, 
where individuals can be both victimised and victimiser over a period of time”409.  
 
There will be no easy answers for the ICC when it is faced with such dilemmas. 
Some of the questions that may arise concerning reparation for victims before the ICC who 
also committed crimes concern their eligibility to receive reparation, whether they should 
                                                      
405 Margaret Urban Walker, “Transformative Reparations? A Critical Look at a Current 
Trend in Thinking about Gender-Just Reparations”, International Journal of Transitional Justice, 
(10), 2016, 108–125, p. 110. 
406 Cf. Louise Chappell, The Politics of Gender at the International Criminal Court: Legacies 
and Legitimacy, Oxford University Press, 2015. 
407 Andrea Durbach and Louise Chappell, “Leaving Behind the Age of Impunity: Victims of 
Gender Violence and the Promise of Reparations”, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 
2014. 
408  Luke Moffett, “Reparations for ‘Guilty Victims’: Navigating Complex Identities of 
Victim–Perpetrators in Reparation Mechanisms”, International Journal of Transitional Justice, 
(10), 2016, pp. 146-167, p.  
409  Luke Moffett, “Navigating Complex Identities of Victim-Perpetrators in Reparation 
Mechanisms”, Queen’s University Belfast, School of Law Research Paper No. 2014B13, p. 2-3.  
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be treated differently, and how the Court constructs notions of victimhood. Upon a 
thorough analysis of the topic, Luke Moffett posits that “[b]y affirming accountability as 
part of reparations we can hopefully depoliticise contentions around reparations for 




In this chapter the goal was to review the different approaches that international 
criminal courts and mechanisms have put in place regarding victim redress. Through a 
descriptive and comparative exercise, a spectrum of the different models can be perceived. 
At one end of the spectrum lie the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals (precursors of modern 
international criminal law) followed by the ad hoc and hybrid tribunals, with a model that 
does not provide an avenue for victim redress within the proceedings as it  focuses  solely 
on the criminal aspects of trials. Victims’ roles in these courts and mechanisms are 
primarily that of passive expectators and international criminal proceedings are not the fora 
for dealing with claims of reparation. 
 
In the middle of the spectrum there is the model created by the ECCC, which 
includes a civil dimension for victim redress, and certain categories of victims have a 
(limited) possibility of obtaining reparation. This model strikes a balance between criminal 
trials and victims redress, criminal and civil dimensions, but not without its challenges, as 
reviewed above. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, there is the model of the ICC which has created a 
whole system of victim reparation that is still in its development years. In the ICC, a 
broader  range of possibilities for  reparation is available to victims than at the ECCC. A 
parallel administrative mechanism (the Trust Fund), functioning as part of the ICC system 
of reparation is in place for managing victim redress. 
 
The consequences of these different approaches to victim redress in international 
criminal proceedings is that, according to one model, victims will be left to other 
                                                      
410 Ibid., p. 23. 
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mechanisms (e.g. national courts) to seek reparation for international crimes, whereas the 
model established by the ECCC and the ICC provide, at least theoretically, an avenue at 
the international criminal level for victims to obtain some sort of redress. 
 
The questions that remain, and which are the focus of this study, are which of the 
models would be suitable for the international level and which model will international 
criminal justice embrace in the years to come. The compatibility of international criminal 
proceedings with a civil dimension that entails reparation for victims was also underlying 
the comparative analysis in this chapter. These questions will be tackled at the end of this 
study in light of the examination of the role of national courts and of administrative 
mechanism in the pursuit of redress for victims of international crimes.  
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CHAPTER 4: PAVING A NEW ROAD FOR REPARATION FOR VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL 




With the advent of the ICC, a new mechanism for providing redress for victims of 
international crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC was created: the Trust Fund for 
Victims (“TFV”)411. Its inclusion in the international criminal justice scene is both as 
unprecedented412 as it is significant.  
 
The TFV is a novel enterprise of the States Parties to the ICC to set out a unique 
mechanism, within the realm of the ICC framework, dedicated solely to victims, providing 
assistance and implementation of Court-ordered reparation for victims in relation to the 
harm caused by international crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. It is an important 
creation as it works towards ensuring that victim redress is part of international criminal 
justice.  
 
With a very promising purpose, the TFV is bound, nevertheless, to encounter many 
challenges ahead. Its nature, mandate and objectives will dictate the scope of reparations 
                                                      
411 The TFV has gained much attention in the literature in recent years. For examples of 
essays about the TFV, see Peter G. Fischer, “The Victims' Trust Fund of the International Criminal 
Court-Formation of a Functional Reparations Scheme”, Emory International Law Review  17 
(2003), p.187; Pablo De Greiff &  Marieke Wierda, “The Trust Fund for Victims of the 
International Criminal Court: Between Possibilities and Constraints”, in Out of the Ashes: 
Reparation for Victims of Gross and Systematic Violations of Human Rights, Koen de Feyter et al., 
Intersentia, 2005; Heidy Rombouts et al., “The Right to Reparation for Victims of Gross and 
Systematic Human Rights Violations of Human Rights”, in Out of the Ashes: Reparation for 
Victims of Gross and Systematic Violations of Human Rights, Koen de Feyter et al., Intersentia, 
2005; Linda Keller, “Seeking Justice at the International Criminal Court: Victims' Reparations”, 
Thomas Jefferson Law Review 29 (2007),  p. 189; Tom Dannenbaum, “The International Criminal 
Court, Article 79, and Transitional Justice: The Case for an Independent Trust Fund for Victims”, 
Wisconsin International Law Journal 28 (2010). See also on the Trust Fund, Sam Garkawe, 
“Victims and the International Criminal Court: Three Major Issues”,International Criminal Law 
Review 3 (2003), pp. 345-367; Marc Henzelin et al., “Reparations To Victims Before The 
International Criminal Court: Lessons From International Mass Claims Processes”, Criminal Law 
Forum 17  (2006); David Boyle, “The Rights of Victims Participation, Representation, Protection, 
Reparation”, Journal of International Criminal Justice 4 (2006), pp. 307-313. 
412 Pablo de Greiff &  Marieke Wierda, “The Trust fund for Victims of the International 
Criminal Court: Between Possibilities and Constraints”, in Out of the Ashes: Reparation for 
Victims of Gross and Systematic Violations of Human Rights,  Koen de Feyter et al. (eds.),  
Intersentia,  2005, p. 225.  
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for victims. These challenges are highlighted by the fact that other international criminal 
tribunals, as discussed in the previous chapters, did not provide for victim reparation, and 
less so, reparations through an administrative mechanism linked with a judicial procedure, 
such as the TFV. In this context, I argue that much can be learned from the experience of 
other similar administrative reparation mechanisms and mass claims processes413.  
 
In previous chapters, this study discussed whether a legal basis for an individualized 
approach to reparations can be construed and operationalized within the setting of 
international criminal courts. Thus, it analysed the legal basis and contents of reparations 
within international criminal proceedings.  
 
In this chapter, this dissertation turns attention to another form of addressing the 
question of reparation to victims of international crimes: the use of administrative 
mechanisms (linked with  judicial processes). The aim of this chapter is to examine the 
principled question of whether and to what extent an administrative mechanism linked with 
a judicial process may provide a path to deal with mass claims of reparation pertaining to 
international crimes. Thus, this chapter address the following specific sub-questions:  
Ø Should reparations for international crimes be the object of another 
mechanism, such as an international administrative mechanism (linked 
with a judicial mechanism)?  
Ø What role can international administrative mechanisms play in relation to 
reparations for victims of international crimes?  
 
The goal of this chapter fits within the broader aim of this study, which is to examine 
different approaches to victim reparation in international criminal justice, administrative 
mechanisms linked with a judicial body, and to question whether a mixture of criminal and 
civil dimensions (or a sui generis system) makes sense at the international level.  The TFV 
is a unique example of such a mechanism. As such, this chapter studies the endeavour of 
administrative mechanisms linked with a judicial processes as a possible route for civil 
redress for international crimes, and in this light, examines the TFV of the ICC.  
                                                      
413  The International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Redressing Injustices 
Through Mass Claims Processes: Innovative Responses to Unique Challenges, Oxford University 
Press, 2006; Marc Henzelin et al., “Reparations To Victims Before The International Criminal 




In order to examine whether the TFV should play a leading role in the ICC 
context414, and in broader terms, the contribution that similar mechanisms may have on the 
quest for civil redress for international crimes, it is important to first briefly consider the 
legal framework of the TFV, and its connection with a judicial mechanism (the ICC 
Chambers). Following this, various rationales for reparations through the TFV are 
examined, along with the role of the TFV vis-à-vis the Chambers of the Court and the 
challenges ahead of the TFV. After the descriptive overview, this chapter discusses the 
measures taken by the TFV and their impact on victims at different stages of  cases. It also 
explores the important role of the TFV in the reparation phase of the Lubanga case. As 
well, it critically examines in this regard how the budget has been spent. This chapter 
engages in a critical discussion of the pros and cons of administrative versus judicial 
mechanisms. In this respect, this chapter builds on critical scholarship pertaining to the 
detrimental effects that criminal justice may produce for  victims.  
 
In order to extract some lessons learned, this chapter considers various  examples of 
other mechanisms that deal with mass claims for civil redress with a view to pulling 
together common themes that can shed light on some of the questions the TFV may have to 
grapple with. In the final part of the chapter, the question whether the TFV can pave the 
way for the creation of other administrative mechanisms in the international plane for 
redress for victims of international crimes is dwelt upon. 
 
This chapter inquires whether the TFV should play a leading role in the award of 
reparation for victims of ICC crimes. It is argued that it should remain connected to the 
Court (the judicial proceedings) in the sense that the Court (the Chambers) should establish 
the principles of reparation, as stipulated in the Rome Statute. As Peter Dixon argues, it is 
imperative to have “close involvement by the Trial Chamber throughout the targeting 
process”415.  
                                                      
414 See e.g., Pablo de Greiff and Marieke Wierda, “The Trust fund for Victims of the 
International Criminal Court: Between Possibilities and Constraints”, in Out of the Ashes: 
Reparation for Victims of Gross and Systematic Violations of Human Rights,  Koen de Feyter et al., 
Intersentia, 2005, arguing for a greater role for the TFV in the reparations mandate of the ICC. 
415  Peter J. Dixon, “Reparations and the Politics of Recognition”, in Contested Justice: The 
Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions,  Carsten Stahn et al.,  
Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 327-328. 
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The Court will have a huge burden with the criminal proceedings. As such,  the TFV 
might be better placed to deal with reparation awards swiftly and more appropriately due to 
its expertise and focused mandate. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the TFV should 
remain linked with judicial proceedings to ensure that the Court is playing its role of 
principle in the reparation proceedings.  
 
It will also be demonstrated in this chapter that, while it is an important achievement 
to create an administrative mechanism that focuses on victims of the crimes under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, it is also true that many victims of international crimes will 
necessarily be left out of the reparation scheme. Accordingly, this chapter analyses whether 
a link to criminal proceedings is desirable. In this regard, it is important to ponder about 
the question of whether linking trust funds with the international criminal justice process is 
desirable given the potential of further victimization that criminal trials may produce on 
victims416.  Thus, in this chapter, the TFV will provide the main case study and will also be 
a lens through which the question as to whether administrative mechanisms may be a 
viable possibility for civil redress claims for international crimes will be assessed.  
 
II. THE ROAD TO THE TFV AND ITS LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
As already discussed, the award of reparations directed to perpetrators to the benefit 
of individual or collective victims is new in international law417. Historically, under 
international law, contrary to domestic law, there has been a significant divide between 
State reparation for wrongful conduct and reparation paid by the individual418. The 
                                                      
416 Concerning the creation of perceptions and constructions of victims by international 
criminal justice, see Laurel Fletcher, “Refracted Justice: The Imagined Victim and the International 
Criminal Court”, in Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court 
Interventions,  Carsten Stahn et al.,  Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 302-325. 
417 See discussion in Part 2, chapter 1 of this study for a detailed overview of this question. 
See also, Eva Dwertmann, The Reparation System of the International Criminal Court: Its 
Implementation, Possibilities and Limitations,  Nijhoff, 2010, pp. 22-23; Christine Evans, 
“Reparations for Victims in International Criminal Law”, Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Law, (2012). 
418  Article 58 of the ILC Draft Articles. See also, Christian Tomuschat, “Reparation for 
Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations”,  Tulane Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 10 (2002), p. 181. 
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breakthrough of individual criminal responsibility dates from the Second World War trials, 
as already discussed; however, the time then was not ripe to develop individual criminal as 
well as civil or tort responsibility for international crimes419. The evolution of the position 
of the individual in international law has brought about changes to this scenario. This 
divide between the State’s and the individual’s civil responsibility is becoming blurred at 
this print of international law, as it has already been discussed. Crimes are committed by 
individuals, who, admittedly, often operate behind the machinery of the State420. Now, they 
not only face criminal responsibility for their crimes, but they can also engage civil 
liability at  the international level. In this light, the ICC Statute enables an international 
Court, for the first time in international criminal law, to order a perpetrator of an 
international crime to give reparation to the victims, as already discussed.  
 
Against this context, the background to the inclusion of reparation for victims of 
international crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC was not uncontroversial. One author 
who studied the reparation system of the ICC in detail, has suggested that “[i]n the 
formation of the Rome Statute there were widely varying views about the role of victims in 
the international criminal process, rooted in the different approaches varying national 
systems take to victims in criminal procedure.”421 
 
                                                      
419 See discussion in Part 2, chapter 1 of this study.   
420 I subscribe however to the theory that individual and State responsibility for international 
crimes are not always disconnected, and may complement each other in cases where the State may 
have been involved in the international crime: see in this regard, Jurisdictional Immunities of the 
State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Judgment,  3 February 2012, Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Cançado Trindade, paras. 57-59, and references cited therein;  Antônio Augusto  Cançado 
Trindade, “Complementarity between State Responsibility and Individual Responsibility for Grave 
Violations of Human Rights: The Crime of State Revisited”, in International Responsibility Today 
- Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter,  Maurizio Ragazzi, Nijhoff, 2005, pp. 253-269;  
Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, “International Crimes and State Responsibility”, in International 
Responsibility Today - Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter,  Maurizio Ragazzi,  Nijhoff, 2005, 
pp. 76-77; R. Maison, La responsabilité individuelle pour crime d’État en Droit international 
public, Bruxelles, Bruylant, Éds. de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2004, pp. 24, 85, 262-264 and 286-
287.   
421  Eva Dwertmann, The Reparation System of the International Criminal Court: Its 
Implementation, Possibilities and Limitations,  Nijhoff, 2010, p. 25, citing William A. Schabas, An 
Introduction to the International Criminal Court,  Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., 2004, p. 
171 and  Christopher Muttukumaru, “Reparation to Victims”, in The International Criminal Court: 
The Making of the Rome Statute – Issues, Negotiations, Results, Roy S.K. Lee, Kluwer Law 
International, 1999, pp. 262 et seq.  
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In this light, the ICC Statute is not only innovative because it has incorporated the 
possibility for victims of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC to claim reparation 
within international criminal justice; but also because of its approach to the reparation 
mechanism, by the creation of an independent administrative mechanism connected to the 
Court, the TFV.  
1. Relevant legal provisions 
The TFV was established under the auspices of the ICC. As such, the main legal texts 
governing the ICC – that is, the ICC statute, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and the 
Regulations of the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) – also govern the operation of the 
TFV to some extent. In order to discuss legal issues surrounding the operation of the TFV, 
I will refer to the legal basis for the TFV; for ease of reference, relevant parts of legal 
provisions are cited hereunder. 
 
In the ICC Statute, Article 75 concerns reparations to victims, and provides, in 
relevant part: 
 
“1. The Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in 
respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. 
On this basis, in its decision the Court may, either upon request or on its 
own motion in exceptional circumstances, determine the scope and extent 
of any damage, loss and injury to, or in respect of, victims and will state 
the principles on which it is acting. 
2. The Court may make an order directly against a convicted person 
specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including 
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. 
Where appropriate, the Court may order that the award for reparations be 
made through the Trust Fund provided for in article 79. […]”422 
 
As for the TFV, under the terms of Article 79 of the ICC Statute, 
 
“1. A Trust Fund shall be established by decision of the Assembly of 
States Parties for the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court, and of the families of such victims. 
                                                      
422 For a commentary on Article 75, see e.g.  David Donat-Cattin, “Article 75 – Reparations 
to Victims”, in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – Observers’ 
Notes, Article by Article,  Otto Triffterer,  Baden-Baden, 1999; William A. Schabas, The 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute, Oxford University Press, 2010, 
Article 75. 
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2. The Court may order money and other property collected through fines 
or forfeiture to be transferred, by order of the Court, to the Trust Fund. 
3. The Trust Fund shall be managed according to criteria to be determined 
by the Assembly of States Parties.” 
 
Additionally, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide further guidance about 
the two mandates of the TFV. Rule 98(1-4) concerns reparations awarded by the Court 
against a convicted person; Rule 98(5) concerns the TFV’s assistance mandate with regard 
to the use of “other resources” for the benefit of victims, subject to Article 79. Rule 98 
reads as follows: 
 
“1. Individual awards for reparations shall be made directly against a 
convicted person. 
2. The Court may order that an award for reparations against a convicted 
person be deposited with the Trust Fund where at the time of making the 
order it is impossible or impracticable to make individual awards directly 
to each victim. The award for reparations thus deposited in the Trust Fund 
shall be separated from other resources of the Trust Fund and shall be 
forwarded to each victim as soon as possible. 
3. The Court may order that an award for reparations against a convicted 
person be made through the Trust Fund where the number of the victims 
and the scope, forms and modalities of reparations makes a collective 
award more appropriate. 
4. Following consultations with interested States and the Trust Fund, the 
Court may order that an award for reparations be made through the Trust 
Fund to an intergovernmental, international or national organization 
approved by the Trust Fund. 
5. Other resources of the Trust Fund may be used for the benefit of victims 
subject to the provisions of article 79”. 
 
The Regulations of the TFV were adopted by the Assembly of States Parties at the 4th 
plenary meeting on 3 December 2005. Their aim is to ensure the proper and effective 
functioning of the TFV. They regulate many areas; the TFV official website explains the 
provisions of the Regulations in the following terms: 
 
“Regarding the TFV's activities and projects, the Regulations specify that 
all resources of the Trust Fund shall be for the benefit of victims within the 
jurisdiction of the Court as defined by Rule 85 of the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, and, where natural persons are concerned, their families. 
The Regulations provide a detailed legal regime for the Trust Fund's two 
mandates: 
Under the TFV's Reparation mandate, the Regulations contain detailed 
provisions on awards for reparations by the Court, referring to individual 
awards (Rule 98 (2) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence), collective 
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awards (Rule 98 (3)), and awards to an intergovernmental, international, or 
national organization (Rule 98 (4)). 
With respect to the TFV's assistance mandate, the Regulations specify that 
before undertaking activities to provide physical rehabilitation, 
psychological rehabilitation, and/or material support to victims, the Board 
is required to formally notify the Court of its intentions”423. 
 
Additionally, some of the Resolutions of the Assembly of States Parties which 
concern the TFV. These include ICC-ASP/1/Res.6, ICC-ASP/3/Res.7, ICC-ASP/4/Res.3, 
ICC-ASP/4/Res.5, ICC-ASP/4/Res.7, ICC-ASP/6/Res.3. These Resolutions address some 
important aspects of the functioning of the TFV, for example, the voluntary contributions, 
and the term of office of members of the Board of Directors, among others. These texts 
together govern the operation of the TFV. 
 
The conception of “victims” in the framework of the ICC has already been discussed 
in previous chapters of this study. At this juncture, it appears useful to recall the definition 
of victims contained in Rule 85 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC. In this 
sense, Rule 85(1) provides a broad definition of victims as including “natural persons who 
have suffered harm as a result of the commission of any crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court”. Rule 85(2) states the victims may include “organizations or institutions that 
have sustained direct harm to any of their property which is dedicated to religion, 
education, art or science or charitable purposes, and to their historic monuments, hospitals 
and other places and objects for humanitarian purposes.”  
 
Reparation proceedings are not in principle limited to those who have suffered 
directly from the criminal acts of the accused. Article 75 of the ICC Statute refers clearly 
to victims of crimes and the families of such victims as potential beneficiaries of the 
reparation system424.  
                                                      
423 Available at: http://trustfundforvictims.org/legal-basis.  
424 See also, Christopher Muttukumaru, “Reparations to Victims”, in The International 
Criminal Court:  The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, Results, Roy S. K. Lee, 
Kluwer Law International, 1999, pp. 262 et seq.,  referring to a footnote inserted in the Report of 
the Working Group on Procedural Matters of 13 July 1998 (UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L2/Add.7) to the effect that: “[Article 75 of the Statute] refers to the 
possibility for appropriate reparations to be granted not only to victims but also to victims’ families 
and successors. For the purposes of interpretation of the terms ‘victims’ and ‘reparations’, 
definitions are contained in the text of article 44, paragraph 4 of the Statute, article 68, paragraph 1, 
and its accompanying footnote […], the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of 
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From the above-mentioned provisions, it stems clearly that the TFV is not a judicial 
mechanism that defines reparation beneficiaries, but rather an administrative mechanism 
linked to a judicial procedure (the ICC proceedings). It is a kind of complementary organ 
of the Court and an integral part of the reparative scheme established  by the ICC425. The 
TFV is however independent from the Court426. 
 
By its nature, structure and reach of activities, the TFV is not a mechanism set up to 
provide for reparations for all victims of international crimes, but rather only to “natural 
persons who have suffered harm as a result of the commission of any crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court”, pursuant to Rule 85 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence427. 
Thus, the TFV has a limited scope in the redress it can afford to victims of international 
crimes, the principal limitation being the confines of international crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court. It is also limited by practical considerations such as the resources 
available. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Crimes and Abuse of Power […] and the examples in paragraphs 12-15 of the revised draft basic 
principles and guidelines on the right to reparation for victims of gross violations of human rights 
and humanitarian law” – cited in Marc Henzelin et al., “Reparations to Victims Before the 
International Criminal Court: Lessons from International Mass Claims Processes”,  Criminal Law 
Forum 17 (2006), pp. 323-324. 
425  Eva Dwertmann, The Reparation System of the International Criminal Court: Its 
Implementation, Possibilities and Limitations, Nijhoff, 2010, p. 265. 
426 See Resolution of the Establishment of the Secretariat of the Trust Fund for Victims, ICC-
ASP/3/Res.7 (2004). 
427 On the jurisprudential construction of the definition of victims, see ICC, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, “Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings 
of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6”, 17 January 2006, ICC-01/04-101-
tEN-Corr, Pre Trial Chamber I,  para. 79; ICC Bemba, “Fourth Decision on Victims' Participation”, 
12 December 2008, ICC-01/05-01/08-320, Pre-Trial Chamber III,  para 30; ICC, Situation in 
Kenya, “Decision on Victims' Participation in Proceedings”, 3 November 2010, ICC-01/09-24, Pre-
Trial Chamber II, para 19. See also, E.g., ICC, Kony, Otti, Odhiambo & Ongwen, “Decision on 
Victims' Applications for Participation a/0014/07 to a/0020/07 and a/0076/07 to a/0125/07”,  21 
November 2008, ICC 02/04-01/05-356, Pre-Trial Chamber II,  para 7.ICC, Muthaura, Kenyatta and 
Ali, “Decision on Victims' Participation at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and in the Related 
Proceedings”,  26 August 2011, ICC-01/09-02/11-267, Pre-Trial Chamber II,  para. 40. 
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2. Mandates of the TFV 
Having reviewed the legal basis for the existence and operation of the TFV, it is now 
important to discuss the mandates of the TFV. On the basis of the framework provided in 
the Statute, the TFV can act in two ways: first, it can act as an institution through which the 
Court can order reparation awards or it can use its “other resources” for the benefit of the 
victims pursuant to rule 98 (5). 
 
The TFV has a double role, both of which are aimed at providing support to victims 
of crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC: it performs, on the one hand, a reparations 
mandate, and on the other, an assistance mandate to the victims. While this study is 
concerned with reparations for victims of international crimes, and thus more closely 
linked with the reparations mandate of the TFV, it is also relevant to examine the second 
mandate of the TFV, and critically analyze their differences in terms of practical 
implications. 
 
Concerning the reparations mandate, according to Rule 98, the Court may order an 
award for reparations against a convicted person to be made through the TFV, if at the time 
of making the order, it is impossible or impracticable to make individual awards directly to 
each victim. Reparations to victims can be individual or collective, and can include 
restitution, compensation and/or rehabilitation. Reparations may be provided in collective 
or symbolic measures that can help to promote peace and reconciliation within divided 
communities.   
 
The assistance mandate stems from Rule 98 (5) which concerns “other resources” of 
the TFV. The assistance mandate is not linked to a conviction of accused persons, and it 
can happen prior to the end of trial proceedings, and prior to any conviction. The assistance 
mandate provides physical and psychological rehabilitation and material support as a 
means to assist victims in their recovery. This assistance mandate provides the TFV the 
autonomy to give support to victims outside the scope of Court-ordered reparations. 
 
The TFV itself has expressed the view that the two mandates are separate and that 
support provided under Rule 98 (5) (the “assistance mandate”) is actually broader than the 
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reparations, and is the “provision of assistance to victims in general through the use of 
other resources”428.  
 
While it seems that the assistance mandate can reach a greater number of victims and 
affected societies in a more timely fashion,  (since it is not connected to the cases before 
the Court, and can affect victims of broader situations), the programs demonstrate that both 
mandates aim at repairing the harm suffered due to international crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court. The actual measures taken are not diametrically different: both 
mandates provide forms of reparation, and aim at providing some form of redress to 
victims. Collective reparations after a conviction and the assistance mandate will likely 
have similar impacts on victims, and the measures will also likely fall under one of the 
three categories of physical, psychological rehabilitation and monetary support.  
 
More fundamentally, this study refers to the analysis of Peter Dixon in relation to 
these two mandates where he posits that “[m]orally, reparations are given to a recipient 
because she has been wronged, not because she is in need or is vulnerable. Politically, 
reparations are awarded because a recipient’s rights have been violated”429. Similarly, the 
distinction between reparation and assistance “is the moral and political content of the 
former, positing that victims are entitled to reparations because their rights have been 
violated”430. 
 
In the context of the reparations mandate, how does the TFV fit within the 
dimensions discussed in the first chapter of this study? Chapter 1 referred to the report by 
the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and 
guarantees of non-recurrence. It is relevant to mention this report again in relation to the 
mandate of the TFV. One significant conclusion of the report is the “scandalous” gap in the 
                                                      
428 ICC, Situation in Uganda, “Notification of the Board of Directors of the Trust Fund for 
Victims in accordance with Regulation 50 of the Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims”, 25 
January 2008, ICC-02/04. 
429  Peter J. Dixon, “Reparations and the Politics of Recognition” in Contested Justice: The 
Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions, Carsten Stahn et al.,  
Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 331-332.  
430   Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Katharine Orlovsky, “A Complementary Relationship: 
Reparations and Development”, in Transitional Justice and Development: Making Connections, 
Pablo de Greiff & Roger Duthie, Social Science Research Council, 2009,  p. 179. 
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implementation of reparations431. In this regard, the TFV has much to contribute to breach 
this gap by designing and implementing programmes to victims of crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court. In the words of the report, which are worth quoting in full here: 
 
“While well-designed reparation programmes should primarily be directed 
at victims of massive violations, they can have positive spillover effects 
for whole societies. In addition to making a positive contribution to the 
lives of beneficiaries and to exemplifying the observance of legal 
obligations, reparation programmes can help promote trust in institutions 




 Thus, in fulfilling its mandate, it is argued that the TFV should bear in mind the 
analysis and conclusions of this report. 
3. Functioning of the TFV, budget and programs 
The TFV is administered by a Board of Directors, with five members originating 
from each region of the world. They shall be nominated and elected by the Bureau of the 
Directors, the Assembly of States Parties. Each member shall serve for a mandate of three 
years with the possibility of re-election433. The Members serve in a pro bono and 
individual capacity. 
 
The TFV counts on contributions from countries. It is reported that from 2004 to 
October 2014, the total of contributions from countries amounted to over €20.4 million 
euros, with over €5 million euros from 2014 alone434. The contributions are divided in two 
kinds: the earmarked contribution and the general contributions. The first category is  for 
specific purposes, such as for victims of sexual and gender-based violence or child 
                                                      
431 United Nations, General Assembly, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion 
of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence”, A/69/518, 14 October 2014. 
432 Ibid.,para. 82. 
433 See Resolution on the Establishment of a Fund for the Benefit of Victims of Crimes within 
the Jurisdiction of the Court, and the Families of such Victims, ICC-ASP/1/Res.6 (2002), which 
established the Board of Directors. See also, Resolution on the Procedure for the Nomination and 
Election of Members of the Board of Directors of the Trust Fund for the Benefit of Victims, ICC-
ASP/1/Res.7 (2202), 9 September 2002. 
434 See http://trustfundforvictims.org/financial-information.  
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soldiers, for example 435 . The conditions for the acceptance of these earmarked 
contributions are set out in Regulations 27-30 of the TFV, with the exception of assets 
acquired for the purposes of Court ordered reparations. In this regard, it is also interesting 
that the TFV has a reserve fund which is held for the purposes of payment of Court 
reparations in case the accused is declared indigent. In 2015, the amount of the reserve was 
at €3.6 million euros436. It is important to note that the TFV also receives funds from 
private donors, in addition to States Parties. The cost of functioning is included in the 
budget of the Court and the members of the Board of Directors act on a pro bono capacity, 
according to Regulation 16 of the Regulations of the TFV. 
 
In 2015, the TFV received over €8.000 in individual donations and over €2.9 millions 
in donor state donations. It is reported that contributions have continuously risen since 
2004, totalling 34 donor States in 2015. In 2016 the TFV has accumulated over €12.8 
million and US$61.300. Some of the allocations of the budget include: €1 million for 
current projects in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; €600,000 for 
assistance mandate activities in the Central African Republic. The TFV also carries a 
reparation reserve of €5 million from which the Board of Directors allocated €1 million to 
implement reparations in the Lubanga case437.  
 
Having reviewed the budget of the TFV, the question is how the budget is used for 
the benefit of victims. I shall now examine the programs and decisions of the TFV 
regarding victims. The programs in Northern Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo were  approved by the Pre-Trial Chamber in 2008. The programs provide assistance 
to victims as defined under Rule 85 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The TFV 
partners with  local organizations and provides services such as psychological 
rehabilitation, material support, medical referrals and physical rehabilitation438. In 2014, 
                                                      
435 See http://trustfundforvictims.org/financial-information. 
436 See http://trustfundforvictims.org/financial-information. 
437 The Trust Fund for Victims, “The Year 2015 in Donations”, Newsletter No. 1/2016, 15 
February 2016. See also, Trust Fund for Victims Board of Directors, 14th Annual Meeting, The 
Hague 18-21 April 2016. 
438 Some of the programs are: “Treating the Mental Health Needs of Ugandan Victims of 
War Crimes: A Service and Capacity Building Approach”, “Capacity Building, Advocacy and 
Medical Rehabilitation of Northern Uganda’s Victims of War”, (Northern Uganda);  
“Accompagnement socioéconomique et psychosocial des victimes des Violences Sexuelles dans le 
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the Board of Directors approved assistance assessment missions for Kenya and Côte 
d’Ivoire439. 
 
In its most recent 2015 “Programme Progress Report” some of the activities of the 
TFV are reported, including both the implementation of the assistance and the reparations 
mandate. The programmes of the TFV focus on psychologica and physical rehabilitation 
and material support – the reported summary of achievements is as follows440: 
 
Global Programme Indicators  DRC  Uganda  Total  
Physical rehabilitation     
Number of beneficiaries received Physical Rehabilitation assistance 
and during the reporting period  82  1,246  1,328  
No. of victims fitted with prostheses or orthotics  0  207  207  
Number of victims receiving reconstructive or corrective surgery  1  0  1  
Number of victim survivors of SGBV referred for specialized medical 
care  6  0  6  
Number of mutilated victims referred for physical rehabilitation 
services  75  35  110  
Psychological rehabilitation     
Number of direct beneficiaries received Psychological Rehabilitation 
during the reporting period  55,411  828  56,239  
Number of individuals referred to a specialized mental health care  5  0  5  
Number of TFV direct beneficiaries participated in facilitated 
community therapy sessions  786  0  786  
Number of victim testimonies collected, translated and published for the 
Memory Project  150  0  150  
Number of new counsellors trained in mental health care  0  37  37  
Number of community workers trained in psychosocial care  47  16  63  
 Material support     
Number direct beneficiaries (adults and children) provided with IGA’s 
and MUSO’s support  2,700  0  2700  
Number of literacy centres supported by the TFV  33  0  33  
                                                                                                                                                                   
Territoire de Beni, au Nord Kivu”, “Réintégration communautaires  des jeunes victimes des 
conflits armés en Ituri pour la lutte contre toutes formes des violences”, “Accompagnement 
psychosocial des victimes des violences sexuelles à Bunia et 8 localités périphériques” , « Projet de 
Réinsertion Socio-économique des victimes des violences sexuelles dues à la guerre », « A l’école 
de la paix” (in the DRC). 
439 See Record of the 11th Annual Meeting, March 2014. 
440 Trust Fund for Victims, “Assistance and Reparation: Achievements, Lessons Learned, 
and Transitioning – Programme Progress Report 2015”, available at: 
http://Ibid..trustfundforvictims.org/sites/default/files/media_library/documents/FinalTFVPPR2015.
pdf   
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Number of learners registered at literacy centres supported by the TFV  662  0  662  
Number of children provided direct support by the TFV to attend school 
(former child soldier, other victim, child of victim)  1806  0  1,806  
Number of radio programs conducted to talk about peace and 
reconciliation  29  0  29  
 
 
A review of the assistance programs  currently in place demands  some important 
remarks.  The TFV partners with organizations in order to fulfill its assistance mandate and 
provide support to victims. It is crucial that the TFV play an active role on the type of 
support that is granted to victims. It has to avoid a situation where it becomes a mere fund 
contributor by engaging in  decision-making  and  maintaining control of its  activities. In 
this regard, further reporting would be appropriate. How is the TFV ensuring  that all 
victims are being helped  by the assistance programme? How are the needs of victims 
being met by the programmes in place? What lessons can be learned from experience? 
These are some of the questions that are raised and for which further  reporting would be 
beneficial. 
 
Furthermore, it is important to assess whether other situations within the jurisdiction 
of the Court also require the TFV to act under its assistance mandate. In addition to 
actually implementing the assistance programmes, the TFV needs to act proactively  and 
assess situations that may fall under its assistance mandate. It is important that the TFV set 
out clear guidelines on how to prioritize programmes and how to attend to urgent requests. 
It may also be a good idea to report some best practices to inform future assistance 
programmes.  
 
 The next section will discuss the role of the TFV in the reparations stage and will 






III. THE ROLE OF THE TFV VIS-À-VIS THE COURT IN THE REPARATIONS STAGE  
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An important question concerning reparations at the ICC pertains to how the Court 
will approach its reparation mandate and more specifically, the role of the TFV in this 
regard. Will the Court have an active role in the adjudication and administration of 
reparation awards, making the procedure similar to domestic litigation of civil claims? Or, 
will the TFV play a leading role in the implementation of awards of redress for victims?  
 
In this regard, the Court and the TFV function in a kind of hierarchical  system. This 
is so based on the provisions governing reparations within the ICC. The Court has 
discretion on whether or not to award reparations and it is the one to devise principles on 
reparation441. The Court is also to decide whether an individual or collective award should 
be ordered (or both)442. The Court furthermore determines whether the reparation award 
should be made through the TFV443. This latter situation occurs when the Court deems it 
“appropriate”, according to the terms of Article 75(2) of the Rome Statute, or when it is 
“impossible or impracticable to make individual awards directly to each victim”444. 
Alternatively, awards “should be made through the Trust Fund where the number of the 
victims and the scope, forms and modalities of reparations makes a collective award more 
appropriate”445. 
 
From the foregoing and the provisions just mentioned, it seems that the Court’s role 
is important and encompasses the establishment of principles of reparation: the use of the 
verb “shall” under Article 75 of the ICC Statute makes it clear that the Court must establish 
the principles under which the Court, or the TFV, will act in relation  to reparations. As 
regards the actual award of redress and designing programmes for reparations, under 
Article 75, either the Court may award reparations to victims itself - directly through 
judicial Court proceedings - or it may order that the TFV take charge of the award of 
redress446. 
                                                      
441 See Article 75(1) of the ICC Statute.  
442 See Article 75(2) of the Rome Statute and Rules 97(1) and 98(1)-(4) of the RPE. 
443 Article 75(2) of the Rome Statute. 
444 Rule 98(2) of the RPE. 
445 Rule 98(3) of the RPE. 
446  See generally for a commentary:  Eva Dwertmann, The Reparation System of the 
International Criminal Court: Its Implementation, Possibilities and Limitations,  Nijhoff, 2010, pp. 
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In this context, it is argued that the Court should have a limited role in the 
management of awards of reparation to victims. More specifically, the  Court should have 
a supervisory role. In my view, such a role has two aspects. The first one is the 
establishment of principles of reparation, as stated in the Rome Statute. In this context, I 
have argued that the Court should look at the experiences of other institutions that have 
similar tasks. The second one should be the monitoring of the implementation of 
reparations, as more fully discussed below. 
 
In the author’s view, the Court’s plenary should establish the principles of reparation 
that apply in all cases and situations. This approach would provide clarity and uniformity. 
It is submitted that the plenary deciding on reparation principles, rather than each Chamber 
deciding on principles applicable to each case (which are subject to review by the Appeals 
Chamber) would ensure that there is cohesion across cases in terms of principles of 
reparation. This is positive since it would avoid the creation of categories of victims 
depending on the situation and would ensure transparency and fairness. Moreover, it could 
be argued that the text of the Statute, Article 75, provides that it is for “the Court” to adopt 
the principles of reparation, and thus, it could be argued that it is for the plenary of the 
Court. This would ensure that reparation principles are applied evenly across the board, 
such that  there is no disparity. Then each Chamber, in light of the specific circumstances 
of each case, could adapt the principles, or apply those principles, to the particularities of 
each case. For example, a case bearing a sexual violence component should be guided by 
principles of reparation that concern sexual crimes447. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the recent Judgment of the Appeals Chamber in 
the Lubanga case developed some principles of reparations448. The principles laid out by 
the Appeals Chamber provide useful guidance. However, considering that the TFV will be 
in charge of implementing the reparations mandate, the TFV should have concrete 
                                                                                                                                                                   
265-271.  Thordis Ingadottir, “The Trust Fund for Victims (Article 79 of the Rome Statute)”, in 
The International Criminal Court – Recommendations on Policy and Practice – Financing, 
Victims, Judges, and Immunities,  Thordis Ingadottir,  Ardsley,  2003, pp. 111 et seq. 
447  See on this Anne-Marie De Brouwer, “Reparation to Victims of Sexual Violence: 
Possibilities at the International Criminal Court and at the Trust Fund for Victims and Their 
Families”, Leiden Journal of International Law 20 (2007), pp. 207-237. 
448 See Lubanga Reparations Appeals Judgement, discussed in the previous chapter. 
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guidance as to how to implement the reparations decision. While the Judgment is already a 
step forward in establishing rules that will ensure that some basic principles are met, more 
specific and direct guidance should have been given in relation to the role of the TFV. 
While there should be some freedom as to how the TFV will work with victims for 
reparation purposes, certain issues, such as deadlines for implementation and  reporting on 
activities, should have been detailed in the Judgment. It is submitted that the reparation 
function of the TFV will be a learning process for everyone involved.  
 
This second, more subsidiary aspect of the role of the Court, would entail supervision 
of the reparations designed by the TFV in order to ascertain that the programme meets the 
principles the Court previously set out. It is to be recalled that the TFV is an administrative 
mechanism, run by a Board of Directors. It is important in this light that it remains 
continuously attached to the judicial arm of the ICC, the Chambers. The TFV does not 
exist in a vacuum. While I argue for an active and leading role for the TFV in the 
reparation scheme of the ICC, I shall also underscore the key judicial role of the Court in 
ensuring the proper design of reparation programmes and implementation of reparation 
awards by the TFV. 
 
It is thus submitted that this proposed approach would provide a uniform system of 
reparations, across cases and situations, and it would provide the “judicial” arm necessary 
in a reparation programme, through the Court’s Chambers. The guidelines provided by the 
Court will enable the TFV to ensure that reparations follow the framework of the Statute, 
and to remain consistent in its administration of reparations.  
 
This does not seem, however, to be  the way in which the ICC has decided to proceed 
thus far. As already discussed, it was not the Court’s plenary that adopted, upon study of 
the question, principles of reparation. Rather, an individual Chamber, upon reviewing the 
arguments of Parties and participants, established brief principles to guide the 
implementation of reparation by the TFV. It remains to be seen whether this will be the 
approach of each Trial Chamber, and how the jurisprudence on principles of reparation 
applicable in each individual case will be formed. 
 
At the time of the writing of this study, the activities of the TFV were at an infant 
age, given that only one decision on reparation from Trial Chamber 1 in the case of 
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Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is available to date449. This decision is very telling as 
to the role that it is envisaged for the TFV concerning reparations.  
 
The decision of Trial Chamber I, as the first decision in the history of the ICC 
concerning the award of reparation for victims, unfortunately left some questions 
unanswered. While the Decision of Reparation from Trial Chamber I dedicated much 
attention to the arguments of the Parties and participants (including  NGOs), the principles 
on reparation have been treated more cursorily and superficially. One could expect that the 
Trial Chamber would accord more importance to its pivotal role of establishing the 
principles of reparation to be applied in the cas d’espèce.  
 
Be that as it may, it was clear however that the Trial Chamber set up a major role for 
the TFV in the award of reparations. This is a positive development in my  view, especially 
in the case of victims of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, who was declared indigent450, and 
thus he would not have any financial resources to contribute to compensation to victims. 
The Appeals Chamber Judgment in Lubanga, already discussed in the previous chapter, 
further clarified the principles on reparations and further strengthened the role of the TFV 
in the reparations mandate. 
 
In fact, it is part of the two-fold mandate of the TFV that it not only implement the 
reparations ordered by the Court but also that it provide physical, material and 
psychological support for victims and their families451. The TFV has in place a few 
programmes that are not derivative of the Appeals Chamber Judgment on reparation in the 
                                                      
449 ICC, Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, “Decision Establishing the 
Principles and Procedures to be applied to Reparations”, 7 August 2012, ICC-01/04-
01/06(hereinafter: “Decision on Reparations”). At the time of the writing of this article, the 
Decision on Reparations is pending of appeal: Defence,  “Acte d’appel de la Défense de M. 
Thomas Lubanga à l’encontre de la ‘Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be 
applied to reparation’ rendue par la Chambre de première instance I le 7 août 2012”, 6 September 
2012, ICC-01/04-01/06; Legal Representatives of Victims, “Acte d'appel contre la ‘Decision 
establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparation’ du 7 août 2012 de la 
Chambre de première instance I”, 3 September 2012, ICC-01/04-01/06; Office of Public Counsel 
for Victims and Legal Representatives of Victims, “Acte d’appel à l’encontre de la ‘Decision 
establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparation’ délivrée par la Chambre de 
première instance I le 7 août 2012”, 24 August 2012, ICC-01/04-01/06-2909. See in this regard, 
chapter 3 which analyses in more detail this decision.  
450  Decision on Reparations, para. 269.  
451 See TFV website at Ibid..trustfundforvictims.org  
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Lubanga case, and thus, are not part of the reparations for the victims in the case. 
Nevertheless, they provide assistance to victims of situations, before the trial proceedings 
are finished and there is a convicted person. As discussed above, the programs in the 
assistance mandate can provide some guidance for the implementation of the Court ordered 
reparations in the Lubanga case.  
 
In relation to the implementation of collective reparations in the Lubanga case the 
TFV reported consultations in Ituri District between May and July 2015 in order to assess 
the current location of direct and indirect victims for purposes of reparation in accordance 
with the Appeals Chamber Judgment mentioned above. The TFV also held consultations in 
22 localities in Ituri to assess the damages suffered and collect views of victims concerning 
reparations. The TFV however reported that “is still lacking important information 
required to address comprehensively the tasks set by the Appeals Chamber. In particular, 
the Trust Fund considers that in order to assist the Trial Chamber with establishing the 
liability of the convicted person and to create the draft implementation plan, it is necessary 
to have access to reliable data on the direct victims as defined by the Court currently held 
by third parties in the DRC”452.  
 
Significantly, the TFV submitted to Trial Chamber II on 3 November 2015 a “Draft 
Implementation Plan” for implementing the collective reparations in the Lubanga case453. 
On 9 February 2016, in the exercise of its monitoring and supervisory function, Trial 
Chamber II, after examining the Draft Implementation Plan decided that it was incomplete 
and that it could not rule on the proposed plan454. According to the Chamber the plan did 
not include sufficient information on: the victims potentially eligible to benefit from the 
reparations, including the requests for reparations and the supporting material; the extent of 
the harm caused to the victims; proposals regarding the modalities and forms of 
reparations; the amount of the convicted person’s liability. In response to the Trial 
                                                      
452 TFV, “Assistance and Reparation: Achievements, Lessons Learned, and Transitioning – 
Programme Progress Report 2015”, at p. 54, available at: 
http://Ibid..trustfundforvictims.org/sites/default/files/media_library/documents/FinalTFVPPR2015.
pdf  
453 TFV, “Filing on Reparations and Draft Implementation Plan”, 3 November 2005, ICC-
01/04-01/06-3177-Red, and its two annexes, ICC-01/04-01/06-3177-AnxA, and “Annex I”, ICC-
01/04-01/06-3177-Conf-Exp-AnxI. 
454 Trial Chamber II, “Order instructing the Trust Fund for Victims to supplement the draft 
implementation plan”, 9 February 2016, ICC-01/04-01/06. 
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Chamber’s Order, on 7 June 2016, the TFV provided a detailed explanation of the various 
issues and concerns arising from the Chamber’s Order. In particular, the TFV: 
 
“respectfully request[ed] the Trial Chamber to accept its request for 
reconsideration made in the Victim Dossier Filing, to revise its current 
procedural approach and to instead consider approving the Draft 
Implementation Plan of 3 November 2015 in its entirety”455.  
 
As explained in the previous chapter, it was only very recently (in October 2016) that 
the process seems to have moved along (see discussion above). It follows that the TFV’s 
plan for the first reparation order in the Lubanga case is, at the time of the writing, still in 
process of being implemented. It is thus premature to take any conclusions regarding the 
actual role of the TFV in the actual reparations awarded within the ICC.  
 
While it has been submitted that other institutions can inform reparation measures at 
the ICC - such as the IACtHR 456, which has immense experience with victims of grave 
human rights abuse in terms of resources for the purpose of compensation, the ICC, unlike 
a human rights Court, does not have the power, nor the mandate, to hold States accountable 
for crimes committed under its jurisdiction and to order them to pay compensation. Even 
when the offender may have the assets to contribute to reparation awards457, there seems to 
be no reason for the TFV to stay out of the equation458. 
                                                      
455 TFV, “Additional Programme Information Filing”, 7 June 2016, ICC-01/04-01/06-3209. 
456 See chapter 3. 
457 See Pablo de Greiff &  Marieke Wierda, “The Trust Fund for Victims of the International 
Criminal Court: Between Possibilities and Constraints”, in Out of the Ashes: Reparation for 
Victims of Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations, Koen de Feyter et al., Intersentia, 2005, 
p. 237, concerning the international experience recovering funds from perpetrators.  
458 Other authors have defended a more central role for the TFV, see e.g. Pablo de Greiff &  
Marieke Wierda, “The Trust Fund for Victims of the International Criminal Court: Between 
Possibilities and Constraints”, in Out of the Ashes: Reparation for Victims of Gross and Systematic 
Human Rights Violations,  Koen de Feyter et al., Intersentia, 2005. 
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IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CHANNELLING REPARATIONS THROUGH THE TFV 
 
Having reviewed the legal framework of the TFV within the legal documents of the 
ICC, the innovation that the TFV represents, and the intertwine between the TFV and the 
Court, at this juncture, it is important to turn attention to the rationale, or justification, for 
having an administrative mechanism within the auspices of the ICC - but also independent 
from the administration of the Court459 - that may have a major role in the provision of 
reparation for victims.  
 
In addition to the question specifically referring to the TFV within the ICC 
framework, the broader question that in my view is prompted by an analysis of the TFV 
mechanism is whether administrative procedures, connected to a judicial function, may 
prove to be an efficient way to tackle mass claims of reparation for international crimes.  
 
As to the inquiry of setting up an administrative mechanism for which a major part of 
its mandate relates to victims reparation, it has been argued that there are advantages to the 
TFV and further, that it should have an expansive role in the fulfilment of the reparations 
mandate for victims. For example, it has been posited that  
 
“given the freedom of the TFV from narrowly defined legal principles – a 
freedom unavailable to the Court itself – it will be more feasible for the 
TFV than for the Court to design reparations programs that attain whatever 
goals could be attained by a reparations program at this level.”460 
  
It can also be argued that including an administrative mechanism such as the TFV 
within the ICC framework will provide an efficient way to implement reparations. This 
may be so because the Court’s Judges will be concerned with the trial proceedings and it 
will be arguably more efficient to have an administrative mechanism to handle the 
administration of the reparation order, with the Court’s supervision. The question is where 
                                                      
459  Thordis Ingadottir, “The International Criminal Court: The Trust Fund for Victims 
(Article 79 of the Rome Statute), A Discussion Paper”, ICC Discussion Paper #3, PICT, February 
2001. 
460 Pablo de Greiff &  Marieke Wierda, “The Trust Fund for Victims of the International 
Criminal Court: Between Possibilities and Constraints”, in Out of the Ashes: Reparation for 
Victims of Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations, Koen de Feyter et al., Intersentia, 2005  
p. 235. 
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to draw the line between implementation of the reparations and the TFV own-decision 
making. This demonstrates the importance of having clear pronouncements as to what 
kinds of decisions are for the TFV to make, and what decisions are for the Court to make.  
 
At the outset, the governing texts of the TFV establish criteria that must be taken into 
account. For example, concerning the reparations mandate in relation to Court ordered 
reparations, Regulation 55 stipulates specific factors that the TFV shall take into account in 
determining the nature and/or size of awards when the Court does not stipulate how 
reparations are to be distributed. These include: the nature of the crimes, the size and 
location of the beneficiary group of victims, the particular injuries to the victims and the 
type of evidence to support such injuries. In relation to the assistance mandate pursuant to 
Rule 98 (5), the TFV enjoys more flexibility than with Court ordered reparations since it is 
less linked to the Court’s judicial function, and the governing texts of the TFV do not set 
out specific factors to be taken into account461.  Despite this larger discretion, Article 79 
(3) of the Statute states that the TFV “shall be managed according to the criteria to be 
determined by the Assembly of States Parties”, which in practice, are the TFV Regulations 
established by the resolution ICC-ASP/4/Res.3. Of particular relevance to the assistance 
mandate of the TFV, Regulation 48 states that “[o]ther resources of the Trust Fund shall be 
used to benefit victims of crimes … who have suffered physical, psychological and/or 
material harm as a result of these crimes”. In addition, Regulation 50 (a) stipulates that the 
TFV shall be considered seised in relation to assistance to victims when “the Board of 
Directors considers it necessary to provide physical or psychological rehabilitation or 
material support for the benefit of victims and their families”. Thus, the assistance 
mandate, while broader than Court ordered reparations, still needs to benefit victims of the 
crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court who have suffered harm as a consequence of 
these crimes, as opposed to the general humanitarian and socio-economic needs of victims 
not connected with said crimes.  
 
It is argued that due to the nature of the TFV (i.e. an administrative mechanism 
linked to a judicial body) there is a clear line of division between decision-making powers 
of the Court and the TFV. The Court is a judicial body that has a thorough knowledge of 
the legal aspects of the cases it encounters.  It should be for the Court to make all decisions 
                                                      
461 Connor McCarthy, Reparations and Victims Support in the International Criminal Court, 
Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 232-233.  
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in relation to the categories of victims and the classification of victims, since they are 
defined in a legal text, according to legal criteria, as discussed above. The decision on what 
is the harm for the purposes of reparation should also be left to the Court for the same 
reasons.  
 
The types of reparation (e.g. symbolic or material reparations) should also be defined 
in broad terms by the Court, leaving the TFV with some autonomy so as to devise the 
reparation programs. For instance, the Court should decide in a given case whether 
collective reparations are allowed, and whether it is a case that rehabilitation or 
compensation are possible forms of reparation. From this point, with the assistance of 
broad guidelines, the TFV can decide how to actually implement the reparations program. 
While it is claimed that the Court should still hold all judicial definitions and guide the 
TFV in implementing reparations, the latter should be given a large degree of autonomy to 
ensure that reparations are appropriate for victims. The TFV has eyes on the ground, has 
experience with reparations programs, and has knowledge of the needs of victims. It is thus 
better placed to devise reparation programs for the full benefit of victims. 
 
In this line of reasoning, it is within the nature of international crimes that a large 
number of victims will come before the Court for every case, and whom will be possible 
claimants of reparations462. In order to fulfil the need of victims for reparation, the ICC 
reparations system has to operate at a different level than that of human rights mechanisms 
where usually a limited number of victims appear before the Court or the human rights 
mechanism. At the ICC, many victims will be eligible to participate in proceedings, and 
then later claim reparation. Additionally, many other victims who do not qualify to 
participate in Court proceedings may still be real “victims of crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court”, to use the language of Article 79 of the Rome Statute.  
 
Thus, this study argues, as already stated above, that the approach to the conception 
of the kind of reparations available should be broad. More specifically, it should not be 
focused on compensation awards to individual victims, but also on symbolic reparations 
                                                      
462 For example, in the Lubanga case, there were 120 victims participating the case; in the 
Germain Katanga/Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui case, there were 364 victims participating, see Eleni 
Chaitidou,  Recent Developments in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court, 
available at: http://Ibid..zis-online.com/dat/artikel/2013_3_740.pdf  
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and collective reparations463 that will reach more victims by overcoming  the issue of  
available funding to pay compensation. As the Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case has 
affirmed, “a community-based approach, using the TFV’s voluntary contributions, would 
be more beneficial and have greater utility than individual awards, given the limited funds 
available.”464 I have discussed this question in more detail in previous chapters; the point 
to be made here is that the TFV has a flexible mandate, and will likely be in a better 
position than the Judges to assess what kind of reparation will best assist victims of crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC. This is, in my opinion, a testament to the argument that 
reparations should be channelled through the TFV. 
 
Repairing victims of international crimes presents unique challenges, not only due to 
the multiplicity of victims, but also because it is impossible to repair what is irreplaceable. 
Mass suffering creates an emptiness not only for victims, but for society and humanity as a 
whole. A sum of money - which is likely to be modest, considering the usual lack of 
resources of the accused and limited sources available465 - to isolated, individual victims, it 
is submitted, will certainly not correspond to the international law standard of restitutio ad 
integrum and will fall short of victims’ needs. This is one of the reasons supporting the 
argument made in this chapter, and underpinning this study, that while it may be easier to 
address individual complaints with sums of money, this is not the best approach to redress 
in the aftermath of international crimes; compensation and the award of sums of money 
should be limited to attending to victims’ special needs in light of the crimes they have 
suffered (e.g. victims of sexual crimes). This does not suggest that there should be a 
hierarchy or classes of victims in the sense that some victims have greater entitlements 
than others; victims shall be treated equally in terms of entitlement to receive reparation. It 
is simply posited that reparation programmes should take into account the needs of victims 
                                                      
463 See Frédéric Mégret, The Case for Collective Reparations before the ICC (November 15, 
2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2196911 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2196911. The author argues, inter alia, that “collective reparations 
will in many cases be superior not only on pragmatic grounds but also because they make most 
sense from the point of view of transitional justice. Most importantly, collective reparations are the 
most faithful to a construction of most international crimes as crimes that target groups (e.g.: the 
Genocide Convention groups) or categories (e.g.: civilians) rather than individuals as such”.  
464  Decision on Reparations, p. 274.  
465 Frédéric Mégret , The Case for Collective Reparations before the ICC (November 15, 
2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2196911 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2196911, p. 7. 
 180 
and thus be a sort of “custom-made” reparation. In this regard, hearing the voices of 
victims and attending to their needs is crucial.  
 
It is in this line of argument that it can be hoped that members of the TFV will  have 
expertise in mass claims processes and mass reparation for victims which can be  used to 
design  reparation programs that will, in pragmatic terms, make the most of the limited 
funds available to the victims. The Court’s Judges, in all likelihood, will not have the 
resources or needed knowledge or expertise of victims’ issues in order to establish and 
assess reparation programmes that will meet the needs of the many victims of crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Designing programmes that will benefit a larger number 
of victims has the advantage of more holistically dealing with the question of redress in the 
aftermath of international crimes and minimizes the possibility of involuntary 
discrimination among victims.  
 
Furthermore, the TFV, as outlined above, may also act in assisting victims before a 
reparation award is ordered against a convicted person. In this light, it also makes sense to 
have an organ that operates within the Court responsible for questions of reparation such 
as, for example, raising funds for reparation awards and assistance programs. The funds 
raised through the convicted individual may not be sufficient, even if one departs from the 
idea of reparation as monetary compensation, to fulfil reparation initiatives. Thus, the 
fund-raising possibilities of an administrative reparation mechanism such as the TFV 
should not be overlooked466. 
 
Having an administrative mechanism such as the TFV can also provide  “eyes on the 
ground”, which may be difficult for the Chambers to have. The TFV may be in a position, 
in light of its role and mandate, to design programs tailored to a number of victims, rather 
than individual victims, and direct such reparation initiatives to the reality on the 
ground467. 
                                                      
466 For example, recently in 2013, the United Kingdom contributed £500,000 to the ICC 
Trust Fund for Victims as part of G8 Initiative on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict, see: 
http://Ibid..trustfundforvictims.org/news/united-kingdom-donates-%C2%A3500000-icc-trust-fund-
victims-part-g8-initiative-preventing-sexual-viol  
467 See Pablo de Greiff &  Marieke Wierda, “The Trust Fund for Victims of the International 
Criminal Court: Between Possibilities and Constraints”, in Out of the Ashes: Reparation for 
Victims of Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations, Koen de Feyter et al. (eds.), Intersentia, 
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In sum, it can be argued that channelling reparation efforts through the TFV meets 
many concerns. The TFV has a link with the judicial branch of the ICC (the Court’s 
Chambers) as already discussed, and yet, they present more flexibility in their mandate and 
more opportunities to raise resources for reparation programmes, especially in  cases where 
the accused is impecunious. The TFV will also have added expertise, in light of its core 
mandate, to design programmes that will address the needs of victims in a given specific 
case (e.g. sexual crimes as opposed to the use of child soldiers). This is due to its ability to 
act on the ground with projects that will assist victims, and act with the Fund’s “other 
resources”.  
 
One may now turn to the important question of the justification for having a 
mechanism that operates within the ICC framework, rather than leaving the task of 
reparation to national courts or other kinds of procedures, as is the case with the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, for example.468. History has shown us that the consequence of 
setting up an international tribunal that deals solely with the criminal responsibility of 
offenders and leaves the civil liability to domestic courts results in most victims not 
receiving any reparation469. Thus, while national courts have a significant role to play in 
the quest for civil redress, as will be discussed, there is also an important role for 
administrative mechanisms at the international level which focuses on victim redress. In 
the following section, domestic schemes are examined to inform the practice of the TFV, 
as an administrative mechanism linked with a judicial branch. Specialized domestic 
proceedings are also discussed in order to determine their level of efficiency.  As well, the 
following section will discuss a variety of lessons learned from other situations. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
2005, pp. 239-240. 
468 See chapter 2. 
469 See discussion on this issue in chapter 2 above. 
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V. CHALLENGES AHEAD: THE TFV IN UNCHARTERED GROUND  
 
The mandate of the ICC and the TFV in relation to reparations is a noble one, 
providing victims with the possibility of obtaining redress for international crimes. In 
saying this, it is also an ambitious one, including a civil dimension in  international 
criminal justice. As it has been noted, “[t]he challenging and ambitious mandate assigned 
to the International Criminal Court under article 75 to ensure reparations for victims of 
crimes is in stark contrast with the embryonic structure put in place to ensure the fulfilment 
of that mandate.”470  
 
Especially due to the fact that the TFV mechanism for reparation is a novelty in 
international criminal law, it will face many difficult questions. Additionally,  there are 
undoubtedly countless challenges that the TFV will face in the pursuit of its mandate. 
These will range from practical to symbolic challenges.  
 
The most obvious challenge is the availability of funds and resources to provide 
redress for the large number of individuals that may unfortunately become  victims of the 
crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC. As explained above, the TFV may obtain funds 
from: (1) voluntary contributions of governments, international organizations, individuals, 
corporations and other entities (in accordance with criteria established by the ASP; (2) 
money and property gathered through fines or forfeitures transferred to the TFV by a Court 
order according to Article 79 of the ICC Statute; (3) resources gathered by awards for 
reparations if ordered by the Court; and (4) such resources other than assessed 
contributions as the ASP may decide to allocate to the TFV.  
 
The funds of the TFV will thus necessarily be limited. As such, fund-raising should 
be an important aspect of the activities of the TFV so as to ensure that it has the available 
financial resources to fulfil its tasks471. In this light, the TFV should also focus attention on 
                                                      
470 Marc Henzelin et al., “Reparations to Victims Before the International Criminal Court: 
Lessons from International Mass Claims Processes”,  Criminal Law Forum 17 (2006), pp. 338-339. 
471 See  Peter G. Fischer, “The Victims' Trust Fund of the International Criminal Court-
Formation of a Functional Reparations Scheme”, Emory International Law Review  17 (2003), pp. 
191-192 (concerning fund-raising). 
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gathering voluntary contributions that will ensure the fulfilment of reparation awards. As 
an example, according to the website of the TFV,  
 
“The total TFV income by November 2009 was € 4.5 million. Out of 
these, approximately € 2.2 million were obligated for grants in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda.   Another € 600,000 were 
allocated for activities to start in 2010 in the Central African Republic.  In 
addition, a current reserve of € 1 million is available for potential 
reparations.”472 
  
The financial limitations of the TFV do not however mean that the ability of the TFV 
to implement reparation awards will be completely hampered. In this scenario, the meaning 
and scope of redress becomes ever more important. Indeed, financial compensation is not 
the only means of reparation to victims of crimes within the ICC jurisdiction, as already 
discussed. Symbolic and collective reparations should be an important aspect of 
reparations through the TFV. The financial resources of the TFV should be used bearing in 
mind victims that need specific and urgent assistance as a consequence of the crimes 
committed against them, such as victims of sexual violence473.  
 
 The number of victims of international crimes of the kind the ICC will prosecute 
will likely always be very high, and as a consequence, the potential claimants of reparation 
will also be of a high scale. As an example, in the Lubanga case, 120 individuals were 
recognized as victims. Similarly,  in the Germain Katanga/Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui case, 
there were 364 victims participating in the case474. It is certainly important that victims get 
reparation for the crimes they have suffered; this however should  not stand  in the way of 
the Court’s mandate of prosecuting serious international crimes and determining the guilt 
or innocence of the accused.  
 
                                                      
472 Trust Fund for Victims website, available at: http://Ibid..trustfundforvictims.org/financial-
info (accessed on 7 March 2013). This stands in contrast for example with the United Nations 
Compensation Commission which approved the payment of more than US$3.2 billion in 
compensation for more than 860.000 successful “A” claimants, see 
http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/clmsproc.htm   
473  Anne-Marie De Brouwer, “Reparation to Victims of Sexual Violence: Possibilities at the 
International Criminal Court and at the Trust Fund for Victims and their Families”, Leiden Journal 
of International Law 20 (2007),  pp. 207-237. 
474 See references on http://icc-cpi.int.  
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It is in this light that I argue that the Court should be coherent with the principles of 
reparation to be applicable across the framework of reparations within the ICC, with the 
necessary modifications in relation to each case, and then perform a supervisory role of the 
administration of reparations by the TFV. This approach would lighten the burden of the 
Court, which has limited resources and is primarily in charge of criminal trials of accused 
persons. It is important, certainly, that the Court does not completely divorce itself from 
the TFV, but rather should have a more limited role. The TFV staff will also likely count 
on staff with expertise in administering the reparation award under the guidance of the 
principles of the ICC. The TFV should have the mandate of a true reparations body475. 
 
 Another challenge refers to the practical implementation of the reparations 
principles the Appeal Chamber has established. As reviewed above, the Chamber has set 
out principles rather abstractly. The TFV will have to grapple with the principles when 
implementing the reparation for victims in the Lubanga case. The TFV thus has a 
significant responsibility to implement reparations, within the available budget, while 
keeping in line with the principles stated by the Court476. The TFV may consider taking a 
comprehensive approach in this first implementation which can inform future cases. In this 
sense, the TFV itself can establish principles to be followed in a transparent manner, within 
the limitations of the principles set out by the Court and the constraints imposed by the 
governing texts as explained above. For example, it may decide to set out some specific 
guidelines in terms of reporting on the implementation of the reparations, and timelines for 
implementing the order of the Court, which will not only apply in one case, but rather 
provide some transparent guidelines for future court-ordered reparations.  
 
Furthermore, as reviewed above, the TFV has already acquired significant  
experience in programs for the benefit of victims of crimes in different situations under the 
jurisdiction of the Court. These experiences have given the TFV some specific knowledge 
and expertise in terms of what works and what needs victims may have. The TFV may 
consider using these experiences to inform the reparations for victims. In my view, the 
most important criterion however is determining the views of victims and following their 
needs in every  reparation program.  
                                                      
475 Marc Henzelin et al., “Reparations to Victims Before the International Criminal Court: 
Lessons from International Mass Claims Processes”,  Criminal Law Forum 17 (2006), p. 342. 
476 For the time being, the principles are those stated in the Lubanga case. 
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 The challenges and difficult questions that the Court and the TFV will face in the 
implementation of the reparations mandate make it crucial for a concerted effort between 
the Court and the TFV so as to have an efficient reparations mechanism. It has been argued 
that the task of the Court in deciding thousands of claims for reparation may well be more 
difficult than deciding on several different cases for each situation 477 , especially 
considering that the expertise of the Members of the Court will possibly be more focused 
on criminal law and procedure than on mass civil claims.  
 
 Having discussed some of the many challenges the TFV will likely face in the 
coming years, I turn next to the examination of lessons that can be learned by looking at 
mechanisms also in charge of reparation for mass victimization.    
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS: TRAILBLAZING A NEW REPARATION MECHANISM FOR 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES? 
 
As already discussed, the inception of reparation into international criminal justice 
came about in a more recent phase of international criminal justice. Previous international 
criminal justice enterprises, such as the ad hoc criminal tribunals, did not have a scheme 
for victim reparation478. Importantly, the ICC  represents a major step towards providing 
redress for victims of international crimes, alongside  the TFV. The ICC is unique in its 
conception of and activities in international criminal justice. An interesting question in this 
context is whether the TFV may be a trailblazer for similar initiatives in respect to 
reparations for international crimes or violations of international humanitarian law outside 
the scope of the ICC. 
 
The ICC does not, unfortunately, have yet a global reach in respect of all 
international crimes that are committed worldwide. Limitations concerning the jurisdiction 
                                                      
477 Gilbert Bitti & Gabriela Gonzalez Rivas, “The Reparations Provisions for Victims Under 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”, in Redressing Injustice Through Mass 
Claims Processes: Innovative Responses to Unique Challenges, The International Bureau of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, Oxford University Press, 2006,  p. 321.  
478  Michael Bachrach, “The Protection of Rights and Victims Under International Criminal 
Law”,  International Law 34  (2000). 
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of the Court479 make the scope of the activities of the TFV also limited to the victims of 
crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC. This means that many victims of international 
crimes will remain outside the civil dimension of international criminal justice. As Jann 
Kleffner and Liesbeth Zegveld argues, “while the ICC may, either upon request or on its 
own motion, afford reparations to victims of war crimes, these are reparations afforded 
within the individual responsibility framework of the ICC”480.  
 
Thus, it is submitted that the model of TFV could be a trailblazer for similar 
mechanisms competent to consider civil claims from individual victims of international 
crimes. The TFV provides a promising model of an administrative mechanism dealing with 
mass victimization in the aftermath of international crimes.  
 
Thus, I argue that the TFV, and its potential success as a mechanism to foster 
reparation for victims of crimes within the ICC, may serve as  a model for other similar 
approaches to provide reparation for victims of international crimes and in this sense, its 
message and example may stand as a catalyst for other similar reparations schemes for 
victims of international crimes. Such efforts could be on an individual basis, for example, 
in relation to victims of a specific conflict. Alternatively, they could be in a more global 
aspect481, geared towards victims of international crimes in general, and with a view to 
                                                      
479 In general terms, the ICC has jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. The ICC has jurisdiction over natural persons, 
over the age of 18 years old at the time the crime was perpetrated. A crime falls within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC if it is perpetrated in a State Party to the ICC (or in a State having otherwise 
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court), by a national of a State Party (or of a State having otherwise 
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court), or if the Security Council has referred the case to the Court, 
irrespective of the nationality of the perpetrators) or the place of the crime. The ICC has 
jurisdiction for crimes committed after the entry into force of its Statute (1 July 2002); in the case 
of a State having joined the Court after 1 July 2002, the Court only has jurisdiction after its Statute 
entered into force for that State in question, unless the State accepts the jurisdiction of the Court for 
the period before the Statute’s entry into force. On the jurisdiction of the ICC, see William A. 
Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, Cambridge University Press, 4th ed., 
2011, chapter 3. 
480 Jann K. Kleffner & Liesbeth Zegveld, “Establishing an Individual Complaints Procedure 
for Violations of International Humanitarian Law”,  Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 
3 (2000), p. 384. 
481 Such fund, with a global reach, could be established for the benefit of all victims of 
international crimes. The trust fund would receive, like the TFV, voluntary contributions from 
individuals, international/regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations and States. As 
already discussed, the main source of funding of the TFV comes from voluntary contributions, as 
opposed to the accused. Such trust fund could be based on the example of the TFV and could 
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bridging the gaps of the TFV, which unfortunately does not have a universal reach due to 
its link with the ICC which does not have jurisdiction over all conflicts. 
 
In this chapter, I reviewed the legal framework, challenges and possibilities of the 
TFV within the ICC framework. The aim was to both highlight this innovative perspective 
of the civil redress dimension of the ICC, and to provide a window into broader questions, 
such as the usefulness of administrative mechanisms linked with a judicial process as a 
new frontier for redress for victims of international crimes. In this sense, the TFV was the 
leading protagonist of the analysis.  
 
It is reiterated in this chapter, in line with the overall theme of this study, that civil 
redress should be a part of the model of modern international criminal justice; the question, 
in my view, should not be whether or not victims’ reparation should be included in 
international justice, but rather how to make it feasible. This is the real question to which 
this thesis hopes to make a contribution to enlighten, by referring to diverse models where 
victims can claim reparation for international crime. Thus, the TFV is another piece in the 
fabric of international justice, weaving the  civil dimension within international criminal 
justice. 
 
In this light, it is argued that the TFV should play a leading role in the administration 
of reparation to victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. Pragmatic reasons 
such as the larger degree of flexibility in terms of reparation programmes and the centrality 
of its mandate (i.e. the TFV was created for the benefit of the victims) stand for the 
argument that the Court’s Judiciary should play a supervisory role and trust the TFV with 
the design of reparation programmes. The TFV could operate in this sense as the 
administrative arm of the ICC for the purposes of reparation awards. 
 
The present chapter thus aimed at demonstrating that the reparation system at the ICC 
should move away from a complete reliance on the Court’s judicial arm for the purpose of 
reparation, and that there should be a division of decision-making powers. As posited in a 
previous chapter, international criminal trial proceedings do not seem to be the most 
appropriate forum for  decision-making on all kinds of reparation questions. It is my 
                                                                                                                                                                   
function under the auspices of the United Nations. 
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contention that the ICC’s Chambers’ role should be to decide on principles of reparation 
and the beneficiaries of reparation in a given case. The administration of the reparation 
award should  be given to the TFV. 
 
Furthermore, the study of the TFV has been undertaken as a lens through which the 
broader question of the use of administrative mechanisms to deal with civil redress for 
victims of international crimes has been considered. It is thus argued that the TFV, 
alongside other comparable initiatives reviewed herein, can pave the way for similar 
initiatives in areas where the TFV cannot act for certain victims of international crimes due 
to its jurisdictional  limitations. The argument is thus made that while there are  some 
obscure areas for the TFV to grapple with at this stage, it may still provide useful lessons, 
or at least inspiration, for the creation of similar initiatives. Such initiatives may be used to 
address specific conflicts, such as the Rwandan genocide, or, for a broader purpose, 





CHAPTER 5: THE ROLE OF NATIONAL COURTS IN THE ADJUDICATION OF CIVIL REDRESS 
FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
 
 There can be a variety of responses to deal with international crimes. International 
criminal justice, in particular, stands on two pillars: it has an international dimension, 
performed by international courts, coupled by administrative mechanisms, which were the 
object of previous chapters. It also has a national dimension, fulfilled  by domestic courts 
which enforce international law482.  
 
This study already addressed two legal frameworks for reparations for international 
crimes and in this chapter, it focuses on the third framework concerning the role of national 
courts in relation to reparations for victims of international crimes. In particular, this 
chapter attempts to address the following research questions:  
§ What role should domestic courts play in relation to reparations for victims of 
international crimes?  
§ Are domestic courts better equipped to deal with reparations for international 
crimes?  
§ Can the doctrine of universal jurisdiction include a civil dimension?  
The present chapter thus addresses the role of domestic courts in the adjudication and 
award of reparations through case studies, including a discussion of the principle of 
universal civil jurisdiction. In this regard, it advances the broader research goal of this 
thesis, that is, an inquiry into the civil dimension of international criminal justice. 
Underlying this chapter is the question of the implications of  adding a civil dimension in 
domestic litigation in relation to international crimes. 
 
                                                      
482 The present chapter will focus on the question of the role of domestic courts in the award 
of reparation for victims of international crimes. In relation to domestic prosecutions of 
international crimes, many studies have addressed this question in detail. See e.g.: Robert Cryer, 
Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law Regime, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005; Damien Vandermeersch, “Prosecuting International Crimes in 
Belgium”, Journal of International Criminal Justice 3 (2005), pp. 400-421; Anthony D'Amato, 
“National Prosecution for International Crimes”, in International Criminal Law, Cherif Bassiouni 
(ed.),  Nijhoff, 2008.  
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As it has been stated, bringing civil claims before domestic courts offers a potential 
for addressing international wrongs483, including international crimes. This study focuses 
on reparations for international crimes claimed directly from individuals and examines 
how different mechanisms co-exist for providing civil redress (reparations) for victims of 
international crimes. In the present chapter, I dwell upon the possibilities and challenges 
for national courts in providing an avenue for civil claims from victims of international 
crimes. In doing so, this chapter keeps in line with this study’s paradigm – individuals 
claiming a right to reparation from individual perpetrators – thus, it focuses on 
transnational tort litigation of individual versus individual, leaving out cases against the 
State and those against corporations. 
 
In this sense, this chapter launches into two levels of inquiries: the first one, by 
analysing how (selected) different legal traditions treat the criminal (prosecution and 
punishment)/ civil (reparation) dichotomy, especially when it pertains to international 
crimes. This first dimension will highlight the possibilities of claiming civil redress for 
international crimes on the basis of the structure of the legal systems in question, and as an 
adjunct to a criminal prosecution. This chapter also briefly addresses how recent 
developments in international criminal law at the international level may work as a catalyst 
for civil claims in national courts, for example, by the implementation in national 
legislation of the provisions of the Rome Statute, including provisions on reparations. In 
this respect, this chapter examines how international criminal law at the international level 
can inform and influence domestic civil litigation in respect of international crimes.  
 
This chapter then turns to a case study referring to civil claims for international 
crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war in the former Yugoslavia, for 
which an international criminal tribunal was established but which did not deal with claims 
for reparation. In this respect, the challenges of bringing civil claims for international 
crimes before domestic courts will also be examined which will shed light on the road 
ahead. 
 
                                                      
483   Jaykumar A. Menon, “The Low Road: Promoting Civil Redress for International 
Wrongs”, in Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law, Antonio Cassese, Oxford 
University Press, 2012, chapter 47.  
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In the last part of this chapter, I look at the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. I 
consider its scope, definition and whether it encompasses a dimension for reparation (i.e. a 
civil dimension), in addition to its criminal dimension. Starting from the criminal 
dimension of universal jurisdiction in relation to the prosecution of international crimes, I 
inquire whether universal jurisdiction can encompass a civil dimension to provide an 
avenue for victims to seek reparation from individual perpetrators of international 
crimes484.  As well, I explore the implications of adding a civil dimension to universal 
jurisdiction.   
 
Questions concerning the right to reparation under international law and State 
responsibility in relation to reparations for international crimes485 were treated in a 
previous part of the present study. In this section, I dwell upon whether domestic courts 
can rely on the doctrine of universal jurisdiction to entertain victims’ claims for reparation 
from individual perpetrators of international crimes. As explained 486 , domestic 
mechanisms relating to transitional justice, such as truth and reconciliation commissions, 
as well as well domestic claims processes involving the State are also outside the scope of 
the present study. 
 
In this analysis, it is pondered whether there should be an increased role for national 
courts concerning reparations for victims of international crimes and whether progress in 
international criminal law at the international level could work as a catalyst for national 
claims for reparation. This chapter nevertheless also highlights the challenges that lie 
ahead and ponder about ways to increase the role of national courts in the quest for 
reparation for international crimes. 
 
It is important to focus the present chapter in the broader theme of this study. While 
reparations for international crimes often involve questions of State responsibility, such 
issues are outside the scope of the present study, which focuses solely on individual 
responsibility and reparations from an international criminal law perspective, leaving out 
                                                      
484 In this chapter, as throughout  the entire study, I use the term “international crimes” to 
include the core crimes of the Rome Statute as discussed in the Introduction of the present study. 
485 See chapters I and II of the present study. 
486 See Introduction. 
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other related questions of State responsibility for international crimes487. The present 
analysis also leaves out cases dealing with the responsibility or liability of corporations.  
 
I. DOMESTIC APPROACHES TO CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AND CLAIMS FOR REPARATION 
WITHIN CRIMINAL LAW PROCEEDINGS 
 
This chapter starts with a brief overview of two models of adjudication of civil 
claims: one model where civil claims are completely dissociated from criminal 
prosecutions and processes and another where civil claims can be brought within the 
criminal process. The goal of this overview is to demonstrate how domestic courts may 
approach a claim for civil redress. This section is purely an overview, with limited selected 
examples of different jurisdictions purely to illustrate the point rather than provide an 
exhaustive or detailed discussion of this topic488. 
 
The concept of victim participation and the award of civil reparation in criminal 
proceedings489 is common ground in many States490. In saying this, there is a difference 
within States in Europe depending on whether they come from a civil Germanic 
background, such as Austria and Germany, a Nordic background, such as Denmark and  
Norway, a civil Romanic background, such as France, Italy and  Spain, or even a mixed 
background, such as the case of Greece. This being said, each of these systems grants 
                                                      
487 For a review of this question and related issues, see generally: Dinah Shelton, “Righting 
Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility”, American Journal of International 
Law 96 (2002), pp. 833-856; André Nollkaemper, “Concurrence between Individual Responsibility 
and State Responsibility in International Law”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 52 
(2003), pp. 615-640; Lorna McGregor, “State Immunity and Jus Cogens”, The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 55 (2006), pp. 437-445. 
488 For a detailed discussion see Marion E. Brienen &   Ernestine IBID.. Hoegen, Victims of 
Crime in 22 European Criminal Justice Systems, Wolf Legal Productions,  2000. 
489 However, as Judge Pikis has indicated, no national system has a similar provision to 
article 68(3) of the Rome Statute concerning victims’ participatory rights within ICC proceedings, 
see Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, “Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the Joint 
Application of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 and a/0105/06 concerning the Directions and 
Decision of the Appeals Chamber",  2 February 2007, ICC-01/04-01/06-925, Separate opinion of 
Judge Pikis, p. 16. 
490 See  Marion E. Brienen &   Ernestine IBID.. Hoegen, Victims of Crime in 22 European 
Criminal Justice Systems, Wolf Legal Productions,  2000. 
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victims participatory rights as a “partie civile”491. Prticipation in this section is discussed in 
connection with the ability to claim reparations. 
 
Participation in criminal proceedings can vary from playing the role of a civil 
claimant, which allows the civil claim of victims to be integrated in the criminal 
proceedings492, to acting as a private prosecutor493. Another trait of the civil law system is 
the “investigative judges”, who hold investigation powers, which normally lie with the 
Prosecution; however, this characteristic is slowly disappearing494. Given the differences 
between various  legal traditions this study will proceed  to analyse some selected national 
criminal jurisdictions. 
 
The participation of victims in criminal proceedings raises the possibility of claims 
for reparation from victims within the same criminal proceedings.  Domestic proceedings 
for reparation may take dramatically different forms, depending on whether victims are 
permitted to participate in criminal proceedings and bring claims for reparation within the 
same proceedings, or whether claims for reparation are completely dissociated and separate 
from criminal prosecution against the accused.  
 
Depending on the legal system’s approach to dealing with civil claims of victims of 
crimes, the role of domestic courts, prosecutors and victims will be different in shaping the 
path to reparation. Domestic legal systems are largely influenced by the legal tradition to 
which they belong. In the next section, I shall review two legal systems (Romano-
Germanic and common law systems), not with the purpose of exhaustive analysis of the 
                                                      
491  Mugambi Jouet, “Reconciling the Conflicting Rights of Victims and Defendants at the 
International Criminal Court”,  St. Louis University Public Law Review 26  (2007), p. 3. In regards 
to the concept of “partie civile”, see in France articles 85 and 87 of the “Code de Procédure 
Pénale”, in Belgium the “burgerlijke partij”, articles 63, 66 and 67 of the Belgian Criminal 
Procedure Code “Wetboek van Strafvordering”, and in Austria the “Privatbeteiligter”, para. 47 of 
the Austrian Criminal Procedure Code “Strafprozessordnung 7975”. In Germany, victims do not 
act as a “partie civile” but rather as auxiliary prosecutor, see paras. 395 to 402 of the German 
Criminal Procedure Code “Strafprozessordnung”. 
492 See  Mugambi Jouet, ibid., p. 39. 
493 See  Mugambi Jouet, ibid., p. 3, where the author submits that in many continental 
European systems victims can prosecute criminals of felonies without the need of a public 
prosecutor. 
494  In regards to the role of investigative judges in national systems, see Jerome de 
Hemptinne, “The Creation of Investigating Chambers at the International Criminal Court”,  Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 5 (2007), p. 402. 
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legal traditions that exist, but rather to compare and contrast different countries’ 
approaches to victims’ claims for reparation, and to survey whether  victims in certain 
instances may claim reparations within criminal proceedings. For this purpose, I first 
provide a general overview of two main legal systems and discuss whether victims may 
claim reparations within criminal proceedings or whether  civil proceedings are the only 
avenue available to victims. 
1. Romano-Germanic Systems 
In France495, victims may hold different roles within the criminal justice system. 
Victims may act as a “partie civile” (civil claimant), a complainant or private prosecutor496. 
A victim who reports a crime (“complainant” role) will not only inform the public 
authorities of the crime, but will also initiate  criminal proceedings if they  have not  been 
started by the public prosecution497. In this sense, victims’ rights are broader than the rights 
provided in the ICC system, since they can participate in proceedings without further 
conditions and begin criminal proceedings in the event that the prosecution has not yet 
done so. In certain cases, victims can also act as private prosecutors, which enable them to 
summon the accused to appear in court and start the prosecution498. However, once the 
prosecution has been initiated, the public prosecutor has to continue with the proceedings 
since it is the duty of the prosecution to carry on public prosecution499. As far as  
participation as a civil claimant goes, it concerns the right of victims to demand 
compensation in a criminal court of justice, in addition to his/her  right in a civil court500. 
That being said, there are some conditions for the exercise of this right which are set out in 
section 2 of the French code of criminal procedure. 
 
                                                      
495 See generally,  Mireille Delmas-Marty &  J.R. Spencer, European Criminal Proceedings, 
Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 218-291. 
496  Marion E. Brienen &   Ernestine IBID.. Hoegen, Victims of Crime in 22 European 
Criminal Justice Systems,Wolf Legal Productions, 2000, p. 316. 
497   Ibid., p. 317. Here, I will not analyse the case of certain crimes such as defamation in 
which  filing a complaint is an essential condition for a public action, see for instance section 48 of 
the French Penal Code, cited in  Marion E. Brienen &   Ernestine IBID.. Hoegen, Victims of Crime 
in 22 European Criminal Justice Systems, Wolf Legal Productions, 2000, p. 318. 
498 See section 2 French Code of Criminal Procedure. 
499  Marion E. Brienen &   Ernestine IBID.. Hoegen, Victims of Crime in 22 European 
Criminal Justice Systems, Wolf Legal Productions, 2000, p. 321.  
500  Ibid., p. 318. 
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In Brazil, victims may act as assistants to the prosecutor throughout the criminal 
proceedings and no special application needs to be filed for them to be granted the status of 
victims in criminal proceedings501. Similarly, in Senegal, according to Articles 2 and 3 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure also recognize the possibility of raising civil claims in 
criminal proceedings502.  
  
To sum up, these selected examples demonstrate that victims from countries which 
partake in a Romano-Germanic legal system are granted extensive participatory rights 
which are broader than the system established in the ICC. In this sense, if compared to 
Romano-Germanic legal systems, a broad interpretation of participatory rights within the 
ICC framework will be compatible. However, it is important to note that the large scope of 
participation in national systems is based on different  provisions than those of the Rome 
Statute which confine participatory rights to a judge-oriented system503.  Such extensive  
participatory rights cannot be convened in the absence of a supporting legal text.  
 
2. Common law systems 
In the common law system, victims are not granted participatory rights in criminal 
proceedings504. In general, victims only have the right to participate in the sentencing part 
of the proceedings. In Canada, victims are given a voice during sentencing where they can 
express their opinion as to the sentence the judge should  give the convicted person505. In 
these cases, the judge is not obliged to follow victims’ suggestions. Likewise, in the 
American legal system, most States grant victims a participatory right at the sentencing 
                                                      
501 See in general: Flaviane de Magalhães Barros Pellegrini, “Os direitos das vítimas de 
crimes no Estado Democrático de Direito – uma análise do Projeto de Lei nº 269/2003 – Senado 
Federal”. The author suggests in this article that victims are lacking a few essential rights in the 
Brazilian criminal law system, such as the right to be informed of the initiation of proceedings, and 
also mentions the difficulty to effectively obtain reparation. 
502 For a discussion of Senegal and other countries, see Amnesty International, Annual 




503 Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute states “where the Court considers it appropriate”. 
504 Mugambi Jouet, “Reconciling the Conflicting Rights of Victims and Defendants at the 
International Criminal Court”, St. Louis University Public Law Review 26 (2007), p. 4. 
505 See section 722 of the Canadian Criminal Code. 
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stage506. Private prosecutions are banned both in federal cases, as well as in every State507. 
In England and Wales, victims are granted no participatory rights other than that of 
initiating private prosecutions508. However, it is worth noting that in this system, victims 
are not granted any special status since any person can initiate a private prosecution,  
including non- victims509. 
 
This brief overview of the role and rights of victims in different domestic legal 
systems provides the backdrop for a discussion of specific case studies in the following 
section, and provides a context in which the initiatives in each case study came about. It 
also provides the fabric in which proposals for the  role of  domestic courts in adjudication 
of reparation claims for international crimes can develop.  
 
II.  CASE STUDY: FILLING IN THE REPARATION GAP IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA  
This study now turns to an analysis of a case-study through domestic mechanisms in 
the aftermath of the international crimes committed in the Balkans war, particularly in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, alongside the international criminal prosecutions at the ICTY. 
This case study was selected on the basis of its potential to illustrate how domestic 
mechanisms for reparation can fill in the gaps left by international criminal tribunals 
pertaining to reparations. In this perspective, I shall examine how the proceedings at the 
international level were not concerned with reparations for victims of the crimes under 
their jurisdiction, and to what extent domestic mechanisms have filled in the gaps. In this 
section, domestic mechanisms, such as court proceedings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as 
well as in foreign States will be examined.  
 
                                                      
506 Douglas E. Beloof, Victims in Criminal Procedure, Carolina Academic Press, 1998. 
507  Mugambi Jouet, “Reconciling the Conflicting Rights of Victims and Defendants at the 
International Criminal Court”,  St. Louis University Public Law Review 26 (2007), p. 5. 
 
508  See inter alia, Queen's Bench Division R (on the application of Gladstone Pic) v 
Manchester City Magistrates [2005] All.E.R. 56 (All England Law Reports); Divisional Court, 
Jones v. Whalley [2006] 2 Criminal Law Review 67 on appeal to the House of Lords, Jones v. 
Whalley [2006] 4 All.E.R 113; Cyprus: Supreme Court, Ttofinis v. Theochandes (1983) 2 Cyprus 
Law Reports 363. 
509  Mugambi Jouet, “Reconciling the Conflicting Rights of Victims and Defendants at the 
International Criminal Court”,  St. Louis University Public Law Review 26 (2007), p. 5. 
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The second dimension is forward-looking and analyses how international criminal 
tribunals may inform or influence reparation cases in domestic courts and mechanisms. 
This second dimension is dealt with at another section of this chapter. 
 
1. The Balkans War: Reparations in Bosnia and Herzegovina510 
 The conflict in the Balkans took many lives and left hundreds of thousands of 
victims511. In additional to outrage and violence, the war was characterised by a campaign 
of sexual violence crimes512. The surviving victims of sexual violence during the war not 
only deserve reparation but also need reparation to continue to survive with the 
                                                      
510 Many pieces in the literature review efforts at the international and national levels 
concerning reparation for victims of international crimes committed during the Balkan wars. I rely 
on some accounts in detail in this section of the present chapter, see references supra. Other 
interesting works include: Dino Abazovic, “Reconciliation, Ethopolitics and Religion in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina”, in  Post-Yugoslavia: New Cultural and Political Perspectives, Dino Abazovic &  
Mitja Velikonja,  Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.  Antoine Buyse, Post Conflict Housing Restitution:  
The European Human Rights Perspective with a Case Study on Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Intersentia, 2008. Timothy Cornell & Lance Salisbury, “The Importance of Civil Law in the 
Transition to Peace: Lessons from the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina”, 
Cornell International Law Journal 35 (2000-2001), pp. 389-426. Lara J. Nettlefield, Courting 
Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Hague Tribunal’s Impact in a Postwar State, 
Cambridge University Press, 2010. Linda Popic & Belma Panjeta, Compensation, Transitional 
Justice and Conditional International Credit in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Independent Research 
Publication, 2010 http://Ibid..justice-
report.com/en/file/show//Documents/Publications/Linda_Popic_ENG.pdf . Eric Rosand, “The 
Right to Compensation in Bosnia: An Unfulfilled Promise and Challenge to International Law”, 
Cornell Journal of International Law 33 (2000), pp. 130, 131. Rodri C. Williams, Post Conflict 
Property Restitution in Bosnia: Balancing Reparations and Durable Solutions in the Aftermath of 
Displacement, TESEV International Symposium on ‘Internal Displacement in Turkey and Abroad’, 
5 December 2006, Istanbul,  pp. 10, 11. David Yeager, “The Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina:  A Case Study in Transitional Justice”,  International Legal Perspectives 14  
(2004). 
511  Concerning official background information of the conflict see the ICTY website: 
http://Ibid..icty.org/sid/322  
512 Concerning studies of sexual violence during the war, see e.g. Kelly D. Askin, “Sexual 
Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status”, 
American Journal of International Law 93 (1999), pp. 97-123; Colette Donadio, “Gender Based 
Violence: Justice and Reparation in Bosnia And Herzegovina”, Mediterranean Journal of Social 
Sciences 5 (2014), p. 692. Anne-marie De Brouwer, Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual 
Violence,  Intersentia, 2005; Courtney Ginn, “Ensuring the Effective Prosecution of Sexually 
Violent Crimes in the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber: Applying Lessons from the ICTY”, Emory 
International Law Review 27 (2013). See also reports by Amnesty International concerning sexual 
violence during the conflict: “Bosnia-Herzegovina: Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Forces”, 
1993; “‘Whose Justice?’ - The Women of Bosnia and Herzegovina Are Still Waiting”, 2009; 
“Public Statement - Bosnia and Herzegovina: Amnesty International Calls for Justice and 
Reparation for Survivors of War Crimes of Sexual Violence”, 2010; “Old Crimes, Same Suffering: 
No justice for Survivors of Wartime Rape in North-East Bosnia and Herzegovina”, 2012. 
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consequences of inter alia rapes and sexual violence 513 . For example, unwanted 
pregnancies, internal injuries and mutilations, and contraction of HIV require care, and are 
lasting marks of the conflict.  
 
As it has been stated, in countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina, devastated by war, 
and having left numerous victims in the aftermath of the war, the harm caused can never be 
fully repaired; yet there must be efforts towards reconciliation and lasting peace, and 
reparation is part of a sense of justice for victims514. 
2. Developments at the international level 
The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina witnessed hundreds of thousands of victims of 
international crimes perpetrated on a massive scale. The war and the crimes committed 
therein prompted the establishment, by the Security Council acting under its chapter VII 
powers515, of the ICTY, as already discussed. Nevertheless, the ICTY has been crucial only 
in so far as it pertains to criminal accountability for the crimes perpetrated during the war. 
The question of reparation for victims has  not been fully addressed by the Tribunal516.  
 
Judge Jorda, then President of the Tribunal, expressed his concern about the need to 
develop mechanisms for the award of reparations to victims517. However, as already 
discussed in a previous chapter518, the ICTY did not concern itself with the issue of 
reparations and did not award reparation for victims of the Balkans wars. The matter was 
                                                      
513 Concerning sexual violence crimes and rapes during the war in Bosnia, see Helsinki 
Watch, Human Rights Watch, “War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina”, 1992; Report on the Situation 
of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Submitted by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, 
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., Annex, 
Agenda Item 27, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/50 (1993); see also Yolanda S. WU, “Genocidal Rape in 
Bosnia: Redress in United States Courts Under the Alien Tort Claims Act”, UCLA Women's Law 
Journal4 (1993). 
514  Manfred Nowak, “Reparation by the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”, in Out of the Ashes: Reparations for Victims of Gross and Systematic Human Rights 
Violations, Koen de Feyter et al., Intersentia, 2005, p. 245. 
515 See chapter 3 of this study for details. 
516 See chapter 3 of this study, and references cited therein. 
517 Cf. UN Doc./S/ 2000/1063, 3 November 2000. See also discussion in Carla Ferstman &  
Sheri P. Rosenberg, “Reparations in Dayton’s Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Reparations for 
Victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: Systems in Place and Systems in 
the Making, Carla Ferstman et al., Nijhoff, 2009, p. 484. 
518 See chapter 3 of the present study. 
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highlighted by the Tribunal as an important one, and according to Rule 106 of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal,  a judgment condemning an accused is  final and 
binding as to the criminal responsibility of the perpetrator concerning claims of 
compensation, which may be brought by victims in a national court. Thus, compensation 
for victims was left for national courts and domestic mechanisms. 
 
Another development at the international level pertaining to reparations to victims of 
the Balkans wars derived at the International Court of Justice in the Bosnia Genocide case, 
concerning claims by Bosnia and Herzegovina against Serbia for reparation for alleged acts 
of genocide519. Although this is a case of State responsibility concerning a claim between 
States for reparation, it is relevant to refer to it at this juncture in the perspective of 
attempts at the international level to obtain reparations for international crimes committed 
during the war.  
 
The ruling of the Court, in sum, was to the effect that Serbia had not committed 
genocide in Bosnia, nor was it an accomplice. Although the Court did find  that Serbia 
incurred responsibility for its failure to prevent and punish the genocide that occurred in 
Srebrenica, it was held  that the genocide could not be attributed to Serbia. For present 
purposes, it is important to note the Court’s failure to order reparations, which can be 
explained by its finding that Serbia did not commit the genocide. In this sense, the Court 
held that compensation would not be an appropriate remedy for Serbia’s breach of the 
obligation to prevent the genocide in Srebrenica: 
 
“The question is whether there is a sufficiently direct and certain causal 
nexus between the wrongful act, the Respondent's breach of the obligation 
to prevent genocide, and the injury suffered by the Applicant, consisting of 
all damage of any type, material or moral, caused by the acts of genocide. 
Such a nexus could be considered established only if the Court were able 
to conclude from the case as a whole and with a sufficient degree of 
certainty that the genocide at Srebrenica would in fact have been averted if 
the Respondent had acted in compliance with its legal obligations. 
However, the Court clearly cannot do so.”520 
 
 In particular, the Court held that:  
                                                      
519 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 2007.  
520  Ibid. at para. 462. 
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“the Court’s findings […] constitute appropriate satisfaction, and that the 
case is not one in which an order for payment of compensation, or, in 
respect of the violation referred to in subparagraph (5) [failure to prevent 
genocide], a direction to provide assurances and guarantees of non-
repetition, would be appropriate.”521 
 
Another case concerning the application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, between Croatia and Serbia, was recently 
adjudicated by the Court. This case refers to a claim by Croatia, and a counter-claim by 
Serbia, for reparation for allegations of genocide committed by Serbia in Croatia, and by 
Croatia in Serbia (during “Operation Storm”). This case provided another missed 
opportunity for the Court to address questions of reparation. The Court looked at the 
crimes alleged to have occurred in each of the municipalities put forward by Croatia, and 
although it found that the actus reus of the crime of genocide was proven in many 
localities addressed by Croatia, it could not find that the specific intent, or the mens rea, 
was proven by either Party in their respective claim and counter-claim. As a consequence 
of this finding, the claims for reparation were not entertained by the Court522.  
 
An analysis of the reasoning of the Court concerning the merits of the case, and in 
particular, the allegations of breaches of the Genocide Convention from a State 
responsibility perspective are beyond the scope of the present study523. The conclusion that 
can be drawn from the Judgment of the Court is that victims have yet again been left 
without reparation for international crimes that were committed during the wars in the 
Balkans524. 
                                                      
521 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 2007, p. 
239. 
522 See ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, 5 February 2015.  For an in-depth discussion of the 
question of reparations, see the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade. 
523 See in this regard a commentary on the case: Monica Moyo, “ICJ Delivers Decision on 
the Application of the Genocide Convention”, AJIL International Law in Brief, 3 February 2015. 
524 See criticisms to the Court’s Judgment in respect of its treatment of reparations:  Marko 
Milanović, “State Responsibility for Genocide: A Follow-Up”,  European Journal of International 
Law 18 (2007), pp. 669-694; see also Christian Tomuschat, “Reparation in Cases of Genocide”,  
Journal of International Criminal Justice 5 (2007), pp. 905-912, who states, in regard to the 
Court’s treatment of the question of reparation: “in the human rights field the judges take into 
account the degree of pain and suffering endured by the victims. It is hard to understand why the 
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It is important nevertheless to place both cases in their right perspective in terms of 
the legal framework and the question of reparations claimed by the Applicant States. In 
both cases, the jurisdictional basis for the Court was the Genocide Convention, and thus, 
the legal claims of the Applicant States were circumscribed by the legal framework of that 
Convention.  More importantly, they had to prove a breach of the Respondent State, Serbia 
in both cases, of the Convention. This was an important point since the Court could not 
adjudicate claims of war crimes or crimes against humanity525. Thus, the treatment of the 
question of reparation, in both cases, was limited by the finding of a breach of an 
obligation of the Genocide Convention (or otherwise). As already discussed, given the 
Court’s finding in the Bosnia Genocide case of Serbia’s failure to prevent genocide, 
reparation, in the form of compensation, could have been ordered. Instead, the Court 
limited itself in dealing with the request for reparation in a cursory manner by stating that 
the Court’s finding was appropriate reparation526.  
 
The other question that needs to be put into perspective is that: if reparations were to 
be ordered by the Court, would they have reached the victims themselves? The ICJ deals 
with questions of State responsibility rather than individual criminal responsibility527, and 
one of the consequences thereof is that individual victims have no role to play in the 
proceedings, including for purposes of reparation. Thus, even if the Court were to order 
reparation in the form of compensation, it is not clear whether individual victims would  
                                                                                                                                                                   
international judge at The Hague dismisses any such considerations, without even addressing the 
issue. The praetorian statement—one sentence!—that a simple declaration indicating the 
occurrence of a breach constitutes appropriate satisfaction fails to comply with the duty of any 
judge to support his or her decision by explicit reasons. This is all the more deplorable since the 
proceedings in the case had been going on for 14 years. There was ample time to assess every facet 
of the relevant facts. Instead, the Court rushes though the issue of satisfaction as if it intended to 
avoid giving it due consideration”, p. 911. 
525 There is no universal Convention on Crimes Against Humanity on which the Applicant 
State could base its claims. 
526 See ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 2007,  p. 
239. 
527 On the question of State responsibility and individual criminal responsibility relating to 
the proceedings before the Court and the Court’s decision see: Richard J. Goldstone & Rebecca J. 
Hamilton, “Bosnia v. Serbia: Lessons from the Encounter of the International Court of Justice with 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia”, Leiden Journal of International 
Law 21  (2008), pp. 95-112. 
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directly benefit from the compensation award, other than the obvious symbolic meaning to 
victims of such a decision. 
 
Be that as it may, there have been developments both at the level of domestic Court 
decisions concerning reparations for the crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
also the creation of other domestic mechanisms concerning reparations for international 
crimes committed therein. I first analyse examples of court proceedings within the Balkans 
and assess the adjudication of reparation claims, both in criminal and civil proceedings. 
Then I discuss some examples of cases brought in domestic courts of foreign States (i.e. 
outside the Balkans) for reparation regarding the crimes committed in the former 
Yugoslavia. Finally, other domestic mechanisms devised for the purpose of awarding 
reparation for the international crimes committed during the Balkan conflict are 
considered. 
3. Domestic mechanisms in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
In addition to the examples discussed above at the international level concerning crimes 
committed during the Balkan wars, there have also been initiatives at the domestic level. 
As Frederiek de Vlaming and Kate Clark have reviewed with great detail, victims have 
claimed reparation in relation to the war in various different fora528. 
 
In December 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed which put a formal end to 
the conflict. In its Annex 6, the Agreement provided for the establishment of a 
Commission on Human Rights and a Human Rights Chamber529. The Peace Agreement 
thus provided for two fora for dealing with reparations for victims. Annex 7 established a 
Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees (CRPC). The 
study of these two mechanisms demonstrate that they are rather sui generis in the sense 
that they are quasi-international mechanisms set up by a peace agreement. 
  
                                                      
528 Frederiek de Vlaming & Kate Clark, “War Reparations in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
Individual Stories and Collective Interests”, in Narratives of Justice In and Out of the Courtroom, 
Zarkov Dubravka & GlasiusMarlies, Springer International Publishing, 2014, pp. 163-185. 
529 See concerning the work of the Human Rights Chamber, David Yeager, “The Human 
Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Case Study in Transitional Justice”,  International 
Legal Perspectives 14 (2004).  
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According to chapter 2 of Annex 6 of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the Human 
Rights Chamber was modelled on the basis of the European Court of Human Rights, and 
was set up to examine allegations of human rights violations of one of the Parties to the 
Dayton Peace Agreement (that is, the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Sprska)530. The Chamber only could hear 
claims that had occurred after the entry into force of the Dayton Peace Agreement dated 14 
December 1995531.  
 
The Chamber was comprised of 14 members and heard hundreds of cases concerning 
human rights abuses during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was set up to be a court 
of last instance532. Naturally, given the number of victims devastated by the conflict, the 
Chamber had a busy docket and established some practices which aided in dealing with the 
high volume of cases, such as, for example, relying on ICTY cases to set the historical 
record of a given case533. The Chamber entertained applications from victims or legal 
entities in relation to allegations of human rights violations by the State of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Sprska.  
 
The cases decided by the Human Rights Chamber were wide-ranging. In terms of 
reparations for international crimes committed during the war, it is worth mentioning that 
the Chamber ordered innovative and varied awards, and had a major impact on victims and 
society534. The Chamber dealt with important issues such as: cases concerning enforced 
                                                      
530  Carla Ferstman & Sheri P. Rosenberg, “Reparations in Dayton’s Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”, in Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 
Systems in Place and Systems in the Making, Carla Ferstman et al., Nijhoff, 2009, p. 486. 
531 Ibid. 
532  Ibid. at pp. 487-488.  
533 See e.g. Ferida Selimović et al. v. the Republika Srpska, Decision on Admissibility and 
Merits, 7 March 2003, where the Human Rights Chamber applied the trial chamber decision of the 
ICTY in the case of Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, [IT-98-33-T], to provide the overall context for 
the events at Srebrenica: “As the Krstić judgment contains a comprehensive description of the 
historical context and underlying facts of the Srebrenica events, established after long adversarial 
proceedings conducted by a reputable international court, the Chamber will utilise this judgment to 
set forth the historical context and underlying facts important for a full understanding of the 
applications considered in the present decision”, cited in Carla Ferstman &  Sheri P. Rosenberg, 
“Reparations in Dayton’s Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War 
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: Systems in Place and Systems in the Making, Carla 
Ferstman et al., Nijhoff, 2009, p. 489. 
534  Carla Ferstman & Sheri P. Rosenberg, “Reparations in Dayton’s Bosnia and 
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disappearances, which was a major problem during the war535; repossession of property, 
and in this regard, the case-law of the Human Rights Chamber played a role in reviewing 
the laws, policies and practices which related to the return of property536. 
 
The Commission for Real Property Claims of Refugees and Displaced Persons 
(“CRPC”), established pursuant to Article XI of Annex 7 of the Dayton Peace Agreement,  
was a quasi-judicial entity, whose task was described as encompassing “hundreds of 
thousands of claims in a short period of time” where “the Commission developed a stream-
lined approach aimed at maximising efficiency, and its operating procedures bore greater 
resemblance to a mass arbitration or claims process”537.  
 
The CRPC faced a few challenges538 in dealing with property claims, but together 
with the Human Rights Chamber, provided a domestic mechanism where victims had a 
forum to claim varied types of reparations539. Many of the challenges were connected to 
the poor state of property books and the impact of this on deciding property claims; the 
handling of property transfers, and the enforcement of Commission decisions. It is reported 
that, at the end of the mandate of the Commission, local authorities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina had decided  approximately 93% of all claims540. Although a thorough review 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Herzegovina”, in Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 
Systems in Place and Systems in the Making, Carla Ferstman et al., Nijhoff, 2009, p. 491. 
535 To the extent that the Chamber deemed that the violation of enforced disappearance was a 
continuous violation after the entry into force of the Dayton Peace Agreements, such cases were 
admissible, see: Palic v. Republika Srpska,  Decision on Admissibility and Merits,  11 January 
2001, Case No. CH/99/3196; Unkovic v. Federation of Bosnia and Herzogovina,  Decision on 
Admissibility and Merits,  9 November 2001, Case No. CH/99/2150; Josip, Bozana and Tomislav 
Matanovic v. the Republika Srpska, Decision on Admissibility, 13 September 1996, Decision on 
the Merits, 6 August 1997, Decisions on Admissibility and Merits, March 1996–December 
1997,Case No. CH/96/01; Ferida Selimović et al. v. the Republika Srpska, Decision on 
Admissibility and the Merits, 7 March 2003, CH/01/8365 et.al,. 
536 Examples of such cases relating to repossession of property: Rasim Jusufović v. the 
Republika Srpska, Decision on Admissibility and Merits,  9 June 2000, Case no. CH/98/698; Ivica 
Kevesevic v. the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,  10 September 1998, Case No. CH/97/46. 
537  Carla Ferstman & Sheri P. Rosenberg, “Reparations in Dayton’s Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”, in Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 
Systems in Place and Systems in the Making, Carla Ferstman et al., Nijhoff, 2009, p. 502. 
538  Ibid., pp. 507-511. 
539  Ibid. 
540 UNDP Access to Justice, 2009-2011, unknown year of publication; Carla Ferstman &  
Sheri P. Rosenberg, “Reparations in Dayton’s Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Reparations for 
Victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: Systems in Place and Systems in 
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of the activities of the Commission is outside the scope of this study, it is useful to refer to 
its activities for purposes of illustrating domestic mechanisms that exist for providing  
reparation. 
 
In concluding the discussion on domestic mechanisms for reparation set up by the 
Dayton Peace Agreement in regards to international crimes committed in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, it can be said that alongside court proceedings, which I will review next, 
there can be other forms of domestic mechanisms that deal with the question of reparation 
for victims.  
 
Interestingly, for the purpose of this study, it can be said that these domestic 
mechanisms created by the Dayton Peace Agreement served not only to provide an avenue 
for victims to seek reparation domestically for international crimes they suffered, but also 
to cross-fertilise and feed other institutions. In this sense, it has been argued that:  
 
“In many ways, therefore, the Human Rights Chamber was a training 
ground for the Entities of Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and State level institutions to bring their laws and 
practices in line with the European Convention”541. 
 
In terms of national laws and proceedings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, currently, 
there does not exist in Bosnia and Herzegovina a governmental reparation system for 
victims of war crimes committed during the Balkans war: as Popic and Panjeta rightly 
summarize, in terms of a domestic reparation scheme, Bosnia and Herzegovina count on “a 
complex array of on-going payments to people who suffered war-related personal 
harms”542. 
 
In this light, I turn attention to the activities of Bosnian domestic courts concerning 
proceedings on reparation. The following discussion of domestic court decisions in Bosnia 
is relevant both in light of the overall aim of the chapter, (i.e. to assess the current and 
                                                                                                                                                                   
the Making, Carla Ferstman et al., Nijhoff, 2009, p. 511.  
541  Carla Ferstman & Sheri P. Rosenberg, “Reparations in Dayton’s Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”, in Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 
Systems in Place and Systems in the Making, Carla Ferstman et al., Nijhoff, 2009, p. 511. 
542  Linda Popic & Belma Panjeta, Compensation, Transitional Justice and Conditional 
International Credit in Bosnia and Herzegovina,  Independent Research Publication 2010 
http://Ibid..justice-report.com/en/file/show//Documents/Publications/Linda_Popic_ENG.pdf . 
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potential role of national courts concerning reparations for victims of international crimes) 
and also to address how national courts may fill in the gaps left by international and 
domestic mechanisms. 
4. Proceedings before domestic courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
In the case study I review in the present chapter concerning reparations for 
international crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is important to bear in mind the broader 
context regarding reparations: at the international level, the ICTY (dealing with 
international criminal responsibility) and the ICJ (dealing with State responsibility of 
Serbia) have left victims without any significant form of redress; at the national level, the 
mechanisms devised by the Dayton Peace Agreement (the Human Rights Chamber and the 
CRPC discussed above) have halted activities in 2004. 
 
In light of this background, numerous victims initiated suits to try to obtain 
reparations for international crimes543. In this section, this study now focuses on an 
overview of court cases in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
Most court cases were filed on behalf of collectives of victims, such as former 
detainees. Usually, the overall goal was to achieve changes from authorities,  recognition 
of harm caused, and a reestablishment of the rule of law. Because they were unsuccessful 
in obtaining compensation from the governmental authorities, as they did not fall under the 
scope of the domestic governmental war victims reparation scheme described above, many 
former detainees filed suits before national courts in Bosnia544.  
 
                                                      
543 For a detailed analysis of case studies, see Frederiek de Vlaming &  Kate Clark, “War 
Reparations in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Individual Stories and Collective Interests”, in Narratives 
of Justice In and Out of the Courtroom, Zarkov Dubravka & GlasiusMarlies, Springer International 
Publishing, 2014, pp. 179-182.  
544 UNDP, “Access to Justice, Facing the Past and Building Confidence for the Future 
(2009–2011)”, p. 10–12; Selma Boracic, “Bosnia War Victims’ Compensation Struggle” 
(International War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) 3 August  2011, cited in Frederiek de Vlaming &  
Kate Clark, “War Reparations in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Individual Stories and Collective 
Interests”, in Narratives of Justice In and Out of the Courtroom, Zarkov Dubravka & Glasius 
Marlies, Springer International Publishing, 2014, p. 182. 
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In summary, Bosnian courts have awarded compensation in a limited number of 
cases, were not uniform in terms of the amount, and it is reported that the actual sums of 
compensation have  not yet been paid to victims545. 
 
While some claims for reparation were brought before national courts in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, it is suggested that the gaps left by the international courts (ICTY and ICJ), 
as well as the scheme set up by the Dayton Peace Accords, could have been ultimately 
filled by domestic courts. Bosnian courts could have played (and could still play) a more 
active role in post-war reparation and thus assist in the process of healing and allowing 
communities to move forward.  
 
In addition to cases brought before national courts and mechanisms in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, there were also cases brought before courts of foreign States. These cases are 
relevant to demonstrate that often victims cannot find relief in the courts of their own 
countries and thus, end up relying on courts of foreign States by bringing suits based on 
heads of jurisdiction other than territoriality. This idea, and the associated cases, will be 
explored in the last section of this chapter, which dwells upon universal civil jurisdiction. 
III. FOSTERING CIVIL REDRESS FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN DOMESTIC COURTS: 
RATIONALES AND CHALLENGES 
 
The review above of different initiatives and mechanisms that were put in place after 
the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrate that there are both advantages and 
challenges in contouring the award of reparations for international crimes in the context of 
domestic proceedings, especially in war torn countries. This section addresses the 
rationales for fostering an active role of domestic courts in the award of reparations for 
international crimes, as well as  some of the obvious challenges of domestic adjudication 
of such claims. It is not intended to address exhaustively the challenges of bringing 
reparation claims in domestic courts, but rather to paint a large picture of some important 
hurdles victims may face in domestic court proceedings. 
 
                                                      
545 Denis Dzidic, “Bosnian ex-camp detainees join forces”, 2012 Balkan Transitional Justice; 
see also, Selma Boracic, “Bosnia War Victims’ Compensation Sttruggle”, cited in Frederiek de 
Vlaming &  Kate Clark, ibid., p. 182.  
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The main rationale for fostering a greater role for domestic courts relates to the 
scarcity of appropriate international mechanisms and  their limited scope of authority  (due 
to limited jurisdiction or temporal limitations). National courts are already in place – i.e. 
they do not need to be devised to deal specifically with cases of reparations for victims of 
international crimes; the judicial machinery already exists, and in some form,  civil 
recovery for wrongful conduct already exists under domestic laws, thus sparing the time 
and resources needed to  create a special apparatus to deal with reparation claims.  
 
Another advantage refers to logistical considerations of the conduct of proceedings, 
for example, in relation to witnesses and collection of evidence. National courts in the 
areas where international crimes were committed, in theory, could be in a privileged 
position to deal with claims for reparations: they are the closest forum for victims. 
 
Be that as it may, it is not always straight-forward to use national courts for purposes 
of reparation for international crimes. The first important challenge relates to the lack of 
political will and functioning judicial institutions capable of entertaining reparation claims. 
The lack of political will may be connected, among other things, to the involvement of 
political authorities in the criminal conduct which is object of the proceedings. For 
example, in the Bosnian case study, victims often requested reparations directly from 
official authorities, and only once unsuccessful in this enterprise, would they revert to 
national courts.  
 
As well,  in post-war societies, the judicial machinery is often broken, making not 
only prosecutions but also civil redress difficult to obtain in domestic courts. Without 
domestic institutions able to address the (international) criminal conduct and the 
corresponding civil liability, victims are left with no domestic avenue to pursue. Another 
challenge relates to practical difficulties such as enforcement of decisions when the 
accused is outside the countries where the crimes were committed or when his/her assets 
are outside the country. 
 
Thus, while it may initially seem that national courts are the most natural path for 
reparation, in practice, there are many challenges which victims may face in order to settle 
their grief domestically. 
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IV. THE ROAD AHEAD: HOW INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AT THE INTERNATIONAL 
LEVEL CAN INFORM DOMESTIC REPARATION CLAIMS  
 This chapter has reviewed how different legal systems deal with claims for civil 
redress in the aftermath of mass violence, and it has discussed a case study emanating from 
the Balkan wars and the shortcomings in relation to reparations.  
 
Civil claims in national courts may provide an avenue for victims to obtain redress 
for the crimes they have suffered. Additionally, in cases where bringing a civil suit is not 
possible or desirable, in many civil law countries, victims may participate in prosecutions 
as parties civiles and seek reparation within the criminal proceedings, if the defendant is 
convicted546. Nevertheless, more needs to be done in this respect for victims to be able to 
truly benefit from national claims and proceedings in countries torn by war, as discussed 
previously.  
 
My claim is that international criminal mechanisms should promote the role of 
national courts and mechanisms regarding civil redress for victims. International criminal 
justice should not be fragmented in the sense that international and national proceedings 
and mechanisms operate in a dissociated and parallel manner. I argue that they should feed 
off each other, and work in conjunction. As Professor Noelkaemper has posited,  
 
“For one thing, international institutions can develop creative incentives 
for domestic actors to provide for reparation schemes; for instance, by the 
prospect that absence of proper domestic reparation will lead to top-down 
obligations by human rights courts. International institutions also can 
provide critical knowledge to attorneys, who will have the prime 
responsibility to raise such issues before the courts and other actors. They 
also may help to provide financial and material means to actually deliver 
reparation.”547 
 
                                                      
546 See in general, Mireille Delmas-Martry &  John Spencer, European Criminal Procedures, 
Cambridge University Press, 2002. Victims may also in some cases seek reparation from a civil 
fund, as for example, in France, where victims of some violent crimes may obtain compensation 
from the State through a solidarity fund where offenders do not have the necessary funds, Criminal 
code of France, Arts. 706-3. 
547  André Noelkamper, “The Contribution of International Institutions to Domestic 
Reparation for International Crimes”, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of 
International Law) 103 (2009), pp. 203-207.  
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It is further argued that a way in which international mechanisms can foster 
domestic initiatives is by means of implementing legislation. For example, States Parties to 
the ICC, in implementing the ICC Statute, may well institute in their own legislation 
avenues for victims to seek redress for international crimes. This would counter the 
practical difficulty experienced by victims who cannot turn to their own domestic courts 
for civil claims because victims’ redress is not available, due to lack of legislation or legal 
tools, or for lack of political will in relation to reparation requests.  
 
V. UNIVERSAL CIVIL JURISDICTION AS AN ALTERNATIVE AVENUE TO SEEK REDRESS FOR 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES? 
 
As already discussed548, some jurisdictions combine criminal and civil dimensions in 
the same proceedings, allowing for a claim of reparation to be made in the context of 
criminal prosecutions549. Hence, in such systems, often as parties civiles, victims of 
international crimes may claim reparations within the same proceedings. Alternatively, 
depending on the intricacies of the precise legal system, victims may also initiate separate 
civil proceedings for reparation for a crime for which they have been victimised. A 
challenge can arise, as it has been discussed, when crimes are committed in a  jurisdiction 
where access to the Courts is difficult due to, for example, collapsed justice mechanisms or 
political undue interferences. Another important challenge to bringing reparation claims in 
the State where crimes have been committed is the absence of the perpetrator from that 
jurisdiction. In this manner, by being outside the country where the crimes were 
committed, or by having assets located outside the territory where the crimes were 
committed, alleged perpetrators of international crimes may be shielded from legal action 
concerning reparations. 
 
With this hypothesis in mind, this chapter now explores the possibilities and 
challenges of reverting to universal jurisdiction as a means to claim reparations from 
                                                      
548 See Part I of the present chapter. 
549 See references in chapter V of this study. See also, Marion E. Brienen &  Ernestine IBID.. 
Hoegen,  Victims of Crime in 22 European Criminal Justice Systems: The Implementation of 
Recommendation (85) 11 of the Council of Europe on the Position of the Victim in the Framework 
of Criminal Law and Procedure, Wolf Legal Publisher, 2000. 
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individual perpetrators550 for international crimes committed outside the jurisdiction of the 
forum State. In this respect, it enquires whether the rationales that supported the 
development of the doctrine in its criminal dimension permit its use in suits for civil 
redress. What is the current state of international law in this area? In this respect, I explore 
whether universal civil jurisdiction could provide an alternative means for victims to seek 
reparations from perpetrators of international crimes by countering the limitations of 
national courts operating under territorial jurisdiction.  
 
In this light, this section proceeds as follows: first, it discusses the definition of the 
doctrine of universal jurisdiction; then it examines whether under the current state of 
international law, a civil dimension is permitted; the scope of this dimension – whether 
civil claims are connected with criminal trials or are completely separate civil 
proceedings– and how universal civil jurisdiction should develop. In this perspective, the 
discussion of universal civil jurisdiction takes into account new developments in the field 
and examines whether universal jurisdiction may assist in establishing new possibilities for 
reparation claims for international crimes in national courts.  
 
1. The doctrine of universal criminal jurisdiction: definition, genesis and 
rationales 
In a time of global concern about impunity for grave human rights atrocities that 
amount to international crimes551, universal criminal jurisdiction has received much 
                                                      
550 As already explained, procedures to obtain reparation from States are largely outside the 
scope of the present study. In any event, the examination of universal jurisdiction for claims of 
reparation does not concern claims against States.  
551 In recent years, many authors, governments and non-governmental organizations have 
expressed growing concern about human rights violations that happen within borders and across 
frontiers. The concern seems to be focusing around the idea of a need to end impunity and to 
achieve justice. Especially in an era where ‘never again’ is not a mirror image of reality when it 
comes to genocide and crimes against humanity, great efforts have been deployed to make the case 
for expanding national jurisdiction to prosecute serious human rights offenses. In the Annex to the 
question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (civil and political), revised 
final report prepared by Mr. Joinet, impunity is “the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing 
the perpetrators of human rights violations to account – whether in criminal, civil, administrative or 
disciplinary proceedings – since they are not subject to any inquiry that might lead to their being 
accused, arrested, tried and, if found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to make 
reparation to their victims.” Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights 
Through Action to Combat Impunity,  UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1. 
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scholarly attention552. The exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-nationals is by no 
means a new phenomenon553, yet in the past few decades, discussions over the doctrine 
have re-emerged554.  
 
The exercise of jurisdiction is generally limited by dictates of the sovereign equality 
of States and the principle of non-interference555. International law generally requires some 
connection or link for the exercise of jurisdiction556. Such link is often found in territory557, 
                                                      
552 In the past decades, scholarly literature and a great number of human rights defenders 
dedicated attention to the topic of universal jurisdiction. Some of the prominent efforts to describe 
the theory and practice of universal jurisdiction in modern international law: Mitsue Inazumi, 
Universal Jurisdiction in Modern International Law: Expansion of National Jurisdiction for 
Prosecuting Serious Crimes under International Law, adapted version of dissertation defended at 
Utrecht University on 27 October 2004, Oxford University Press, 2005; Stephen Macedo,  
Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes under International 
Law, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003; Luc Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction: International 
and Municipal Legal Perspectives, Oxford University Press, 2003, (in this study, the author not 
only addresses a comprehensive analysis of universal jurisdiction in international law but also 
provides an insightful account for the approach of national legal systems to universal jurisdiction). 
Amongst the non-governmental efforts to promote universal jurisdiction for human rights 
atrocities, some studies have proved insightful in the description and analysis of the principle: 
Amnesty International, Universal Jurisdiction: The Duty of States to Enact and Implement 
Legislation, (September 2001), AI Index: IOR 53/002/2001 and Amnesty International, Universal 
Jurisdiction: 14 Principles on Effective Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction (1999); International 
Council on Human Rights Policy, Hard Cases: Bringing Human Rights Violators to Justice 
Abroad- A Guide to Universal Jurisdiction, (1999); Redress, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: 
Criminal Prosecutions in Europe since 1990 for War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity, Torture 
and Genocide (1999); International Law Association, Final Report on the Exercise of Universal 
Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights Offences, Committee on International Human 
Rights Law and Practice, London Conference (2000). 
553 Universal jurisdiction was the subject of various studies in the beginning of the past 
century: see e.g. IBID..  Eric Beckett, “Criminal Jurisdiction over Foreigners”, British Yearbook of 
International Law 8  (1927). Universal jurisdiction was originally used as a means to prosecute 
piracy and slave trade.  
554  See e.g., Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction, The Princeton Principles on 
Universal Jurisdiction (2001). Scholarly collective initiatives have also created materials 
concerning universal jurisdiction: cf. TMC Asser Institute for International Law, Universal 
Jurisdiction in Theory and Practice; Princeton University Program in Law and Public Affairs, The 
Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction. 
555 See Donald Donovan &  Anthea Roberts, “The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil 
Jurisdiction”,  American Journal of International Law 100 (2006), p. 142. 
556  Ibid., pp. 142-143. 
557 This principle stands for the proposition that acts committed within the limits of a State 
are subject to the laws of that State.  The most interesting point to underscore about the territoriality 
principle relates to acts that have not been committed entirely in the territory of a certain State. The 
conduct of States varies with regards to the application of the territoriality principle. Thus, if part of 
an act occurred within the boundaries of the forum State, this is an exercise of the territoriality 
principle and not the universality principle. 
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the nationality of the offender558 (or the victim)559, or the need to protect the national 
security interests of the State560. 
 
By contrast, universal jurisdiction is based upon the premise that certain crimes are 
so grave that they should become universally abolished. As such, any  State is entitled to 
prosecute the offender of said crimes regardless of the nationality of the accused or the 
victim, or the territory where the crime occurred561. The universality principle is  not based 
upon  a  direct nexus between the offender and the forum; the reasoning behind its 
existence is rooted in  law and morality, fundamental ethical values562 and the “conscience 
of humankind”563.  
 
As one author puts it, universal jurisdiction holds the potential for a global system of 
accountability564. It can be argued that, from a time where universal jurisdiction played a 
role in the prosecution of piracy and slave trade565, to an era of grave human rights 
                                                      
558 This principle concerns the jurisdiction of a State in relation to  its nationals abroad. In 
this case, the nexus between the State exercising jurisdiction and the conduct is the nationality of 
the alleged criminal. States have competence to extend the application of their laws to nationals 
even when they are outside the territory. State practice under this principle varies greatly depending 
on the legal system.  
559 According to this principle, the national State of the victim of a crime committed abroad 
can assert prescriptive jurisdiction over the offender. This principle is intimately connected to 
certain offences, often targeted at nationals of certain countries, such as the offence of terrorism.. 
See generally  Geoffrey R. Watson, “The Passive Personality Principle”,  Texas International Law 
Journal 28  (1993), p.1.  
560 According to this principle, a State can exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over aliens for 
acts done abroad which affect certain “vital” interests of the State. This principle is often justified 
by reference to a State’s right of self-defense. Common offenses for a claim of the protective 
principle are treason, espionage and attacks against embassies, see  Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, 
“Criminal Jurisdiction over Foreigners for Treason and Offences Against the Safety of the State 
Committed Upon Foreign Territory”,  University of Pittsburgh Law Review 19  (1958), p. 567.  
561  See M. Cheriff Bassiouni, “The History of Universal Jurisdiction and Its Place in 
International Law”, in  Universal Jurisdiction – National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious 
Crimes under International Law, Stephen Macedo, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. 
562 See  Christopher Keith Hall, “Universal jurisdiction: New Uses for an Old Tool”, in  
Justice for Crimes Against Humanity, Mark Lattimer & Philipe Sands, Hart, 2007, pp. 55-56.  
563  A. Bailleux, La compétence universelle au carrefour de la pyramide et du réseau, 
Bruxelles, Bruylant (2005), p. 137, cited in Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, International Law 
for Humankind: Towards a New Jus Gentium, Nijhoff, 2010, p. 386. 
564 Stephen Macedo , Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious 
Crimes under International Law, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003, Introduction, p. 4. 
565  See M. Cheriff Bassiouni, “The History of Universal Jurisdiction and Its Place in 
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atrocities, universal jurisdiction has been instrumental in addressing human rights 
violations and providing an important tool to combat impunity and enforce 
accountability566.  
A) Conceptualizing universal jurisdiction: legal basis and conditions for exercise 
 
There are two main forms of jurisdiction within international law: prescribing 
jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction is an additional principle 
for exercising jurisdiction alongside other heads of jurisdiction in international law (i.e. 
territoriality principle, nationality principle, passive personality principle and protective 
principle). As Professor Cryer explains, universal jurisdiction 
“refers to jurisdiction established over a crime without reference to the 
place of perpetration, the nationality of the suspect or the victim or any 
other recognized linking point between the crime and the prosecuting 
State. It is a principle of jurisdiction limited to specific crimes”567.  
 
For the purposes of the present study, I refer to universal jurisdiction, in its criminal 
dimension, as a State having jurisdiction over foreigners for crimes committed abroad, 
when foreigners (alleged perpetrators) are present in their territory. 
i. Legal basis for exercising universal jurisdiction: permissibility and the Lotus 
principle568 
 
There are two main sources that may provide for the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction: customary international law and treaty law569. In this chapter, I will not focus 
                                                                                                                                                                   
International Law”, in Universal Jurisdiction – National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious 
Crimes under International Law, Stephen Macedo (ed.), University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. 
566 Non-governmental organizations and human rights activists advocate for a broader use of 
universal jurisdiction for perpetrators of mass human rights violations. See also generally, Henry 
Steiner, “Three Cheers for Universal Jurisdiction- Or Is it Only Two?”,  Theoretical Inquiries in 
Law 6  (2004), p. 200. See also, Kenneth Roth, “The Case for Universal Jurisdiction”, Foreign 
Affairs 80  (2001). See  Menno T. Kamminga, “Lessons Learned from the Exercise of Universal 
Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights Offenses”,  Human Rights Quarterly 23  (2003). 
567 Robert Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal and Procedure, Cambridge 
University Press, 2007, p. 44. See also, Luc Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction: International and 
Municipal Legal Perspectives, Oxford University Press, 2003,  p. 220 
568 The Lotus principle refers to the Judgment of the PCIJ in the case of The S.S. Lotus Case 
P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 10, p. 4 (1927) (“Lotus case”). The principle per se will be explained in the 
following section of this chapter. 
569 A thorough study of whether a certain crime is a universal jurisdiction crime as a matter 
of treaty law or customary international law is outside the scope of this paper, see Luc Reydams, 
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on whether, as a matter of treaty or customary international law, a specific international 
crime is subject to universal jurisdiction570. The focus here is to first conceptualize and 
discuss the scope of universal jurisdiction and then explore the concept of universal civil 
(or tort) jurisdiction. 
 
At this juncture, it is important to address the question as to whether it is necessary 
under international law to have a legal basis to exercise universal jurisdiction or whether 
the absence of prohibition is enough to allow a State to exercise universal jurisdiction. In 
other words, I address the question of permissibility or mandatory exercise of universal 
jurisdiction. To address this question, it is important to analyze the so-called Lotus 
principle.  
 
The Lotus case involved  a collision between a French ship (the S.S. Lotus) and a 
Turkish ship, leading to the death of Turkish sailors. France claimed before the Permanent 
Court of International Justice (P.C.I.J.) that Turkey did not have jurisdiction to try the 
French officers, because they were on a French boat in international waters at the time of 
the accident. The Court essentially decided that sovereign States may act in any way they 
wish, as long as they do not contravene an explicit prohibition. More precisely, in the 
words of the Court: “Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot . . . be 
presumed” as  international law accords to States “a wide measure of discretion which is 
only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules.”571  
 
The question at this juncture is whether one can use the Lotus principle to adopt a 
permissible approach towards universal jurisdiction, that is, in the absence of express 
prohibition of universal jurisdiction, are States permitted to exercise universal jurisdiction? 
Thus, the lawful exercise of universal jurisdiction can be traced back to the Lotus 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives, Oxford University Press, 
2003 (for a thorough study of treaties and state practice regarding universal jurisdiction). See also, 
Jon B. Jordan, “Universal Jurisdiction in a Dangerous World: A Weapon for All Nations Against 
International Crimes”, Michigan State University-DCL Journal of International Law 9 (2000) 
(noting that treaties themselves can become customary international law; if they are accepted by a 
great number of countries, the treaty will become customary international law and will be binding 
upon all nations, even non-signatories). 
570 Luc Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives, 
Oxford University Press, 2003 (for a thorough analysis of domestic legislation supporting universal 
jurisdiction and an examination of treaties establishing universal jurisdiction). 
571 Lotus case, p. 18. 
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principle572, and the permissibility to exercise universal jurisdiction, in the absence of 
prohibition. In this sense, Professor Scharf posited that: 
 
“In the setting of international criminal law, the contemporary logic of the 
Lotus Principle is supported by the nature of State sovereignty and the 
embryonic status of international law relative to domestic law. The 
continued growth and evolution of international criminal law requires a 
permissive legal culture, which encourages the collective expansion of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over international crimes.”573 
 
Be that as it may, under customary international law, jurisdiction is primarily 
territorial574. The Lotus principle is not widely used as a justification for the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction. Ryngaert, upon providing a detailed study of jurisdiction under 
international law, has succinctly summarised the state of the law: 
 
“[A] jurisdictional assertion is lawful if it is justified under a generally 
accepted principle authorizing the exercise of jurisdiction. Only to the 
extent that there is uniformity of State practice as to the lawfulness of the 
exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction over core crimes could a State 
establish such jurisdiction”575. 
 
Universal jurisdiction under international law is either treaty-based (i.e. it is 
recognized as a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction under a treaty regime) or it is based on 
customary international law576. Some scholars claim that universal jurisdiction for a core 
international crime (i.e. war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide) is lawful under 
                                                      
572 Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction under International Law, Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 
2015, p. 128. 
573 Michael P. Scharf, “Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction on  Nationals of 
Non-Party States”,  New England Law Review 35 (2000), p. 368. 
574 Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction under International Law, Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 
2015, p. 35.  
575 Ibid., p. 129. 
576 Michael P. Scharf, “Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction on  Nationals of 
Non-Party States”,  New England Law Review 35 (2000), p. 363. See also, Lee A. Steven, 
“Genocide and the Duty to Extradite or Prosecute: Why the United States is in Breach of Its 
International Obligations”, Virginia Journal of International Law 39 (1999); see also M. Cherif 
Bassiouni & Edward M. Wise, “Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in 
International Law”, Brill, 1995 (according to whom under international law, nations may agree 
through treaties to exercise universal jurisdiction over offenses that might not otherwise allow such 
exercise of jurisdiction). 
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customary international law577. Under current treaty law, a number of treaties recognize 
universal jurisdiction: 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1958 Law of the Sea Convention, the 
1970 Hijacking Convention, the 1971 Aircraft Sabotage Convention, the 1973 
Internationally Protected Persons Convention, the 1979 Hostage Taking Convention, the 
1984 Torture Convention, the 1988 Airport Security Protocol, the 1988 Maritime 
Terrorism Convention, the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations 
Peacekeepers, and the 1998 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings578. Thus, to assert universal jurisdiction over a certain crime, it is necessary that 
there be an  applicable treaty or rule under customary international law.  
ii. The presence of the accused as a pre-condition for the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction? 
 
Universal jurisdiction involves two sub-categories579: the jurisdiction over offenses 
when the accused is present in the territory of the State asserting jurisdiction; and the 
jurisdiction of a State to try offences regardless of the offender’s whereabouts. The latter is 
often called “pure universal jurisdiction”580 or universal jurisdiction in absentia581. The 
manner in which universal jurisdiction is enforced according to the latter sub-category 
depends upon the cooperation of States to bring the accused to trial in the territory of the 
forum State582, since the forum State does not have custody of the offender.  
 
                                                      
577 Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction under International Law, Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 
2015, p. 129. 
578 See Michael P. Scharf, “Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction on  Nationals 
of Non-Party States”, New England Law Review 35 (2000), pp. 363-364 for full references and 
comments on each treaty. 
579 Robert Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal and Procedure, Cambridge 
University Press (2007), at p. 45. See also, Antonio Cassese, “Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? 
A Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal Jurisdiction”, 1 Journal of Int’l Criminal Justice 589 
(2003) (for a discussion of this distinction). 
580 See Robert Cryer et al., ibid. 
581 For an analysis of the exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia, see Ryan Rabinovitch, 
“Universal Jurisdiction in Absentia”, 28 Fordham Int'l Law Journal 500 (2004-2005); Luc 
Reydams, “Belgium's First Application of Universal Jurisdiction: The Butare Four Case”,  1 
Journal Int'l Criminal Justice 428 (2003); Anthony J. Colangelo, “The New Universal Jurisdiction: 
In Absentia Signaling over Clearly Defined Crimes”, 36 Geo. J. Int'l L. 537 (2004-2005).  
582 See Stephen Ratner, “Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem”, 97 American 
Journal of International Law 888 (2003) (narrating the saga of Belgium concerning the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction over foreigners that are found outside of Belgium). 
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In this sense, the prescribing State is similar to an international criminal court that 
issues an international arrest warrant and requests that any State with custody of the 
alleged offender surrender him or her. The controversies that universal jurisdiction in 
absentia raise are complex and have been explored by scholars583. In the traditional 
conception of universal jurisdiction, States exercise jurisdiction over offenders present in 
their territory584. It may be argued that the presence of the accused is a criterion that 
justifies the interest of the prosecuting State to exercise jurisdiction over individuals 
present in its territory585. Under treaties that recognize universal criminal jurisdiction, none 
provide an express legal basis for universal jurisdiction in absentia586. The complexities 
and controversies of universal criminal jurisdiction in absentia are numerous and outside 
the scope of this study, thus, I will not examine in detail the practical and legal 
implications of the different uses of the principle, or the controversies relating to the use of 
universal jurisdiction in absentia. 
iii. Some technical legal aspects 
 
In analysing universal jurisdiction, some technical legal aspects need to be briefly 
discussed in light of some examples from State practice. These legal aspects may also be 
transposed to the civil dimension of universal jurisdiction, which will be examined later in 
the section. 
 
                                                      
583  For an example of some of the controversies raised by the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction in absentia relate, see Luc Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction: International and 
Municipal Legal Perspectives, Oxford University Press (2003);  See also, Arrest Warrant Case 
(Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), ICJ Reports 3 (2002), p. 43, Opinions of Judges 
Guillaume and Rezek. 
584 See Mitsue Inazumi, Universal Jurisdiction in Modern International Law: Expansion of 
National Jurisdiction for Prosecuting Serious Crimes under International Law, adapted version of 
dissertation defended at Utrecht University on 27 October 2004, Oxford University Press (2005), p. 
103, cited in Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction under International Law, Oxford University Press, 2nd 
ed., 2015, p. 133. 
585 In The Netherlands, for example, there have been prosecutions on the basis of universal 
jurisdiction involving suspects who were residing in The Netherlands when the proceedings started. 
Under Dutch law, presence on the territory is a necessary precondition for the exercise of 
jurisdiction of national courts, see Liesbeth Zegveld and Jeff Handmaker (eds.), “Universal 
Jurisdiction: State of Affairs and Ways Ahead A policy paper”, January 2012, p. 6 (Larissa van den 
Herik). 
586 Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction under International Law, Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 
2015, p. 133. 
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The first one refers to national statutes of limitations in relation to international 
crimes which may bar prosecution. The United Nations Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutes of Limitations for War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity587 
and the more recent European Convention on Non-Applicability of Statutes of Limitations 
for Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes (Inter-European) 588  have very few 
ratifications. For example, under domestic French law, while crimes against humanity and 
genocide are not subject to a statute of limitations, war crimes are subject to a 20 or 30 
year limitation period (depending on the type of war crime)589. 
 
Another technical legal question that is relevant relates to the collection of evidence. 
Given that criminal prosecutions based on universal jurisdiction relate to conduct that 
happened outside of the forum State, the process of gathering  evidence to build a case is of 
utmost importance. The complexity involved in collecting  evidence is well-illustrated by  
Guus Kouwenhoven, a case involving a Dutch businessman who was charged with war 
crimes committed in Liberia in early 2000. In this case, there was much difficulty in 
collecting evidence and cooperation590.  
B) The evolution of theoretical rationales for  universal jurisdiction: from piracy to crimes 
of universal concern 
 
Piracy was the “traditional” universal jurisdiction crime591. Universal jurisdiction 
grew from its traditional application to piracy based upon some specific rationales592. 
                                                      
587  26 November 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73. 
588  Europ. T.S. No. 82. 
589  French Penal Code, arts. 462(10) and 213(5).  
590  See a discussion of this case at: Liesbeth Zegveld and Jeff Handmaker (eds.), “Universal 
Jurisdiction: State of Affairs and Ways Ahead A policy paper”, January 2012, p. 6 (Larissa van den 
Herik). 
591 See e.g, Mark IBID.. Janis, An Introduction to International Law 325 (2003) (explaining 
universal jurisdiction as the jurisdiction of every State traditionally over pirates); see also, Eugene 
Kontorovich, “International Legal Responses to Piracy”, 13 American Society of Int’l Law 2 (2009) 
(“Piracy is the original universal jurisdiction crime”) and Eugene Kontorovich, “The Piracy 
Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation”, 45 Harvard Int'l Law Journal 183 
(2004) (the author criticizes the analogy between piracy and human rights violations for the 
purposes of applying universal jurisdiction). 
592 See Mitsue Inazumi, Universal Jurisdiction in Modern International Law: Expansion of 
National Jurisdiction for Prosecuting Serious Crimes under International Law, adapted version of 
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Because of its central relevance to the foundation and development of universal 
jurisdiction, the next section focuses on conceptualizing piracy on the high seas and 
outlines the rationales justifying the exercise of universal jurisdiction for piracy593. This 
discussion will lay the foundations of the rationales for universal jurisdiction in order to 
then make an  argument concerning the  civil dimension of the doctrine594.  
 
Piracy is ancient595 and, as one author states, it is the oldest offense that invokes the 
assertion of universal jurisdiction596. Piracy has been a crime of universal concern: “even 
before International Law in the modern sense of the term was in existence, a pirate was 
already considered an outlaw, a ‘hostis humani generis’”. 597  The United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea establishes universal jurisdiction over piracy in article 
105: 
“On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any 
State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft 
taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and 
seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the 
seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also 
determine the action to be taken with regard to the ship, aircraft or 
property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith” 598. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
dissertation defended at Utrecht University on 27 October 2004, Oxford University Press (2005), at 
pp. 45-60 (discussing the two main rationales for the development of universal jurisdiction). 
593 Understanding the crime of piracy in international law is not only important because it 
was the precursor of the doctrine of universality, see M. Cheriff Bassiouni, “Universal Jurisdiction 
for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice”, 42 Va. J. Int’l L. 81 
(2000-2001) (for an analysis of the evolution of universal jurisdiction). The importance of 
discussing piracy relies also on the premise that piracy is the precursor of the conception of 
international crimes. However important the study of the crime of piracy may be to  understanding 
the broad scope of universal jurisdiction in contemporary international law, the majority of the 
literature concerning universal jurisdiction deals very superficially with the crime of piracy. The 
analogy between piracy and other crimes is done in  a very subtle manner in scholarly writings and 
very few studies have been devoted to an in-depth analysis of this analogy. 
594 The focus on the crime of piracy in this section is because this is the genesis of universal 
jurisdiction and it provides an adequate framework to discuss the rationales underpinning universal 
jurisdiction. 
595 See Joshua Michael Goodwin, “Universal Jurisdiction and the Pirate: Time for an Old 
Couple to Part”, 39 Vanderbilt Journal Transnational l Law 973 (2006); see Willard Cowles, 
“Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes”, 33 California Law Review 177 (1945), at pp. 181-
194 (noting that jurisdiction over piracy has occurred since the sixteenth century). 
596 Ibid., p. 791. See generally, Dickinson, “Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?”, 38 Harvard 
Law Review 334, 337-339 (1925) cited in Kenneth C. Randall, “Universal Jurisdiction Under 
International Law”, 66 Texas Law Review (1988), at p. 791. 
597  Oppenheim, International Law (1992), at 609. 
598 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 21 ILM 1261 (1982), article 105. 
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Piracy involves acts of robbery and violence599 . An important feature of the 
definition of piracy is the fact that it happens on the high seas, outside the jurisdiction of 
any State, “a global commons”600. Every State has an equal right to navigate the high seas. 
This characteristic of the high seas is sometimes argued to be one rationale for the exercise 
of universal jurisdiction since other traditional principles of jurisdiction would be 
inapplicable601.  
 
i. Theoretical rationales of universal jurisdiction in relation to crimes of universal 
concern 
As it can be perceived from the discussion above, universal jurisdiction is not a recent 
phenomenon602. The principle that States can punish foreigners for crimes committed 
outside their territorial boundaries is a concept that has existed for a long time in 
international law603. Without purporting to provide  a thorough analysis of the formation of 
                                                                                                                                                                   
This provision states the right, but not the obligation, to assert universal jurisdiction over acts of 
piracy, see Kenneth C. Randall, “Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law”, 66 Texas Law 
Review (1988), p. 792. 
599 See Fitfield v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 47 Pa. 166, 187 (1864) (concluding that pirates are sea 
robbers); see also, Alfred Rubin, The Law of Piracy 213 (1998) (noting that States can define 
statutorily what constitutes acts of piracy). 
600 Eugene Kontorovich, “The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow 
Foundation”, 45 Harvard Int'l Law Journal 183 (2004), at p. 190. The occurrence of piracy on the 
high seas could be seen as a third rationale (in addition to the ones I study in this paper). I will not 
examine this question in this paper. One interesting note is that universal jurisdiction, by definition, 
is exercised regardless of where the offense occurs, see Luc Reydams, “Universal Criminal 
Jurisdiction: The Belgian State of Affairs”, 11 Criminal Law Forum 183, 185 (2000).  
601 See generally, Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 124 US 2739, 2775 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that the norm for piracy was developed because pirates 
were “beyond all…territorial jurisdictions”); Lee A. Casey, “The Case Against the International 
Criminal Court”, 25 Fordham Int’l Law Journal 840, 855 (2002) (contending that universal 
jurisdiction for piracy has been accepted since it takes place “on the high seas, beyond the 
territorial jurisdiction of any single State”), cited in Eugene Kontorovich, “Implementing Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute”, 80 Notre 
Dame L. Review 111, (2004), at p. 151. 
602 See Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind: Towards a 
New Jus Gentium, Nijhoff (2010), p. 383 (affirming that universal jurisdiction “has a long history, 
which dates back to the thinking of the founding fathers of the law of nations”). 
603 See generally, Harvard Research in International Law, “Draft Convention on Jurisdiction 
with Respect to Crime”, 29 American Journal of InternationaL Law 435 (1935), p. 739; Kenneth 
C. Randall, “Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law”, 66 Texas Law Review (1988), pp. 
785, 793. 
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the principle of universality, this chapter analyses a few basic points in the evolution of this 
doctrine.  
 
As already discussed, universal jurisdiction was developed to combat the crime of 
piracy based on the rationale that because the crime  occurred on the high seas604, no State 
could have jurisdiction over pirates unless they claimed the universality of jurisdiction605. 
The doctrine changed with time and the basis for a claim of universal jurisdiction shifted to 
the grave nature of the crime and the need to combat impunity for such conduct606. Thus, 
the underlying principles for asserting universal jurisdiction over certain crimes can be 
seen as two ends of a spectrum: the place where the offence occurred - outside the 
jurisdiction of any State - or the grave nature of the crime.607  
 
In the case of universal jurisdiction over grave offences,  “because a state exercising 
universal jurisdiction does so on behalf of the international community, it must place the 
overall interests of the international community above its own.” 608  In its criminal 
dimensions, universal jurisdiction is mostly acclaimed to be an effective tool to fight 
impunity and to fill in the gaps of international criminal tribunals’ proceedings609. In 
                                                      
604 It is often argued that the heinous nature of piracy is the basis for universal jurisdiction, 
see Kenneth C. Randall, “Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law”, 66 Texas Law Review 
(1988). This rationale has been criticized, see Eugene Kontorovich, “The Piracy Analogy: Modern 
Universal Jurisdiction's Hollow Foundation”, 45 Harvard International Law Journal 183 (2004).  
605 See Kenneth C. Randall, “Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law”, 66 Texas Law 
Review (1988); Cheriff M. Bassiouni, “Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical 
Perspectives and Contemporary Practice”, 42 Virginia Journal of International Law 81 (2000-
2001). 
606 Ibid.. The authors claim that the modern basis for universal jurisdiction is the grave nature 
of the crime and the need to combat impunity for those crimes. 
607 See Mitsue Inazumi, Universal Jurisdiction in Modern International Law: Expansion of 
National Jurisdiction for Prosecuting Serious Crimes under International Law, adapted version of 
dissertation defended at Utrecht University on 27 October 2004, Oxford University Press (2005); 
Chandra Lekha Sriram, Globalizing Justice for Mass Atrocities, Routledge (2005).  
608  Cheriff M. Bassiouni, “Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical 
Perspectives and Contemporary Practice”, 42 Virginia Journal of International Law 81 (2000-
2001), pp. 88-89. 
609 See Hays Butler, “Universal Jurisdiction: a Review of the Literature”, Criminal Law 
Forum 11 (2000), pp. 353–373, citing Daniel T. Ntanda Nsereko, “The International Criminal 
Court: Jurisdictional and Related Issues”, 10 Criminal Law Forum 87 (1999), p. 105 (concerning 
the limited scope of the Court’s jurisdiction and arguing for an increased role of universal 
jurisdiction of national courts to complete the gaps of international institutions in prosecuting 
egregious crimes.  
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addition to being a resource for prosecuting serious human rights violations, universal 
jurisdiction is also esteemed as a tool for global justice, especially with regards to countries 
that  are unwilling or unable to prosecute criminals610.  
 
Universal jurisdiction is premised upon the idea that, contrary to other principles of 
international jurisdiction, the heinous nature of the crime justifies the exercise of 
jurisdiction by any State611. In this sense, the seriousness of the crime allows for any State 
to prosecute the offender612. Due to the gravity of certain crimes, their consequences 
stretch  beyond victims and their communities, and  affect the international community as a 
whole613.  
 
These ideas can be traced back to the writings of the philosopher and political 
scientist Cesare Beccaria614. In his work Dei Delliti e Delle Pene615, Beccaria appeals to 
the notion of rationality and humanity in the law. In line with the latter, Beccaria also 
claims that “an act of cruelty committed, for example, in Constantinople, may be punished 
at Paris for this exact reason, that he who offends humanity should have enemies in all 
mankind”616. I take Professor Bassiouni’s point in concluding that Beccaria “did not 
propound universal criminal jurisdiction” 617  as it is understood today; however, the 
foundations for universal jurisdiction concerning crimes of grave nature can be said to find 
some explanation in Beccaria’s work.  
 
                                                      
610 Anne IBID. Geraghty, “Universal Jurisdiction and Drug Trafficking: a tool for fighting 
one of the World’s Most Pervasive Problems”, 16 Florida Journal of International Law 371 
(2004), p. 372. 
611 Cheriff Bassiouni, “The History of Universal Jurisdiction and Its Place in International 
Law”, in Universal Jurisdiction – National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes under 
International Law, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p. 42. 
612 Ibid., pp. 41-44. 
613 Ibid., pp. 42-43. 
614 See a discussion in Cheriff Bassiouni, “The History of Universal Jurisdiction and Its Place 
in International Law”, in Universal Jurisdiction – National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious 
Crimes under International Law, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p. 40. 
615 (1974), translation available at: http://Ibid..constitution.org/cb/crim_pun.htm.  
616 Cesare Beccaria, Dei Delliti e Delle Penne (1974), Translation. 
617 Cheriff Bassiouni, “The History of Universal Jurisdiction and Its Place in International 
Law”, in Universal Jurisdiction – National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes under 
International Law, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p. 43. 
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On the other end of the same spectrum, Hugo Grotius, in The Law of War and 
Peace 618  argued that freedom of navigation was applicable universally and, as a 
consequence, any infringement upon this right would provoke universal punishment619. In 
Grotius’ conception, pirates were “enemies of human race”620. His theory of universal 
punishment is based on the nature and effect of the crime on all nations621.  
 
There thus seems to be three main points which have provided a theoretical basis for 
the development of universal jurisdiction in relation to the (original) crime of piracy. First, 
the fact that pirates are “stateless” and that  no country  can have jurisdiction over them 
based on the nationality principle. Secondly, the idea that crimes of piracy happen on the 
high seas where no State has jurisdiction based on the territoriality principle. Under these 
two rationales, States are not acting in violation of each other’s sovereignty, but rather for 
a common objective, a sort of “mutual self-interest” to combat a crime that potentially 
affects all nations. The third rationale for universal jurisdiction is based on the claim that 
some crimes are so heinous that they are perpetrated against the international community 
and not only individual States622. Under this rationale, in exercising universal jurisdiction, 
States are acting on behalf of the interests of the international community as a whole, for 
the pursuit of the ultimate goal of justice. This last rationale provided the basis for the 
expansion of universal jurisdiction from piracy to crimes of universal concern. 
 
Currently, universal jurisdiction arises from the concept that some kinds of crimes 
are so heinous that shock all humankind and thus preclude any claims against 
extraterritoriality. In this regard, it has been asserted that:  
 
“universal jurisdiction [is] founded on the sheer heinousness of certain 
crimes, such as genocide and torture, which are universally condemned 
                                                      
618 Translated by FW Kelsey, (1925). 
619 Ibid. 
620 Ibid. 
621  See Cheriff Bassiouni, “The History of Universal Jurisdiction and Its Place in 
International Law”, in Universal Jurisdiction – National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious 
Crimes under International Law, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, claiming that Grotius’ 
theory is the basis for universal jurisdiction for international crimes. 
622 See M. Itsouhou Mbadinga, “Le recours à la compétence universelle pour la répression 
des crimes internationaux : étude de quelques cas”, 81 Revue de droit international et de sciences 
diplomatiques et politiques (2003), pp. 286-287. 
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and which every state has an interest in repressing even in the absence of 
traditional connecting factors. . . . [T]hough subject to evolution, the roster 
of crimes presently covered by universal jurisdiction includes . . . 
genocide, torture, some war crimes, and crimes against humanity”623. 
 
Thus, universal criminal jurisdiction as it is currently conceived has gone beyond the 
original crimes of piracy and slave trade to include international crimes such as genocide, 
torture, war crimes and crimes against humanity that shock the conscience of 
humankind624. 
 
Concerns based on comity and international relations between States are often cited 
against the human rights enforcement benefits of universal jurisdiction. In looking ahead at 
the development, or rather the retreat of universal jurisdiction, it may be wise, rather than 
balancing the pros and cons, the support against the criticisms of the doctrine, to actually 
focus on a reasonable exercise and development of the doctrine625. That would mean that 
States making use of universal jurisdiction would follow certain principles regarding, for 
example, comity, requests for extradition, the ability and willingness of the State having 
stronger grounds of jurisdiction (e.g. based on nationality or territoriality) to assert 
jurisdiction over the offender.  
ii. Measuring universal jurisdiction: advantages and critiques 
 
As already discussed, the main rationale for the modern exercise of universal 
jurisdiction is based on the nature of the crime626. Universal criminal jurisdiction is 
claimed to be a tool for combating impunity and bringing perpetrators to justice. The 
advantages of relying on universal jurisdiction are plenty. For instance, it stands against 
safe havens for perpetrators of international crimes. In its criminal dimensions, universal 
jurisdiction is mostly acclaimed as an effective tool to fight impunity, secure accountability 
                                                      
623 Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, “The Emerging Recognition of Universal 
Civil Jurisdiction”, 100 American Journal of International Law 142 (2006), p. 143. 
624 See e.g., ICTY, Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Trial Chamber, Judgment of 10 December 
1998 (no. IT-95-17/1-T). 
625 See on this point also, Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, 2nd ed., 2015. 
626  Noora Arajärvi, “Looking Back from Nowhere: Is There a Future for Universal 
Jurisdiction over International Crimes?”, Tilburg Law Review 16 (2011) 5-29, p. 7. 
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and to fill in the gaps that international criminal tribunals leave627 with regards to countries 
that do not prosecute crimes committed in their territories628. Universal jurisdiction can 
also be used  as a means of prosecuting crimes that occur outside the territory of any State 
(i.e. piracy on the high seas)  that would otherwise  go unpunished629. 
 
The criticisms of universal jurisdiction refer to the risks that it poses and the scope of 
its exercise. For example, Judge Guillaume in his Separate Opinion in the Arrest Warrant 
case before the ICJ stated that universal jurisdiction can create “total judicial chaos” and 
“encourage the arbitrary for the benefit of the powerful, acting as agent for an ill-defended 
‘international community’”630. This view summarizes the main points of criticism of 
universal jurisdiction: a tool that powerful States may use without proper checks and 
balances.  
2. Towards a victim-orientated approach: a civil dimension of universal jurisdiction? 
 
In this part of the chapter, I investigate the enforcement of victims’ reparation 
through the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. This doctrine, as explained above, is 
grounded in concepts such as the fight against impunity and accountability for certain 
crimes of universal concern. The key question as it pertains to the further development of 
universal civil jurisdiction is whether the foundation of the doctrine, in its criminal 
dimension, can be expanded to include a civil dimension.  
 
In this perspective, I first address the broader doctrinal question of criminal 
punishment and reparation. Then I examine the intricacies of universal civil jurisdiction in 
                                                      
 
627 See Hays Butler, “The Doctrine of Universal Jurisdiction: A Review of the Literature”, 11 
Criminal Law Forum 353, 355 (2000), citing Daniel Ntanda Nsereko, “The International Criminal 
Court: Jurisdictional and Related Issues”, 10 Criminal Law Forum 87 (1999), at 105 (concerning 
the limited scope of the Court’s jurisdiction and arguing for an increased role of universal 
jurisdiction of national courts to complete the gaps of international institutions in prosecuting 
egregious crimes).  
628  See Amnesty International, Universal Jurisdiction: The duty of states to enact and 
implement legislation (2001). See International Council on Human Rights Policy, Hard Cases: 
Bringing Human rights violators to Justice Abroad- A Guide to Universal Jurisdiction (1999). 
629 See Harvard Research in International Law, “Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with 
Respect to Crime”, 29 American Journal of Int’l Law 439 (Supp. 1935), p. 739 
630 Arrest Warrant Case (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, ICJ Reports 
2002, p. 43. 
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order to dwell upon the rationale underpinning the inclusion of a civil dimension in 
universal jurisdiction. I also consider whether the doctrine can be an effective tool for 
bridging the gaps of justice and providing an effective mechanism to enforce victims’ right 
to reparation. The fil conducteur of my analysis is that the relationship between criminal 
and civil dimensions of justice, offenders and victims, criminal sanctions and civil 
remedies, needs to be aligned for the ultimate goal of justice to be attained. 
A) Defining the civil dimension of universal jurisdiction   
 
Universal civil jurisdiction, often also called universal tort jurisdiction631, similar to 
that of universal criminal jurisdiction, does not require any jurisdictional link between the 
forum and the wrongful act632. It has been defined “as the principle under which civil 
proceedings may be brought in a domestic court irrespective of the location of the unlawful 
conduct and irrespective of the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim, on the grounds 
that the unlawful conduct is a matter of international concern.”633 
 
The concept of universal civil or tort jurisdiction is less known and less common 
than its counterpart, universal criminal jurisdiction. In short, as the other side of the coin, 
universal tort jurisdiction refers to civil action taken against perpetrators of international 
crimes, in any forum, irrespective of where the crime was committed and the nationality of 
the offender or the victim634. While universal criminal jurisdiction is reserved primarily  
for international crimes (see above), universal civil jurisdiction has been claimed for gross 
human rights violations, wherever they may have occurred635. Thus, at the current print of 
international law, it is not possible to refer to a clearly circumscribed list of criminal 
                                                      
631 See Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
2015, 2nd ed., pp. 135 et suiv. In this chapter, I will use the terms “universal civil jurisdiction” and 
“universal tort jurisdiction” interchangeably. 
632 Donald Donovan, “Universal Jurisdiction - The Next Frontier?”, 99 American Society of 
International Law Proceedings 123 (2005), p. 117. 
633 Menno T. Kamminga, “Universal Civil Jurisdiction : Is it Legal ? Is it Desirable?”, 99 
American Society of International Law Proceedings 123 (2005), p. 123. 
634 See generally on the concept of universal tort jurisdiction, Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction 
in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., 2015, pp. 135 et seq. and Donald 
Donovan, Universal Jurisdiction - The Next Frontier?, 99 American Society of International Law 
Proceedings 123 (2005). 
635 See Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2nd 
ed., 2015, p. 135. 
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conduct that may be subject to universal civil jurisdiction. In saying this, the State practice 
reviewed below will demonstrate some of the conduct subject to universal civil 
jurisdiction.  
 
Concerning the presence requirement, beyond questioning whether it is permissible 
under international law, it does not seem that universal civil jurisdiction in absentia is 
desirable. In order to obtain enforcement of civil awards of reparation, a minimal territorial 
connection such as the mere presence of the perpetrator in the forum State during the 
proceedings636 may be necessary, without the need for formal links such as residence or 
nationality637. 
 
As to the scope and reach of universal civil jurisdiction, State practice, as discussed 
below, demonstrates that victims may claim reparation under this doctrine against 
individual perpetrators - as it is shown by cases against individuals alleged to be guilty of 
war crimes during the former Yugoslavia wars; against corporations - as it is shown by 
diverse cases brought before United States courts638; and  (with more difficulty due to 
claims of State immunity) against States- as it is shown by  the recent cases against 
Germany639. 
B) Lawfulness of universal civil jurisdiction 
 
In this context, a question arises as to the lawfulness of universal civil jurisdiction 
and whether such exercise of universal jurisdiction is permitted by international law. It has 
been rightly observed that a general international treaty allowing for universal civil 
jurisdiction is lacking640. It can be stated at this stage that, unlike universal criminal 
jurisdiction, there is not yet enough State practice and opinion juris to ground 
unequivocally the argument that customary international law allows for the exercise of 
                                                      
636 See Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
2015, 2nd ed., p. 135, n. 216. 
637 Ibid. 
638 See discussion of cases and references in the following section of this chapter. 
639  See the Case concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy, Greece 
intervening), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011 and related national proceedings in Italy and Greece. 
640 Luc Reydams, “Universal Jurisdiction in Context”, 99 American Society of International 
Law Proceedings 123 (2005), p. 118. 
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universal civil jurisdiction for the same crimes as those allowing universal criminal 
jurisdiction.  
 
This study reviews further below some State practice in regards to universal 
jurisdiction and it will be made clear that international law has not yet reached a stage 
where universal civil jurisdiction is recognized under customary international law. 
Nevertheless, an argument has been made that: “It would make sense to assume that the 
exercise of universal civil jurisdiction is permitted in respect of the same unlawful conduct 
as universal criminal jurisdiction and that similar conditions apply” 641 ; and that 
“[i]nternational law authorizes universal civil jurisdiction, in part because it operates as a 
less intrusive form of jurisdiction than universal criminal jurisdiction.” 642 In a similar vein, 
in a concurring opinion to the United States Supreme Court Decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, Justice Breyer stated that “universal criminal jurisdiction necessarily 
contemplates a significant degree of civil tort recovery as well” and that the exercise of 
universal civil jurisdiction is no more threatening than that of universal criminal 
jurisdiction643. 
 
In discussing the lawfulness of universal civil jurisdiction, Cédric Ryngaert posits 
that “the fact that only a limited number of states allow the exercise of universal tort 
jurisdiction is not fatal to the lawfulness of such jurisdiction under international law”. He 
goes on to claim that “[t]hese states may not provide for universal tort jurisdiction because 
they prefer criminal justice solutions, rather than because they consider such jurisdiction to 
be internationally unlawful”644. With regards to whether universal jurisdiction is actually 
permissible under international law, the author concludes that although only a few States 
have actually exercised universal civil jurisdiction, there is no crystallised customary rule 
that prohibits universal civil jurisdiction645. Thus, by looking  at the lawfulness of universal 
                                                      
641 Menno T. Kamminga, “Universal Civil Jurisdiction : Is it Legal ? Is it Desirable?”, 99 
American Society of International Law Proceedings 123 (2005), pp. 124-125. 
642 Beth Van Schaack, “Justice without Borders: Universal Civil Jurisdiction”, 99 American 
Society of International Law Proceedings 123 (2005), p. 120. 
643 542 U.S. 692 (2004), p. 763. 
644  Cédric Ryngaert, “Universal tort jurisdiction over gross human rights violations”, 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 38 (2007) 3-60. 
645 Ibid. 
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civil jurisdiction from a perspective of whether it is prohibited (rather than permitted), it is 
argued that universal civil jurisdiction is allowed.  
 
Be that as it may, it does not seem that universal civil jurisdiction (in relation to 
international crimes) is uniformly accepted under international law. Some States have 
expressed the view that, although international law recognizes universal criminal 
jurisdiction, it does not “recognize universal civil jurisdiction for any category of cases at 
all, unless the relevant states have consented to it in a treaty or it has been accepted in 
customary international law.”646   
  
In any event, at this early stage of the development of the doctrine under 
international law, the examination of individual States’ practice is not of much help to 
defining the contours of universal civil jurisdiction. In the author’s view, universal civil 
jurisdiction should be justified on reliance on principles of international law, such as the 
right of victims to receive reparation, which transcends the realm of international human 
rights law. It is in this perspective that attention is now turned to recent State practice and 
possible rationales that may justify adding a civil dimension to universal jurisdiction.  
 
C) Rationales for adding a civil dimension to universal jurisdiction 
 
It is appropriate at this juncture to examine State practice and possible rationales that 
could eventually underpin universal civil jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction (in its criminal 
dimension) has strengthened its foundation pursuant to the principle of combating 
impunity and providing accountability for serious violations of international law647 by 
allowing prosecution in any State of certain crimes - such as, for example, piracy, 
genocide, slave trade, war crimes, torture - that defy traditional boundaries of criminal 
                                                      
646 Brief of the Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Swiss Confederation 
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339). 
647 Cf. Kenneth C. Randall, “Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law”, 66 Texas Law 
Review (1988); Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction, The Princeton Principles on Universal 
Jurisdiction 28-29 (2001); Mitsue Inazumi, Universal Jurisdiction in Modern International Law: 
Expansion of National Jurisdiction for Prosecuting Serious Crimes under International Law, 
adapted version of dissertation defended at Utrecht University on 27 October 2004, Oxford 
University Press, 2005.  
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justice and which shock the conscience of humankind648. Hence, at first sight, to include 
civil dimensions in universal jurisdiction may seem inappropriate649.  
 
As explained above, universal jurisdiction for international crimes has developed 
pursuant to the rationale that some crimes are so heinous that any State can prosecute the 
perpetrator, no matter where he/she may be found650. This rationale, based on the heinous 
nature of the conduct, provides, it may be contended, a foundation for the development of 
the civil dimension of universal jurisdiction: the same rationale that supported the 
expansion of universal jurisdiction for “crimes of universal concern” could potentially 
justify the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction651. Thus, victims of crimes subject to 
universal jurisdiction would be able to claim reparation in any forum, without necessarily a 
jurisdictional link to the offender or the place where the heinous conduct took place.  
 
The question as to how to transpose from a criminal dimension to a civil dimension 
of universal jurisdiction poses itself from theoretical and practical perspectives. As to the 
practical perspective, as discussed above, it has been argued that universal criminal 
jurisdiction contemplates a degree of civil recovery.  
 
The link between the criminal and civil dimensions of universal jurisdiction is the 
heinous nature of the criminal conduct and the gravity of the crime, which exclude a 
territorial nexus652. In its civil dimension, universal jurisdiction can serve as an alternative 
for victims of international crimes to seek and obtain reparation. Furthermore, civil 
proceedings provide victims a chance to tell their stories and have their day in court. It is 
also important to bear in mind that civil remedies may serve as an independent means of 
                                                      
648 American Law Institute, Restatement (Third), The Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States (1987), section 404; see also Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339), 
Concurring Opinion of Justice Breyer. 
649  See Beth Van Schaack, “Justice without Borders: Universal Civil Jurisdiction”, 99 
American Society of International Law Proceedings 123 (2005).  
650 See discussion in the chapter above.  
651 Donald Donovan, “Universal Jurisdiction - The Next Frontier?”, 99 American Society of 
International Law Proceedings 123 (2005), p. 117. 
652 Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2015, 
2nd ed., p. 135. 
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enforcing international norms proscribing defined criminal conduct, and as a means to give 
victims access to international criminal justice pertaining international crimes653.    
 
The civil dimension of universal jurisdiction is also a means by which the goal of 
putting an end to impunity and creating a culture of accountability may be achieved, a goal 
which was one of the driving forces behind the modern expansion of universal jurisdiction. 
Civil judgments have an important declarative function as identifying conduct which is 
condemned by the international community as a whole.  
 
These above considerations are necessarily abstract and there certainly remain some 
open questions and challenges regarding the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction in 
practice and its further development in international law. It remains however that Courts 
exercising (universal) jurisdiction over civil claims for reparations will usually have to 
follow their procedural rules and domestic laws. In this regard, the above discussion 
regarding some technical legal aspects, e.g. statutes of limitations, may also apply to civil 
claims in relation to international crimes, depending on the laws of the forum State. Other 
relevant questions include, for example, the impact of claims of State or official immunity 
on the exercise of universal jurisdiction for international crimes and breaches of jus cogens 
norms, the grants of amnesties and the enforcement of judgments based on universal 
jurisdiction. While a detailed analysis of such questions is outside the scope of the present 
chapter, the review of State practice that follows will shed some light on how these 
questions have been treated in practice.  
D) Recent State practice and possible rationales for a civil dimension of universal 
jurisdiction 
 
Universal jurisdiction in its civil dimension has developed in the case law of some 
States. I now turn to review some recent and select State practice. The following analysis is 
meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive, and is thus necessarily selective, with 
reference to some relevant cases. 
 
                                                      
653  See Linda Malone, “Enforcing International Criminal Law Violations with Civil 
Remedies: The US Alien Tort Claims Act,” in International Criminal Law, Brill, 3rd ed., Vol. III, 
2008. 
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The main country where something akin to a civil dimension of universal jurisdiction 
has developed is the United States. This is because in the United States, there are two 
statutes that have been interpreted to allow for the exercise of a sort of universal civil 
jurisdiction. The Alien Tort Claims Statute (“ATS”)654, from 1789, states that “[t]he district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”. Additionally, 
the Torture Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”) provides a cause of action for any victim of 
torture and extrajudicial killing, wherever the crime was committed655.  
 
The majority of cases that relied on the ATS concern corporate liability rather than 
individual civil liability656. Without purporting to pursue a detailed analysis of all cases 
that dealt with individual civil liability for international crimes, this study discusses the 
some relevant examples and highlights of the ATS jurisprudence with a focus on 
transnational tort litigation.  
 
While in the past decades there has been a great number of cases relying on the ATS 
concerning torts committed outside the United States657, a notable recent case before the 
Supreme Court of the United States has somewhat changed the panorama for ATS 
litigation. While not dealing with individual civil liability for international crimes (which is 
the paradigm of the present study), this case is worth discussing due to its impact on the 
development of universal civil jurisdiction before US Courts. Recently, in 2013, the United 
States Supreme Court decided the case Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum658 which dealt 
                                                      
654 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (“ATS”). 
655 Pub. L. 102-256, 12 March 1992, 106 Stat. 73, in particular Section 2(a) of the TVPA. 
656 For a list of ATS cases concerning corporations, see Michael D. Goldhaber, “Corporate 
Human Rights Litigation in Non-U.S. Courts: A Comparative Scorecard”, UC Irvine Law Review 
3, 2013, Appendix A (list of cases compiled by Jonathan Drimmer concerning corporate cases). 
657 See ibid. 
658 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). Not long after the Judgment of the Supreme Court was rendered, 
many scholars commented on it, see e.g. Janine M. Stanisz, “The Expansion of Limited Liability 
Protection in the Corporate Form: The Aftermath of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.," Brook. 
J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 5 (2010), 573 (for a commentary before the Supreme Court Judgment); 
Frank Cruz-Alvarez and Laura E. Wade, “The Second Circuit Correctly Interprets the Alien Tort 
Statute: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch”, University of Miami Law Review 65 (2010), 1109 (for a piece 
before the Supreme Court Judgment). For commentary on the Supreme Court Judgment, see e.g.: 
Ingrid Wuerth, “The Supreme Court and the Alien Tort Statute: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co.”, American Journal of International Law 107 (2013), pp. 13-26; Anthony J. Colangelo, “The 
Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations in Kiobel and Beyond”, Georgetown Journal of 
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with allegations that Shell entities planned, conspired and facilitated extrajudicial 
executions, torture and crimes against humanity by Nigeria in the Niger Delta between 
1992 and 1995. The case was based on the ATS.  
 
One of the main issues in the case hinged upon the question of the extraterritorial 
nature of the ATS, and more specifically, whether the United States Courts can rely on the 
ATS to hear civil claims concerning human rights violations that have no connection to the 
United States, that is, the violations were not committed on United States soil, or by an 
American national or against an American victim659. Thus, under these parameters, this 
case fell squarely within the conception of universal civil jurisdiction. Although this case 
centred on corporate civil liability, which is not the focus of this study, it also has 
implications for the development of universal civil jurisdiction concerning international 
crimes committed by individuals. 
 
The Supreme Court made a decision that has a negative impact on the development 
of universal jurisdiction civil claims under the ATS. The Supreme Court decided that the 
ATS could not be applied in civil suit cases for acts committed outside the United States; it 
                                                                                                                                                                   
International Law 44 (2013); Vivian G. Curran, “Extraterritoriality, Universal Jurisdiction, and the 
Challenge of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.”, 28 Md. J. Int'l L. 76 (2013), available at: 
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol28/iss1/6; Humberto Fernando Cantú Rivera, 
“Recent Developments in Kiobel vs. Royal Dutch Petroleum: An Important Human Rights Forum 
In Peril?.” Cuestiones Constitucionales 28 (2013), pp. 243-254; Angelica Bonfanti, “No 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute: Which Forum for Disputes on Overseas 
Corporate Human Rights Violations after Kiobel?.” Diritti umani e diritto internazionale (2013), 
pp. 377-398. 
659 The questions presented to the Supreme Court of the United States, on appeal from the 
Second Circuit, were: 
“1. Whether the issue of corporate civil tort liability under the Alien Tort treated by all other 
courts prior to the decision below, or an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, as the court of appeals 
held for the first time. 
2. Whether corporations are immune from tort liability for violations of the law of nations 
such as torture, extrajudicial executions or genocide, as the court of appeals decision provides, or if 
corporations may be sued in the same manner as any other private party defendant under the ATS 
for such egregious violations, as the Eleventh Circuit has explicitly held.” Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491). 
In the oral arguments phase, the Court ordered the Parties to argue the following point: 
“Whether and under what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows courts to 
recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a 
sovereign other than the United States.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 
(2012) (mem.). See on this question: Vivian G. Curran, “Extraterritoriality, Universal Jurisdiction, 
and the Challenge of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.”, 28 Md. J. Int'l L. 76 (2013), available 
at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol28/iss1/6  
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thus closed the extraterritoriality door of ATS suits. According to the United States 
Supreme Court, claims under the ATS cannot be brought before federal courts in the 
United States for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a 
sovereign State other than the United States660. 
 
It may be argued, based on the focused questions before the Court661, that this 
interpretation of the ATS applies only to cases concerning torts for violations of the law of 
nations, and not to a treaty of the United States, as the second prong for the application of 
the ATS. It has also been argued that the “Court’s misunderstanding has not completely 
erased the possibility of future claims involving foreign elements from being brought under 
the [ATS]. The Court left the door open for claims that sufficiently ‘touch and concern’ the 
United States”662. 
 
As regretful as this precedent may seem for the development of a civil dimension of 
universal jurisdiction cases – the United States, under the ATS, represented a valuable 
avenue for the development of universal civil jurisdiction – it is not the end of the road just 
yet.  
 
I turn now to examine other cases from Europe. A recent example may be cited in 
defense of universal civil jurisdiction. In 2012, a Dutch Court in The Hague awarded 
reparation in the form of compensation to a Palestinian doctor who was imprisoned in 
Libya for allegedly infecting children with HIV/Aids. The claimant alleged that he was 
unjustly detained and tortured by the defendants. The claimant, born in Egypt, who resided 
in The Netherlands, sued 12 Libyan officials pursuant to a universal jurisdiction Dutch 
law663. The plaintiff sought both material and non-material damages664.  
                                                      
660 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
661 See “2. Whether corporations are immune from tort liability for violations of the law of 
nations such as torture, extrajudicial executions or genocide, as the court of appeals decision 
provides, or if corporations may be sued in the same manner as any other private party defendant 
under the ATS for such egregious violations, as the Eleventh Circuit has explicitly held.” Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari at, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491). 
662 Anthony J. Colangelo, “The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations in Kiobel and 
Beyond”, Georgetown Journal of International Law 44 (2013), p. 1329. 
663 El-Hojouj c. Amer Derbas et al., 21 mars 2012, Case No. 400882/HA ZA 11-2252   . See 
also, “Dutch court compensates Palestinian for Libya jail”, BBC news, 28 March 2012, available 
at: http://Ibid..bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17537597 For a commentary, see Eugene 
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This case, decided by a first instance court in The Hague, proceeded on the basis that, 
as the case was of an international character, it had to be determined whether the Dutch 
court had jurisdiction. The alleged basis for jurisdiction was Article 9(c) of the Code of 
Civil Procedure. This provision states that jurisdiction is found when the case is 
“sufficiently connected with the Dutch legal order” and when “it would be unacceptable to 
ask of the plaintiff that he bring the case before a foreign court”. The Court found 
jurisdiction on the basis that it was unacceptable to require the claimant to take the case 
before a court in Libya, considering the circumstances in Libya at the time of the initial 
filing of the case (in July 2011), and the claimant was a resident in The Netherlands665. 
 
While this is a judgment of a first instance court without much substantive analysis, it 
serves as an insightful and recent example of the use of universal civil jurisdiction through 
domestic laws and procedures – in this case, the crimes were committed abroad, the victim 
and alleged perpetrators were not nationals of the forum State. The Dutch court looked at 
two important aspects in order to found its jurisdiction: the first one is the fact that the 
claimant was a resident in The Netherlands, providing an important link with the forum 
State and a procedural basis upon which to found jurisdiction. The second important aspect 
of this case is the fact that the Court found that the criterion of “unacceptable to ask the 
claimant to bring the case in a foreign court” was met. These aspects point to two potential 
guiding principles for the development of universal civil jurisdiction in a sensible manner 
and with  respect for certain international legal principles such as international comity. The 
first is the existence of a sufficient link with the forum State (e.g. a residency requirement); 
the second is the notion of “forum of necessity”, where the claimants allege that their case  
could not be heard in another jurisdiction.  
 
On this latter point, before turning to examine other important cases, it should be 
noted that the Institut de Droit International, in a recent report (2015) concerning universal 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Kontorovich, “Kiobel (IV): Precedent-setting Dutch Civil Universal Jurisdiction Case”, Opinio 
Juris, 28 March 2012, available at: http://opiniojuris.org/2012/03/28/precedent-setting-dutch-civil-
universal-jurisdiction-case/  
664  The analysis of this case is based on an unofficial translation of the Judgment (original in 
Dutch). 
665  El-Hojouj c. Amer Derbas et al., 21 mars 2012, Case No. 400882/HA ZA 11-2252   . 
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civil jurisdiction for international crimes, provides  a detailed review of State practice 
(concerning claims against individuals, corporations and States), and posits that  
 
“l’évolution du droit international européen est sensible à l’opportunité 
d’une certaine ouverture des tribunaux aux litiges portant sur des graves 
violations des droits fondamentaux même en l’absence d’un for fondé sur 
les règles ordinaires. L’existence d’un for de sauvegarde en tant que « for 
de nécessité » est de tradition dans plusieurs pays européens. Cependant, si 
l’opinion publique est plutôt favorable à un tel for, les positions politiques 
sont plus reservés”666.  
 
In reviewing the practice of States in Europe, including France and The Netherlands, 
as well as Canada, on the question of the applicability of the “forum of necessity,” the 
report notes that: 
 
“La question n’est pas, dès lors, de savoir si des intérêts nationaux sont en 
jeu au point que le pouvoir juridictionnel doit être à disposition afin de 
fournir un remède à des crimes contre l’humanité commis par les 
«ennemis de l’humanité». La question est plutôt de savoir si les intérêts de 
la communauté internationale militent pour qu’un tel remède soit fourni 
par une juridiction appropriée de telle manière à ce qu’aucun « havre sûr » 
ne subsiste qui pourrait en fin de compte opérer comme un écran 
protecteur à l’encontre des demandes légitimes des victimes de torture, de 
génocide et d’autres atrocités de ce genre. Afin d’éviter une telle issue, le 
droit international devrait assurer l’existence et le bon fonctionnement de 
tribunaux aptes à en juger afin de protéger les victimes face à un déni de 
justice. Les quelques procès qui ont été menés ont permis, en raison de 
leurs effets désastreux sur l’image des sociétés visées, de provoquer une 
prise de conscience débouchant sur une approche de prévention par 
rapport aux droits de l’homme”667.  
 
Concerning cases relating to the Balkans war, in addition to cases brought before 
domestic courts and mechanisms in the Balkans reviewed above, domestic courts outside 
                                                      
666  Institut de droit international, Commission I, “La compétence universelle civile en 
matière de réparation pour crimes internationaux - Universal civil jurisdiction with regard to 
reparation for international crimes”, Rapport par Andreas Bucher, p. 22, available on the site of the 
Institut (session of 2015, Tallinn) at: http://justitiaetpace.org/annuaire_resultat.php?id=16 (last 
accessed 10 May 2016). 
667  Institut de droit international, Commission I, “La compétence universelle civile en 
matière de réparation pour crimes internationaux - Universal civil jurisdiction with regard to 
reparation for international crimes”, Rapport par Andreas Bucher, p. 26, available on the site of the 
Institut (session of 2015, Tallinn) at: http://justitiaetpace.org/annuaire_resultat.php?id=16 (last 
accessed 10 May 2016). 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina668 have heard reparation claims from victims of the crimes 
perpetrated during the war669. Interestingly, such suits were mainly brought against alleged 
individual perpetrators. In the United States Courts670, in the 90’s, there were two cases 
brought against Radovan Karadzić, which concluded in default judgments671.  
 
These cases concerned civil suits brought by two individuals who claimed to be 
victims of the crimes allegedly perpetrated by Mr. Karadzić. The alleged crimes for which 
compensation was being sought included: “genocide, rape, forced prostitution and 
impregnation, torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, assault and 
battery, sex and ethnic inequality, summary execution, and wrongful death”672. In the first 
instance district Court, the claims were dismissed on the basis of lack of jurisdiction under 
the ATS (which the plaintiffs used as a basis of their action).  
 
Nevertheless, the Second District Court reversed the decision of the first instance 
Court and found that there was subject-matter jurisdiction under the ATS for a violation of 
the law of nations committed by a non-state actor, such as the defendant, Mr. Karadzić. 
The Court thus decided that individual non-state actors could be held liable for crimes such 
as genocide and war crimes673 and that individuals could bring a suit against the perpetrator 
                                                      
668 These cases are very detailed in the chapter by Frederiek de Vlaming and Kate Clark, 
“War Reparations in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Individual Stories and Collective Interests”, 
Narratives of Justice In and Out of the Courtroom, Springer International Publishing, 2014, pp. 
167-175. 
669 See Carla Ferstman and Sheri P. Rosenberg, “Reparations in Dayton’s Bosnia and 
Herzegovina” in Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 
Systems in Place and Systems in the Making, Nijhoff, 2009, pp. 484-485. 
670 Commentators have affirmed that “‘[. . . it] appears these cases, when taken together with 
other anti-impunity efforts around the world, are also helping to create a climate of deterrence and 
[to] catalyze efforts in several countries to prosecute their own human rights abusers’: Sandra 
Coliver, Jennie Green, and Paul Hoffman, “Holding human rights violators accountable by using 
international law in U.S. courts: Advocacy efforts and complementary strategies”, 2005 Emory 
International Law Review 19 (1): 174–175. For a commentary from the representative of some of 
the victims, see Catherine MacKinnon, “Remedies for war crimes at the national level”, 1998 The 
Journal of the International Institute 6. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.4750978.0006.103 Accessed 
on 12 February 2015. 
671 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d. Circ. 1995), cert. denied, 518 US 1005 (1996). For a 
commentary, see David P. Kunstle, “Kadic v. Karadzic: Do Private Individuals Have Enforceable 
Rights and Obligations Under the Alien Tort Claims Act?”, 6 Duke Journal of Comparative & 
International Law 319-346 (1996). 
672 Cf. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d, 232. 
673 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d, 241-43. 
 239 
for redress for such violation. Given the decision of the Court, the jury awarded a total of 
US$ 745 million to the 14 plaintiffs (US$ 265 million compensatory damages and US$ 480 
million punitive damages)674. 
 
Similarly, in 1998, a case was brought before a US court by four Bosnian Muslim 
plaintiffs against NikolaVucković, a Bosnian Serb soldier 675 . The claimants sought 
compensation and punitive damages for allegations of crimes committed against them 
during the course of the conflict. The claimants alleged they were victims of arbitrary 
detention, torture and abuse allegedly committed against Bosnian Muslims and Croats, and 
the forced relocation of Bosnian Muslim and Croat families living in the municipality of 
Bosanski Samac in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Court found for the claimants and 
awarded US$ 10 million each in compensatory damages and US$ 25 million each in 
punitive damages676. 
 
These cases were remarkable having been brought to domestic courts even before the 
ICTY had custody of the accused. As one of the claimants against Mr. Karadzić stated: 
“verdict was not about monetary damages, but about gaining recognition of the acts 
committed by Bosnian Serb ultra-nationalists”677. The question then is whether the 
symbolic value of the judgment is sufficient when the enforcement of the award does not 
follow. This question is relevant as there were many other accused in the Balkans wars but 
there weren’t as many civil suits brought in domestic courts – why was this precedent not 
followed? There are certainly many hurdles to bring cases of this magnitude. In the end, 
when examining civil suits before domestic courts, it is important to bear in mind what is 
the ultimate goal of bringing these cases as often monetary damages do not get enforced. 
 
In addition to cases brought before the United States Courts, there have also been 
other cases brought before Courts in Europe, including in Serbia. The first case in Europe 
                                                      
674 Kadic v. Karadžic, No. 93 Civ. 1163, judgment (S.D.N.IBID.. August 16, 2000). 
675 Mehinovic, Kemal, et al. 2009. v Nikola Vuckovic, Civil Section 1:98-cv-2470-MHS US 
District Court, Northern District of Georgia, 29 July 2009. 
676 Mehinovic, Kemal, et al. 2009. v Nikola Vuckovic, Civil Section 1:98-cv-2470-MHS US 
District Court, Northern District of Georgia, 29 July 2009. 
 677 David Rohde, “A Jury in New York Orders Bosnian Serb to Pay Billions, New York 
Times, 26 September 2000, available at: http://Ibid..nytimes.com/2000/09/26/world/jury-in-new-
york-orders-bosnian-serb-to-pay-billions.html  
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in relation to the Balkan wars, in courts outside the region, took place in France, before the 
Tribunal de Grande Instance. The case concerned allegations of crimes committed during 
the Bosnian war by Bosnian Serb defendants, Radovan Karadzić and Biljana Plavsić. The 
Court ordered R. Karadzic and B. Plavsic to pay € 200,000 as reparation to the victims678.   
 
Another case was brought before Norway courts. A series of decisions from the 
District Court of Oslo (lower court) culminated with the 2010 decision of the Supreme 
Court of Norway’s finding that former member of the Croatian Armed Forces, Mirsad 
Repak, who was a guard in the Dretelj detention camp in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and had 
been allegedly involved in the arrest and unlawful detention of civilian non-combatants, 
including allegations of torture. The defendant was found guilty and sentenced to 
imprisonment, and the victims were awarded compensation from 4.000-12.000 euros679. 
 
Commenting on the series of decisions in Norway, Frederiek de Vlaming and Kate 
Clark rightly posited that: 
 
“The case against Repak was the first of its kind in Norway. It 
demonstrates how judicial reasoning succeeded in weaving together 
domestic and international legal provisions that came into being at 
different times but were nonetheless aimed at protecting the same interests. 
Moreover, the extensive investigations that led to the indictment were 
done by the Norwegian prosecutor in cooperation with the Serbian war 
crimes prosecutor, and they involved the statements of at least 211 former 
detainees of the Detelj camp, almost all the prisoners who were detained in 
the camp at the time. The above points taken together show once again 
that the criminal prosecution of individual war crimes perpetrators can 
bring benefits to more than the small group of witnesses/victims involved 
in the case: They can help facilitate the intermeshing of national and 
international law to achieve broader jurisdiction over war criminals, and 
such cooperation between national and foreign prosecutors signals that 
                                                      
678 See Ann Riley, 2011, “France court awards Bosnia civil war victims damages for 
injuries”, Jurist, 14 March. http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/03/france-court-awards-bosnia-civil-
war-victimsdamages-for-injuries.php, and Irwin, Rachel, Civil actions offer some closure for 
Bosnia victims, Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), 26 April. http://iwpr.net/report-
news/civil-actions-offersome-closure-bosnia-victims, cited in Frederiek de Vlaming and Kate 
Clark, “War Reparations in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Individual Stories and Collective Interests”, 
Narratives of Justice In and Out of the Courtroom, Springer International Publishing, 2014, p. 170. 
679 For all judgments, see The Public Prosecuting Authority vs Mirsad Repak, Oslo District 
Court case no: 08-018985MEDOTIR/08, 2 December 2008; Borgarting Lagmannsretten, Court of 
Appeal, Judgement of 12 April 2010 (case summary at International Red Cross database on 
Humanitarian Law available at: http://Ibid..icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_no_rule99. 
Supreme Court of Norway Judgement, case no. 2010/934, 3 December 2010).  
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crossing a border may no longer be enough to save a war criminal from 
prosecution”680. 
 
Similar to the Norway decisions, in Sweden, a district Court of Stockholm convicted 
another Dretelj camp officer, Mr Ahmet Makitan, of participation in the abuse of 21 Serb 
civilian prisoners and he was sentenced to 5 years in prison. In addition to the prison 
sentence, the defendant was also ordered to pay Krona 1.5 million (approximately € 
170,000) in the form of compensation to victims681. 
 
Another interesting example currently under development refers to the case against 
Hissène Habré, a former Chadian dictator, who has been living in Senegal for decades. 
After much delay in prosecution, in 2016 Extraordinary African Chambers in the Senegal 
court system (created to prosecute crimes allegedly committed during Habré’s regime in 
Chad) convicted Mr. Habré of torture, crimes against humanity and torture for life 
imprisonment682. In 2016, he was convicted for crimes against humanity. This case is 
worth mentioning since reparations proceedings are happening within the same Special 
Chamber, and within the same proceedings that tried and convicted Mr. Habré. At the time 
of writing, the judgment concerning reparations is under deliberation, but it has been 
reported that should there be a reparations award this would be against Mr. Habré, which 
would thus recognize his civil liability towards victims, in addition to his criminal 
responsibility, and within the same proceedings.  
 
It is relevant to note that a year earlier, in 2015, twenty top security agents were 
convicted of murder, torture, kidnapping, and arbitrary detention perpetrated during the 
Habré dictatorship and sentenced to pay, along with the Chadian Government, US$125 
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Springer International Publishing, 2014, p. 171. 
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million in reparations to more than 7.000 victims. Symbolic measures such as the 
construction of a monument and a museum to honour the victims were also ordered683. 
 
These examples of cases across the United States and Europe demonstrate that 
domestic courts, even in States outside the region, have indeed played a role in the 
adjudication and award of reparations for victims of international crimes. It is also 
interesting to note that victims turned to foreign courts often after it had become clear that 
they would not be able to settle their case with the authorities684. This is an important 
example of the argument that State and individual responsibility for reparation for 
international crimes are not mutually exclusive. While on doctrinal and symbolic levels the 
Court’s order on reparations is very important, a year after the order, it is reported that 
reparations were still not implemented. This highlights how there is still a disconnect 
between theory and practice in reparations for international crimes. 
 
E) Desirability, advantages and criticism of a civil dimension for universal jurisdiction 
 
Having discussed the scope and lawfulness of universal civil jurisdiction under 
international law, based on State practice, it is important to turn attention to the advantages 
and downfalls of a civil dimension of the doctrine. The question to be asked is why States 
may wish to assert civil jurisdiction for crimes committed abroad, to non-nationals? This 
section highlights many of the underlying questions of adding a civil dimension to 
international justice: what features make it “civil”? What precisely is the difference to 
“criminal”? Why is this distinction useful and what are the contrasts with a criminal 
dimension (e.g. burden proof, procedural status, duties of Judges? In discussing the 
advantages and disadvantages of a civil dimension of universal jurisdiction, some of these 
inquiries are touched on. 
                                                      
683 See https://Ibid..hrw.org/news/2015/03/25/chad-habre-era-agents-convicted-torture  
684 Frederiek de Vlaming and Kate Clark, “War Reparations in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
Individual Stories and Collective Interests”, Narratives of Justice In and Out of the Courtroom, 
Springer International Publishing, 2014, p. 174. 
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These questions have been dealt with in detail by Ryngaert in his exhaustive analysis 
of universal tort jurisdiction, balancing the advantages and issues raised by universal tort 
jurisdiction685. The present section briefly weighs the advantages and disadvantages of 
universal civil jurisdiction in order to discuss the desirability of using universal civil 
jurisdiction as a means of claiming  reparations for international crimes, the central 
question of this thesis. 
 
Arguments in favour of universal tort litigation include the fact that it is a victim-
orientated approach in the aftermath of mass atrocities. This means that victims may 
initiate proceedings (rather than prosecutorial bodies), they have control over the 
proceedings, they have their day in court and their voices and stories are heard (which can 
be a form of healing). Civil actions controlled by victim plaintiffs could also be effective in 
preserving the collective memory686. 
 
Another advantage is that the involvement of the State is limited in civil suits. This 
might work to preserve foreign relations concerning extraterritorial litigation, since “the 
greater involvement of the State in criminal prosecutions appears to be more likely to 
produce adverse effects on the conduct of foreign relations than the adjudicatory practice 
of civil judges”687.  
 
 It may also be argued that universal civil jurisdiction complements the goals of 
international criminal justice, of which universal criminal jurisdiction is a tool. Civil 
awards may also bear a sanctioning effect, especially with the award of punitive damages, 
which, in addition to repairing, may also foster punitive goals. As to the deterrent effect 
which universal criminal jurisdiction (and international criminal justice in general) seek to 
attain, universal civil jurisdiction, through the award of reparation to victims, may also 
                                                      
685  Cedric Ryngaert, “Universal tort jurisdiction over gross human rights violations”, 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 38 (2007), pp. 6-17. 
686 See Jose E. Alvarez, “Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadić judgment”, 96  Michigan 
Law Review (1998), pp. 2101-2102. 
687  Cedric Ryngaert, “Universal tort jurisdiction over gross human rights violations”, 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 38 (2007), pp. 7-8. 
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contribute to this goal, where individuals might be concerned with civil suits, and losing 
their assets688. 
 
 As to criticisms and disadvantages of universal jurisdiction, the first one to be 
mentioned is the difficulty in enforcing judgments. Freezing assets and actually obtaining 
compensation for victims are not always straight-forward. Another difficulty is that of 
gathering evidence (although the burden of proof is less stringent in civil suits than in 
criminal prosecutions), for crimes committed elsewhere might lengthen proceedings or 
make it difficult for victims to actually make use of universal civil jurisdiction. In this 
regard, for example, in relation to civil suits brought against Mr. Karadzić in the United 
States and more recently in France, the Institute for War and Peace Reporting states that 
while victims are unlikely to ever receive the payments, this “does not diminish the 
enormous symbolic significance of these decisions”; such cases “contribute to the growing 
body of State practice relevant to the implementation of the right to reparation for 
violations of International Humanitarian Law”689. 
 
 Another criticism is related to the private nature of civil suits and the community 
condemnation that international crimes call for. It may be argued that because universal 
civil jurisdiction does not involve prosecution and punishment, only private interests are 
pursued rather than community interests.  
 
 It has furthermore been claimed that, especially in regards to the exercise of 
universal civil jurisdiction as it relates to corporations, it could impinge on a foreign 
nation’s prerogative to “regulate its own commercial affairs” and “affect much needed 
foreign investment in host countries”690.  
                                                      
688 See however Cedric Ryngaert, “Universal tort jurisdiction over gross human rights 
violations”, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 38 (2007), pp. 11-12 stating that “it is no 
doubt true that universal tort litigation may hardly deter future human rights violations”, p. 12. 
689 Rachel Irwin, Civil Actions Offer Some Closure for Bosnia Victims: Huge damages 
demanded of perpetrators unlikely to be recovered, but the judgements do provide a degree of 
justice for the victims, cited in Nuhanovic Foundation, Center for War Reparations, available at: 
http://Ibid..nuhanovicfoundation.org/en/reparations-cases/france-tribunal-de-grande-instance-
kovac-vs-karadzic-march-2011/ (last accessed on 10 May 2016). 
690 See Supplemental Brief of the Governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdoms of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae in support of neither 
party, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S Ct 1659 (2013) (No 10-1491). 
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 Having briefly discussed some of the reasons invoked in favour and against the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction, I will now review some recent State practice using 
universal civil jurisdiction in various States. This review is not intended to examine 
whether or not customary international law has formed in relation to universal civil 
jurisdiction for (certain) international crimes or to provide an exhaustive review of cases 
that have decided in favour or against universal jurisdiction. The following review is 
intended to illustrate the rationales and modalities of application of universal civil 
jurisdiction. It is also, and principally, intended to demonstrate whether universal civil 
jurisdiction might serve as a tool for victims to claim civil redress for international crimes 
where the crime was committed in another State. It also serves to argue for a  legal basis 
for the claim of universal civil jurisdiction. 
 
VI. ASSESSING UNIVERSAL CIVIL JURISDICTION AS A WAY TO SEEK REDRESS FOR 
VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
 
Certain criminal conduct is so heinous that it shocks the universal conscience of 
mankind and it affects the international community as a whole, which acts to repress the 
criminal conduct and punish the offender. It still remains, however, that often heinous 
conduct leaves victim(s) grieving the consequences thereof. Their grievances are rooted in 
the same conduct that prompted the juridical conscience of humankind to punish the 
offenders. Universal civil jurisdiction, on a normative level, offers the possibility for  
justice for international crimes not to be solely centred on the trial and punishment of the 
perpetrators of the offence, but also to take into account the internationally recognized 
right of victims to receive reparation. 
 
The right to reparation transcends the realm of international human rights law and 
is established under general international law and, more recently, under international 
criminal law, as previously discussed. Offenders and victims are the cause and 
consequence of one another; the punishment of the offender cannot be oblivious to the 
consequences of the criminal act for which the offender is being punished.  
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While universal civil jurisdiction may provide an alternative avenue on a normative 
level, at the current print of international law, it is still not widely accepted. As well, 
customary international law has not crystallized to a rule of universal civil jurisdiction for 
international crimes. Nevertheless, as discussed, State practice reviewed above 
demonstrates that there is an emerging recognition of some form of universal civil 
jurisdiction, despite the recent retreat in the United States. At a minimum, it has been 
demonstrated that there is no customary international law prohibiting universal civil 
jurisdiction. If one applies the Lotus principle described above (if universal civil 
jurisdiction is not prohibited under international law), then States can exercise it.  
 
In the wake of heinous conduct, the international community should, in addition to 
punishing the offender, have victims’ rights at heart. In this sense, the criminal and civil 
dimensions in the aftermath of an international crime cannot be completely dissociated. In 
its civil dimensions, universal jurisdiction can prove to be an effective alternative model to 
enforce the right of victims to receive reparation. This is so because often claiming 
reparation under the domestic courts where the crime occurred can  prove to be difficult, 
especially if the judicial system of the State concerned has fallen or if the offender is no 
longer in the territory where the crimes were committed, as discussed in this chapter. 
Nevertheless, the time is not yet ripe for affirming that universal jurisdiction can be 
exercised to pursue claims of civil redress, despite  the progress in this direction. 
 
As demonstrated by some State practice, universal civil jurisdiction in relation to 
international crimes could be further developed by taking into account the doctrine of 
“forum of necessity”, which is in line with the notion of ensuring that victims have an 
avenue to claim a right to reparation from perpetrators and requiring some link between the 
alleged perpetrator and the forum State.  
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Victims of international crimes have always existed; yet, recently there have been 
many developments with regards to reparation for victims. Historically, the notion of 
justice for victims has evolved in international criminal law: from its inception, where 
justice for victims meant the criminal accountability of perpetrators, to a more 
contemporary notion of justice, one that includes a more active role for victims in the 
proceedings against the accused and the right to claim reparations directly from the 
perpetrator. From the inclusion of the right to reparation in international criminal tribunals, 
to the creation of administrative mechanisms, to domestic cases concerning reparations for 
international crimes, international criminal justice has been moving away from a purely 
criminal dimension, focused on retribution, to the inclusion of a civil dimension. This 
emerging new dimension of international criminal justice raises many questions, including 
a fundamental one concerning whether international criminal justice should have a 
dimension for reparation for victims. This dissertation has attempted to flesh out the 
meaning and scope of the civil dimension of international criminal justice as it pertains to 
reparations, and its application in different frameworks. This conclusion aims to bring 
together the key themes and research questions discussed in this dissertation as well as 
offer some findings and recommendations. 
1. Goals of dissertation and summary of research questions 
 
Before turning to some findings, critiques and recommendations, it is important to 
recall the goals of this dissertation as well as the focused researched questions it attempted 
to address. As such, in this study, the primary goal was to assess the civil dimension of 
international justice by examining the fabric of avenues for reparations for victims of 
international crimes. In this sense, this study offered a fresh analysis of reparations within 
the realm of international criminal justice, by going beyond the analysis of only the 
position of international criminal tribunals691, and conceiving international criminal justice 
                                                      
691 See other studies that address the question of reparation for international crimes from the 
perspective of international criminal tribunals which were fundamental to the development of the 
present study: Conor McCarthy, Reparations and Victim Support in the International Criminal 
Court, Cambridge University Press, 2012; Eva Dwertmann, The Reparation System of the 
International Criminal Court: Its Implementation, Possibilities and Limitations. Brill, 2010; J. 
Wemmers, “Victim Reparation and the International Criminal Court”, International Review of 
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as a broader enterprise composed of international courts, administrative mechanisms and 
domestic courts. It is also recalled that the broader theme of this study – reparations for 
international crimes – is incredibly vast and rich, branching out into diverse research areas. 
The goal of this study was thus not to produce an exhaustive, all-encompassing assessment 
of reparations for victims of international crimes. Rather, it focused specifically on the 
development of reparations in international criminal justice within three frameworks: 
international trials and processes; administrative mechanisms linked with judicial 
processes, through the lens of the TFV; domestic civil litigation before courts. This study is 
thus, by its very purpose, necessarily selective in its treatment of the various 
interconnected issues.  
 
The analysis in this study hopes to contribute to the development of the debate 
concerning reparations for victims of international crimes through its unique 
methodological approach: a triad of frameworks that assess reparations at two levels, the 
international and national levels, navigating from international criminal tribunals and 
administrative mechanisms to national courts. The advantage of this approach is that it 
paves the way for a holistic and all-encompassing analysis of reparations in international 
criminal justice to answer the question posited, that is, whether a mixture of criminal and 
civil dimensions makes sense in international criminal justice, and in the affirmative, how 
international criminal justice should develop in this regard.  
 
This study fits within other academic and scholarly efforts that question and analyze 
the role of reparations in international criminal justice, and ultimately the relationship 
between punishment and reparation; victims, the offender and the community692; the 
interconnection and cross-fertilization of different fields of international law which deal 
with responses to mass atrocity; and the meaning of justice in this context693. It proposes a 
fresh analysis of these questions in an attempt to contribute to the academic debate in these 
fields. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Victimology 16, no. 2 (2009), 123; Frédéric Mégret, “The International Criminal Court Statute and 
the Failure to Mention Symbolic Reparation”, International Review of Victimology 16, no. 2 
(2009), 127-147. 
692 Be it the international community or the community where the international crime took 
place. 
693 See Chapter 1. 
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In this light, this study focused on some key research questions in relation to 
reparations for international crimes as applied in international justice. Specifically, the 
overarching research questions that this study offered an analysis are:  
 
§ Should international criminal justice be concerned with reparation for victims 
of international crimes? Specifically, is the blend of civil and criminal 
dimensions a desirable model in international criminal law, and if so, why?  
 
This overarching research inquiry is interconnected with additional related research 
questions, which were generally addressed in specific chapters of this study and they all 
formed a single fabric and contributed to the analysis of the main research inquiry. The 
related sub-questions addressed in this study were as follows: 
 
Ø Which justice theories provide the theoretical framework for the civil dimension of 
international criminal justice? What is the legal basis of a legal duty of reparation on 
individual perpetrators? Is the individualized approach to reparation always better and 
more progressive than a State-based approach to reparation? This was the focus of 
chapter one. 
 
Ø What is the scope and content of a duty to repair for individuals? To what extent can 
principles and the case law on the duty of States to repair inform the duty to repair for 
individuals? These questions were examined in chapter two. 
 
Ø Are international criminal trials compatible with the adjudication and awards of 
reparation for international crimes? How can the civil dimension of international 
criminal justice operationalize within the setting of international criminal tribunals? 
How do different international/hybrid courts and tribunals compare and contrast in 
regards to reparations for victims? Chapter three examined the operationalization of the 
civil dimension of international criminal justice within different international criminal 
tribunals.  
 
Ø Should reparations for international crimes be the object of another mechanism, such as 
an international administrative mechanism (linked with a judicial mechanism)? What 
role can international administrative mechanisms play in relation to reparations for 
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victims of international crimes? These questions were the focus of chapter four which 
provided a discussion through the lens of the ICC Trust Fund for Victims as a case 
study. 
 
Ø What role should domestic courts play in relation to reparations to victims of 
international crimes? Are domestic courts better equipped to deal with reparations for 
international crimes? Can the doctrine of universal jurisdiction include a civil 
dimension? Chapter five addressed the role of domestic courts in the adjudication and 
award of reparations through case studies, including a discussion of the principle of 
universal civil jurisdiction. 
 
 
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the thesis proposed in this study is that 
international criminal justice has evolved from a purely offender-oriented outlook, where 
the focus was on punishment and retribution, to one that includes a (civil) dimension for 
victims. The analysis in this study has however demonstrated that this dimension has not 
met without difficulties. From a normative, almost utopian perspective, it is argued that 
international criminal justice should include a civil dimension for victims, one that 
includes reparations for international crimes. Nevertheless, much still needs to be done 
before reparations can be said to be fully integrated in international criminal justice. This 
conclusion addresses some recommendations moving forward concerning how this civil 
dimension should develop. I claim that in the development of a civil dimension of 
international criminal justice, ideology and notions of justice are, in practice, 
overshadowed by the reminiscence of the historical development of international criminal 
law, focused on retributive goals and remedies. 
 
Reparations for victims of international crimes should develop in a holistic manner, 
where national and international mechanisms are interconnected and feed off each other, 
and where national courts assume a crucial role in the award of reparations for victims, 
influenced by developments at the international level; or as Luke Moffett argues, “a victim 
orientated complementarity”694. It is also claimed that the individualized approach to 
reparations for international crimes, which forms the proposed  paradigm and is the focus 
                                                      
694 Luke Moffett, Justice for Victims before the International Criminal Court, Routledge, 
2014, especially chapter 6. 
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of this  research, is not always better than other approaches such as State-based reparations. 
It is purely complementary, and not mutually exclusive.  
 
The basis for this assessment started with theoretical and conceptual chapters dealing 
with theories of justice and other fundamental concepts.  This study then proceeded with 
an analysis of three different frameworks for reparations for victims of international 
crimes, focusing on international criminal justice at the international level (first 
framework) 695 , administrative mechanism (TFV) linked with international criminal 
process696 (second framework) , and finally, international criminal justice at the national 
level, including the notion of universal civil jurisdiction (third framework)697. 
 
In order to assess systems in place and make recommendations for the development 
of reparations in international law, this study followed interconnected methodologies that 
together contributed to the overall aim of the study. It first followed a theoretical 
methodology to lay the foundations for the discussion of the role of reparations in 
international law. It also followed a case study methodology in various parts of this study 
as a means to address specific questions in the study, and draw lessons from specific cases. 
For example, it addressed the question of State responsibility and reparation through the 
lens of a case study of an analysis of the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (in chapter 2). In chapter 5, on the role of domestic courts in the 
adjudication and award of reparations for victims of international crimes, this dissertation 
looked at a case study concerning reparations in the aftermath of the Bosnian war. 
 
In the first introductory part, this study discussed, in chapter 1, theories of justice and 
the dichotomy between punishment and reparation, especially as it pertains to international 
crimes. Therein, it analyzed the different aims pursued by punishment of the offender and 
reparations for victims and whether these aims can converge. It also provided an overview 
of retributive and restorative or reparative justice theories. It examined the evolution of 
reparations under international law, starting from an inquiry of international responsibility, 
from State responsibility to individual criminal responsibility, and the right to reparations 
                                                      
695 See Chapter 3. 
696 See Chapter 4. 
697 See Chapters 5 and 6. 
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under other fields of international law. It then assessed the role of reparations under 
international criminal law, thus laying the theoretical foundation for this study. This 
chapter assessed theories of justice to appraise a purely criminal function of international 
justice and plant the theoretical grounds of the question of this thesis, that is, whether 
international criminal justice can include a civil dimension. 
 
In the same vein, in chapter 2, this study looked at reparations from a State 
responsibility perspective. In this respect, it examined State responsibility to pay 
reparations in the realm of human rights law and its distinctions with individual criminal 
responsibility. This study then looked at the trailblazing jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights as a precursor of enforcing claims for reparation at the 
state level, in the human rights fields. This case study is significant as it portrays how the 
Court has dealt with  questions such as collective reparations.  
 
The substantive discussion of the study followed three intertwined analytical 
frameworks. The first legal framework, in chapter 3, discussed international criminal law 
at the international level, navigating through the distinct international/ hybrid criminal 
tribunals, discussing the “evolution” of international criminal justice from a focus on 
purely criminal trials to the inclusion of a civil dimension for victims. It then compared the 
existing systems in this regard, by positioning them on a spectrum as it pertains to the 
treatment of reparation for victims.  At one end of the spectrum are the ICTY and ICTR, 
and the hybrid Special Court for Sierra Leone, where victims cannot claim reparations 
within the international criminal process. In the middle of the spectrum is the ECCC where 
victims can obtain collective symbolic reparations. At the opposite end of the spectrum lies 
the ICC where victims have wide-ranging rights, from participation in various stages of the 
proceedings to claiming forms of reparation directly from the accused. On the basis of this 
comparative analysis of different institutions, an assessment can be made regarding a 
criminal function of international justice and whether or how reparations can be weaved 
into the process.  
 
In the second legal framework, also looking at international criminal justice and 
reparations at the international level, this study examined a model of administrative 
mechanisms, a trust fund, linked to a judicial process, the TFV at the ICC, to evaluate the 
contribution of such avenue for victims to obtain reparations for international crimes that 
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they have suffered. This chapter addressed the trailblazing example of the TFV at the ICC, 
its mandate, its activities thus far, and its role, especially in light of the first Judgment of 
the ICC concerning reparations for victims in the DRC698. It assessed whether an 
administrative mechanism such as a trust fund, connected with a judicial institution, is a 
feasible avenue for victims to obtain reparation for international crimes.  
 
In the third legal framework, at the national level, the focus was on domestic 
mechanisms, and specifically reparation claims before domestic courts. Chapter 5 thus 
analysed the role of domestic courts in adjudicating reparation claims, the challenges and 
rationales for reverting to national courts and mechanisms to claim reparations for 
international crimes. To address these questions, the first focus was on a case study of 
reparation claims before national mechanisms in the aftermath of the Bosnian war so as to 
flesh out some important aspects of the issue. The analysis then focused on the concept of 
universal jurisdiction applied in the civil dimension (as opposed to its criminal dimension) 
and addressed whether it is permissible under international law for reparations for victims, 
the pros and cons of using the concept for reparation claims pertaining to international 
crimes, and some recent practice in this regard. 
 
2. Assessment and critiques 
 In the present study, having examined different frameworks for reparations for 
victims of international crimes, a preliminary assessment can be made regarding the 
current state of affairs. This assessment is made through some general remarks of findings 
and then some more specific assessments. Critiques and recommendations will follow. 
 
By contrasting different judicial mechanisms, both at the national and international 
levels, some conclusions can be drawn. First, on a theoretical dimension, justice, in the 
aftermath of mass international crimes, is evolving to have a broader meaning, one that 
encompasses retribution to the offender, and reparation for their victims. Theories of 
justice – retributive and reparative justice – meet in the design of international criminal 
justice. A trend is indicating that punishment of the offender is no longer the sole and 
unique objective of international criminal justice. Similar to the manner in which 
                                                      
698 Decision on Reparations. See in more detail, Chapter 3. 
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international law evolved in order to bring individual perpetrators to justice to be tried for 
their crimes, the way is (albeit slowly) being paved for victim redress for international 
crimes both at national and international levels.  
 
Be that as it may, there are still some inconsistencies and uncertainties in this 
emerging dimension. At the current print of international criminal justice, the spectrum of 
how international courts and mechanisms treat victims and reparations is still wide-
ranging, from no possibilities of claiming reparations, to a system of reparation that bears 
the potential of being meaningful. The same is true about national court proceedings and 
mechanisms. 
 
At the beginning of this study, the question was whether the time is ripe for the 
inclusion of reparations for victims in international criminal justice, or whether reparations 
should be reserved to other areas of law. As examined, limiting reparations claims to the 
realm of State responsibility and human rights law leaves a gap where victims of 
international crimes may find no forum to make their claim. It has been demonstrated that 
while international human rights law can be informative to the development of 
international criminal justice as it pertains to reparations for victims, human rights law and 
State responsibility mechanisms cannot be directly transposed to international criminal 
justice. The existing mechanisms - in international human rights law, international 
humanitarian law and domestic law - are not mutually exclusive; they can co-exist and feed 
off each other; there is a place for international criminal justice to deal with reparations for 
victims; otherwise, many victims will be left unaccounted for. 
 
Thus, the thesis that this study has attempted to defend is one of the progressive 
development of international criminal justice to include a dimension for victims. What has 
dictated the development of international criminal justice from its inception was the 
reminiscence of historical dichotomies and dogmas, and of a clear-cut division of theories 
of justice.  
 
While some systems in place take an approach to international criminal justice that 
excludes victim redress, such as the ad hoc international criminal tribunals (ICTY and 
ICTR), the advent of the ICC has taken the notion of international criminal justice to a 
different level, with its reparation system. The system developed at the ICC is on the one 
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hand innovative, and on the other, still immature. Efforts should be made to develop it to 
its full potential, making sure there is legal certainty concerning principles for reparation 
and their application in concrete cases. In addition, it is important to recognize that the ICC 
is but one mechanism that exists, and it cannot carry more than its own weight with regards 
to reparation. 
 
Another assessment that can be made in this study pertains to the role of national 
courts in the award of reparations for victims of international crimes. There are many 
challenges that victims face in obtaining reparations in countries where the international 
crime took place. Using the case study of the aftermath of the Bosnian wars, and the 
mechanisms instituted to provide victims with a  forum to claim reparations, this study has 
illustrated that often times national courts do not provide the perfect road to redress and 
restoration. In the case of Bosnia, there were mechanisms set up by Dayton Agreements 
which filled in the gaps, for a period of time, of national courts.  
 
This study also addressed the emerging doctrine of universal jurisdiction as applied 
in the civil dimension (i.e. universal jurisdiction for cases of reparation). This study has 
analysed the scope of universal civil jurisdiction under international law, how it can be 
further developed and how it can work to overcome  some of the challenges of bringing 
cases before national courts where the international crimes were committed (for example,  
if the judicial system is collapsed after war, victims will not be able to claim civil redress 
from perpetrators in the courts where the crimes were committed). While it is not yet 
widely recognised, and there are limitations under international law, universal civil 
jurisdiction, within certain circumscribed parameters, could be used as an avenue for 
victims to claim reparations, as it was illustrated in the cases against Karadizić studied 
herein699. 
 
The final general assessment that can be made is that international criminal justice 
has gone through phases of development, evolving from a purely retributive outlook to an 
approach that takes into account victims and reparations. This study concludes that 
contemporary international criminal justice includes a dimension for victims, a “civil” 
                                                      
699 See Chapters 5 and 6. 
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dimension where victims can seek and obtain some form of reparation. This “dimension” is 
still in the process of development.  
 
Thus, in addressing different frameworks where reparations for victims can be 
assessed, this study concludes that this “civil dimension” of international criminal justice is 
still in its infancy stage, and that some efforts must be made to further develop it. It is on 
the basis that this study makes some recommendations for the progressive development of 
this civil dimension with regards to reparation. 
A)  The emerging civil dimension of international criminal justice 
 
The leading research questions in this study are whether international criminal justice 
should be concerned with reparation for victims of international crimes and whether the 
blend of civil and criminal dimensions is a desirable model in international criminal law.  
 
  In short, the research and analysis of the themes addressed in this study suggests 
that there exists a legal duty for individuals to give reparations to victims of international 
crimes under certain circumstances, within the ambit of international criminal law. The 
contents of this duty are currently under development and there are many challenges ahead. 
The theoretical justifications for including a civil dimension include empowerment of 
victims and the notion of justice for victims. The question whether it is a desirable model 
hinges on how the civil dimension develops and is implemented in international criminal 
justice. In this sense, international criminal courts, and specifically the ICC, cannot single-
handedly bear the responsibility of including a civil dimension in international criminal 
justice. National courts have an important role to play as discussed in the last chapter of 
this study. Based on this overall finding, this study now proposes some general conclusions 
of the research sub-questions developed in each chapter. 
 
1. A civil dimension to international criminal justice brings about new paradigms  
While this dissertation discusses a civil dimension of international justice primarily 
with a focus on reparations for international crimes, a civil dimension is not limited to 
questions of reparations, and includes for example victim participation in the criminal 
proceedings, a topic outside the scope of this dissertation. The report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence 
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is enlightening in this regard700. Including a civil dimension to international criminal 
justice also brings about new paradigms which may differ from the criminal dimension: the 
expertise of Judges dealing with reparation requests, the enforcement of reparation awards, 
the standard of proof, hierarchy as well as exclusion of victims, and instances when 
reparation is connected to a conviction.  
 
2. Reparations is only one facet of the civil dimension of international criminal 
justice and the broader goal of delivering “justice for victims” of international crimes 
Reparations for international crimes do not stand in a vacuum. There are important 
dimensions that accompany and are crucial to any reparation initiative, and that contribute 
in delivering justice for victims of international crimes. As the Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence concluded, to be 
seen as a true justice mechanism, reparations must be “accompanied by an 
acknowledgment of responsibility and needs to be linked with other justice initiatives such 
as efforts aimed at achieving truth, criminal prosecutions and guarantees of non-
recurrence”701. This calls for two related propositions. The first is that symbolic forms of 
reparation such as acknowledgement of responsibility and guarantees of non-repetition 
should not be discarded automatically. These are important forms of reparation and an 
effort should be made by the different actors involved in reparations proceedings to 
accommodate these dimensions, bearing in mind seemingly conflicting rationales such as 
the human rights of the accused. The second proposition that stems from the different 
dimensions of justice for victims is that reparations are distinct from assistance or 
development aid; they may complement one another but they are distinct ways in which 
justice for victims in the aftermath of international crimes may be delivered.  
 
3. Individual perpetrators have a legal duty to provide reparations to victims of 
international crimes, in certain circumstances, and victims have a corollary right to 
receive reparations 
International law has seen over the years an evolution with regard to reparations in 
general, and in particular in relation to international crimes. Traditionally, reparations were 
owed from one State to another State. With the advent of human rights law, individuals 
                                                      
700 United Nations, General Assembly, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion 
of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence”, A/69/518, 14 October 2014. 
701 Ibid. 
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began to be recognized as the beneficiary of reparations owed by the State. The basis of 
this study was a third paradigm: the construction of a legal duty owed by the individual 
(perpetrator/ convicted person) to the individual victim (who is the direct beneficiary). It is 
submitted that a legal duty owed by individual perpetrators, separate from that of the State, 
exists in relation to international crimes. It is still at its infancy stage however, and the 
contours of this legal duty are in process of formation. The legal duty to pay reparations to 
victims under modern international criminal law is a corollary of the criminal 
accountability of perpetrators. Imposing a legal duty on perpetrators to pay reparations to 
victims serves symbolic purposes, contributes to the overall goal of international justice to 
deliver justice for victims, assists in ending impunity and contributes to reconciliation. This 
legal duty imposed on individuals has to move from rhetoric to real implementation; it has 
yet to be fully realized. The legal duty of perpetrators and the right of victims are two sides 
of the same coin: at this print of international law, this study suggests that an international 
crime gives rise both the accountability of perpetrators and the right to victims to receive 
reparation. 
 
4. The contents of the legal duty to repair imposed on individual perpetrators are 
still under formation in international criminal justice and lessons can be learned from 
other reparations initiatives 
  Principles of reparation in other fields, such as in the human rights field, may 
inform the content of the legal duty to repair under international criminal law, while 
bearing in mind some systemic differences that exist across different fields. Importantly, 
international human rights law can inform matters such as the form of reparation 
(collective or individual), type of reparation (i.e. rehabilitation, apology, compensation, 
etc.). Other difficult questions that including a civil dimension to international criminal 
justice will bear are: the duties of judges in relation to reparation, evidence, the balancing 
of rights of the accused and rights of victims. Many of these challenges will have to be 
answered on a case-by-case basis, and looking at lessons from international human rights 
law (for instance) can be inspirational. The operationalization of reparations for 
international crimes before international courts and tribunals is in the process of 
development and in this process, it is important to devise clear and fair principles of 
reparation and keep striving to apply them consistently and meet the challenges required.  
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5. An individualized approach to reparations is complementary to State 
responsibility for reparations for international crimes 
While the focus of this study was not on State responsibility for international crimes, 
the conclusion in this regard is that, an individualized approach to reparation is not better 
or worse that State-based reparations. The emphasis is different. Some forms of reparation, 
such as guarantees of non-repetition might make more sense within State-based reparations 
- where the State will continue in power and whereas an individual perpetrator may have 
lost his/her eventual position of power. One rationale for seeking reparations directly from 
individual perpetrators is to deliver on the promise of “justice for victims” which is not 
limited only to reparations and encompasses criminal and civil dimensions, and empowers 
victims, by connecting the criminal and civil liabilities of the perpetrators. Nevertheless, in 
order to fully achieve justice for victims of international crimes, the potential responsibility 
of States has to be still borne in mind. The nature of international crimes is such that 
individual accountability shall not automatically exclude State responsibility. Where State 
responsibility for international crimes is also involved, States shall be jointly liable to pay 
reparations in order to fully achieve the objective of “justice for victims”. While at the ICC 
for example, State responsibility falls outside its jurisdiction, such responsibility has to be 
sought through other mechanisms such as a reparation fund.  
 
This study posits that there are diverse avenues where victims can search and 
possibly obtain reparation for international crimes. Much will depend on some specific 
circumstances, such as whether a State is involved, and thus, whether reparations can be 
claimed against a State. Furthermore, in many instances, the State is not directly involved 
in the atrocities committed, thus, relying solely on the responsibility of States, and 
excluding the actual perpetrators might leave victims without any form of redress, which 
explains the importance of analysing individual responsibility in terms of redress for 
victims of international crimes. From a moral standpoint, it should also be questioned 
whether a State has the right to negotiate and enter into agreement relating to reparation for 
harm that individual victims suffered, without any form of consultation, participation or 
assignment of rights.  
 
It is also argued that individual liability for reparations should not be to the exclusion 
of any other right victims might have against the State. Thus, victims’ right to reparation 
against the individual perpetrator might be complemented by a right to reparation against 
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the State. Where the State can be involved in the fulfilment of reparations awards, even if it 
is found that individual perpetrators are liable, such approach should be preferred so as to 
afford the best chance for reparations to be implemented.  
 
6. There is a disjuncture between the rhetoric that included reparations in 
international criminal justice, supported by the idea of justice for victims, and the 
substantive realization of reparations  
The idea of “justice for victims” may theoretically justify reparations in 
international criminal justice. As Luke Moffett argues “the treatment and protection of the 
ICC is victims orientated justice by being inclusive to their needs”702 . This study 
subscribes to his argument that: 
 
“Attaching responsibility for reparations to perpetrators, whether 
individual, state, or organisational, can provide an important psychological 
function for victims in appropriately directing blame at those who 
committed the atrocity against them and to relieve their guilt. Reparations 
made by the responsible perpetrator can also help to symbolise their 
commitment to remedying the past and to be held to account for their 
actions”703. 
 
The civil dimension of international criminal justice needs however to move 
beyond from the traditional rhetoric that broke away from a purely retributive approach to 
international crimes and start actually delivering justice for victims. Many are all too ready 
to claim that the inclusion of victims’ rights is paramount to a complete international 
criminal justice system; however, this discourse often looks more like lip service. In the 
example of the first case before the ICC, after a decade, victims still have not received 
reparations. Once the long trial ended, victims are now caught in between a back and forth 
between the TFV and the Trial Chamber charged with monitoring the implementation of 
reparation704. In fact, since the first decision on reparation in the Lubanga case by the Trial 
                                                      
702 Luke Moffett, “Justice for Victims before the International Criminal Court”, Routledge, 
2014, p. 141. 
703 Ibid., p. 147. 
704 For a detailed account of the numerous procedural stages of the implementation of 
reparations in the Lubanga case, see the procedural history summarized in ICC, Trial Chamber II, 
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, “Order approving the proposed plan of the Trust Fund for 
Victims in relation to symbolic collective reparations”, ICC-01/04-01/06, 21 October 2016, paras. 
1-10.  
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Chamber, in 2012, more than four years later, only very recently (end of October 2016) has 
the reparation plan been accepted by the Trial Chamber, which will admittedly take time to 
be implemented. While it is acknowledged that this is the first case of reparations before 
the Court, this example sheds light on the delays and complexities for the substantive 
realization of reparations for victims. It is hoped that lessons can be learned from this first 
case and the process can be streamlined in the future with the objective of substantive 
realization of justice for victims. 
 
7. A civil dimension of international criminal justice, including reparations for 
victims of international crimes, is not limited to the ICC 
The ICC cannot single-handedly be responsible for reparations for victims of 
international crimes. Its possibilities are limited by numerous factors. Its jurisdiction 
provides a limitation: temporal jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction mean that some 
international crimes, as well as other serious violations that do not amount to international 
crimes, will fall outside its scope and the victims of those atrocities will not be able to turn 
to the ICC. Furthermore, the ICC is limited by its resources (both human and financial 
resources) as well as systemic dictates, such as the inherent selectivity of international 
prosecutions and the connection between a conviction of the accused and adjudication of 
reparation claims.  
 
Administrative mechanisms such as trust funds connected to judicial mechanisms 
(and the TFV is the primary example in this regard) could play an important role in the 
adjudication of reparations particularly in light of the massive nature of international 
crimes and the complexities of planning and implementing reparation awards. In the same 
vein, national courts have an important role to play in relation to reparations. The ICC is a 
court of last resort. This is so in relation not only to criminal proceedings but in relation 
also reparations. Thus, positive complementarity should include also dimensions for 
reparation - national courts should play an important role in cases of reparations for 
international crimes. Importantly, however, more efforts have to be put on implementation 
and enforcement of reparation awards. As the case against Karadzić demonstrates, rich 
reparations are often awarded but not always implemented, thus bearing only the symbolic 
advantage of the reparation award.  
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8. In the ICC context, victims may have too high expectations with regards to 
reparation 
The potential for the ICC to provide reparations for victims of international crimes 
is limited. It is limited by the system itself, which links reparations to a conviction, and 
thus is limited to providing reparation to those victims of crimes whose perpetrator was 
prosecuted and punished by the ICC. This limited reach of the ICC is not always in line 
with victims’ expectations705. Part of the journey of the Court in regards to its reparation 
mandate will be to manage victims’ expectations. This can be done through a coherent and 
connected effort of all organs of the Court to inform affected communities of the Court’s 
inherent limitations and explain its multifaceted mandates (i.e. accountability, reparation, 
etc.). The study conducted by the Human Rights Center at the University of California, 
Berkely School of Law indicates that many victims see the Court as a venue where they 
can get reparations for the harm they have suffered, that they joined the ICC proceedings 
with the expectation they would individually receive reparation706. Outreach to affected 
communities should include information about the possibilities as well as limitations of 
reparations through the ICC. Filling in this informational and knowledge gap about what 
the Court can realistically achieve in terms of reparation can indeed avoid false 
expectations and limit further victimization.  
 
9. Victims’ provisions at the ICC have a significant symbolic value and could be a 
catalyst for the implementation of reparations in other forums 
Including a civil dimension in international criminal justice and the ICC in 
particular, provide theoretical justifications for the Court, which was instituted a Court to 
seek justice for victims. It might also add a degree of legitimacy to the Court, in that 
victims are part of the international criminal justice project. The symbolic meaning of 
recognizing victims’ suffering and giving them rights empower them, and can have a 
rippling effect. But after a decade of existence, the Court has to capitalize on this 
significant symbolic value and start pro-actively being a catalyst for the implementation of 
                                                      
705 See a discussion on this topic: Sharon Nakandha, “ICC Court Ruling on Reparation for 
Kenyan Victims: Does the ICC Oversell Its Mandate or Are Victims Simply Expecting Too 
Much?”, International Justice Monitor, 25 July 2016, available at: 
https://Ibid..ijmonitor.org/2016/07/icc-court-ruling-on-reparation-for-kenyan-victims-does-the-icc-
oversell-its-mandate-or-are-victims-simply-expecting-too-much/  
706 Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkely School of Law, “The Victims’ 
Court: A Study of 622 Victim Participants at the International Criminal Court”, p. 3, available at: 
https://Ibid..law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/VP_report_2015_final_full2.pdf 
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reparations before domestic courts and mechanisms. As Luke Moffett argues, “the Court 
will need to encourage states to implement justice for victims to overcome its structural 
limitations and to move beyond the rhetoric of realizing justice for victims of international 
crimes”707. 
 
10. Adding a civil dimension to universal jurisdiction may provide an avenue for victims’ 
claims of reparation for international crimes 
Using the doctrine of universal jurisdiction to allow victims to bring civil claims 
against individual perpetrators before domestic courts of foreign States is a way to counter 
some of the challenges of domestic civil litigation in the State where the crime occurred, 
such as lack of legislation supporting civil claims in relation to international crimes, 
political interference or the collapse of judicial institutions. As discussed in chapter 5 of 
this study, universal jurisdiction in its criminal dimensions has been gaining support in 
recent decades as a strong tool against impunity; a civil dimension, for all the hurdles it 
may encounter, could be the next frontier. This study examined the difficulties with 
universal civil jurisdiction and concluded that there isn’t any customary international law 
rule prohibiting the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction (with some exceptions, such as 
in cases of State immunity). States could adopt legislation that allows for a civil claim to 
be brought against individual perpetrators for crimes for which universal jurisdiction is 
already recognized (in its criminal dimension) under domestic law. 
* 
Having reviewed some general conclusions of the present study, the way is paved 
to provide some recommendations on the overarching themes and the road ahead.  
B) Recommendations and the road ahead 
The road ahead in terms of reparations for international crimes in the realm of 
international criminal justice, as examined in this study, looks more like a hill, a steep 
uphill.  Nevertheless, the ground has previously been more arid than it is at the moment. In 
terms of international tribunals, only the ICC and ECCC provide the possibility for victims 
to obtain some meaningful form of reparation. In terms of administrative mechanisms, the 
TFV provides an interesting model, but it is still in the process of defining it contours. At 
the national level, much still needs to be done, and national courts need to play a more 
                                                      
707 Luke Moffett, Justice for Victims before the International Criminal Court, Routledge, 
2014, p. 283. 
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important role in the adjudication of reparations and other domestic mechanisms such as 
trust funds should be envisaged. With these remarks in mind, this study turns to some 
recommendations. 
 
1. The ICC shall move beyond the rhetoric of victims reparation and into concrete 
realization of reparations 
Developing the civil dimension of international justice means empowering victims. 
Reparations, in whichever form, ultimately means acknowledging victims’ suffering, and 
giving them a place in the justice process. This can be done at the Court through its organs 
(the OTP when making statements, interacting with victims, selecting its cases) and 
Chambers (when making and drafting decisions). The important is that the relevant 
stakeholders be willing to engage in realizing justice for victims. 
 
2. At the ICC, all stakeholders have to make a sincere effort to get on board with the 
reparations mandate of the Court  
All organs and stakeholders of the Court have to work towards realizing the 
reparations mandate of the Court. This includes limiting any influence of internal or 
external politics. The observed delay observed in the first case before the Court at the stage 
of reparations, as discussed above, can no longer be justified. The Court has to learn from 
its own mistakes and those who compose the Court shall have a genuine interest in 
realizing reparations for victims and empowering victims, as recognized in the Court’s 
formative texts.  
 
3. Victims should be factored in the OTP’s decisions in relation to situations and 
cases 
The decision of the OTP to bring charges affects the inclusion or exclusion of 
victims under the umbrella of the Court. When deciding to exclude certain criminal 
conduct for investigation or charges, the OTP has to bear in mind the potential impact this 
will have for individual victims, who have suffered from crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court, but whose perpetrators are not charged before the Court (or are not charged with 
a given crime), will be excluded, even though they are real victims. OTP’s decisions shall 




4. ICC Judges should bear in mind the interests of victims when making decisions 
The first case before the Court illustrated a disconnect between the requests and 
interests of victims and the decision of judges. This can create an impression amongst 
victims that their voices are not in fact being heard. When making decisions on cases 
Judges shall bear in mind the impact that such decisions might have on victims and 
affected communities. After all, victims’ rights, including reparation, are part of the 
Court’s endeavour. This may include a process of selection of the composition of the Court 
(or at least some) who have expertise and sensibility concerning victims’ rights and 
victimology. Judicial training on victimology might also breach potential gaps of the 
criminal and civil dimensions of international justice from the judicial perspective. 
 
5. More efforts have to be put into bridging informational gaps and managing 
victims’ understanding and expectations of the mandate and limitation of the ICC 
The first decade of the Court’s operation has demonstrate a disconnect between what 
the Court can realistically do and what victims may expect it to do. In interactions with 
victims and affected communities more efforts have to be put into educating about the role 
of the Court, its different mandates (including reparations, and prosecution of the offender) 
and its inherent limitations. Victims should also be informed of the role of the TFV and 
other potential avenues to obtain redress. An educational approach to the role of the Court 
can avoid secondary victimization and a general sense of dissatisfaction on the part of 
victims and affected communities. 
 
6. An individualized approach to reparation for international crimes is inherently 
selective and limited, and as such it should not exclude other models of reparations 
The individualized approach to reparations in respect of international crimes is 
inherently selective, as this study has discussed. It is also limited, as international crimes 
do not encompass all kinds of human rights violations and mass atrocities. It further suffers 
from other practical restrictions such as lack of resources, especially when the perpetrator 
is indigent. It is important that it is thus seen for what it is: another avenue under which 






7. States Parties shall complement reparations 
It is suggested that with the recognition of the right to reparations for international 
crimes at the ICC, and the first decision on principles of reparations, the Assembly of 
States Parties can take this mandate of the ICC to another level by being a catalyst for a 
more significant domestic approach to reparations, through concrete reports and 
resolutions on an active role for States Parties to implement provisions on reparations for 
victims of international crimes, and the building of national trust funds for reparations for 
victims of international crimes (that fall within the jurisdiction of the Court)708. States 
Parties where mass international crimes were committed should be proactive in removing 
any barriers for allowing victims to claim reparations through domestic courts; also setting 
up trust funds or other administrative mechanism for the benefit of victims of the conflict 
might also provide an avenue for victims to obtain redress.  
 
States Parties have to act on their responsibility to complement the Court in 
criminal and civil dimensions of international justice, including reparations. This is also in 
line with the Basic Principles, which provide in Article 16 that: “States should endeavour 
to establish national programmes for reparation and other assistance to victims in the event 
that the parties liable for the harm suffered are unable or unwilling to meet their 
obligations”; and Article 17 that: “States shall, with respect to claims by victims, enforce 
domestic judgements for reparation against individuals or entities liable for the harm 
suffered and endeavour to enforce valid foreign legal judgements for reparation in 
accordance with domestic law and international legal obligations. To that end, States 
should provide under their domestic laws effective mechanisms for the enforcement of 
reparation judgements”.  
 
6. Victims of international crimes outside the jurisdiction of the ICC shall also 
receive redress 
As discussed in this thesis, other international courts and tribunals in relation to 
distinct conflicts (such as the ICTY and ICTR) do not have provisions on reparations. This 
should not mean that victims of those conflicts are to be left without reparation. Created 
                                                      
708 See in a similar vein, Luke Moffett, “Elaborating Justice for Victims at the International 
Criminal Court: Beyond Rhetoric and The Hague”, 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice 2, 
(2015), 281-311, who claims that the Assembly of States Parties and States Parties should play a 
greater role in implementing justice for victims domestically. 
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under the auspices of (or upon agreement with) the UN, a claims commission or trust fund 
should be set up by the UN to deal with reparations for victims of those conflicts, who 
could not turn to the tribunals for claims of assistance or reparation. 
 
7.  The context in which reparation is sought is important 
Another important consideration is the context in which reparation is claimed: 
whether a post-conflict/ peace-time context, or an armed conflict context. While a conflict 
is still on-going, avenues are more limited in international criminal law as through the ICC, 
a conviction is necessary before reparation by the perpetrator is owed. Even when the 
broader conflict has not ceased, there may be possibility for reparation if individual 
perpetrators are brought to trial and convicted of crime(s) within the jurisdiction of the 
Court. Reparation in an armed conflict situation, where the conflict has not completely 
ceased, should take into account the difficulties imposed by the armed conflict and the 
particular needs of victims in those situations.   
 
In post-conflict situations, one alternative model is that adopted in Rwanda in 1998 
after the conflict709, where the Rwandan government established a fund (FARG) which 
counts on a percentage of the government’s annual fund, grants by foreign governments, 
individual donations and damages payable by those convicted of participating in the 
genocide710. Moving forward however, should a similar model be crafted, there are a 
number of lessons that ought to be learned from this  experience, especially the fact that 
many victims have not been able to claim reparations711. 
 
One avenue that was briefly mentioned in this study, but that is nevertheless crucial, 
concerns the inclusion of claims in peace treaties. When peace is achieved and a peace 
treaty is signed, one way forward to ensure reparations to victims are provided is to include 
reparation provisions in the peace treaty. The issue however is that, as history 
                                                      
709 Law No 69/2008 of 30/12/2008, Law relating to the establishment of the Fund for the 
support and assistance to the survivors of the Tutsi genocide and other crimes against humanity 
committed between 1st October 1990 and 31st December 1994, and determining its organisation, 
powers and functioning, Article 26. 
710 See ibid.,  Article 22. 
711 Heidy Rombouts and Stef Vandeginste, “Reparations for Victims in Rwanda: Caught 
Between Theory and Practice”, in Out of the Ashes: Reparation for Victims of Gross and 
Systematic Human Rights Violations, K. De Feyter et al. (eds.), Intersentia, 2005, p. 310. 
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demonstrates, if peace treaties are accorded between States, reparations are often provided 
to the injured State, rather than directly to individual victims. Reparation may be for injury 
suffered by States or their nationals, but the payment (usually in lump-sums) is  provided 
to the injured State, who is responsible for its distribution712. One example to be noted is 
Article 16 of the 1951 Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and Japan where it was 
provided that the lump-sum awarded was a final settlement of all claims precluding 
individual claims by victims713.  
 
In post-conflict situations and peace time contexts, the focus might be different, such 
as in rebuilding communities and providing programs of rehabilitation and community 
stability. In the case of peace agreements with rebel groups, one way forward would be 
inclusion of claims of reparation for victims. There is also the possibility of including 
provision of a claims commission such as in the peace agreement between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia714. It is worth mentioning that in a decision of 2001, the Commission established 
that the appropriate form of reparation was in principle compensation, but it did not 
exclude that other forms of reparation could be given if in accordance with the principles 
of international law 715 . This Commission is tasked with deciding through binding 
arbitration all claims between the two States and private entities for losses and damages 
during the conflict (violations of international humanitarian law and other violations of 
international law). Another example, which was not explored or discussed in the present 
study, is mixed claims commissions (arbitral tribunals established by treaty), where 
individuals may be able to assert claims against States. One such commission is the Iran-
US Claims Tribunal established by the so-called Algiers Accords between Iran and the 
United States in 1981. The tribunal can hear claims of nationals of one State against the 
other State (and also claims of one State against the other). Another possibility is to set up 
quasi-judicial institutions, either by peace treaties or the Security Council, to hear claims 
                                                      
712 Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, “Reparation for violations of international humanitarian law”, 
IRRC September 2003, Vol. 85 No 851, pp. 535-536.  
713 Ibid., p. 536. 
714 Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and 
the Government of the State of Eritrea, 12 December 2000, Article 5, International Legal 
Materials, Vol. 40, 2001, p.260.  
715 Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Decision Number 3: Remedies, 24 July 2001. See 
Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, “Reparation for violations of international humanitarian law”, IRRC 
September 2003, Vol. 85 No 851, pp. 542-543. 
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for reparations. One notable example is the United Nations Compensation Commission, 
established by the Security Council in 1991, which has jurisdiction over claims against Iraq 
for “any direct loss, damage — including environmental damage and the depletion of 
natural resources — or injury to foreign governments, nationals and corporations as a 
result of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.”716 
 
C) Final remarks 
In sum, while different forms of reparations for international crimes (i.e. reparations 
obtained from individuals, reparations obtained from States) present some systemic 
differences, as explored above, they all form part of a broader system of reparation for 
international crimes. This study aimed at exploring a piece of this puzzle: the development 
and operationalization of a legal duty imposed on individuals to repair in the context of 
international criminal law – the emergence of a civil dimension in international criminal 
justice. This dimension is still developing from its infancy: just as a fragile baby bird, it 
needs to be nurtured in order to thrive. The present study trailed with this humble aim: to 
contribute to ongoing reflections of how this civil dimension fits in the broader framework 
of reparation for international crimes and how it should develop. 
  
                                                      
716 UN Security Council resolution 687, 3 April 1991, para. 16. Technically, individuals do 
not bring claims directly to the Commission but rather do it through their State, who acts in an 





The main purpose of this research project is to launch an inquiry into the emerging 
civil dimension of international criminal law which, in contrast to the criminal dimension, 
focuses on reparation for victims both at national and international levels. There may be 
other aspects of the “civil” dimension, in addition to reparation for victims; however, such 
aspects are not focus of this study, and will not be dealt with in this dissertation. The 
ultimate goal of this project is to address how international criminal justice should develop 
in relation to civil redress for victims of international crimes.  
 
There are two conceptual parameters within this project which guide its direction and 
inform its analysis: first, this project concerns international criminal law, thus, 
conceptually, proceedings against individuals, and not States; secondly, it concerns the 
civil dimension (i.e. reparation/ redress for victims, or “damages” in domestic courts 
terminology, see further below) of international criminal justice. As such, criminal 
accountability and criminal prosecutions will not be the main focus of this project. In 
saying this, it will draw upon the rich literature that exists in this field to inform the 
analysis herein. 
 
For this purpose, this study will examine, compare and contrast three analytical 
frameworks for the adjudication of the civil dimensions of international crimes. The 
analysis starts the first framework from a theoretical and conceptual discussion of theories 
of justice grounding the right of victims to reparation juxtaposed with the development of a 
duty of reparation imposed directly on individuals.  In order to build the theoretical 
foundations for the examination that will then follow, it will be necessary to address a 
theoretical question concerning the dichotomy between criminal punishment and 
reparation within the notion of justice. I address the relationship between punishment and 
reparation and their impact on victims, offenders and societies in general, in a theoretical 
perspective. The theoretical foundation of this thesis is pursued mainly in the first two 
chapters: chapter one discusses theories of justice and inquires upon the legal basis of the 
duty of reparation for individuals; and chapter two discusses the contents of a duty to 
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repair for individuals, as well as the extent to which case law pertaining to the contents of 
duties to repair for States can be transposed717.  
 
After this theoretical discussion, the first framework concerns the adjudication of 
civil claims within the international criminal process and deals with the evolving 
approaches to reparations before international criminal courts and tribunals. For this 
purpose, this dissertation studies international criminal justice institutions, not with a view 
to purely describe each institution but rather to compare their models (i.e. international 
criminal trials with only a criminal function and the international criminal process 
encompassing a civil dimension). Thus, chapter three addresses the operationalization of 
duties to repair within the setting of international criminal courts and tribunals. 
 
In the second analytical framework, beginning at chapter four, I propose to examine 
the contribution of administrative mechanisms at the international level, which are linked 
to legal processes. This will be done through the lens of the Trust Fund for Victims (linked 
to the ICC), which is a relevant model, to examine whether similar models could be 
applied in the international criminal law context. In this part, I examine the advantages and 
disadvantages of concentrating civil redress claims in administrative mechanisms. I will 
also posit whether a novel administrative mechanism should be created at the international 
level to deal with civil claims resulting from international crimes.  
 
The third analytical framework of this research concerns the civil dimension of 
international criminal law at the national level and is developed in chapter five. It looks at 
an alternative model for claims for reparations for victims of international crimes: before 
domestic courts on the basis of an extension of the doctrine of universal civil jurisdiction to 
encompass civil suits. In this framework, the dissertation examines selected transnational 
tort litigation that focuses on individual versus individual and questions whether a 
transnational torts litigation model provides an alternative avenue, and discusses a critical 
perspective on including a civil dimension to universal jurisdiction. In this part, I examine 
the role that national courts play in the adjudication of civil claims relating to international 
crimes. I also consider the possibilities that exist for civil litigation pertaining to 
international crimes within domestic courts.  
                                                      
717 This inquiry will be carried out through a case study of the experience of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. 
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At the conclusion of this project, I hope to be able to critique a purely criminal 
function of international justice with respect to international crimes. In this manner, I hope 
to be able to sustain the claim that international criminal justice should encompass a civil 
dimension in addition to its criminal function. Nevertheless, it may be pondered that the 
focus for the progressive development of this civil dimension should be on the building of 
a stronger domestic civil litigation framework pertaining to reparation for international 
crimes, and further development (or empowerment) of international administrative 
mechanisms linked to legal processes. This study differentiates between post-conflict 
context, armed conflict context, and peace time context in the conclusion.  
 
In sum, the research goals are to analyse and critique a purely criminal function of 
international criminal justice and examine possibilities of a greater emphasis on victim 
reparation for international crimes through alternative avenues such as national courts and 





Schadevergoeding voor internationale misdrijven en de ontwikkeling van een burgerlijk aspect van 
de internationale strafrechtrechtspraak 
 
 Het hoofddoel van dit project is een onderzoek in te stellen naar het opkomende civiele 
aspect van het internationale strafrecht (dat zich, zoals hierboven is vermeld, in tegenstelling tot het 
criminele aspect richt op schadevergoeding voor de slachtoffers) zowel op nationaal als op 
internationaal niveau. Er zijn mogelijk nog andere aspecten van de “civiele” dimensie, naast de 
schadevergoeding voor de slachtoffers; deze zullen echter niet nader belicht worden. Het doel van 
dit project is na te gaan hoe het internationale strafrecht zich zou moeten ontwikkelen met 
betrekking tot burgerlijke schadeloosstelling voor de slachtoffers van internationale misdrijven. 
 Dit project is gebaseerd op twee conceptuele parameters die de richting bepalen en de 
analyse vormen: ten eerste, dit project betreft het internationale strafrecht, dit wil zeggen, 
conceptueel, procedures tegen individuen en niet tegen landen. Ten tweede, dit project behandelt 
het civiele aspect van het internationale strafrecht (zijnde schadevergoeding/schadeloosstelling 
voor de slachtoffers, of “schade” in de terminologie van de binnenlandse rechtspraak, zie 
hieronder). Strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid en strafrechtelijke vervolging staan als zodanig dus 
niet centraal in dit project. Dit gezegd zijnde, wordt er wel gebruik gemaakt van de rijke literatuur 
die in dit vakgebied bestaat om de analyse in dit project toe te lichten. 
 Met dit doel zal deze studie drie analytische kaders voor de berechting van de civiele 
aspecten van internationale misdrijven onderzoeken, vergelijken en tegen elkaar afwegen.  De 
analyse begint het eerste kader vanuit een theoretische en conceptuele bespreking van de 
rechtspraak waarin het recht van de slachtoffers op schadevergoeding en de ontwikkeling van een 
schadevergoedingsplicht die rechtstreeks aan individuele personen wordt opgelegd, naast elkaar 
geplaatst worden. Om de theoretische basis voor het onderzoek vast te leggen, is het noodzakelijk 
om de theoretische tweedeling tussen straf en schadevergoeding binnen de rechtspraak te 
behandelen. De relatie tussen straf en schadevergoeding en hun impact op de slachtoffers, de 
daders en de gemeenschap in zijn geheel, wordt behandeld vanuit een theoretisch standpunt. De 
theoretische basis is hoofdzakelijk vervat in de eerste twee hoofdstukken: hoofdstuk een bespreekt 
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de theorie van de rechtspraak en onderzoekt de juridische basis van de schadevergoedingsplicht 
voor individuele personen; en hoofdstuk twee behandelt de betekenis van die plicht tot 
schadevergoeding voor individuele personen, en ook de mate waarin het gewoonterecht met 
betrekking tot schadevergoedingsplicht voor Staten kan worden omgezet718. 
 Na deze theoretische uiteenzetting richt het eerste kader zich op de berechting van civiele 
vorderingen binnen de internationale strafrechtelijke procedure en behandelt de evoluerende 
aanpak van schadeclaims voor  internationale strafhoven en tribunalen. Hiervoor onderzoekt dit 
proefschrift internationale strafrechtbanken, niet om elke instelling te beschrijven, maar eerder om 
hun modellen te vergelijken (dit wil zeggen internationale strafzaken met een uitsluitend 
strafrechtelijke functie en het internationale strafrechtelijke proces dat ook een civiel aspect bevat). 
Bijgevolg behandelt hoofdstuk drie de operationalisering van de plicht tot schadeloosstelling 
binnen het raamwerk van internationale strafhoven en tribunalen. 
 In het tweede analytische kader, dat begint bij hoofdstuk vier, wordt voorgesteld om de 
bijdrage te onderzoeken van de administratieve mechanismen op internationaal niveau die 
verbonden zijn aan de juridische procedures. Dit gebeurt vanuit het oogpunt van het Trust Fund for 
Victims (trustfonds voor slachtoffers – verbonden aan het International Strafhof), een relevant 
model, om te onderzoeken of gelijkaardige modellen toegepast kunnen worden binnen het 
internationale strafrecht. In dit hoofdstuk worden de voor- en nadelen van het onderbrengen van 
civiele schadeclaims in administratieve mechanismen onderzocht. Er wordt ook aangevoerd of een 
nieuw administratief mechanisme op internationaal niveau moet worden opgericht om burgerlijke 
vorderingen te behandelen die voortvloeien uit internationale misdrijven.   
 Het derde analytische kader van dit onderzoek richt zich op het civiele aspect van het 
internationale strafrecht op nationaal niveau en is uitgewerkt in hoofdstuk vijf. In deze context 
wordt er gekeken naar een alternatieve structuur voor schadeclaims van slachtoffers van 
internationale misdrijven voor nationale rechtbanken door de doctrine van universele 
                                                      
718  Dit wordt onderzocht door middel van een case study van de ervaring van het 
Inter-Amerikaans Hof voor de Mensenrechten. 
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civielrechtelijke jurisdictie uit te breiden naar civiele rechtszaken. In dit verband wordt in  het 
proefschrift onderzoek gedaan naar grensoverschrijdende rechtszaken die zich richten op individu 
versus individu en vraagt men zich af of een grensoverschrijdend model voor de berechting van 
misdrijven een alternatief kan bieden. Het toevoegen van een civiel aspect aan de universele 
jurisdictie wordt vanuit een kritisch perspectief besproken. Dit hoofdstuk onderzoekt de rol die 
nationale rechtbanken spelen in de berechting van civiele vorderingen die gerelateerd zijn aan 
internationale misdrijven. Tevens worden de mogelijkheden overwogen binnen nationale 
rechtbanken voor burgerlijke rechtszaken die betrekking hebben op internationale misdrijven. 
 Aan het einde van dit project hoop ik het een kritische analyse te kunnen geven van het 
louter criminele aspect van het internationale recht met betrekking tot internationale misdrijven. Op 
die manier hoop ik de stelling te bewijzen dat het internationale strafrecht naast een criminele 
dimensie ook een civiel aspect zou moeten omvatten. Niettemin valt te overwegen dat de nadruk 
voor de geleidelijke ontwikkeling van dit civiele aspect zou moeten liggen op een sterkere structuur 
voor binnenlandse burgerlijke rechtszaken met betrekking tot schadevergoeding voor internationale 
misdrijven en de verdere ontwikkeling (of “empowerment”) van internationale administratieve 
mechanismen gekoppeld aan juridische processen. In de conclusie van deze studie wordt een 
onderscheid gemaakt tussen de context na een conflict, de context tijdens een gewapend conflict en 
de context in vredestijd. 
 Samengevat, het doel van dit onderzoek is de louter criminele functie van het internationale 
strafrecht  kritisch te analyseren en te onderzoeken hoe een grotere nadruk gelegd kan worden op 
schadevergoeding voor de slachtoffers van internationale misdrijven door middel van alternatieve 
wegen zoals nationale rechtspraak en administratieve mechanismen die zich bezighouden met 
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